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Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-
Clinics and Reclaiming Informed Consent
Teneille R. Brown(
ABSTRACT: Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) adopt the look of medical
practicesFcomplete with workers in scrubs, ultrasound machines, and invasive
physical examsFto deceive pregnant women into thinking they are being treated
by licensed medical professionals. In reality, CPCs offer exclusively Bible-
based, non-objective counseling. Numerous attempts to regulate CPCs have
faced political roadblocks. Most recently, in NIFLA v. Becerra, the Supreme
Court held that state efforts to require CPCs to disclose that they are not
.ediHallW liHensed are unH,nstituti,nal 'i,lati,ns ,f !6!s’ Pirst #.end.ent
right to free speech. In the wake of that decision, pregnant women in crisisFa
disproportionate percentage of whom are low-income women, minority women,
or women in vulnerable or dangerous situationsFcontinue to be subject to
!6!s’ ide,l,giHal .arAetingS .as)uerading as .ediHal ad'iHe.
This Article employs tort laZ t, ,ffer a n,'el ZaW t, regulate !6!s’ deHe*ti'e
practices. It proposes that women who submit to physical exams or ultrasounds
under !6!s’ false *retenses H,uld suHHessfullW raise a batterW Hlai.. TCe
intimate touching of a woman would most certainly be considered objectively
offensive, and while the woman might technically consent to the touching, this
consent is meaningless if it is based on misrepresentations. Contrary to popular
understanding, the touching need not be intentionally malicious or result in
physical injury to the plaintiff.
This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it provides a
practicable, novel solution to an urgent and timely issue. By relying on private
Hauses ,f aHti,nS tCis #rtiHle’s *r,*,sal sideste*s tCe collective action problems
and political willpower obstacles that have long hampered larger-scale attempts
t, regulate !6!s. It *laHes tCe inBured Z,.an in tCe dri'er’s seat and all,Zs Cer
to be compensated for the dignitary harm imposed when CPCs use deception to
( Teneille R. Brown is a Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law and an adjunct Professor
of Internal Medicine at the University of Utah. This research was made possible, in part, through
generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence.
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gain access to her body. Second, this Article contributes to robust literatures in
torts, informed consent, and medical ethics by reinforcing an increasingly blurry
line between medicine and pseudo-medicine. Informed consent means
something; it is not merely a vehicle through which ideology can be shoehorned.
Where CPCs are not licensed, they should be sued for battery, which honors the
indi'idual’s dignitW and is n,t deferential t, an industrW standard ,f Hare.
Physicians should be allowed to have political voices. So, too, should pro-life
activists. But each should have their policy debates, and win or lose them, in the
political sphere. It does violence to the physician-patient relationship, and the
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INTRODUCTION
Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) are nonprofit agencies that purport to
provide free services to women who are considering terminating their
*regnanHies. N,Ze'erS tCeir D*ara.,untS and tW*iHallW undisHl,sedS .issi,n is
t, H,n'inHe Z,.en n,t t, Ca'e ab,rti,ns.31 CPCs engage in deliberate efforts to
mislead pregnant women.2 They hold themselves out as secular medical
1. Kathryn Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and
Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 U. MI. L. REV. 592, 592 (2013).
2. DPalse and .isleading ad'ertising bW HliniHs tCat d, n,t provide abortions, emergency
contraception, or referrals to providers of such services has become a problem of national importance.
This issue has been the subject of a congressional report and proposed federal legislation . . . . The
congressional report f,und tCat Hertain *regnanHW res,urHe Henters 2fre)uentlW fail t, *r,'ide .ediHallW
aHHurate inf,r.ati,n’ and tCat 2tCe 'ast .aB,ritW ,f *regnanHW Henters’ H,ntaHted during tCe in'estigati,n
misrepresented the medical consequences of abortion. The report furtCer H,nHluded tCatZCile 2\t[Cis taHtiH
.aW be effeHti'e in frigCtening *regnant teenagers and Z,.en and disH,uraging ab,rti,n \S[’ it 2denies
[them] vital health information, prevents them from making an informed decision, and is not an accepted
publiH CealtC *raHtiHe.’3 See First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017). See also
B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 64 (2015)
UDIu.er,us re*,rts Ca'e indiHated tCat s,.e !6!s use deHe*ti'e taHtiHs t, dissuade Z,.en fr,.
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providers, claiming in their advertising to counsel pregnant women on the full
range of their reproductive options. CPCs buy Google ad-Z,rds liAe Dab,rti,n
ser'iHes33 to direct people to their facilities. Their websites feature images of
nurses wearing scrubs and standing in front of ultrasound equipment.4When you
visit the CPC, its lobby resembles that of a health clinic.5 CPCs have names like
D7bria MediHal !liniHs3 ,r tCe D"aAersfield 6regnanHW !enter.36 The exam
rooms resemble those of d,Ht,rs’ ,ffiHes. Before you see a volunteer, you are
asked to fill out paperwork, channeling the procedure you would experience
before seeing a doctor. To complete the presentation that this is a medical
facility, some CPCs even refer t, tC,se ZC, seeA tCeir ser'iHes as D*atients.37
Given this quite deliberate staging, one would be forgiven for thinking that
CPCs are ordinary medical clinics. However, CPCs have a different purpose,
which is primarily to counsel against abortion.8 They are different in terms of the
training and licensure their staff is required to receive, which is usually none.9
They are different in terms of the privacy and safety standards that are imposed
upon them by law, which are few.10 As of June 2018, they are different in terms
choosing abortion, such as providing false information about the risks and effects of abortion, providing
false information about the law and availability of abortion, and telling women that their pregnancies are
more advanced than they really are.3).
3. Press Release, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, In Response to NARAL Pro-Choice America,
Google Removes Deceptive Anti-Choice Ads from Search Engine (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.prochoice
america.org/media/press-releases/2014/pr04282014_google_cpc.html [https://perma.cc/WB8H-9E5L]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Press Release, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, 66,608 Americans
Call on Yellowpages.com and Superpages.com to Stop Allowing Deceptive Anti-Abortion Ads (July 6,
2010), http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/07/07/66608-americans-call-yellowpagescom-an
d-superpagescom-stop-allowing-deceptive [https://perma.cc/WRU3-LXAH] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
4. D/ellS tCeW are ad'ertising tCe.sel'es. I l,,Aed at ,ne -- a few of them. An exemplary of this
is tCe Pallbr,,A 6regnanHW 4es,urHe !enter Zebsite. #nd it’s -- I’. fairlW s,*CistiHated -- there is a
woman on the home page with a uniform tCat l,,As liAe a nurse’s unif,r. in fr,nt ,f an ultras,und
.aHCine. It sC,Zs an eXa. r,,.. TCe teXt ,f tCe *age titled 2#b,rti,n’ saWs Pallbr,,A Zill eduHate Hlients
about different abortion methods available, and describe in medical terms different abortion procedures.
The website also says clients will be evaluated by nurses and that they follow all HIPAA regulations,
ZCiHC if tCeW’re n,t a .ediHal *r,'iderS tCeW d,n’t Ca'e t, f,ll,Z If a reas,nable *ers,n H,uld l,,A at tCis
Zebsite and tCinA tCat W,u’re gi'ing .ediHal ad'iHeS Z,uld tCe unliHensed n,tiHe be Zr,ng$3 7ral
#rgu.ent at @>:>>S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@ U?Q@9T UI,. @;-
1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
5. Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the Right to Informed Decision Making, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933, 934 (2013).
6. See OBRIAMEDICAL CLINICS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, https://omcsocal.org/ [https://perma.
cc/4G86-RT5W] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018); BAKERSFIELD PREGNANCY CENTER, http://www.bpc
partners.org/ [https://perma.cc/9W7X-UC9C] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018).
7. D\#lternati'es/,.en’s !enter[ refers t, tC,se ZC, seeA its ser'iHes as 2*atients.’3 #/,.an’s
Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, ;;8 P. #**’X
495 (9th Cir. 2016).
8. Danielle Lang, Truthful but Misleading? The Precarious Balance of Autonomy and State
Interests in Casey and Second-Generation Doctor-Patient Regulation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353, 1390
(2014).
9. Most CPCs are unlicensed facilities and are staffed by volunteers who are not licensed medical
professionals. Beth Holtzman, Have Crisis Pregnancy Centers Finally Met Their Match: California’s
Reproductive FACT Act, 12 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 78, 83 (2017).
10. Given that CPCs are not considered professional medical providers, they would not be
subjected to medical malpractice, and held to a professional standard of care, for their negligence. Instead
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of the First Amendment protection they are afforded, which is considerably more
than that afforded to medical clinics. And, because of all of this, they are different
in terms of their lack of accountability when they injure women. Actual medical
clinics have safety, training, and compelled disclosure requirements that do not
apply to pseudo-clinics like CPCs.
CPCs are typically funded by Christian organizations as well as state and
local governments.11 In some cases, CPCs are subsidized by federal block grants
that were developed to aid poor families.12 The counseling CPCs provide is
exclusively pro-life and D"ible-based.313 Many CPC volunteers see their job as
a religious ministry or calling to do whatever is necessary to convince women to
carry their pregnancy to term.14
There have been several investigations of CPCsFsome from the ivory halls
of Congress and some from the glossy pages of Cosmopolitan magazineF
revealing widespread deceptive CPC practices. In one instance, after asking a
pregnant woman to submit urine for a pregnancy test, the staff then spent 45
minutes going over Bible verses, adoption options, and inaccurate descriptions
,f tCe e.brW,’s de'el,*.ent in ZaWs tCat Z,uld Cu.aniVe tCe fetus. TCe
pregnant woman recounted how D\t[Ce nurse reallWS reallW sl,Zed d,Zn during
tCe fetal *ain *art. SCe saidS 2\C[ere are tCe fingerti*s. TCe babW feels e'erWtCing
W,u’re feeling . . . .315 During the sonogram, the nurse said the images were not
tCeW Z,uld be Celd t, tCe l,ZerS D,rdinarW3 negligenHe standard. #dditi,nallWS tCe .anW state and l,Hal
safety ordinances that apply to health clinicsFthat regulate facilities, licensure, and staffingFdo not
apply to CPCs. Finally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires that health care
providers receive authorization before sharing protected health information with a non-covered entity. See
45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (West 2018). Oi'en tCat !6!s are n,t DH,'ered entitiesS3 tCe *ri'aHW *r,teHti,ns
HIPAA affords would not protect pregnant women who visit CPCs, unless the CPC voluntarily complies
with HIPAA (which could not be enforced by the U.S. government).
11. D\4eal #lternati'esS a !6!S Cas[ ad'ised Pl,rida, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota in
establishing state-financed anti-ab,rti,n HentersS and it Cel*ed establisC TeXas’s .ulti.illi,n-dollar
*r,gra.S ZCiHC runs ,n tCe sa.e .,del \as 6ennsWl'ania’s[. In ?Q@=S 4eal #lternati'es Z,n a n,-bid
contract t, ,*erate MiHCigan’s burge,ning *r,gra..3 MeagCan /interS What Some Pregnancy Centers
Are Really Saying to Women with Unplanned Pregnancies, COSMOPOLITAN (July 14, 2015),
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a43101/pregnancy-centers-august-2015/ [https://perma.cc/8
Q5T-XG7S] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
12. ThinkProgress issued a report in 2016 that revealed that many CPCs are funded, in part,
through state welfare programs. See Bryce Covert & Josh Israel, The States that Siphon Welfare Money
to Stop Abortion, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/tanf-cpcs-ec002305dd18/
#.jllccm8ij [https://perma.cc/GU2R-J6RE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
13. See, e.g., THE AM. ASS’N OF CHRISTIAN COUNSELORS, https://www.aacc.net [https://perma.
cc/BUF3-TWE8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). See also Callie Beusman, How Anti-Abortion Zealots Pose
as Medical Professionals to Trick Pregnant Women, BROADLY (May 30, 2017), https://broadly.vice.com/
en_us/article/pae9ak/how-anti-abortion-zealots-pose-as-medical-professionals-to-trick-pregnant-women
[https://perma.cc/6DVR-2LUG] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
14. See, e.g., PRESBYTERIANS PRO-LIFE (PPL), http://www.ppl.org/index.php/ministry-equipping/
ministry-development/crisis-pregnancy-ministry [https://perma.cc/3BDN-Y7HZ] (last visited Nov. 19,
2018).
15. Winter, supra note 11. There is no evidence that a 6-8 week fetus can feel pain. María J.
Mayorga-Buiza, Letter to the Editor, Can Fetus Feel Pain in the Second Trimester? Lessons Learned from
a Sentinel Event, 34 CHILD NERVOUS SYSTEM 195, 195 (2018). Even so, CPCs share this inaccurate
information with pregnant women.
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clear and she needed to do a transvaginal ultrasound. According to the woman,
tCe nurse Ddidn’t eX*lain anWtCing ,r saWS 2/e’re g,ing t, stiHA tCis H,ne inside
W,u.’316
In another instance, a Manhattan CPC kept delaying the return of a pregnant
Z,.an’s lab,rat,rW results. TCe !6! insisted sCe return week after week for
various and vague reasons. When this woman became agitated about the delays,
sCe Zas inH,rreHtlW t,ld Dn,t t, Z,rrW beHause sCe H,uld get an ab,rti,n in IeZ
^,rA at anW ti.e.317 She eventually went to an obstetrician in severe distress,
seeking a late-term abortion that was no longer legal and no longer possible. She
sobbed with her obstetrician, who felt powerless to help her.
While these instances may constitute fraud, in many cases the counseling
takes on a subtler form of deception. Staff are instructed to use fear tactics and
to provide medically unsound information, such as claiming that undergoing an
abortion heightens the risk of breast cancer or decreases a Z,.an’s fertilitW.18 In
some states, legislatures have cooperated with pro-life organizations to create
.andat,rW disHl,sure Dinf,r.ed H,nsent3 laZs tCat re)uire *CWsiHiansS but n,t
CPCs, to provide clinically inaccurate information19 (such as the above comment
tCat in tCe first tri.ester DtCe babW feels e'erWtCing W,u’re feeling.3T. These
informed consent statutes have been referred to as targeted regulation of abortion
*r,'idersS ,r DT4#63 laZs.
Informed consent TRAP laws have been largely upheld as constitutional
regulations on professional speech. One of the key issues that this Article will
address is the disparate treatment of licensed and unlicensed medical providers
in the context of abortion. While physicians can be compelled to provide
medically inaccurate or misleading information to patients because they are
professionals, CPCs cannot be so compelled, because they are not professionals.
This paradoxical treatment leaves pregnant women vulnerable to harm and
obscures the distinction between medicine and pseudo-medicine.
16. Id.
17. Dr. Anne Davis, MD, Remarks at Medical and Legal Aspects of Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws Symposium (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=leH4_
ODKoLA [https://perma.cc/5X64-5AQC] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (speaking about a patient she saw
in IeZ ^,rAS ZC, Zas re*eatedlW t,ld tCat sCe H,uld Dget an ab,rti,n at anW ti.e in IeZ ^,rAS and t,
Aee* H,.ing baHA t, tCe !6!.3T.
18. D\7ne studW f,und[ tCat a**r,Xi.ately 87% of the centers contacted provided false or
misleading information about the health effects of an abortion, including information about a link between
abortion and breast cancer, the effect of abortion on future fertility, and the mental health effects of
abortion. The second report cited was a January 2008 report by the NARAL ProGChoice Maryland Fund.
NARAL sent volunteers into [CPCs] in Maryland, including Centro Tepeyac, and found that every center
visited provided false or misleading information, inHluding 2false inf,r.ati,n ab,ut ab,rti,n risAsS
.isleading data ,n birtC H,ntr,lS and e.,ti,nallW .ani*ulati'e H,unseling.’3 Te*eWaH '. M,ntg,.erW
Cty., 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 749 (D. Md. 2014).
19. See generally Lois Shepherd and Hilary Turner, The Over-Medicalization and Corrupted
Medicalization of Abortion and its Effect on Women Living in Poverty, 46 J. LAW MED. & ETHICS 672
(2018); see also Michele Goodwin, The Pregnancy Penalty, 26 HEALTHMATRIX 17, 19 (2016).
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To be sure, not every woman is tricked by CPC tactics.20 At some point, a
woman may realize the advice she is receiving is peculiar: it is not balanced,
secular, or objective, as it should be.21 SCe.igCt tCen H,nHlude tCat tCis DHliniH3
is really an elaborate theatrical set for deception. However, because CPCs target
under-insured, under-educated, and low-income women,22 they often encounter
women who are not as equipped to ferret out the pseudo-clinical from the
clinical. Indeed, low-income women of color might be particularly familiar with
tCe *ubliH s,Hial Budg.ent tCat Cas H,.e ZitC .anW ,f tCeir life DHC,iHes.323
These women unfortunately may be accustomed to receiving patronizing and
directive counseling from someone who should be unbiased and neutral. It makes
sense then, that undercover investigations have documented that many pregnant
women who visit CPCs actually think that the advice they are receiving is
medical and measured against an industry standard of care.
TCe H,nse)uenHes ,f tCis .isinf,r.ati,n f,r tCe *regnant Z,.an’s CealtC
are astronomical, as the CPC postpones necessary clinical treatment. Treatment
during pregnancy is extremely time-sensiti'eS and D\p]rompt obstetric
interventions are crucial to prevent intrapartumErelated fetal hypoxic injury and
maternal morbidity and m,rtalitW ass,Hiated ZitC ,bstetriH e.ergenHies.324
Pregnant women can have significant health risks that, if undetected, can lead to
the death of the woman, the fetus, or both.25 Of course, receiving pseudo-clinical
20. DThis is B.S., Nicole kept thinking, but you’re trying to make me think it’s true . . . . Some
women arrive at those centers in search of Christian counseling or free diapers, but the vast majority are
looking for professional advice to help them navigate unplanned pregnanHies.3 /interS supra note 11.
(emphasis in original).
21. See Thomas R. McCormick, Spirituality in Medicine, Ethics in Medicine University of
Washington School of Medicine (Apr. 2014), https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/spirit.html
[https://perma.cc/HC3D->>]1[ UD\6[r,fessi,nal etCiHs re)uires *CWsiHians t, n,t i.*inge tCeir beliefs ,n
patients who are particularly vulnerable when seeking CealtC Hare.3T.
22. DCPCs specifically target low-income communities, minority populations, and places with
young, vulnerable womenS liAe CigC sHC,,ls and H,lleges.3 "rittanW #. !a.*bellS The Crisis Inside Crisis
Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom,
37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 76 (2017). See also Shepherd, supra note 19, at 677.
23. D\6[,,r Z,.en’s *ri'ate li'es are .ade a'ailable f,r state sur'eillanHe and *r,ble.atiVati,n .
. . *ri'ate inf,r.ati,n ab,ut Z,.en’s CealtC and economic statuses is gathered and recorded. Their diets
are quantified and censured.Their histories with substance abuse, sexual abuse, public assistance, and any
form of contact with the state are considered significant and relevant. In essence, a poor, pregnant
Z,.an’s *ri'aHW interestFthat is, her interest in preventing the government from intruding into her
personal, intimate affairsFCas been 'i,lated.3 KCiara M. "ridgesS Poor Women and the Protective State,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 1619, 1622G23 (2012).
24. G. Justus Hofmeyr et al., Obstetric Care in Low‐Resource Settings: What, Who, and How to
Overcome Challenges to Scale Up?, 107 INTL. J. GYN. & OBSTET. S21, S21 (2009).
25. Andrew Healy et al., Early Access to Prenatal Care: Implications for Racial Disparity in
Perinatal Mortality, 107 OBSTET. & GYN. ;?<S ;?< U?QQ;T UDThe establishment of regularly scheduled
medical visits for pregnant women represents one of the most important advances in obstetric care in the
*ast HenturWS and its r,le in reduHing fetal deatC is Zell establisCed.3T. See also Pregnancy and Prenatal
Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/health
communication/toolstemplates/entertainmented/tips/PregnancyPrenatalCare.html [https://perma.cc/2DC
L-XXN9] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) UDEaHC WearS re*,rts ,f a**r,Xi.atelW <QQ Z,.en who died as a
result of a pregnancy-related complication are received by the Division of Reproductive Health at CDC.
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Hare als, Be,*ardiVes a Z,.an’s trust and confidence in the larger health care
establishment, as the clinic is no longer exclusively a place for objective health
information. This can negatively affect her relationship with medical providers
for the rest of her life.
The explosion of CPCs has been attributed to Birthright International, a CPC
network organization that was founded in 1968 and has over 400 chapters on
three continents.26 Most CPCs in the United States are linked with an umbrella
organization such as Birthright, Care Net, Heartbeat International, or the
Iati,nal Institute ,f Pa.ilW and Jife #d',Hates UDIIPJ#3T. These umbrella
organizations are Christian and provide leadership and support to thousands of
CPCs. NIFLA, for example, states on its website that it is a
Christian ministry that seeks to glorify God by proclaiming the sanctity of
human life, both born and unborn. Through the provision of legal resources
and counsel to charitable faith-based Pregnancy Resource Centers (PRCs)
and Pregnancy Medical Clinics (PMCs), NIFLA seeks to develop a network
of life-affirming ministries in every community across the nation.27
While these websites eventually disclose the religious mission of the CPCs, in-
person visits often do not provide the same transparent disclosure.
There are thousands of CPCs in the United States.28 This is a national, large-
scale campaign. Heartbeat International, a Christian organization that started out
as a tele*C,ne C,tline and de'el,*ed int, a sWste. ,f !6!sS HurrentlW Dser'es
1,800 affiliated pregnancy help locations, maternity homes, and non-profit
ad,*ti,n agenHies ,n all ; inCabited H,ntinents.329 In the United States, CPCs
now outnumber abortion clinics 3-to-1, though this number is likely an under-
estimate.30 In some states, the ratio is more like 10-to-1.31
There are probably up to 500 additional such deaths that are not identified as being caused by
*regnanHW.3T.
26. See Discover Birthright, BIRTHRIGHT INT’L, http://birthright.org/learn/ [https://perma.cc/5447-
NVCP] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Chen, supra note 5, at 935-36.
27. About NIFLA, NIFLA, https://nifla.org/about-nifla/ [https://perma.cc/JUG5-6TM3] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018).
28. Laura Bassett, What Are ‘Crisis Pregnancy Centers,’ And Why Does The Supreme Court Care
About Them?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/crisis-pregan
cy-centers-supreme-court_us_5a09f40ae4b0bc648a0d13a2 [https://perma.cc/4ZZZ-QNM3].
29. Our Story, HEARTBEAT INT’L, https://www.heartbeatinternational.org/about/our-story [https://
perma.cc/J5K6-3UX2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
30. Jenny Kutner, How Crisis Pregnancy Centers are Using Taxpayer Dollars to Lie to Women,
SALON (July 14, 2015), https://www.salon.com/2015/07/14/how_crisis_pregnancy_centers_are_using_
taxpayer_dollars_to_lie_to_women/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQD-4X7A] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). This
number is difficult to confirm, given that many CPCs operate without a license. The number of CPCs is
likely even higher in many states.
31. Teddy Wilson, ‘Completely Intentional’: Fake Clinics Outnumber Abortion Providers 10 to 1
in Texas, REWIRE.NEWS (May 24, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/05/24/completely-intentional-
fake-clinics-outnumber-abortion-providers-10-1-texas/ [https://perma.cc/J3EG-2W9B] (last visited Nov.
19, 2018).
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While the stated missions of these organizations appear charitable, and
Z,.en benefit fr,. tCe !6!s’ *r,'isi,n ,f free dia*ers ,r *regnanHW testsS tCeir
practices are quite deceptive. Film documentaries, non-profit investigations,
investigative journalism, and a 2006 Congressional report, commissioned by
Senat,r /aX.an UtCe D/aX.an 4e*,rt3TS32 have demonstrated that the aim of
CPCs is to lure vulnerable, under-insured or uninsured women away from
abortion clinics.33 Given the ideological importance of their mission, CPC staff
openly endorse misleading women if it means that fewer abortions will be
performed.34 The success of CPCs depends on how many women they can
persuade to carry their pregnancies to term.
To further confuse pregnant women, CPCs are typically located just a few
blocks from clinics that do counsel on and provide abortions.35 Some CPCs have
bought the exact real estate where Planned Parenthoods were located after
aggressive TRAP laws forced the Planned Parenthood clinics to close their
doors.36 However, unlike the Planned Parenthood clinics, which are licensed and
thoroughly regulated as medical clinics, CPCs are often not so licensed.
Recognizing that many states could close the CPCs under statutes that require
health facilities and their staff to be licensed, NIFLA has assisted over 700 CPCs
in their conversion into licensed medical clinics.37 These conversions are a step
in the right direction, as additional safeguards come from the CPCs being
licensed. However, licensure has not completely halted the deceptive practices
32. SeeMINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV. REFORM, FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS 6 (July 2006)
U*re*ared f,r 4e*.NenrW #./aX.anT.#t tCe !,ngress.an’s re)uestS tCe S*eHial In'estigations Division
evaluated twenty-three CPCs through anonymous telephone interviews and also reviewed website tactics
and advertising methods.
33. Unmasking Fake Clinics: An Investigation into California’s Crisis Pregnancy Centers,
NARAL PRO-CHOICE CALIFORNIA FOUND., www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/cpc-rep
ort-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G578-KQN8] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
34. DIf W,u d,n’t C,,A Cer rigCt aZaWS sCe Cangs u* ,n W,u. /Cen sCe Halls and sCe saWs 2_, W,u
do aborti,ns$’ I saW 2#re W,u Halling f,r W,urself ,r are W,u Halling f,r W,ur friend$’...and Ze engage in
H,n'ersati,n."eHause if sCe Halls and saWs 2_, W,u d, ab,rti,ns$’ and I saW 2I,S’ HliHA. \TCe!6! direHt,r
*ant,.i.es Canging u* tCe *C,ne[. I’. trWing t, get her in the door. Take control of the conversation . .
. I d,n’t.ind tCe HritiHis.s ,f taAing H,ntr,l. 2TCat d,esn’t s,und fair.’/ell t,, bad03 12TH&DELAWARE
(Home Box Office 2010). See also JACKSON (Girl Friday Films 2016).
35. In another scene from 12th and Delaware, a CPC director conducts a training for volunteers
in which she emphasizes the value of proximity to a clinic that provides abortions. She tells volunteers:
D!learlW ,ur H,.*etiti,n is tCe ab,rti,n HliniH./e are aHtuallW ,n ,**,site sides ,f tCe street . . . . TCeW’re
n,t alZaWs sure ZC, tCeW’re Halling anWZaW.3 12TH & DELAWARE (Home Box Office 2010). See also
Holtzman, supra note 9, at 86.
36. These laws impose stringent requirements on abortion clinics that dictate such things as the
width of hallways, lighting requirements, square footage requirements for exam space, admitting
privileges for physicians at area hospitals, etc. Many clinics have had to close in the wake of these laws,
which was the intended effect. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Borrowing from Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine in Analyzing Abortion Clinic Regulations, 26 HEALTHMATRIX 41, 45 (2016); see also Rachel
Suppé, A Right in Theory but Not in Practice: Voter Discrimination and Trap Laws As Barriers to
Exercising A Constitutional Right, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 130 (2014). Following
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), many of these TRAP laws might be struck
down, but much damage in terms of patient access has already been done.
37. Chen, supra note 5, at 935G36.
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of CPCs. And, while many of the women who obtain services from CPCs assume
they are getting treated by health care professionals who are subject to all that
comes with that perception, the CPCs that remain unlicensed are not subjected
to the numerous health, safety, and privacy regulations that attend to the regular
practice of medicine.38 There is a great mismatch between the way CPCs present
themselves to the public and the way they have presented themselves to the
courts.
This Article will proceed in four parts. The first Section will discuss how
legislators have attempted to thwart deceptive CPC practices through mandatory
disclosure laws, and how these statutes have been successfully challenged on
First Amendment grounds. While state consumer protection statutes provide
fantastic a'enues f,r H,rreHting !6!s’ deHe*ti,nS tCeW Ca'e been bafflinglW
underutilized due to political pressure in conservative states. Local prosecutors
are not motivated to bring these consumer protection lawsuits against CPCs.
Therefore, the second Section makes the primary argument for a private remedy
in tort law. Rather than rely on under-enforced or constitutionally vulnerable
consumer protection regulation, this Article advocates for the use of the private,
intentional tort of battery to provide redress for the women who have been
physically touched by the CPCs and injured by their deceptive practices. There
are many advantages to this approach, which puts many injured women in the
dri'er’s seatS ,ffers tCe. .,neW da.agesS and d,es n,t re)uire legislati'e or
political cooperation. In Sections III and IV, this Article discusses how states
could, but do not, prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine without
a license, or for the use of FDA-approved devices in unapproved ways. Again,
due to the lack of political will to enforce these options, they are not likely to
provide an adequate remedy to most American women. The Article then
concludes with some forward-looking concerns about the ways that medical
informed consent has been hijacked by the pro-life movement. Contrasting how
tCe Pirst #.end.ent *r,teHts !6!s’ deHe*ti'e s*eeHC but is )uite li.ited in its
protection of the free speech rights of licensed medical providers, the Article
explores some concepts rooted in medical ethics. Namely, this Article
acknowledges and articulates a worrying trend in reproductive jurisprudence
which blurs the medical with the ideological, shoehorning politics through the
mouths of licensed medical providers and doing violence to the physician-patient
relationship.
38. In order to avoid state fines for the unauthorized practice of medicine, some CPCs have begun
requiring that their nurses and medical directors maintain active medical licenses.
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I. REGULATINGCPCS THROUGH LEGISLATIVELY-COMPELLEDDISCLOSURES
A. Legislators Pass Disclosure Requirements to Curb the Documented,
Deceptive Practices of CPCs
City and county legislators were understandably upset when the Waxman
Report and other local investigations revealed the extent to which pregnant
women were being misled by CPCs.39 Many cities and counties have passed
ordinances attempting to curb the deception of CPCs through mandatory
disclosure requirements.40 Typically, these ordinances required notices to be
placed in the CPC waiting rooms indicating that the clinic is not licensed, or
(more constitutionally infirm) stating that the CPC does not refer anyone to
abortion services.41 These types of disclosure requirements have been struck
down by the Fourth Circuit and, most recently, by the Supreme Court, for
requiring speech that is not narrowly tailored or necessary to fulfill a compelling
state interest.42 Given how much the recent Supreme Court opinion, NIFLA v.
Becerra, limits future restrictions on CPCs’ speech, it will be discussed in some
detail below.
39. Investigations in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
TeXasS and Virginia all Ca'e d,Hu.ented !6!s’ intenti,nallW .isleading *raHtiHes. NARALPRO-CHOICE
CAL. FOUND., UNMASKING FAKE CLINICS: THE TRUTH ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN
CALIFORNIA (2010), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Unmasking-Fake-
Clinics-The-Truth-About-Crisis-Pregnancy-Centers-in-California-.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ2X-PNHQ]
(last visited Dec. 25, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICEMD. FUND, MARYLAND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER
INVESTIGATIONS: THE TRUTH REVEALED (2008), https://maryland.prochoiceamericaaffiliates.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2018/04/crisispregnancycenterreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/86M9-WRKX] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE MASS. & PRO-CHOICE MASS. FOUND., JUST BECAUSE
YOU’RE PREGNANT . . . LIES, HALF TRUTHS, AND MANIPULATION AT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN
MASSACHUSETTS (2011); NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.Y. FOUND. & NAT’L INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH,
DSHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST CANCER3: A REPORT ON THE LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND
PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN NEW YORK CITY (2010), https://
www.nirhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/cpcreport2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RMJ-5TTN] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARALPRO-CHOICEN.C. FOUND., THETRUTHREVEALED: NORTHCAROLINA’S
CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2011), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/2011
NARAL_CPCReport_V05_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCD6-Z96F] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL
PRO-CHOICE TEX. FOUND., THE TEXAS D#LTERNATIVES TO ABORTION3 PROGRAM: BAD HEALTH
POLICY, BAD FISCAL POLICY (2011), http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=163224
[https://perma.cc/3QS8-D8EY] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018): NARAL PRO-CHOICE VA., CRISIS
PREGNANCYCENTERSREVEALED, PART II: AN INVESTIGATIVEUPDATEONVIRGINIACRISISPREGNANCY
CENTERS (2013); Press Release, NARAL Pro-Choice Mo. Found., Show Me Truth: NARAL Pro-Choice
Missouri Organizes a Community Protest Against Deceptive Health Practices at ThriVe St. Louis (Feb.
11, 2012) (on file with author).
40. Campbell, supra note 22, at 84.
41. Id.
42. Holtzman, supra note 9, at 79.
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B. CPCs Challenge Disclosures as Violations of Free Speech
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
#.end.entS *r,Cibits tCe enaHt.ent ,f laZs Dabridging tCe freed,. ,f
s*eeHC.343 !,nse)uentlWS g,'ern.ent Cas Dn, *,Zer t, restriHt eX*ressi,n
beHause ,f its .essageS its ideasS its subBeHt .atterS ,r its H,ntent.344 Laws that
re)uire s*eaAers t, H,..uniHate a *artiHular .essage UDH,ntent-based3 laZsT
Dare *resu.*ti'elW unH,nstitutional and may be justified only if the government
*r,'es tCat tCeW are narr,ZlW tail,red t, ser'e H,.*elling state interests.345
However, the Court has held that this does not apply when the government seeks
to regulate the commercial or professional speech of participants in the public
marketplace.46 In tCe *astS tCe Su*re.e !,urt DCas been ZarW ,f Hlai.s tCat
regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the
!,nstituti,n.347 The key question for regulating CPCs under the First
AmendmentS tCeref,reS is ZCetCer tCe !6!’s s*eeHC is ide,l,giHalS H,..erHialS
or professional.
An ,rdinanHe *assed bW "alti.,re’s HitW H,unHil re)uired !6!s t, disHl,se
tCat DtCe Henter d,es n,t *r,'ide ,r .aAe referral f,r ab,rti,n ,r birtC-control
ser'iHesS3 and tCe disHl,sure .ust be DZritten in EnglisC and S*anisCS3 DeasilW
readableS3 and DH,ns*iHu,uslW *,sted in tCe Henter’s Zaiting r,,. ,r ,tCer area
ZCere indi'iduals aZait ser'iHe.348 This was thus a content-based regulation, and
if the speaker were ideological, as opposed to commercial or professional, the
ordinance would need to satisfy strict scrutiny. A Baltimore CPC and the
Catholic archbishop of Baltimore challenged this disclosure requirement as
violating their free speech. A federal court in Maryland enjoined enforcement of
the ordinance after the Fourth Circuit remanded, demanding greater discovery.49
Baltimore County appealed this decision, but the appellate court has not yet ruled
on the matter.
In Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, a CPC challenged the Maryland
H,untW’s re)uire.ent tCat !6!s Zarn Z,.en tCat Dthe Center does not have a
liHensed .ediHal *r,fessi,nal ,n staff3 and DtCe M,ntg,.erW !,untW NealtC
Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
45. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
46. More will be said infra, at Section I.B.3 about the application of the Zauderer precedent to
CPCs speech. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
650G53 (1985).
47. See Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?>9@ U?Q@9T (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
48. Greater Baltimore Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
721 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2013).
49. The distriHt H,urt’s CastW deHisi,n Hann,t be eXHused bW its ruling tCat anW H,..erHial s*eeHC
regulated bW tCe 7rdinanHe 2is ineXtriHablW intertZined ZitC ,tCerZise fullW *r,teHted s*eeHCS’ tCus
triggering strict scrutiny. Id. at 287.
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CealtC Hare *r,'ider.350_es*ite aHAn,Zledging tCat DH,nteXt.atters3 and H,urts
.ust l,,A t, DtCe effeHt ,f tCe H,.*elled state.ent \,n tCe listener[S351 the
district court emphasized that the speech that was being regulated occurred not
on websites or thr,ugC ad'ertisingS but in tCe !6!’s Zaiting r,,.S and DZitCin
Centro Tepeyac’s f,ur ZallsS .uHC Hl,ser t, tCeir ide,l,giHal .essage.352 They
tCen struHA d,Zn tCe ,rdinanHes as 'i,lating tCe !6!’s free s*eeHC rigCts. TCe
Fourth Circuit found that, as content-based compelled speech, the county
ordinance failed to pass strict scrutiny.53
!alif,rnia’s 4e*r,duHti'e P#!T #Ht UDtCe P#!T #Ht3T54 fared better in the
lower federal courts, in part because it technically applied to all non-profit
community clinics offering pregnancy counseling offices, rather than just those
that are unlicensed or pro-life.55 In addition, the statute did not include any
language ab,ut tCe state’s *referenHe regarding ZCere Z,.en reHei'ed tCeir
pregnancy care, or that they were encouraged to see a licensed provider.56 The
stated aims were clearer as well: to make sure California women were apprised
of state-funded reproductive services in a timely fashion, and were made aware
of how to access them.57 TCe legislati'e findings aHAn,Zledged tCat Dpregnancy
deHisi,ns are ti.e sensiti'eS3 and s, tCe state.ust su**le.ent tCeir *ubliH CealtC
education with materials placed in the clinic offices.58
50. 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 748 (D. Md. 2014).
51. Id. at 758.
52. Id. at 760.
53. 683 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012), on reh’g en banc sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery
Cty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013).
54. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE §§ 123470-123473 (Deering 2018).
55. The Act did have exemptions for certain facilities, which, if not included, may have proved
fatal to the Act. The first exemption was for clinics operated by a federal agency, and was included so the
Act was not federally pre-empted. The second exemption Zas f,r HliniHs tCat *artiHi*ated in !alif,rnia’s
DPa.ilW 6lanningS #HHessS !areS and Treat.ent 6r,gra.3 UPa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.T. Id. § 123471(c). To
*artiHi*ate in tCe Pa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.S a HliniH .ust *r,'ide DtCe full sH,*e ,f fa.ilW *lanning . . .
ser'iHes s*eHified f,r tCe *r,gra.S3 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 24005 (Deering 2018), including
sterilization and emergency contraceptive pills. Id. § 24007.
56. It d,es see. ,ddS C,Ze'erS tCat tCe state interest in *r,teHting Z,.en’s CealtC Z,uld n,t all,Z
states to encourage women to see a licensed medical provider for their pregnancy care. Pregnancy is a
medical condition, with significant risk of complication and even death. It seems like an entirely legitimate
use ,f tCe states’ *ubliH CealtC *,liHe *,Zer to encourage women to be seen by someone who was
professionally trained and licensed.
57. DTCe legislature Zas H,nHerned ZitC Z,.en ZC, .aW n,t be aZare tCat Hertain CealtC ,*ti,ns
are available to them, and wanted to ensure women in California are informed of the full range of free and
low-cost services available to them when they make their reproductive decisions. In this way, the Act
.,re Hl,selW rese.bles inf,r.ed H,nsent Hases tCan deHe*ti'e ad'ertising Hases.3 See #/,.an’s Priend
Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’dS ;;8 P. #**’X =8<
(9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
123470 (Deering 2018).
58. # /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. Narris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1208 (E.D. Cal.
2015), aff’dS ;;8 P. #**’X =8< U8tC !ir. ?Q@;TS cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470(a)-UHT U_eering ?Q@9TS ZCiHC *r,'ide in *artS DUaT #ll !alif,rnia
women, regardless of income, should have access to reproductive health services . . . (c) Because
pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, California must
supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In California, low-
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1. NIFLA v. Becerra in the Ninth Circuit
The Act contained two critical parts. The first part required any pregnancy
counseling center that was not licensed as a medical facility to conspicuously
place a notice in the entrance of the facility, at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches in
size and written in no less than 48-point type font, that stated that the facility
DZas n,t liHensed as a .ediHal faHilitW and Cad n, liHensed .ediHal *r,'ider.3
They were also required to post this statement on billboards and any advertising
materials for the CPC.59 Failure to comply resulted in a $500 fine for the first
offense, and $1,000 fines thereafter.60 This part of the Act will be referred to
Cereinafter as tCe DunliHensed disHl,sure3 *r,'isi,n.
The second part of the Act required licensed facilities to disclose that
California has free or low-cost state-funded family planning options.
Specifically, covered clinics must post in their waiting rooms, in printed
materials, or digitally at check-in that D!alif,rnia Cas *ubliH *r,gra.s tCat
provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning
services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care,
and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the
H,untW s,Hial ser'iHes ,ffiHe at \insert tCe tele*C,ne nu.ber[.361 The stated
reas,n f,r tCe #Ht Zas !alif,rnia’s desire that women have immediate access to
!alif,rnia’s DH,.*reCensi'e fa.ilW *lanning ser'iHes and *regnanHW-related
care through the Medi-!al and tCe Pa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.s.362 This part of the
#Ht Zill be referred t, as tCe DliHensed disHl,sure3 *r,'isi,n.
A handful of California CPCs petitioned for an injunction, to prevent the
state of California from enforcing either part of the statute. They claimed that
both provisions violated their rights to free speech under the U.S. Constitution.
The district courts and Ninth Circuit denied the injunctions.63
Oi'en tCe state’s H,nsu.er and CealtC *r,teHti,n reas,ns f,r *assing tCe laZS
the Ninth Circuit held that the unlicensed disclosure survived strict scrutiny and
was viewpoint neutral.64 As for the licensed disclosure, the Ninth Circuit agreed
income women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family planning services
and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs. However, only Medi-
Cal providers who are enrolled in the Family PACT program are authorized to enroll patients immediately
at tCeir CealtC Henters.3
59. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123472(b)(1) (Deering 2018).
60. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123473 (Deering 2018).
61. CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (Deering 2018).
62. D"eHause *regnanHW deHisi,ns are ti.e sensiti'eS and Hare earlW in *regnanHW is i.*,rtantS
California must supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In
California, low-income women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family
planning services and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs.3
CAL. HEALTH&SAFETY CODE § 123470 (Deering 2018).
63. Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife #d'ocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016) rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@ U?Q@9T.
64. A few district courts found the licensed disclosure to be a regulation of professional, not
ideological speech, and therefore subject to heightened, but not strict, constitutional review. SeeMountain
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that this provision regulated professional speech, and thus was subject to (and
survived) intermediate scrutiny. As the Ninth Circuit was only applying
intermediate scrutiny to this part of the Act, it held that the compelled speech
need not be the least restriHti'e .eans neHessarWS and D\tCe n,tiHe[ d,es n,t
contain any more speech than necessary, nor does it encourage, suggest, or imply
that women should use those state-funded services. The Licensed Notice is
closely drawn to achie'e !alif,rnia’s interests . . . .365 According to the Court of
Appeals, the petitioners could not demonstrate likely success on the merits of
their First Amendment free speech claims for either part of the Act, so the
injunction was denied.66
The CPCs petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in 2017, certiorari
was granted in NIFLA v. Becerra.67 The Court certified the question of whether
tCe #Ht’s H,.*elled s*eeHC re)uire.ents 'i,late !6!s’ rigCt t, free s*eeHC
under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case would resolve the
conflict between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits as to how to classify the relevant
speech and the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. Oral arguments were heard
in the spring of 2018, and the opinion was issued in June of 2018.
2. The Supreme Court Protects CPCs’ Right to Deceive by Holding that
They are Not Medical Providers
The Supreme Court had a different interpretation of both the applicable
*reHedent and tCe statute itself. TCe .aB,ritW granted tCe !6!s’ inBunHti,nS
prohibiting enforcement of the Act.68 Justice Thomas wrote for the majority,
finding that both parts of tCe #Ht DliAelW 'i,lated3 tCe !6!s’ rigCt t, free
speech.69 The Court achieved this result by making a series of creative but
disingenuous moves. Each of these moves rested on the factually inaccurate and
easily disprovable assumption that the CPCs are not practicing medicine or
providing medical services.
4igCt t, JifeS InH. '. "eHerraS ;8? P. #**’X 9Q:S 9Q9 U8tC !ir. ?Q@:T% Ji'ingZell Med. !liniHS InH. '.
NarrisS ;;8 P. #**’X =8>S =8>-95 (9th Cir. 2016); A /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. NarrisS
153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, # /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. NarrisS
;;8 P. #**’X =8< U8tC !ir. ?Q@;T. See also Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 189 (4th
Cir. ?Q@>T UDTCe H,urt ,bser'ed tCat H,ntent-based speech regulations ordinarily are subject to strict
scrutiny, but that lesser degrees of scrutiny may apply where the speech at issue is, inter alia, commercial
,r *r,fessi,nal.3T.
65. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW & Life Advocates, 839 F.3d at 842.
66. D!alif,rnia Cas a substantial interest in tCe CealtC ,f its HitiVensS inHluding ensuring tCat its
citizens have access to and adequate information about constitutionally-protected medical services like
abortion. The California Legislature determined that a substantial number of California citizens may not
be aZare ,fS ,r Ca'e aHHess t,S .ediHal ser'iHes rele'ant t, *regnanHW.3 Iat’l Inst. 7f Pa.ilW + Jife
Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 841 (9th Cir. 2016).
67. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. =;= U?Q@:T.
68. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
69. Id. at 2380.
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TCe H,rnerst,ne ,f *etiti,ner’s argu.ent Zas tCat !6!s Zere n,t .ediHal
providers and what they do is not considered a medical intervention. There is a
mismatch, then, between how CPCs present themselves before the Supreme
Court, and how they are presenting themselves to the public. It was this mismatch
that the state of California sought to rectify with its Act, by requiring CPCs to
disclose their true unlicensed nature. And, given that the case was resolved at the
preliminary injunction phase, without much fact-finding, it is this very mismatch
that the CPCs successfully exploited before the Supreme Court to deem their
speech more protected than that of a licensed physician.
Consider this telling exchange betZeen IIPJ#’s att,rneWS MiHCael ParrisS
and Justice Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg was evidently trying to understand why
the state of California could not compel a CPC to offer accurate and non-
misleading medical information to pregnant women, something constitutionally
permissible under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.70
MustiHe Oinsburg: D"ut ZCW isn’t tCis als, inf,r.ed H,nsent$ . . . S,F
so that the patient will know what are the array of services available to
Cer$3
Michael Farris: D^,ur N,n,rS tCe ser'iHes *r,'ided bW ,ur liHensed
Henters are n,t .ediHal inter'enti,ns.371
6etiti,ner’s att,rneW H,nHeded tCat if tCe state ,f!alif,rnia H,nsidered!6!s
to be practicing medicine, they could prosecute them for the unauthorized
practice of medicine.72 N,Ze'erS IIPJ#’s att,rneW als, stated tCat tCeW d, n,t
think they are practicing medicine or providing medical interventions, despite
their stated compliance with HIPAA requirements that only apply to medical
covered entities, or their provision of pregnancy tests, counseling, exams, or
ultrasounds, any of which would constitute the practice of medicine in any
state.73 To reiterate, what the CPCs advertise themselves as providing, and what
they actually provide, should be considered medical services, interventions, and
tCe *raHtiHe ,f .ediHine in e'erW single 1.S. state. TCe !6!s’ definiti,n ,f DtCe
*raHtiHe ,f .ediHine3 finds n, su**,rt under anW eXisting state laZ.
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. 7ral #rgu.ent at Q@:<@S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pamily & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
72. 7ral #rgu.ent at @::>8S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
73. 7ral #rgu.ent at @8:<@S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. More
Zill be said ab,ut tCe unlaZful *raHtiHe ,f .ediHineS and tCe state’s abilitW t, *r,seHute !6!s under tCis
authority. See discussion infra Section IV.
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a. Is the CPC Speaking as a Commercial, Ideological, or Medical
Entity?
The classification of the speech is central for First Amendment analyses.
This is a particularly difficult task in the present case, as CPCs demonstrate
aspects of all three types of speech: commercial, professional, and ideological.
It is therefore no surprise that there was a conflict between the district courts
about how to classify the speech of CPCs. While the distinctions between each
type are not as clear as they once were, federal precedent has mostly assumed
that these categories were mutually exclusive.
If the CPCs were engaged in purely commercial speech, the statutes in
question would traditionally be subject to mere rational basis review.74 Under
rational basis, the state need only offer a plausible basis for the legislation that is
minimally connected to the Act. In effect, this means the CPCs would not be
given First Amendment protection when they are misleading consumers or when
the compelled speech serves to ensure the provision of accurate information.75
The main objective in the analysis of compelled H,..erHial s*eeHC is DtCe
*r,teHti,n ,f tCe H,nsu.er’s interest in tCe free fl,Z ,f trutCful H,..erHial
inf,r.ati,n.376
The Supreme Court has recently complicated these traditional distinctions a
bit, however, offering greater protection to some forms of commercial speech.
In Sorrell v. IMSS tCe !,urt a**lied DCeigCtened3 sHrutinW t, a Ver.,nt
consumer protection statute that prohibited data-miners and pharmaceutical
.anufaHturers fr,. selling ,r using a d,Ht,r’s *resHribing inf,r.ati,n.77
Understanding the information disclosure objective of commercial speech
regulation helps to explain Sorrell, where the Court found that restrictions on
commercial speech (rather than the more typical compelled speech) violated the
First Amendment.78 In this same case, Justice Breyer reminded the majority that
the courts should exercise caution before applying heightened scrutiny
DZCene'er suHC a *r,gra. burdens s*eeHC3 as tCis Z,uld frustrate se*arati,n ,f
*,Zers and Ddist,rt ,r under.ine legiti.ate legislati'e ,bBeHti'es.379 Even
though Sorrell was about restricting rather than compelling speech, this case can
be read as signaling an erosion of the typical deference afforded to state
consumer-protection statutes.
In tCe Hase ,f !alif,rnia’s P#!T #HtS federal H,urts a**lied tCe traditi,nal
framework for commercial speech. In First Resort v. Herrera, the Ninth Circuit
74. # /,.an’s Priend 6regnanHW 4es. !liniH '. NarrisS @<> P. Su**. >d @@;9S @@88 UE._. Cal.
2015), aff’d, ;;8 P. #**’X =8< U8tC !ir. ?Q@;T.
75. The Central Hudson test informs the proper regulation of commercial speech.
76. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 426 (2001).
77. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
78. Id. at 564.
79. Id. at 584-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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held that whether speech is H,..erHial Ddoes not hinge solely on whether the
\!6!s Ca'e[ an eH,n,.iH .,ti'e.380 Under this view, even speech that is
provided by volunteers can be classified as commercial as it is spoken in a
D.arAet*laHe3 f,r re*r,duHti'e ser'iHes. #nd if it is H,..ercial, the Act would
be a permissible regulation on the dissemination of false or misleading
statements.81
Professional speech, on the other hand, has traditionally been afforded
inter.ediate re'ieZ. TCis Zas Bustified beHause *r,fessi,nalsS DtCr,ugC tCeir
education and training, have access to a corpus of specialized knowledge that
tCeir Hlients usuallW d, n,t3 and tCat Hlients *ut DtCeir CealtC ,r tCeir li'eliC,,d
in the hands of those who utilize knowledge and methods with which [they]
ordinarily have little ,r n, fa.iliaritW.382 Intermediate review meant that the
regulation need not be the least restrictive necessary to further a compelling state
interest. As the Act applied both to licensed and unlicensed facilities, there was
at least some argument that the speech is not professional, particularly when it is
compelled by CPCs that have no professional or licensed staff.83 But given that
the CPCs presented themselves as medical providers, and did offer some
professional services such as diagnosing pregnancies and offering ultrasounds,
there was also an argument that they were engaged in professional speech. The
Ninth Circuit adopted this latter argument, finding the CPCs to be engaged in
professional speech.84
The Fourth Circuit disagreed even further and f,und !6!s’ s*eeHC t, be
ideological due to their pro-life agenda.85 This interpretation was bolstered by
the fact that the CPCs offered free services and products. Ideological speech is
afforded the greatest First Amendment protection. It is assumed that tCe state’s
purpose in compelling this speech is the most suspicious. Given this, restrictions
on ideological speech are subjected to strict scrutiny, and absent compelling state
interests, and a statutory scope that is narrowly tailored to address those state
interests, the restriction will fail.
The problem, of course, and the reason for the disparate treatment among
federal courts, is that CPCs exhibit aspects of commercial, professional, and
ideological speech. To the outside layperson, they appear to be a medical clinic,
80. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017).
81. Id. at 1273-74.
82. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS 9>8 P.>d 9?>S 9>8 U8tC !ir. ?Q@;TS rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@ U?Q@9T.
83. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772-73 (1999).
84. Iat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. =;=S @88 J. Ed.
2d 328 (2017), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138
S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
85. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir.
2013).
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but to the sophisticated courts and attorneys, who have access to much more
information about the mission and funding of CPCs, they are obviously
ideological. And while they usually do not charge for their services, they are still
at least partially commercial in that they are competing with licensed medical
providers in the marketplace to offer a reproductive service.
b. The Supreme Court Classifies CPC Speech as Ideological
While the classification was far from obvious, then, the Supreme Court
deHided t, treat !6!s’ s*eeHC as ide,l,giHal. It did so by largely ignoring the
way CPCs hold themselves out to the public and ignoring that much of what they
do is a professional service. It also distinguished between speech and conduct,
holding that precedent allowing greater regulation of professionals was targeted
at professional speech that is incident to a professional service. This proved
pivotal, as it allowed the Court to distinguish precedents upholding TRAP laws
and other compelled disclosures in the marketplace of licensed physicians.
3. The Unlicensed Disclosure Provision
Given that CPCs advertise to the public for services, the unlicensed
disclosure provision should have been uncontroversial. States have long
recognized an interest in promoting consumer protection and regulating
commerce to promote public health and safety. More specifically, the Supreme
Court has also recognized the importance of ensuring that consumers know
whether they are visiting a licensed medical provider.86 The state’s interest Cas
been H,nsidered str,nger tCan tCe indi'idual *raHtiti,ner’s freed,.s.87
Even if CPCs were not considered medical providers, regulations on
professional speech have often been upheld to protect consumers. The Court has
recognized that professi,nals Han be re)uired t, *r,'ide D*urelW faHtual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be
a'ailable.388 In Zauderer, the Court upheld a requirement that attorneys disclose
their contingency-fee payment structure to potential clients. The Court reasoned
that the
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal . . . [and] warning[s] or
86. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
87. Id.
88. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-53
(1985).
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disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.89
In NIFLA, the majority stated that the Zauderer precedent did not apply
because Zauderer applied only to purely factual information. Here, the Court
stated tCat Dinf,r.ati,n ab,ut state-sponsored servicesFincluding abortion,
\are[ CardlW an 2unH,ntr,'ersial’ t,*iH.390 But this is where they reveal their
category error and confuse the speaker (ideological, controversial pro-life group)
with the speech (which is purely factual and should not itself be considered
controversial).91 The Court then claimed that even if Zauderer did apply,
C,Ze'erS tCe #Ht still failedS as tCe disHl,sures Zere DunBustified ,r undulW
burdens,.eS392 es*eHiallW as a**lied t, a !6!’s ad'ertising .aterials.93 They
did so by focusing on the cost of compliance to CPCs.
Even though the majority classified the speech as ideological and unduly
burdensome, it did not stop there. It decided to go further, and rejected the
distinction between professional and non-professional speech, questioning
lower-court analyses to the extent they applied an intermediate level of scrutiny.
TCe !,urt reas,ned tCat *r,fessi,nal s*eeHC is Da diffiHult Hateg,rW t, define
ZitC *reHisi,n.394 "W i.*,sing a liHensure re)uire.entS tCis Dgi'es tCe States
unfettered *,Zer t, reduHe a gr,u*’s Pirst #.end.ent rigCts.395
6erCa*s tCe .,st *uVVling *art ,f tCe .aB,ritW’s ,*ini,n Zas tCe
asW..etriHal finding bW tCe !,urt tCat tCe Car. t, *regnant Z,.en fr,. !6!s’
deception was imaginary, and the harm to the CPCs by enforcing the Act was
very real. In finding that the licensed disclosure provision was perhaps
res*,nding t, a D*urelW CW*,tCetiHal Car.S396 the Court ignored the briefing by
the state and its legislative findings in passing the Act, which documented the
extent to which women were being misled by CPCs. The legislature had provided
ample evidence of harm, which the Court ignored.97
89. Id. at 651.
90. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?>;: U?Q@9T.
91. Previously, the Court had acknowledged that different types of content might be treated
differently, even if still content-based and all subjected to strict scrutiny.
92. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
93. Id. at 2373-76.
94. Id. at 2375.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2377.
97. In finding tCat tCe Car. Cere.aW be D*urelW CW*,tCetiHalS3 and tCe disHl,sure unneHessarWS tCe
Court seems to be considering the availability of other state options for curbing deceptive practices, such
as the ability of the state to prosecute for the unlawful practice of medicine or under general state consumer
protection laws. However, the bill specified the harm the Reproductive FACT Act was meant to address,
namely tCat DIn ?Q@?S .,re tCan ?.; .illi,n !alif,rnia Z,.en Zere in need of publicly funded family
planning services. More than 700,000 California women become pregnant every year and one-half of
these pregnancies are unintended. In 2010, 64.3 percent of unplanned births in California were publicly
funded. Yet, at the moment they learn that they are pregnant, thousands of women remain unaware of the
public programs available to provide them with contraception, health education and counseling, family
planning, prenatal care, abortion, or delivery. Because pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care
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In contrast, the harm to the CPCs from having to comply with the Act was
H,nsidered bW tCe !,urt t, be DunBustified ,r undulW burdens,.e.398 The Court
tCen reas,ned tCat D\e['en if tCe State Cad *resented a n,nCW*,tCetiHal
BustifiHati,nS tCe P#!T #Ht undulW burdens *r,teHted s*eeHCS3 as D\i[t i.*,ses
a government-scripted, speaker-based disHl,sure re)uire.ent3 tCat a**lies
regardless of whether the CPCs disclose their non-licensed status on their
website.99 Of course, this assumes that everyone has access to these
advertisements before entering the CPC.
4. The Majority Places Much Consumer Protection Law at Constitutional
Risk
By describing the disclosure in this way, the Court cast too wide of a net,
rendering .anW H,nsu.er *r,teHti,n statutes unH,nstituti,nal. #s "reWer’s
dissent correctly points out, this aspect of NIFLA has the potential for sweeping
impact outside of the abortion context, as D'irtuallW e'erW disHl,sure laZ H,uld
be H,nsidered 2H,ntent basedS’ f,r 'irtuallW e'erW disHl,sure laZ re)uires
indi'iduals t, s*eaA a *artiHular .essage.3100
TCe .aB,ritW res*,nds tCat D\H[,ntrarW t, tCe suggesti,n in tCe dissentS Ze
do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial
*r,duHts.3101 But if the FACT Act is not considered a regulation to protect health
and safety, it is hard to imagine ZCat Z,uld be. TCe.aB,ritW’s ,*ini,n ,ffers n,
guidance on this score. Why is the Act not directed at protecting public health?
TCe !,urt’s H,nfusing reas,ning H,uld in'alidate .anW state regulati,nsS ,f
such things as cigarettes, securities, guns, or environmental pollutants, on First
Amendment grounds. States typically do not require non-polluters to state that
they are non-polluting, or that non-cigarettes do not contain nicotine. If passing
legislation that targets the deceivers is considered imper.issible Dg,'ern.ent-
sHri*ted3 H,ntent disHri.inati,nS tCen .uHC regulati,n ,f H,ntr,'ersial *r,duHts
,r industries Z,uld be unH,nstituti,nal. #nd tCe .aB,ritW’s general disHlai.er
tCat tCis is n,t ZCat tCeW .eant Dseem[s] more likely to invite litigation than to
*r,'ide needed li.itati,n and HlarifiHati,n.3102
early in pregnancy is important, California must supplement its own efforts to advise women of its
reproductive health programs. In California, low-income women can receive immediate access to free or
low-cost comprehensive family planning services and pregnancy-related care through the MediGCal and
tCe Pa.ilW 6#!T *r,gra.s.3 See 2015 Cal. Stat. Ch. 700.
98. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
99. Id. at 2377.
100. Id. at ?>9Q U"reWerS M.S dissentingT. D\M[uHCS *erCa*s .,stS Cu.an beCa'i,r taAes *laHe
through speech and because much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the
.aB,ritW’s a**r,aHC at tCe least tCreatens H,nsiderable litigation over the constitutional validity of much,
*erCa*s .,stS g,'ern.ent regulati,n.3 Id.
101. Id. at 2376.
102. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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This holding is quite disturbing and far-reaching. CPCs create deceptive
advertising, and then cannot be required to correct it. Imagine if a gun
manufacturer misled consumers to believe that a gun could do things that it could
not do, or was safer than it was. Then, imagine the state passing a law requiring
tCe .anufaHturer t, H,rreHt tCis deHe*ti,n. 1nder tCe Su*re.e !,urt’s ,*ini,n
in NIFLA, the statute could be presumptively unconstitutional, as the subject
matter is controversial (guns) and the disclosure might cost the gun
manufacturers money. This would, of course, ignore the fact that it was the
actions of the gun manufacturers that created the deception in the first place. This
paradoxical outcome should be alarming to anyone concerned about deceptive
advertising.
5. The Licensed Disclosure Provision
The Supreme Court also found that the second part of the Act likely violated
tCe !6!s’ rigCt t, free s*eeHC. #s ZitC tCe unliHensed disHl,sureS tCe bulk of the
H,nstituti,nal Z,rA Zas d,ne ZCen it Hlassified tCe !6!s’ s*eeHC as ide,l,giHal
rather than professional. Recall that in Zauderer, professional speech could be
regulated for consumer protection.103
a. To Distinguish Casey, CPCs Deemed To Not Be Providing
Medical Services, and the Licensed Disclosure was Not Informed
Consent
TCe !,urt .ade it Hlear tCat tCe liHensed disHl,sure is n,t Dan inf,r.ed
H,nsent re)uire.ent ,r anW ,tCer regulati,n ,f *r,fessi,nal H,nduHt.3104 This is
because it is not tied t, tCe *r,'isi,n ,f a D.ediHal *r,HedureS3 and a**lies t, all
interactions between a CPC and a pregnant woman.105 Of course, this is a very
narrow reading of informed consent doctrine, as licensed doctors can be and have
been required to provide information to women that is disconnected from a
medical procedure. For example, when physicians provide information about the
likely side effects of medications, something they are legally required to do, this
disclosure would not be part of medical informed consent under the NIFLA
framework. Likewise, outside of the health care context, employers can be
required to post safety notices in their break-rooms that do not directly apply to
tCeir e.*l,Wee’s i..ediate H,nduHtS and restaurants tCat ser'e alH,C,l Han be
required to post notices about the risks of drinking alcohol, regardless of whether
a patron orders any alcoholic beverages. Never before have health disclosures
103. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
104. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
105. Id.
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needed t, be i..ediatelW tied t, tCe s*eaAer’s H,nduHt t, *ass Pirst #.end.ent
scrutiny.
The requirement that the health and safety disclosure be limited to those
instanHes ZCere a D.ediHal *r,Hedure3 is i..ediatelW t, be *erf,r.ed als,
reflects a very narrow, and incorrect, reading of what it means to practice
medicine. Under this definition, pediatricians, geriatricians, general
practitioners, infectious disease doctors, and many other specialties rarely
*raHtiHe .ediHine. TCese are H,nsidered DH,gniti'e3 s*eHialties ZCere
procedures are not typically performed, and instead health care is discussed and
monitored, and referrals are made. These physicians would almost certainly
dispute the idea that medical services are only rendered, and informed consent is
only required, when a procedure is about to be performed. To say that only
D*r,Hedures3 a.,unt t, .ediHal ser'iHes is bizarre and incorrect. It is also
dismissive of the large majority of health care providers, who never perform, or
bill for, any procedures, and yet who are still legally required to maintain a
license to practice medicine. Further, if a CPC provides medical services at any
point, which they do when diagnosing a pregnancy, conducting physical exams,
or performing ultrasounds, it should be deemed a medical clinic. There is no such
thing as a part-time or fractional medical clinic. After all, just because a
physician fills out forms for patients who want to play sports or paperwork for
insurance billing, these non-procedure activities do not render the clinic a non-
HliniH. It is H,.*letelW at ,dds ZitC tCe H,nHe*t ,f tCe D*raHtiHe ,f .ediHine3 t,
think of a medical clinic as only providing medical services when a physician is
cutting open a patient.
Of course, there was more to this rhetorical move than merely dodging
Zauderer. It was critical to find that CPCs were not practicing medicine in order
to distinguish the informed consent precedent specific to abortion. Casey made
it quite clear that the state could require providers to offer non-misleading and
accurate information as part of informed consent to abortion, and that this
requirement would not violate due process or free speech.106 But because the
Supreme Court did not view the CPCs as medical providers, they did not apply
Casey. The FACT Act disclosures, they reasoned, could be made in the lobby of
the pseudo-clinic, before any medical procedures were technically provided.
There was no medical procedure being performed yet, and because the CPCs are
not medical providers, there may never be any medical service provided.
Apparently, to the NIFLA majority, informed consent is only triggered moments
before an abortion procedure is about to be performedFand not as part of general
reproductive counseling.107 In oral argument, Justice Sotomayor recognized the
problemwith this, asking DC,Z’s \ZCat a!6! d,es[ different fr,.ZCat a d,Ht,r
106. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
107. This is surprising, as courts have held that providing women counseling and prenatal vitamins
constitutes the practice of medicine, to which regular tort law informed consent would attach.
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does? When you go in for a pregnancy, you see the doctor, and the doctor will
describe, hopefully, the benefits of a pregnancy and perhaps its risk because,
dependingFnot all pregnancies are without complications. So this is consulting
about a medical condition. How is that any different than Casey? You come in
to talk to anFa d,Ht,r ab,ut ab,rti,n.3108 IIPJ#’s att,rneW res*,nded tCat tCis
was different because Casey applied to doctors, and NIFLA is not a medical
*r,'ider. MustiHe S,t,.aW,r res*,ndedS Dn,Z W,u’re redefining .ediHine.3109
Indeed.
If the Court had focused on the reasonable perspective of the listener, and
analogized the CPCs to medical providers, it would have been fairly simple for
the Court to allow the disclosures as part of the proper regulation of medicine
and/or professional speech. It is patently unjust to allow CPCs to deceive women,
and then not allow states to correct this deception through disclosure
requirements that target the deception where it occurs.
With Zauderer and Casey out of the way, the Court still needed to
demonstrate that the regulation was not narrowly tailored. Here, the Court missed
a step by suggesting (but not finding) that the Act discriminated based on
viewpoint and interpreting any evidentiary ambiguity in favor of NIFLA. While
DtCe O,'ern.ent bears tCe burden ,f *r,,f ,n tCe ulti.ate )uesti,n [of the
statute’s[ H,nstituti,nalitWS3110 tCe !,urt Zas ,'erlW dis.issi'e ,f !alif,rnia’s
evidence regarding the need for tailoring its statute in the way that it did. Namely,
the Court dismissed the evidence that a public outreach campaign would be
ineffeHti'e and Z,uld lea'e .anW Z,.en 'ulnerable t, tCe !6!’s deHe*ti'e
practices.111
NIFLA argued that the Act discriminated based on viewpoint because it
exempted facilities that enroll patients in state-funded reproductive programs,
ZCiHC inHlude ab,rti,n. "W eXe.*ting tCese HliniHsS tCeW arguedS DtCe statute
unnecessarily imposes a disproportionate burden upon facilities with pro-life
'ieZsS tCe 'erW faHilities .,st liAelW t, find tCe statute’s referenHes t, ab,rti,n
108. Oral Argument at 14:55, Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
109. Id. at 17:00.
110. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
111. DTCe reH,rd als, sC,Zs tCe liHensed faHilities n,tiHe re)uire.ent is a**r,*riatelW tail,red t,
advance the interest of ensuring that pregnant women are informed about their health care options. Indeed,
the requirement is narrowly tailored. As the Legislature recognized, pregnancy decisions are time sensitive
and care early in pregnancy is critical. Thus, women need to be notified of available resources as soon as
possible. See Assem. Bill No. 775, § 1(a)-(d). The time-sensitive nature of pregnancy makes other policy
optionsFsuch as a statewide advertising campaign, for exampleFunavailable to the Legislature. As the
author of AB 775 stated, the most effective way to make sure that pregnant women obtain the information
and services they need during pregnancy in a timely way is to require a licensed health care facility to
provide the required notice, especially if the facility does not provide the full spectrum of health care
ser'iHes.3 _efendants’ 7**,siti,n t, 6laintiffs’ M,ti,n f,r 6reli.inarW InBunHti,n at >?S Iat’l Inst. ,f
Family & Life Advocates v. Kamala Harris, 2015 WL 13649183 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (No. 3:15-cv-
02277-JAH-DHB).
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.,rallW abC,rrent.3112 But, as Breyer points out in his dissent, the evidentiary
record was insufficient on this score. The district court found that the exemption
made sense beHause tCe eXe.*ted HliniHs D*r,'ide tCe entire s*eHtru. ,f
ser'iHes re)uired ,f tCe n,tiHe.3113 Absent discovery, there was no evidence that
the Act disproportionately and unfairly impacted CPCs. True, poor pregnant
women might visit exempt clinics, and they might benefit from the disclosure
that the state offers low-cost or free reproductive options. But there was nothing
in the record to suggest that the exempt clinics were not already providing this
information, as respondents claimed.114
The Court reasoned that if the state interest was in informing women that
state-funded public health options were available, California should have
required all clinics to disclose this availability, and not just those that fail to offer
the relevant services. In ,ral argu.entS tCe state’s att,rneW atte.*ted t, argue
that it limited the compelled speech to only those speakers necessitating the
disclosure. The Act could have been deemed over-inclusive if it had required
clinics providing abortion and contraception to advertise the availability of state-
funding for the same, without any evidence that this disclosure was necessary.
Indeed, in discussing the unlicensed disclosure, the NIFLA Court recognized that
DdisHl,sures \.ust[ re.edW a Car. tCat is 2*,tentiallW real not purely
CW*,tCetiHal’ and tCe re.edW .ust eXtend Dn, br,ader tCan reas,nablW
neHessarW.3115 The state of California argued that it targeted the CPCs because
that is where the deception existed, as there was no documented failure to inform
women of state-funded reproductive services by private clinics offering general
obstetric services. Regardless, the appearance of regulating a pro-life perspective
112. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?>99-89 (2018) (citing
Brief for Petitioners 31-37).
113. See Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS I,. @<!V??:: M#NU_N"TS ?Q@; /J
3627327, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), aff’d, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part sub
nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. =;=S @88 J. Ed. ?d >?9 U?Q@:TS and
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@S ?Q@ J.
Ed. 2d 835 (2018), and rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '.
"eHerraS 8Q? P.>d 8QQ U8tC !ir. ?Q@9T. P,r defendants’ argu.ents ,n tCis *,int, see also _efendants’
7**,siti,n t, 6laintiffs’ M,ti,n f,r 6reli.inarW InBunHti,n at ?=-?<S Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife
Advocates v. Kamala Harris, 2015 WL 13649183 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (No. 3:15-cv-02277-JAH-
_N"T. DTCe n,tiHe re)uire.ent is als, narrowly tailored to the stated interest of ensuring that pregnant
women are aware of the full spectrum of pregnancy-related health care services in California because the
specific language of the notice speaks to that entire spectrum. In other words, the notice does not simply
.enti,n 2ab,rti,n.’ 4atCerS tCe n,tiHe inHlusi'elW refers t, 2H,.*reCensi'e family planning services
(including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion f,r eligibleZ,.en.’
§ 123472(a)(1). To put it another way, the notice does not express a particular opinion or view, or make
a specific recommendation. It simply conveys the objective range of informationFn, .,re.3 Id.
114. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS 9>8 P.>d 9?>S 9==-45 (9th Cir. 2016); Nat’l
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377.
115. Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life AdvocatesS @>9 S. !t. at ?>:: UHiting IbaneV '. Pl,rida _e*’t ,f
Business & Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982);
accord Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); cf. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 649 (rejecting
Dbr,ad *r,*CWlaHtiH rules3 in tCis area)).
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led the Court, and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence,116 to find that this part of
the legislation was probably viewpoint discrimination, and, at the very least, was
DZildlW underinHlusi'eS3117 and thus failed strict scrutiny.118
C. NIFLA Allows Ideological Speakers to Deceive
The problem with classifying the speech of CPCs is that they are less
deceptive in the disclosures they provide online. After requiring several clicks,
the CPC website will state that they do not provide abortions and they counsel
from a pro-life, Christian perspective. However, many of the women seeking a
CPC’s services might never visit its website. If they do, they might not read the
fine print in the online disclaimers, or successfully click through the pseudo-
clinical content to get to their ideological disclosures. This disparity allows CPCs
to advertise as medical clinics but be regulated as ideologues.
In finding that the CPCs are ideological speakers, the Court ignored the
*ers*eHti'e ,f tCe listener. #s ,ne sHC,lar eX*lainedS DtCe state’s regulat,rW
authority may be triggered by the fact that an individual holds herself out as a
professi,nalS ZCetCer sCe is aHtuallW a *r,fessi,nal ,r n,t.3119 This suggests that
the clandestine intent of the speaker should not control. If the listener reasonably
believes, based on the objective manifestations of the speaker, that the speaker
is *r,fessi,nalS tCen tCe s*eaAer’s *ri'ateS seHreti'e ide,l,gW sC,uld not provide
for greater First Amendment protection. This view makes abundant sense if the
state’s interest in *assing tCe disHl,sure ,rdinanHe Zas t, *r,teHt H,nsu.ers.
Unfortunately, this is not the approach that the majority took in NIFLA.
Given how politicized access to abortion has become, it is no surprise that
the First Amendment has protected politicized speech around abortion services.
However, the NIFLA opinion goes further than necessary to protect deception.
In so doing, the opinion signals to legislatures that consumer protection statutes
cannot provide an effective remedy against CPCs’ deceptive practices. Even if
California gathered sufficient evidence that demonstrated the need to correct
!6!’s deHe*ti'e *raHtiHesS tCe state Z,uld still faHe the hurdle of this speech
being considered purely ideological. Further, the current Court sent strong
116. Id. at ?>:8 UKennedWS M.S H,nHurringT UDIt d,es a**ear tCat 'ieZ*,int disHri.inati,n is inCerent
in tCe design and struHture ,f tCis #Ht.3T.
117. Id. at ?>:< U)u,ting "r,Zn '. Ent.’t MerHCs. #ss’nS <;= 1.S. :9;S 9Q? U?Q@@TT.
118. Id. at 2375-76.
119. Hill, supra note 2 at ;? UDIn Lowe, the investment adviser had been de-registered and therefore
was no longer technically a licensed professional, but neither Justice White nor Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, seemed to consider this fact relevant to whether he was engaged in professional speech.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in considering whether a county could require fortune tellers to have permits
and pay fees in order to operate, applied professional speech standards, although the notion of including
fortune tellers in the same category as doctors and lawyers may, at first glance, seem to be a stretch. In
placing this label on the fortune-teller’s s*eeHCS tCe H,urt e.*CasiVed tCe *ers,naliVed nature ,f tCe Hlient
relationship and the special need for consumer protection, which meant that the state could require her
s*eeHC t, be liHensed.3T.
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signals that they would dismiss public health state interests as not being
sufficiently compelling. This indicates a tremendous amount of judicial
deferenHe t, tCe !6!s’ s*eeHC. If statesZant t, effeHti'elW Hurb !6!s’ deHe*ti'e
practices, they will need to pursue other avenues.
II. REGULATING CPCS THROUGH TORT LAW
A. Legal Tools Discussed Thus Far Require the Political Will of Elected
Officials
There are myriad legal tools in the arsenal of the state attorneys general or
legislators who would like to eliminate the misleading practices of pseudo-
clinics, such as CPCs.
The biggest disadvantage to the public consumer protection statutes that will
be discussed, infra, at Section IV, is that each requires the political will of elected
officials to prosecute CPCs. A private individual cannot prosecute a CPC that
deliberately misleads women, engages in the unauthorized practice of medicine,
or promotes unapproved uses of an FDA-approved device. Unfortunately,
elected officials, including county or state prosecutors, frequently choose not to
HCa.*i,n tCe rigCts ,f Z,.en ,r su**,rt Z,.en’s re*r,duHti'e HC,iHes. TCis
means that private women, especially those who live in conservative states,
cannot rely on these consumer protection statutes and regulations to challenge
the CPCs. Without a legal remedy, the rights these measures seek to protect are
meaningless.
B. Tort Law Puts the Injured Party in the Driver’s Seat
It is in this space, where something is either under-regulated or regulations
are under-enforced, that the law of torts does its best and most useful work. This
Article advocates that individual women should sue CPCs in tort law for the
intentional tort of battery. While this approach presents its own challenges
related to the emotional and financial burdens of litigation, as well as the fact
that the litigation comes after the harm has occurred, it still has significant
advantages over passively waiting for prosecution under consumer protection
statutes. T,rt laZ *uts tCe inBured *artW in tCe dri'er’s seat. In H,ntrast t, *ubliH
actions, which typically involve the remedy of injunctions, a battery lawsuit
allows the plaintiff to receive some compensation from the CPCs, which might
include punitive damages. Finally, it does not in any way undermine public
,ffiHials’ abilitW t, enf,rHe deHe*ti'e !6! *raHtiHes tCr,ugC ,tCer .eans. T,rt
law can work in tandem with public efforts to minimize the deceptive and
harmful practices of CPCs. But, when officials sit on their hands and allow
consumers to be deceived, torts are a terrific remedy.
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A tort claim would function something like the following. Any time that a
woman is touched by a CPC staff member, if the touching is only consented to
through deception by the CPC, she should be able to prevail on a civil battery
Hlai.."atterW C,n,rs tCe indi'idual’s dignitW and is n,t deferential t, an industrW
standard of care, unlike a case for medical malpractice, which would apply only
if the CPCs were licensed, professional health care providers.
Before explaining why the battery tort is such a great tool for women who
have been injured by a CPC to seek redress, this Article will discuss the history
and purpose behind this old intentional tort, and the ways in which TRAP laws
have perverted the doctrine of battery and informed consent. The use of battery
in this context might help redefine and reclaim this doctrine, to challenge the
frequent pro-life blurring of the medical with the ideological. Informed consent
means something; it is not merely a vehicle through which to shoehorn ideology.
C. The History of Battery and its Elements
The battery cause of action is one of the oldest torts, and has deep roots in
,ur H,..,n laZ’s desire to protect the personal dignity of individuals and their
ability to decide how, by whom, and under which circumstances they are
touched. This is one of the most basic rights in our common law. To make out a
civil claim of battery, a plaintiff must prove that each of these elements is more
likely than not to have occurred: (1) the defendant intentionally touched the
plaintiff (2) in a way that was objectively harmful or offensive and (3) the
plaintiff did not consent to the touching, nor was it privileged (say, as part of a
lawful police arrest).120
Pregnant women who were misled about the purpose of their visit to the CPC
may bring battery claims against the CPC staff who touched them in offensive
ways, violating their personal dignity.121 A pregnant woman who is examined by
a CPC volunteer and physically touchedFincluding having her pulse taken, but
especially undergoing a vaginal exam or ultrasoundFcould rather easily make
out a battery claim if she reasonably finds the touching offensive because she
consented to the touching under false pretenses.122 The minority of women who
are not touched by CPC staff, perhaps because they came in for counseling and
left before being seen by one of their volunteers, would not be able to bring a
battery claim. However, it is the physical touching and examination of pregnant
120. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 85 (2018).
121. W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, 41 (5th ed. 1984)
UDTCe ele.ent ,f *ers,nal indignitW in',l'ed alZaWs Cas been gi'en H,nsiderable ZeigCt. !,nse)uentlWS
the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those relatively
tri'ial ,nes ZCiHC are.erelW ,ffensi'e and insulting.3T% RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL
TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
122. Campbell, supra note 22, at 75 UDTCe nurse attempted an external ultrasound, but because she
claimed that the images were unclear, the nurse told Nicole she needed to perform a transvaginal scan
insteadS ZitC,ut eX*laining tCe intriHaHies ,f tCe *r,Hedure.3T.
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women that leads to the dangers this Article seeks to prevent, as the pregnancy
evaluations and exams are the pseudo-medical activities that create the false
sense that the pregnant women are being seen by licensed physicians. Where
women are only receiving pamphlets, there is less of a risk that they will delay
obtaining proper medical care as a result.
1. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove the CPCs Physically Injured Them
Contrary to popular understanding, the intentional touching need not bruise
or physically injure the plaintiff if the claim is for offensive touching.123 The
Dgrievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical
Car. d,ne t, Cis b,dW.3124 Examples of offensive touching include spitting in
s,.e,ne’s faHeS125 re.,'ing s,.e,ne’s CatS126 or tackling someone too
aggressively in a junior-high football league.127
Further, the plaintiff need not even be aware at the time that a battery took
*laHe. TCe insult t, tCe *laintiff’s integritW Dis as AeenlW felt bW ,ne ZC, ,nlW
knows after the event that an indignity has been perpetrated upon him as by one
ZC, is H,nsHi,us ,f it ZCile it is being *er*etrated.3128 Thus, a surgeon who
examines an anesthetized person without her consent could be liable for a
battery. So too could a man who kisses a woman, without waking her, while she
is asleep.129
2. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove that the CPC Had Malicious Intent
To satisfy the intentional component of the battery claim, courts merely
require that the touching was voluntary and the defendant intended to make
H,ntaHt ZitC s,.e,ne’s *ers,n. TCis Bust .eans tCat tCe aHt,r’s .,'e.ent
cannot be the result of an automatic reflex, such as a knee-jerk reaction, epileptic
seizure, or coercion.130 There is no required intent to injure or offend, and there
is n, need t, *r,'e tCat tCe aHt,r Zas Dins*ired bW anW *ers,nal C,stilitW.3131
Indeed, even a friendly practical joke can lead to a battery claim.132 While courts
continue to bungle this standard, it remains the black letter common law,
123. Richard J. Kohlman, Assault and Battery, 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 613 (3d ed. 2017).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
125. Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872); Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527 (1884).
126. Seigel v. Long, 53 So. 753 (1910).
127. Koffman v. Garnett, 574 S.E.2d 258 (2003).
128. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)
129. Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
132. Id. § 19; see also id. § 20 (1965); Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines, 439 F.3d 1197, 1209
(Cal. 2006).
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endorsed by the Restatement of Torts, that defendants need not intend to cause a
harmful touching.133 They need merely intend to touch the plaintiff, in a way that
turns out to be harmful or offensive.134
3. Plaintiffs Must Prove the Touching Was Objectively Offensive
To be objectively offensive, the touching must offend a community standard
of what is considered appropriate. It is not enough that the individual herself be
subjectively offended. Thus, a hug might not be objectively offensive, so long as
it was not accompanied by other inappropriate language or intimidation.
T,uHCing s,.e,ne’s sC,ulder in a crowded subway would likely also fail to be
objectively offensive. The context matters greatly, and courts factor in the
Dusages ,f a deHent s,HietWS3 D*,lite .annersS3 and t,uHCing tCat is DHust,.arW
. . . in tCe H,urse ,f life.3135 The factfinder should consider any power imbalance,
exploitation, or subordination in determining whether the touching is offensive.
There is nothing customary or polite about allowing a stranger to touch your
body, assess your medical situation, and offer personal reproductive adviceFall
under false pretenses. No one could say that it is unreasonable to be offended by
such things. When we agree to the most intimate form of examination, and the
most intimate form of counseling, it is not unreasonable to only do so when we
think the person touching us is a licensed medical provider. A reasonable jury
could easily find the touching by CPC staff offensive, even if a few pregnant
women testified for the defense that they were not personally offended by
fraudulent touching at the pseudo-clinics.136 Just as it does not matter whether
,ne *ers,n .igCt n,t find an unin'ited AissS ,r bl,Zing s.,Ae in ,ne’s faHeS
offensive, it does not matter whether a minority of women find the touching
unobjectionable. The question for the courts is whether it is objectively
reasonable for this plaintiff to be offended by the violation of her personal
dignity, once she realizes the real motivation of the CPC.
It is hard to imagine a touching that could be more offensiveFasking a
woman to expose her belly or submit to a vaginal exam, revealing private
information about a pregnancy or a fetus that is growing inside of her (and
possibly information about miscarriage or anatomical defects). If the woman
agrees to this, it is almost always because she considers this to be a clinical
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
134. DTCe faHt tCat tCe Wagners allege that Mr. Giese could not have intended to harm her, or
understood that his attack would inflict injury or offense, is not relevant to the analysis of whether a battery
occurred. So long as he intended to make that contact, and so long as that contact was one to which Mrs.
Wagner had not given her consent, either expressly or by implication, he committed a battery.3 /agner
'. 1taC _e*’t ,f Nu.an Ser's.S @?? 6.>d <88S ;@Q U1taC ?QQ<T.
135. Id. at ;Q8 UD\P[,r eXa.*leS s,.e,ne ZC, sCaAes Cis Cand against Cis silent ZisCes Cas n,t
H,..itted a Car.ful ,r ,ffensi'e H,ntaHt.3T.
136. Glover v. Oppleman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 622, 641 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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encounter, and not an ideological one. If tCe !6!’s deHe*ti'e t,uHCing is n,t a
'i,lati,n ,f ,ne’s dignitW and rigCt t, H,ntr,l ZC, gets t, t,uHC ,neselfS tCen it
is hard to see what would be. The only way a judge could find that this sort of
unconsented-to touching was not a battery would be by misapplying the common
law of civil battery for political ends. Indeed, the CPCs must know that women
would not otherwise consent to such touching, or they would not work so hard,
and fight all the way up to the Supreme Court, to deceive women in their
advertising practices. Why do the CPCs try to take control of the conversation
and mislead women about the nature of their services? Because they know that
without the misleading tactics, they would not be granted access to pregnant
Z,.en’s b,dies.
4. Misrepresentations Vitiate Consent
In some states, the plaintiff needs to prove that the touching was not
consented to, while in other states this is an affirmative defense the defendant
must raise. Either way, if it is shown that the plaintiff reasonably misunderstood
the purpose of the touching, due to misrepresentations by the defendant, then
consenting to the medical exam or procedure will not bar her claim. Courts have
long recognized that a plaintiff might have technically consented to a blood draw,
for example, but thought the blood draw was for medical purposes. If the blood
draw were instead for law enforcement purposes, the consent is invalid.137
TCe DHruX ,f a batterW Hlai. is an absenHe ,f H,nsent on the part of the
*laintiff.3138 Consent is contextual. A famous Torts treatise even uses a medical
eXa.*le t, .aAe tCis *,int. It states: tCe D*laintiff ZC, H,nsents t, .ani*ulati,n
of her body in the belief that it is for medical purposes, when in fact it is only for
tCe seXual gratifiHati,n ,f tCe defendantS3 Han Ca'e a Hause ,f aHti,n f,r
battery.139 ^,u H,uld substitute DseXual gratifiHati,n3 f,r Datte.*ting t, d,
O,d’s Z,rA3 and tCe sa.e *re.ise C,lds. TCe aHti,n f,r batterW reH,gniVes tCat
the individual has a right to exclude others from touching her and to control the
way they do so. Full stop.
There are four different types of consent applicable to our facts, and
satisfying the criteria for any of them would preclude liability: actual consent;
apparent or implied consent; constructive consent; and the emergency
doctrine.140 However, none of these categories of consent apply to preclude
liability for the CPCs. First, there is no actual (express or implied) consent in the
137. 7’"rien '. SWnn,ttS :? #.>d >>@S >><-36 (Vt. 2013).
138. Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Md. 1997).
139. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (2d ed. 2018).
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 111 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
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case where a pregnant woman is never explicitly told that the medically
costumed volunteer is in fact unlicensed.141
JiAeZiseS tCe !6! Hann,t relW ,n Dreas,nablW a**arent H,nsentS3 ,r i.*lied
consent.142 /Cile a *atient .igCt H,nsent t, D,rdinarW *CWsiHal H,ntaHts tCat are
medically necessarW3 ZCen sCe 'isits Cer d,Ht,r f,r Cer annual *CWsiHalS H,nsent
to the CPC cannot be inferred from the facts. In the oft-cited case of O’Brien v.
Cunard S.S. Co.,143 the evidence that plaintiff held out her arm to be vaccinated,
in a line of people exiting a ship, demonstrated not only that the defendant
reasonably believed that she consented, but also that she did consent. This sort
of implied consent is not present here; the pregnant woman is not implicitly
consenting to a medical exam by the CPC. She is consenting to an exam by a
different person and in a different context.
While a defendant would not be liable for battery if a reasonable person in
the position of the actor believes that the would-be plaintiff consented to the
aHt,r’s ,tCerZise t,rti,us H,nduct,144 it would be unreasonable for a CPC staff
member to believe that the pregnant woman had truly consented, given the
!6!’s ide,l,giHal agenda. #s .enti,ned above,145 CPC staff are trained in
applying deceptive practices to persuade women to carry the fetus to term. CPCs
take advantage of these Z,.en’s relati'e laHA ,f eduHati,nS .,neWS and
insurance to deceive them into thinking they are receiving medical, as opposed
to ideological, care. Given their deceptive playbook, and the fact that they do not
tell pregnant women who appear at their clinics that they are unlicensed medical
providers who do not provide the full range of reproductive services, consent to
the touching cannot be inferred or apparent from the facts. Indeed, given how
CPCs deliberately locate very near Planned Parenthoods and adopt clinically-
sounding names, the very reasonable and clear intention of CPCs is to gain
aHHess t, Z,.en’s b,dies tCr,ugC deHeption, not informed consent.
PurtCerS as disHussed ab,'e under tCe D,bBeHti'elW ,ffensi'e3 ele.ent ,f
battery, there is no constructive consent either. Several courts have recognized
tCat Din a Hr,Zded Z,rldS a Hertain a.,unt ,f *ers,nal H,ntaHt is ine'itable, and
must be accepted. Absent expression to the contrary, consent is assumed to all
those ordinary contacts which are customary and reasonably necessary to the
141. DEX*ress consent may be given by words or affirmative conduct and implied consent may be
manifested when a person takes no action, indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to
occur. The consent .ust be t, tCe 2defendant’s H,nduHtS ratCer tCan t, its H,nse)uenHes.’ A
*laintiff’s consent is n,t effeHti'e if DtCe consenting person was mistaken about the nature and quality of
tCe in'asi,n intended bW tCe H,nduHt.3 Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3d Cir. 1998).
142. DIf Z,rds ,r H,nduHt are reas,nablW underst,,d bW an,tCer t, be regarded as H,nsentS they
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact...In determining whether conduct would
be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent, the customs of the community are to be taken
int, aHH,unt.3 Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003).
143. 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 115 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
145. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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H,..,n interH,urse ,f life.3146 Examples of this include touching someone
while hastily exiting a building during a fire alarm or brushing up against
someone on a crowded bus. In those circumstances, there is something like a
s,Hial neHessitW argu.entS as aff,rdable *ubliH trans*,rtati,n re)uires D.in,r
H,ntaHt betZeen *assengers.3147 Commuters are thought to consent to this
touching, as they are aware of the crowded nature of most public transit and
nonetheless agree to this mode of transportation. But there is no such social
consent in the present case. Pregnant women are not agreeing to a certain amount
of battery in order to take advantage of a public good.
Finally, emergency consent is not applicable. The emergency consent
d,Htrine DrefleHts a narr,Z set ,f HirHu.stanHes in ZCiHC tCe aHt,r reas,nablW
believes that plaintiff would have consented, if he or she had the opportunity to
do so, and in which it is imperative not to wait to see whether plaintiff really
d,es H,nsent.3148 In the kinds of cases contemplated here, there is plenty of time
t, ,btain tCe *regnant Z,.an’s H,nsent. Pailure t, d, s, is not because there is
an urgent, life-threatening clinical need that prevents asking the woman. The
only reason the consent is not explicit is because the CPCs appreciate that they
Zill l,se aHHess t, Z,.en’s b,dies if tCeW are trans*arent ab,ut tCeir ide,logical
purpose.
Thus, CPCs cannot avail themselves of any of the relevant types of consent
to preclude their liability. CPCs that misled a woman into thinking that the
purpose of the exam was to diagnose a pregnancy, or to offer medical counseling
or advice, when the real purpose is to counsel the woman on pro-life, Christian
ideology, would most certainly be liable in battery. To reiterate, where the
consent to a procedure or touching is premised on fraud or misrepresentations,
there is no valid consent.149
5 Battery Claims Do Not Balance the Rights to Batter Against the Right
Not to Be Battered
Contrary to the First Amendment analysis in NIFLA or the structure of
consumer protection or even medical malpractice laws, which might give too
.uHC deferenHe t, tCe defendant’s 'ieZ*,ints ,r *ur*,seS CereS tCe reas,ns why
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 117 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
147. Id. TCe 4estate.ent addsS DMin,r H,ntaHt betZeen passengers is reasonably necessary to
aHCie'e tCat \aff,rdable and effiHient *ubliH transit[ s,Hial 'alue.3 Id.
148. Id. § 118.
149. DTCe *laintiff’s *ur*,rted H,nsent is ineffeHti'e t, bar Cer Hlai. if it is induHed bW
misrepresentation or is given under a material mistake of which the defendant is or should be aware. The
mistake is frequently though not always induced by the defendant’s fraud ,r .isre*resentati,n. ManW
Hases deHided in .anW settings su..ariVe tCe *,int bW saWing tCat 2fraud 'itiates H,nsent’ ,r tCat H,nsent
is ineffeHti'e if gi'en as a result ,f fraudS .eaning tCat tCe *laintiff in suHC a Hase Han reH,'er.3 DOBBS
ET AL., supra note 139.
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the defendant battered the plaintiff are largely irrelevant.150 When the touching
is not consented to, courts do not balance the interests of the batterer against the
interests of the battered. The battery cause of action is about protecting the
inviolate dignity of the individual person. In keeping with this, battery is not a
paternalistic or ideological doctrine. The defendant cannot argue that they failed
to disclose a material fact about the procedure in order to avoid any
psychological harm to the plaintiff.151 Where the First Amendment may be
interpreted in a way that protects misleading practices by CPCs, battery does not
spare defendants who deliberately mislead.
D. The Relationship Between Battery and Informed Consent
In recent years, many states have passed special informed consent laws that
are exclusive to the abortion context. These Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Provider (TRAP) laws require abortion providers to say specific things to
pregnant women as part of the informed consent process. Given that informed
consent as a legal and ethical doctrine developed from the tort of battery, it will
be useful to discuss how this occurred, in order to understand how these TRAP
laws pervert the very notion of informed consent.
Historically, informed consent suits began as intentional torts for
unconsented-to touching by physicians, even where the care received was not
negligent. One of the first cases to recognize the trespass to persons against a
surgeon who operated on someone without her consent was Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital.152 In this 1914 case, the plaintiff claimed that the
hospital staff removed her stomach tumor while she was under anesthesia,
despite her explicit requests that they not do so.153 In deciding that the hospital
could be liable for a battery, if not for negligence, Judge Cardozo famously stated
that D\e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
ZitC,ut Cis *atient’s H,nsentS H,..its an assaultS f,r ZCiHC Ce is liable in
da.ages.3154 A 1913 Oklahoma case further recognized that the skillful removal
,f a *atient’s b,ne H,uld H,nstitute a batterWS ZCere tCe *atient Cad n,t H,nsented
150. D\M[anW t,rts tCat are Hlassified as intenti,nal differ fr,. t,rts ,f negligenHe n,t s, .uHC
because they represent a more serious degree of fault, but because they exhibit a type of fault not
a**r,*riatelW g,'erned bW tCe 2reas,nable Hare’ *aradig.: TCeW f,Hus ,n *r,teHti,n ,f HarefullW defined
interests (such as freedom from confinement, and choice about medical treatment or other physical
t,uHCingsTS ZCile tCeW li.it legal *r,teHti,n t, tCe .,st deliberate Ainds ,f intrusi,ns ,n tCese interests.3
Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1100 (2006).
151. Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986).
152. SHCl,end,rff '. S,H’W ,f IeZ ^,rA N,s*.S @Q< I.E. 8?S 8> UI.^. @8@=TS abrogated by Bing
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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to its removal.155 Thus, even where there is not negligence, there can be a medical
battery.
In the medical context, the intentional tort has morphed into a negligence
cause of action in all but a few states.156 This is because enough of a norm has
developed through medical ethics and practice to say that the failure to provide
relevant medical information to a patient, about the purpose and risks of their
treatment, is now a breach of the professional standard of care. The American
MediHal #ss,Hiati,n Cas issued an etCiHs ,*ini,nS ZCiHC states tCat Dinf,r.ed
H,nsent t, .ediHal treat.ent is funda.ental in b,tC etCiHs and laZ.3157 For
medical professionals, what started as a battery is now considered medical
malpractice. Where CPC facilities and staff are licensed as medical providers in
their states, then, pregnant women should sue them for ordinary negligence and
medical malpractice. Because it is recognized that medical providers should
inform women of the purpose of their care, as well as the risks and benefits of
any procedures, an informed consent claim should be easy to demonstrate.
Importantly, while the Supreme Court declared in NIFLA that CPCs are not
practicing medicine, and therefore the informed consent requirements of Casey
did not apply, it is up to the states, and not federal courts, to determine whether
entities are practicing medicine and subjected to professional malpractice claims
under state law.158
Canterbury v. Spence, one of the early cases to describe the tort of informed
H,nsentS stated tCat D\t[rue H,nsent t, ZCat Ca**ens t, ,ne’s self is tCe informed
exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably
the options available and the risks attendant upon each.3159 Today, making out a
case for informed consent requires proving that the defendant breached a
standard of care in terms of what reasonable physicians would share with a
patient, or what prudent patients would find material to their decision to elect or
155. Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913).
156. D7ften inf,r.ed H,nsent Hlai.s blur int, .al*raHtiHe Hlai.s.3 JANET DOLGIN & LOIS
SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 59 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2009). See Bryan J. Warren,
Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by Abandoning
the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 917, 918 (2000); see also Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md.
1977). But see 6ereV '. NuS 9: I.E.>d @@>QS @@>< UInd. !t. #**. ?Q@:T UDJaHA ,f inf,r.ed H,nsent is
viewed as a battery claim if there is an alleged complete lack of consent to medical treatment, but
,tCerZise it is 2regarded as a s*eHifiH f,r. ,f negligenHe f,r breaHC ,f tCe re)uired standard ,f
*r,fessi,nal H,nduHt.’3T; Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 507 A.2d 718 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986).
157. Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/6ARD-Z9WT] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
158. The joint opinion in Casey explained that the law regulated s*eeHC ,nlW 2as *art ,f tCe practice
,f .ediHineS subBeHt t, reas,nable liHensing and regulati,n bW tCe State.’3 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
(emphasis added). Indeed, the requirement that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform an operation
is Dfir.lW entrenHCed in #.eriHan t,rt laZ.3 Cruzan v. _ir.S M,. _e*’t ,f NealtC, 497 U. S. 261, 269
(1990). See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (explaining that
2a surge,n ZC, *erf,r.s an ,*erati,n ZitC,ut Cis *atient’s H,nsent H,..its an assault.’3T.
159. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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forego treatment.160 The former standard asks what information a reasonable
physician would provide, and reflects the idea that physicians cannot read
*atients’ .inds t, An,Z ZCat eaHC Zould subjectively want to know. The latter
D*rudent *atient3 standard is a**lied in a sligCt .in,ritW ,f statesS and f,Huses
,n tCe DrisAsS benefitsS and ,*ti,ns tCat a reas,nable *atient Z,uld Zant t, An,Z
in reaHCing a treat.ent deHisi,n.3161 It is rooted in patient autonomy, and
recognizes that while the physician may have expertise in clinical decision-
making, she is not an expert in what reasonable patients would want to have
disclosed.
1. TRAP Laws Pervert the Doctrine of Informed Consent
Ironically, an article about abortion access could not address battery and
informed consent without recognizing the absurd turns the doctrine has taken
under states’ T4#6 laZs. TRAP laws are
part of anti-ab,rti,n aHti'ists’ strategW t, HCi* aZaW at tCe legal a'ailability
of abortion . . . by heavily regulating the practice of providing abortions.
These laws are examples of abortion exceptionalism, in which abortion is
singled out for more restrictive government regulation as compared to other,
similar procedures.162
Legislators often justify these TRAP laws as being necessary for true informed
consent, and many TRAP laws are placed in sections of the state code that apply
to medical informed consent generally. A majority of states have such laws,
which place requirements ,n ab,rti,n *r,'iders DtCat are .,re de.anding tCan
f,r anW ,tCer .ediHal *r,Hedure.3163 Occasionally, these TRAP laws pervert the
legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent.
P,r eXa.*leS under tCe guise ,f Dinf,r.ed H,nsentS3 .anW states re)uire
physicians to provide specific, and sometimes misleading, information to
women. An analysis of the mandatory pre-abortion informed consent materials
in 23 states revealed that 45 percent of the statements about first trimester fetal
development were medically inaccurate.164 Examples of inaccuracies included
160. DIn sligCtlW ,'er Calf tCe statesS tCe legal standard f,r disHl,sure t, *atients is tCat ZCiHC a
2reasonable medical practitioner’ would provide. This professionally defined standard is often that of the
locality in which the practitioner works, or a similar locality. The disclosure standard in most other
jurisdictions is that which would be sought by a prudent or reasonable patient, a standard that emphasizes
tCe 'alue ,f *atient aut,n,.W ,'er tCat ,f *r,fessi,nal Budg.ent.3 6eter N. SHCuHAS Rethinking Informed
Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 (1994).
161. DOLGIN, supra note 156, at 49-50.
162. Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER&L. 1, 2-3 (2012).
163. Id. at 13.
164. Cynthia Daniels, et al., Informed or Misinformed Consent, Abortion Policy in the United
States, 41 J. OFHEALTH POL., POL’Y&L. 181, 193 (2016).
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state.ents suHC as Dbrain aHti'itW Han be reH,rded3 at f,ur-ZeeAs’ gestati,nS ,r
,tCer state.ents tCat re*,rted DbabW-liAe3 beCa'i,rs bef,re tCeW H,uld be
seen.165
In addition to misinformation related to the development of the fetus,
Miss,uri re)uires tCat tCe *CWsiHian inf,r. tCe *regnant Z,.an tCat D\t[Ce life
of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life of a
se*arateS uni)ueS li'ing Cu.an being.3166 Of course this blurs objective clinical
information with religious ideology. It is ethically unsound to ask physicians to
deliver propaganda for conservative legislators, shrouded in the veil of
professional judgment. In any event, this uses the legitimate and professional
voices of physicians as shoehorns for ideology, by erroneously treating it like
other forms of medical informed consent.
In TeXasS Z,.en .ust be inH,rreHtlW t,ld tCat Ca'ing an ab,rti,n D.aW
make it difficult or impossible to become pregnant in the future or carry a
*regnanHW t, ter..3167 In South Dakota, women are given information that
abortion increases the risk of infertility, without making it clear that only a highly
unlikely complication will increase this risk.168 Indiana provides some caveats,
but the informed consent materials nonetheless leave the reader with the
impression that abortion carries with it an increased risk of infertility and
complications with future pregnancies. 169 Of course, this depends greatly on the
gestational age of the fetus. Unqualified statements about abortion causing
infertility are medically inaccurate, and yet physicians are required to share this
false data in at least four states.170 In Indiana, pregnant women must be told that
the fetus must be either buried in an DestablisCed He.eterW3 ,r DHre.ated3 bW tCe
abortion clinic.171
In thirteen states, women must be instructed on the ability of a fetus to feel
pain.172 In Utah, physicians must share with pregnant women the puzzling
state.ent tCat Dsubstantial .ediHal e'idenHe3 Cas sC,Zn tCat tCe Dfetus is
Ha*able ,f feeling *ainS3 and tCus anestCesia .ust be *r,'ided if tCe ab,rti,n is
165. Id. at 191, 195.
166. MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERVICES, MO. INFORMED CONSENT BOOKLET, http://
health.mo.gov/living/families/womenshealth/pregnancyassistance/pdf/InformedConsentBooklet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7XW-YBZ8].
167. TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 17 (2003), http://www.dshs.state.tx.
us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHP-YAMG].
168. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2017).
169. IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT BROCHURE 6,
https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Abortion_Informed_Consent_Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZT3-VSV
B].
170. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Oct. 2018, https://
www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion [https://perma.cc/G
K7T-BRDG].
171. IND. STATEDEP’T OFHEALTH, supra note 169, at 11.
172. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 170. For a constitutional analysis, see I. Glenn Cohen
& Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 235
(2011).
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performed after 20 ZeeAs’ gestati,n.173 First, there is no substantial evidence of
this,174 and second, providing anesthesia would impose a significant risk on the
pregnant woman and the fetus that may not be clinically justified. Requiring
anesthesia after 20 weeks, for every pregnancy, violates norms of professional
ethics, as the physician should not do harm to the patient that is not balanced by
some corresponding benefit.175
TCe *resenHe ,f tCese Dfetal *ain3 laZs is e'en.,re H,nf,unding gi'en tCat
full-term, natural childbirth can be very painful for the baby. Objectively, this is
a stressful event. Their 40 week skulls are compressed, their heart rate increases,
and their bodies are mangledFbut there is no requirement that a vaginal delivery
be preceded by anesthesia in Utah or elsewhere. The discrepancy between the
requirement that physicians administer anesthesia during abortions at 20 weeks,
but not at full-term vaginal deliveries, reveals the true purpose behind these
lawsFt, disH,urage Z,.en’s re*r,duHti'e HC,iHes. 4e)uiring a d,Ht,r t,
deliver this message again blurs the line between the clinical and the ideological.
This is quite dangerous in a society predicated on secular delivery of health care
and freedom of religious exercise. Indeed, the informed consent laws of Missouri
are presently being challenged by a religious group that claims that in their view,
human life does not begin at conception, and the informed consent materials
violate the Establishment Clause by endorsing Christian ideology.176
173. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-308.5 (Deering ?Q@9T UD. . . \s[ubstantial .ediHal
evidence from studies concludes that an unborn child who is at least 20 weeks gestational age may be
capable of experiencing pain during an abortion procedure . . . and the *CWsiHian DsCall ad.inister an
anesthetic or analgesic to eliminate or alleviate organic pain to the unborn child caused by the particular
.etC,d ,f ab,rti,n t, be e.*l,Wed.3T.
174. Madeleine Verriotis et al., The Development of the Nociceptive Brain, 338 NEUROSCIENCE
?Q:S ?Q9 U?Q@;T UDN,Z and ZCen tCis H,.*leX brain netZ,rA de'el,*s t, enH,de n,Xi,us sti.uli and
Hreate tCe eX*erienHe ,f *ain is an i.*,rtant area ,f Hurrent researHC.3T. See also Curtis Lowery et al.,
Neurodevelopmental Changes of Fetal Pain, 410 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY ?:<S ?:< U?QQ8T UDMature
thalamocortical projections are not present until 29 to 30 weeks, which has led many to believe the fetus
d,es n,t eX*erienHe e.,ti,nal 2*ain’ until tCen. 6ain re)uires b,tC n,HiHe*ti,n and e.,ti,nal reaHti,n ,r
inter*retati,n.3T.
175. See Andrea Smardon, Abortion Providers in Utah Adapt to New Anesthesia Requirement,
NPR, April 7, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/04/07/473416741/abortion-providers-in-utah-adapt-to-
new-anesthesia-requirement [https://perma.cc/5422-EC6M]. Medical ethics requires respect for
aut,n,.W and benefiHenHe t,Zard *atients. TCese are DtZ, ,f tCe funda.ental *rinHi*les3 tCat g,'ern
patient interactions. Beneficence requires physicians to promote good and act in the best interest of the
patient’s CealtC. TCusS *CWsiHians sC,uld n,t d, tCings tCat Car. *atientsS ZitC 'erW little benefit. See
Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for
Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2010).
176. Doe v. Greitens, 530 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). See also Linley Sanders, Abortion
Rights Fight Has an Unlikely Champion: The Satanic Temple, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/satanic-temple-pushes-abortion-fight-missouri-supreme-court-679779
[https://perma.cc/Y2CU-8X6E].
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2. TRAP Laws Ignore Casey’s Dicta on Informed Consent
The 1992 Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey made it clear that states can require physicians to inform
women seeking abortion about the physiological development of the fetus or the
risks of the abortion procedure.177 However, this was conditioned on the
information being truthful and non-misleading,178 and allowing the physician to
use her judgment to customize the information to the particular patient.179 The
Casey Court made their reasoning explicit: it was not to add extraordinary
informed consent in the abortion arena, but to place informed consent on equal
footing with other areas of medicine. The message was that informed consent in
ab,rti,n sC,uld be Dn, different3 and tCe d,Ht,r-*atient relati,n Zas Dentitled t,
tCe sa.e s,liHitude it reHei'es in ,tCer H,nteXts.3180 Further, in recognizing that
previous abortion informed consent laws had been struck down, the Court
distinguished those in Casey bW stating tCat 6ennsWl'ania’s laZs Zere n,t
Ddesigned t, dissuade tCe Z,.an fr,. Ca'ing an ab,rti,n3 and did n,t Di.*,se
a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,
irres*eHti'e ,f tCe *artiHular needs ,f tCe *atient.3181 In NIFLA, the Court
narrowed the holding of Casey so that it only applied to licensed medical
providers immediately before providing an abortion procedure.
Legislators who have passed TRAP laws that require physicians to provide
medically inaccurate or misleading information have ignored this important dicta
from Casey.182 The part of Casey getting more attention is the general
requirement that a TRAP law not *laHe an Dundue burden3 ,n tCe eXerHise ,f tCe
Z,.an’s rigCt. Casey’s undue burden test C,lds tCat Da *r,'isi,n ,f laZ is
invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a
Z,.an seeAing an ab,rti,n.3183 The Circuits were somewhat split in terms of
177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
178. Id.
179. D!ritiHal t, ,ur deHisi,ns in Akron and Thornburgh to invalidate a governmental intrusion
into the patient-doctor dialogue was the fact that the laws in both cases required all doctors within their
respective jurisdictions to provide all pregnant patients contemplating an abortion a litany of information,
regardless of whether the patient sought the information or whether the doctor thought the information
neHessarW t, tCe *atient’s deHisi,n.3 4ust '. Sulli'anS <QQ 1.S. @:>S ?Q> U@88@T.
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
181. Id. at 882.
182. Indeed, following /C,le /,.en’s NealtC '. Hellerstedt, these types of TRAP laws will be
under greater scrutiny. Given that Whole Women’s Health stated that courts can look to common sense
and tCe aHtual effeHts ,f T4#6 laZs ,n a Z,.an’s H,nstituti,nal rigCtsS as ,**,sed t, s*eHulating ab,ut
whether tCe state’s interests are narr,ZlW tail,redS it Zill be HruHial t, H,lleHt data ,n C,Z T4#6 laZs
unduly burden the right to terminate. See Whole Women’s NealtC '. NellerstedtS @>; S. !t. ??8?S ?>@:
U?Q@;T UD!,urts are free t, base tCeir findings ,n H,..,nsense inferenHes draZn fr,. tCe e'idenHe.3T.
183. CaseyS <Q< 1.S. at 9:9. N,Ze'erS as M,Cn 4,berts,n Cas *,inted ,utS Dfinding an i.*r,*er
purpose to stop abortion or burden women will be rare, given the legitimate fetal-protection, health, and
autonomy H,nHerns tCat.igCt.,ti'ate legislat,rs . . . .3 M,Cn#. 4,berts,nS Science Disputes in Abortion
Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2015). Instead, as the Supreme Court recognized in Whole Women’s
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how to interpret this language and how much deference to give to empirical
evidence to demonstrate an undue burden. However, the Supreme Court in
Whole Women’s Health ,ffered guidanHeS stating tCat D\H[,urts are free to base
tCeir findings ,n H,..,nsense inferenHes draZn fr,. tCe e'idenHe.3184
Regardless of how future courts interpret this important test, however, legislators
have deliberately ignored it, and Casey’s dicta on informed consent, when
fashioning pro-life TRAP laws.185 This is perhaps because they were setting up
legal challenges to Casey itself, anticipating the replacement of Justice Kennedy
on the Supreme Court.186
Informed consent is not some slippery placeholder that means whatever you
want it to mean. It has a history and specific content. Informed consent means
that accurate, relevant information will be shared with a competent patient, who
will have adequate time to process it, understand it, and then use this information
to make a voluntary medical decision.187 According to the American Medical
#ss,Hiati,n’s 7*ini,n ,n tCis .atterS D\s[uHHessful H,..uniHati,n in tCe
patient-physician relationship fosters trust and supports shared decision
.aAingS3 and tCus *CWsiHians .ust D\*[resent rele'ant inf,r.ation accurately
and sensiti'elWS in Aee*ing ZitC tCe *atient’s *referenHes f,r reHei'ing .ediHal
information.3188 TCe *regnant Z,.an’s deHisi,n Han be neitCer ',luntarW n,r
informed if it is based on misrepresentations. But this is precisely what many
TRAP laws, and deceptive CPCs, do.
#s MuditC _aar H,rreHtlW *,ints ,utS tCe Dinf,r.ed H,nsent3 T4#6 laZs blur
ethical clinical judgment with legislative ideology. According to Professor Daar,
inf,r.ed H,nsent is n,t Zell su**,rted ZCen T4#6 laZs Dfoist a scripted
.essage dis*laWing tCe state’s .,ral re*ugnanHe t, tCe *r,*,sed treat.ent
Health, the second prong of the undue burden test may be met with empirical, common sense data on the
aHtual effeHt tCese laZs Ca'e ,n Z,.en’s aHHess t, ab,rti,n.
184. Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2317.
185. For a recent example, see the 2018 proposed bill in the Utah state legislature making abortion
illegal at any point in the pregnancy, if the purpose is to terminate a fetus with Trisomy 21. The legislators
Zere ad'ised bW tCe state’s legislati'e ad'is,rW H,..ittee tCat tCis bill Z,uld 'i,late Casey, but the
sponsors pursued it nonetheless. See Luke Ramseth, Here’s What You Need to Know About Utah’s
Proposed Down Syndrome Abortion Ban, Salt Lake Trib. (March 4, 2018),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/health/2018/03/04/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-utahs-proposed-
down-syndrome-abortion-ban/ [https://perma.cc/KSN2-G89G].
186. While not the focus of this article, the replacement of Justice Kennedy with Justice
Kavanaugh, nominated by President Trump, is likely to move the Supreme Court in a significantly more
conservative direction as it relates to reproductive rights. Justice Kennedy had three times affirmed the
basic holding of Roe v. WadeFby signing on to the majority of Casey; by assuming it was controlling in
the Carhart opinion that he wrote; and in signing on to the opinion in Whole Women’s Health. For a brief
summary of MustiHe Ka'anaugC’s *,siti,n ,n re*r,duHti'e rigCtsS and 4,e '. /adeS see !lare P,ran +
Joan Biskupic, Where Brett Kavanaugh Stands on Key Issues, CNN (Oct. 6, 2018), https:
//www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/kavanaugh-on-the-issues/index.html [https://perma.cc/LDC5-UDK
4]; see also Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Gave Us Its First View of How It Will Handle Abortion
in the Kavanaugh Era, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 10, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/supreme-court-
abortion-kavanaugh-05ac30d8b22a/ [https://perma.cc/UKZ4-KGJD].
187. See generally Schuck, supra note 159, at 902-05.
188. Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, supra note 157.
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*lan.3189 Scholars in medical ethics have generally agreed that this requires
*CWsiHians t, DH,..it an untenable etCiHal and *r,fessi,nal Zr,ngFdeceiving
their patients by providing false information and withholding empirically
derived, evidence-based HliniHal data.3190 Even so, as Jessie Hill points out,
DH,urts tend t, be CigClW *er.issi'e3 ,f T4#6 laZsS ZCile DtCeW Ca'e ,ften been
more skeptical of disclosure requirements imposed on [C6!s[.3191 It is this
federal First Amendment jurisprudence protecting CPC deception that begs for
a private, state tort remedy.
E. The Practical Advantages of Battery Over Negligence Claims
Battery places tCe 'iHti. ,f tCe Car. in tCe dri'er’s seatS all,Zing her to
decide whom to sue and for how much. Battery also entitles the plaintiff to
potential punitive damages, in addition to any damages for her pain and suffering
or dignitary harm.192 While punitive damages are rare, they are more likely to be
awarded in intentional tort cases where there is willful misconduct, malice, or
reckless disregard for the rights of others.193 If the jury finds that the particular
CPC defendant willfully misled the plaintiff in order to get her to carry her
pregnancy to term, then punitive damages might be warranted. This could make
tCe laZsuit.,re attraHti'e f,r *laintiffs’ att,rneWs t, taAe ,n a H,ntingenHW basisS
which might improve access to justice for low-income women.
Given that most states follow the physician-standard for informed consent,
these cases will often require expert testimony as to what the physician should
have disclosed. It can often be difficult for plaintiffs to find a physician who will
testify against another local physician in this regard. Further, even under the
patient-standard, in order to prove the causation element of negligence the
plaintiff needs to prove that, had she been adequately informed, she would have
chosen to do something different. It is often difficult to prove causation, even
where the patient could prove that some information was negligently withheld.
Will the jury believe the claim that the patient would have chosen differently?
189. Judith Daar, Distinctions in Disclosure: Mandated Informed Consent in Abortion and ART,
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 255, 256 (2015).
190. Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-Scripted Consent: When Medical
Ethics and Law Collide, 39 HASTINGS CTR REP. 21, 21 (2009).
191. Hill, supra note 2S at ;Q UDTCusS in H,ntrast t, tCe striHt sHrutinW tCat a**lies t, H,.*elled
s*eeHC in tCe H,nteXt ,f ZCat .aW be Halled 2*ubliH disH,urseS’ tCe !,urt i.*lied tCat ,nlW rati,nal basis
review is applicable to restrictions and speech requirements in the professional speech context, at least
where, as in CaseyS tCe s*eeHC is f,und t, be trutCfulS n,n.isleadingS and rele'ant t, tCe Z,.an’s
deHisi,n.3T.
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFTORTS: PHYSICAL&EMOTIONALHARM § 46 (AM. LAW. INST.
?Q@?T UDAn actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm causes
bodily har.S als, f,r tCe b,dilW Car..3T% Kohlman, supra note 123.
193. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 536-37 (4th ed. 2016).
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In these respects, a battery claim is easier to prove. The battery plaintiff need
not prove that the physician had a duty to disclose anything, that the failure was
a breach of a professional standard of care, or that she would have chosen not to
have the exam had she known its true nature.194 The battery cause of action is
much more protective of the physical integrity of the plaintiff and does not
balance this interest against the rights of the defendant. In a battery claim, there
is no deference to the community or industry practices of defendants.
Given that the petitioner in NIFLA claimed that it was not providing medical
care, a civil plaintiff could cite this when arguing that an informed consent claim
would be inappropriate for a plaintiff who is seen at an unlicensed CPC. But,
more appropriately, the problem with an informed consent claim is that the
defendant CPC is not a medical provider, and the elaborate ethical canons that
have developed for physicians do not apply to unlicensed CPCs. The CPC
plaintiff is not technically a patient, even if she thinks that she is. It is the unique
position of the physician, and the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship,
that has led to the development of informed consent as a claim. You cannot bring
an informed consent-style claim against your auto-mechanic or plumber, nor can
you bring one against a CPC. Instead, you would need to prove battery or
ordinary negligence by the defendant. Under ordinary negligence, given that the
plaintiff would be arguing that inadequate information was shared, this claim
Z,uld be fra.ed as a Dfailure t, Zarn3 tW*e ,f Hlai..
Failure to warn claims are notoriously difficult to win. This is because the
common law does not impose affirmative duties to protect or warn on just any
defendant; there must be a special relationship between the parties. Historically,
the special relationship has been one where there is a power imbalance between
the plaintiff and defendant, where the defendant is a fiduciary of the plaintiff, or
where the plaintiff puts her safety or person in the custody of the defendant. The
classiH Ds*eHial relati,nsCi*3 tCat gi'e rise t, a dutW t, Zarn are landl,rdRtenantS
doctor/patient, and business/customer relationships.
The CPC facility, in taking on a pseudo-clinical function and holdings its
doors open to the public to provide counseling services, would quite likely be
H,nsidered in a Ds*eHial relati,nsCi*3 ZitC tCe *regnant Z,.an. TCusS tCe !6!
would likely be under a duty to protect and warn the women it sees in its pseudo-
clinic, even when it is unlicensed. This could create obvious duties to provide
accurate and complete information to the woman. However, this argument would
depend on the judge and her notions of what makes for good public policy. The
judge makes decisions about whether there is a duty by looking to a long list of
factors. Given the political context in which abortion cases are decided, and the
194. See Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986).
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historical inability for judges to treat abortion as unexceptional in tort,195 the
negligence cause of action against CPCs is not as desirable as a battery claim.
Moreover, damages in a negligence or informed consent case might be
modest. Typically, negligence damages are awarded to pay for economic
expenses and pain and suffering that result as a consequence of the breach.
However, many states limit the amount of pain and suffering damages that can
be awarded and might limit the economic damages if they are framed as caring
for a healthy, unwanted, child. Such claims are unfortunately referred to as
DZr,ngful birtC3 Hlai.s.
If the negligence case is framed as a failure to provide adequate information
that resulted in the birth of a child, some states prohibit this type of claim
because, in their view, the birth of a child can never be an injury.196 States are
about evenly split on whether they will allow for some recovery for the cost of
raising a child when the traditional negligence elements are met.197 Some states
will only allow for compensatory damages for child-rearing expenses when the
HCild tCat is b,rn Cas se'ere disabilities. TCis .aAes DZr,ngful birtC3 Hlai.s
exceptional, when in reality calculating the damages from child care and medical
expenses are quite ordinary, but courts have struggled with the philosophical
implications of allowing the birth of a child to be an injury.198 If, instead, the
claim is brought as a battery claim, the plaintiff will dodge this philosophical
bullet. However, depending on the jurisdiction, the plaintiff may not be able to
receive damages for regular child-rearing expenses.
IV. REGULATING CPCS AS PRACTICINGMEDICINEWITHOUT A LICENSE
A. Medical Licensing Laws Protect the Public and Have Been Deemed
Constitutional
NIFLA teaches states they will need to pursue other non-pregnancy-specific
options if they want to protect their citizens from deceptive CPC practices. The
next option that will be explored is the prosecution of CPCs for the unlicensed
practice of medicine. Even the petitioners in NIFLA acknowledged this
possibility, though they seemed confident that they were not practicing medicine.
Assuming, arguendo, that NIFLA does not practice medicine under a free speech
195. Judges struggle to apply basic tort concepts about compensatory damages to wrongful birth
cases, given that the successful wrongful birth claim requires the parents to argue that they would have
had an abortion had the physician informed them of material clinical information. See generally Kassama
v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1117 (Md. 2002); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984); Turpin v.
Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958 (Cal. 1982).
196. CHARLES KRAUSE, ALFRED GANS & MONIQUE LEAHY, 2A AM. L. OF TORTS §§ 9:27-28
U?Q@9T UDTCe.aB,r ,bstaHle t, an infant *laintiff’s Hlai. in suHC a Hase is tCe deter.inati,n ,f da.ages.3T.
197. Id. § 9:27.
198. Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assoc., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ohio
?QQ;T UD"irtC ,f a n,r.alS CealtCW HCild Hann,t be an inBurW t, Cer *arents.3T.
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analysis, many states would likely disagree that CPCs are not practicing
.ediHine. In a bit ,f a tauntS IIPJ#’s att,rneW granted tCat D\i[t’s illegal t,
*retend t, *raHtiHe .ediHine ZitC,ut a liHenseS3 s, D\i[f tCat’s ZCat’s g,ing ,n
here, surely California would have found a way to [prosecute CPCs] before
n,Z.3199Of course, this is a different remedy, with different applicable standards
and constitutional review, but it is something California, and other states, could
and should do.
Every state prohibits the unauthorized practice of medicine, and then defines
ZCat H,nstitutes tCe D*raHtiHe ,f .ediHine3 f,r tCat state.200 New York has a
re*resentati'e laZS ZCiHC defines tCe *raHtiHe ,f .ediHine as Ddiagn,singS
treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity
,r *CWsiHal H,nditi,n.3201 In some states, like Ohio, DC,lding ,ut ,f ,ne’s self as
being engaged in the practice of medicine shall be regarded as practicing the
sa.eS3202 such that advertising or claiming to tCe *ubliH Dt, be a *raHtiti,ner ,f
.ediHine and surgerWS ,r anW ,f its branHCes3203 would be a violation. Thus,
!6!s’ diagn,stiH re*r,duHti'e ser'iHes and H,unseling Z,uld 'i,late 7Ci,’s
statute. Of course, the state licensing board and local prosecutors would have to
decide that they wanted to bring such a claim, as there is not a private right of
action. This requires the political will of elected officials. But enforcing these
statutes does not pose any First Amendment challenges. Even an extremely
conservative and anti-regulation Supreme Court would struggle to wiggle out
from established precedent that permits this kind of regulation.
In 1889, in Dent v. West Virginia,204 the Supreme Court upheld a West
Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to practice, or attempt to practice,
medicine without being qualified or a graduate of a reputable medical college.205
199. Oral Argument at 17:45, Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. "eHerraS @>9 S. !t. ?>;@
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
200. In the mid 1970s, several state courts upheld convictions of acupuncture practitioners for the
unauthorized practice of medicine, as the insertion of needles was considered minor surgery and the use
of needles to reduce pain constituted the practice of medicine. See People v. Amber, 349 N.Y.S.2d 604
(Sup. Ct. 1973); State v. Won, 528 P.2d 594 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Wilson, 528 P.2d 279 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974). A Washington state court easily found that acupuncturists practiced medicine under the
plain language ,f tCe statuteS as tCeW D,ffer ser'iHes t, *e,*le ZitC 'ari,us affliHti,ns and tell tCe. tCeW
Han Cel* tCe. feel better.3 See State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc., 143 P.3d 618, 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Chiropractors have also been prosecuted for failing to comply with state licensing regulations when their
*raHtiHe eXHeeded tCe sH,*e ,f tCeir *er.it ,r tCeW used tCe title D*CWsiHian3 ,r Dd,Ht,rS3 ZCiHC i.*lied
graduation from an allopathic, accredited medical school. See State v. Rich, 339 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ohio
1975).
201. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2018).
202. State v. Farrand, 120 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
203. OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 4731.41 (West 2018).
204. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
205. William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a Physician’s Medical Practice: Is the Public Adequately
Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer Review, and the National Practitioner Data Bank?, 14
ANNALSHEALTH L. 329, 338 (2005). See also Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation
of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALSHEALTH L. 201, 214 (1999).
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The punishment for each offense could include a $5,000 fine, or a 12-month
imprisonment in the county jail.206 The prohibition on practicing medicine
without a proper degree or license was considered by the Supreme Court to be
ZitCin tCe state’s *,Zer t, *r,teHt its HitiVens fr,. tCe DH,nse)uenHes ,f
ign,ranHe and inHa*aHitWS as Zell as ,f deHe*ti,n and fraud.3207 Medical
licensing laws have also survived most constitutional challenges, specifically
claims of unconstitutional limitation of the free exercise of religion208 and
violations of due process.209 There are limits on regulation of the medical
profession.210 However, requiring medical licensure for clinics engaged in
medical services would almost certainly be upheld. The key, of course, would be
in making the threshold determination that CPCs are practicing medicine without
a license.
The penalties imposed for violating modern regulations vary from state to
state.211 In California,212 anW *ers,n ZC, *raHtiHes DanW sWste. ,r .,de ,f
treating tCe siHA ,r affliHted3 ,r ZC, Ddiagn,sesS treatsS ,*erates f,rS ,r
prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder,
inBurWS ,r ,tCer *CWsiHal ,r .ental H,nditi,n ,f anW *ers,n3 ZitC,ut a re)uired
certificate may be liable for a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for a period
of up to one year, or both. In New Hampshire,213 on the other hand, violations
may be penalized by receiving a cease and desist order or a fine of up to
$50,000.214 In Utah, practicing medicine without a license would generate a
meager civil money penalty of not more than $5,000,215 which again reflects the
weak political will of the state in enforcing these practices. Some of these fines
are modest enough that they might be easy for the CPCs to pay. Alternatively,
the state could pursue imprisonment in some states, like California, but this is
politically very unpopular and therefore quite unlikely. Given the type of
remedies involved, it is unsurprising that California has not yet chosen to
prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine. The action is not likely to
yield meaningful consumer protection where CPCs can merely pay the fine or
obtain a medical license and continue to mislead.
206. Dent, 129 U.S. at 232.
207. Id. at 122.
208. Smith v. People, 117 P. 612 (Colo. 1911).
209. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956).
210. A North Carolina law that required physicians to present pregnant women with a sonogram
of their fetus and describe the fetus in real-time, even if the woman acti'elW Da'ert\s[ Cer eWes3 and
Drefus\es[ t, CearS3 Zas f,und t, g, beW,nd tCe eXtent *er.itted f,r reas,nable regulati,n ,f tCe .ediHal
*r,fessi,nS ZCile si.ultane,uslW tCreatening Car. t, tCe *atient’s *sWHC,l,giHal CealtCS interfering ZitC
tCe *CWsiHian’s professional judgment, and compromising the doctor-patient relationship. Stuart v.
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242-45 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the North Carolina ultrasound law violated
the First Amendment).
211. For an overview, see 118 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 215 (2018).
212. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (Deering 2018).
213. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:24 (2018).
214. Id.
215. UTAH CODEANN. § 58-67-301 (West 2018).
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Unlicensed CPCs may run afoul of the medical licensing laws of the state,
as the diagnosis of pregnancy, the discussion of prenatal care, and the use of
ultrasound imaging will easily constitute the practice of medicine.216 While
CPCs might employ volunteer nurses and physicians, they would need to be
licensed and in good standing in each state, and the facility itself would need to
be licensed as a medical facility.
B. New York Investigates CPCs for the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine
In May of 2013, the Attorney General of New York issued a subpoena on
Evergreen Association, which operates twelve CPCs in the New York City area.
The purpose of the investigatory subpoena was to determine whether the CPCs
were engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine. A series of public
hearings conducted in 2010 and 2011 by the New York City Council found that
E'ergreen Dengaged in H,nduHt ZCiHC H,uld H,nstitute tCe unautC,riVed practice
of medicine, including evaluating fetal health and requesting the medical history
,f Hlients.3217 MeanZCileS a tele'ised neZs seg.ent re*,rted tCat DE'ergreen
made diagnoses of gestational age and situated its centers in medical buildings
.aAing tCe. a**ear liAe .ediHal ,ffiHes.3218 The subpoena was meant to
uncover whether the CPCs should be fined, as they did not appear to have any
licensed medical staff.
Evergreen attempted to quash the subpoena as a politically motivated attack
on their constitutional right to advocate against abortion. It claimed that the
Attorney General lacked a factual basis for issuing the subpoena. In June 2017,
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York found that the
#tt,rneW Oeneral Cad Da.*lW de.,nstrate\d[3 tCat a Dlegiti.ate faHtual basis
existed for the Attorney General to conduct his investigation and issue the
subpoena to determine whether Evergreen is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of medicineS3 as Ce Cad adduHed e'idenHe DtCat E'ergreen’s Henters
were set up to look like medical offices, staff members were dressed in scrubs or
lab coats, a medical history was taken from clients, diagnoses of pregnancies,
ectopic pregnancies, and gestational age were made, and medical advice was
given, including false advice.3219
The investigation could proceed, but, because Evergreen is a CPC with
ide,l,giHal r,,tsS tCe H,urt Cad t, .aAe sure tCe ,rganiVati,n’s freed,. ,f
speech and association were not unduly chilled. Therefore, the court limited the
scope of the document requests to ensure they were narrowly tailored to target
216. SeeAM. JUR. PROOFOFFACTS, supra note 211. But seeAlbini v. Connecticut Med. Examining
Bd., 72 A.3d 1208, 1214 (Conn. App. 2013) (holding that midwifery assistance for normal pregnancies
does not constitute the practice of medicine).
217. E'ergreen #ss’nS InH. '. SHCneider.anS <= I.^.S.>d @><S @>9 UI.^. App. Div. 2017).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 142.
2018] Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics 267
,nlW E'ergreen’s *r,'isi,n ,f .ediHallW-related services.220 The Attorney
General could not request documents about the overarching corporate structure
or funding of Evergreen Association, unless those individuals were related to the
provision of medical care.
The investigation by the Attorney General of New York is a step in the right
direction to protect the health of the women of NewYork. Given that many CPCs
provide confirmation of pregnancy and gestational age of the fetus and offer
prenatal vitamins, ultrasounds, and counseling on sexually transmitted
diseases,221 it is alarming that some continue to do this without having medically
licensed staff. There is great potential for substandard care and resulting harm,
as women delay seeing licensed clinicians. These are the precise kinds of risks
the state medical licensing statutes were drafted to address.
V. REGULATING CPCS BYCHALLENGING THEUSE OF FDA-APPROVED
DEVICES INUNAPPROVEDWAYS
A. The Co-Opting of the Ultrasound Device
In tCe,rWS P_# enf,rHe.ent H,uld als, *r,'ide a .eans f,r Hurbing !6!s’
deceptive practices. One of the chief ways that CPCs deceive pregnant women
is by advertising that they provide free ultrasounds. This is a major selling point,
especially for low-income women who seek their services. And given that the
biggest risk factor in failing to receive adequate prenatal care is poverty and lack
of insurance, this was precisely why California passed the FACT Act, requiring
disHl,sure ,f !alif,rnia’s state-funded pregnancy treatment options.222
Recognizing that their niche market was the underinsured, a CPC trainer advised
trainees to tell callers asking about abortion care that, while the CPC does not
offer abortion services, it does provide free ultrasounds that the woman will need
to have before she can get abortion care.223 From the pro-life perspective,
*r,'iding a guided ultras,und is DHruHial t, tCe eX*liHit tasA ,f *ersuading tCe
Z,.an n,t t, ab,rt.3224 The idea is based in part on an unproven premise that
women who abort their fetuses are doing so thoughtlessly. Once the woman sees,
220. Id. at 146.
221. Chen, supra note 5, at 936-37.
222. Iat’l Inst. ,f Pa.ilW + Jife #d',Hates '. NarrisS 9>8 P.>d 9?>S 9=@ U8tC !ir. ?Q@;T UDTCe
California Legislature determined that a substantial number of California citizens may not be aware of, or
have access to, medical services relevant to pregnancy. This includes findings that in 2012, 2.6 million
California women were in need of publicly-funded family-planning services, and that thousands of
pregnant California women remain unaware of the state-funded programs that offer an array of services,
suHC as CealtC eduHati,n and *lanningS *renatal HareS and ab,rti,n.3T.
223. Winter, Save the Mother, Save the Baby, An Inside Look at a Pregnancy Center Conference,
COSMOPOLITAN (April 6, 2015), http://cosmopolitan.com/politics/a38642/heartbeat-international-confere
nce-crisis-pregnancy-centers-abortion [https://perma.cc/Z9HA-RCFN].
224. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 375 (2008).
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via ultrasound, the heartbeat and perhaps the head, fingers, and toes of her fetus,
she will be forced to emotionally confront the life she is about to terminate and
will change her mind.
Pro-life advocates have relied heavily on the persuasive power of the
ultrasound. Twenty-six states have enacted some form of legislation that requires
a woman to obtain an ultrasound before terminating her pregnancy. Similar bills
have been introduced in many other states.225 In Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas,
and Wisconsin, state law requires that the abortion provider show the woman the
image on the ultrasound and describe it to her, even if she does not want to see
it.226 North Carolina passed a law that required physicians performing abortions
to display and describe the image during the ultrasound, even if the woman
aHti'elW Da'ert\s[ Cer eWes3 and Drefus\es[ t, Cear.3227 TCis Dreal-ti.e 'ieZ3
aspect of the law was challenged by physicians as compelled speech that violated
their First Amendment rights (and professional ethics). The Fourth Circuit
agreed tCat tCe Dreal-ti.e 'ieZ3 *art ,f tCe statute did n,t sur'i'e inter.ediate
scrutiny.228 It Zas HritiHal t, tCe !,urt’s C,lding tCat tCe I,rtC !ar,lina laZ n,t
allow physicians to deviate from the required disclosures or timing, even if, in
the physiHian’s *r,fessi,nal Budg.entS she thought it was best to do so. Doctors
in KentuHAW are liAeZise HCallenging tCeir state’s inf,r.ed H,nsent t, ab,rti,n
statute on similar First Amendment grounds.229 It will be interesting to see what
level of scrutiny the federal courts apply, in light of NIFLA and tCe !,urt’s
dismissal of intermediate review for professional speech. Either way, state
informed-consent laws that provide for the physician to deviate from the content
of the required disclosure and timing if it is in her best medical judgment to do
so, seem much more likely to be upheld.230 Given that ultrasound is becoming a
prerequisite to obtaining an abortion, it is necessary to see what the FDA has to
say about its use in nonclinical settings, such as CPCs.
B. Ultrasounds are FDA-Approved Devices that Should Not Be Used in
Pseudo-Clinical Ways
Ultrasound is a medical technology that is regulated by the FDA. Ultrasound
provides a window into the anatomy of a fetus in utero, by sending sound waves
through soft tissue such as the pregnant belly. The sound waves bounce off the





227. 2011 N.C. SESS. LAWS 405.
228. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014).
229. EM//,.en’s SurgiHal !tr.S 6.S.!. '. "esCearS ?9> P. Su**. >d ;?8S ;>? (W.D. Ky. Sept.
27, 2017).
230. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 254.
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tissue and render images of the size and structure of these organs and tissues,
including any abnormalities in fetal development.231 Ultrasound has become a
very important tool in obstetrics to confirm pregnancy, diagnose ectopic and
molar pregnancies, and reveal fetal disfigurement, fetal movements, and uterine
cysts or other abnormalities.232 Modern ultrasound technology employs higher
frequency sound waves that can show a moving 3-D image of the wiggling fetus.
While the technology is generally considered safe, prolonged non-clinical
exposure may have negative health effects.233 Ultrasound waves can heat the
tissues and produce small pockets of gas in body fluids or tissues.234 The long-
term consequences of these effects are still unknown.235 Out of concern for the
negative health effects on the fetus, organizations such as the American Institute
,f1ltras,und inMediHine Ca'e ad',Hated f,r D*rudent use3 ,f ultras,und during
pregnancy, and have discouraged it from being used off-label. In addition to the
biological effects of ultrasound on the pregnant woman and fetus, there are also
health risks from inadequately trained staff or poorly maintained equipment.236
Even with the 3-D advancements, ultrasound images require skill to be
interpreted correctly and meaningfully. This is especially true in early
pregnancy, when capturing the correct angles is difficult and the rendered images
may be quite ambiguous to the untrained eye. Given the skill required to capture
and interpret the images, it is shocking that many CPCs lack trained or licensed
radiological technicians. The lack of training of CPC staff can harm pregnant
women and their fetuses.
The most obvious potential harm is that women assume, incorrectly, that
their babies are healthy after having the ultrasound performed. This risk was first
identified ZCen DAee*saAe ultras,und3 studi,s suHC as Petal P,t,s ,*ened in
malls around the country. Women assumed the photographer would tell them if
they saw something abnormal in the image.237 However, some photographers
b,ldlW ann,unHed tCat DtCeW Zill ign,re fetal abn,r.alities e'en if a fetus Cas
tCree legs.3238
231. 75 AM. JUR. TRIALS 55 Ultrasound (Sonography) § 49 (2018).
232. Sanger, supra note 224, at 369.
233. See Information for Patients including Expectant Mothers, U.S. FOOD&DRUGADMIN. (Aug.
29, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/
MedicalImaging/ucm115357.htm#industry [https://perma.cc/GZR4-Y2VY[ UD/Cile ultras,und is
generally considered to be safe with very low risks, the risks may increase with unnecessary prolonged
exposure to ultrasound energy, or when untrained users ,*erate tCe de'iHe.3T.
234. Avoid Fetal “Keepsake” Images, Heartbeat Monitors, U.S. FOOD&DRUGADMIN. (Dec. 16,
2016), https://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm095508.htm [https://perma.cc/FVP3-PG
BE].
235. See Information for Patients including Expectant Mothers, supra note 233.
236. Jennifer M. Uhles, Unsound Ultrasounds? An Examination of State Legislation Regulating
Non-Medical Ultrasound Use and Private Ownership, 28 J. LEGALMED. 263, 264 (2007).
237. Archie A. Alexander, “Just Scanning Around” with Diagnostic Medical Ultrasound: Should
States Regulate the Non-Diagnostic Uses of This Technology?, 16 ANNALSHEALTH L. 1, 8 (2007).
238. Id.
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In one instance, a woman went to a keepsake imaging studio and left
believing her baby was healthy. She later discovered at her OB/GYN clinic that
her baby had significant fetal anomalies that were consistent with Trisomy 18
and Smith-Lemli-Opitz Syndrome. These abnormalities were visible earlier, but
went undetected or unreported by the operator at the fetal keepsake studio.239
Ignoring these defects and not reporting them seems cruel, until you realize that
the photographers are probably not very experienced in reading these images and
are also trying to insulate themselves from claims of medical malpractice or the
unauthorized practice of medicine. There are many instances of clinicians being
sued for medical malpractice over improper capture or interpretation of
ultrasound images.240 Whatever line remains between keepsake studios and
clinical practice must be defended by these businesses.
If the keepsake imaging studio were held to a medical standard of care, it
could be liable for negligence for failure to report significant clinical findings.
However, given that these entities are purely commercial and make no claims
about diagnosing disorders, the consumers are poorly protected from the false
sense of security they receive. There is significant risk of psychological injury,
as well as the potential to neglect more rigorous clinical follow-up if they assume
the fetus is healthy. Unfortunately, we will probably never know the extent of
the harm done by these keepsake ultrasound studios, as they are unlikely to report
their findings to any public health agencies.241
While the practices at keepsake ultrasound studios are troubling, the risk that
the consumer will misinterpret the nature of the ultrasound is much more
profound at a pseudo-clinic, such as a CPC. If you are visiting a strip mall and
realiVe W,u are *aWing f,r a Dfun3 and Dn,'el3 ultras,und eX*erienHe in an
obviously non-clinical setting, your expectations differ significantly from the
expectations of women entering a CPC. As discussed previously, CPCs
deliberately mislead women into thinking they are seeing a nurse or doctor at a
proper health clinic. Given the heightened risk of misperception, it is much less
ethical for CPCs to employ ideological and unlicensed staff to interpret
ultrasound images.
C. States and the FDA Could Prohibit the Use of Ultrasound by Unlicensed
CPCs
Louisiana has attempted to eliminate off-label, non-clinical ultrasound
screening by defining them as an unauthorized practice of medicine under
239. Id. at 7.
240. LaRose v. Washington University, 154 S.W.3d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); see also 75 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 55 (2018).
241. Alexander, supra note 237, at 7-8.
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Louisiana law.242 California already protects somewhat against the use of
ultrasound technology for non-approved uses. In 2009, the California legislature
passed a bill that requires certain disclosures before ultrasound is used for non-
HliniHal *ur*,ses. S*eHifiHallWS tCe H,nsu.er .ust be t,ld DtCat tCe P_# Cas
determined the use of medical ultrasound equipment for reasons other than
.ediHal *ur*,ses ,r ZitC,ut a *CWsiHian’s *resHri*ti,n is an una**r,'ed use ,f
mediHal teHCn,l,gW.3243 Unfortunately, despite their ability to do so, state and
federal regulatory agencies have not enforced any actions against keepsake
ultrasound studios or CPCs based on their provision of ultrasounds.244
FDA discourages the use of ultrasound in a non-clinical setting by those who
are not trained in its use or interpretation. While off-label uses of devices may
be allowed under the supervision of a physician and within tight statutory
conditions, the use by non-clinicians such as unlicensed CPCs or keepsake
studios is clearly an unapproved off-label use.245 In addition to regulating how
the device may be used, the FDA has also deemed the promotion of unapproved
uses of a device to be a violation of FDA regulations, and the training of CPC
staff f,r an una**r,'ed use Z,uld be Dillegal *r,.,ti,nal aHti'itW.3246 FDA
could require that CPCs employ trained ultrasound technicians and comply with
clinical guidelines. Ultimately, the FDA has the authority to shut keepsake-
imaging studios down. However, given the limited resources available for
enforcement at the FDA, senior agency officials appear to have opted to focus
their attention on more high-risk devices.247
CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING INFORMED CONSENT IN THEABORTION CONTEXT
By suggesting that women bring battery causes of action against unlicensed
CPCs, this Article advocates for returning informed consent law to its ethical and
legal roots. Informed consent doctrine surrounding abortion has been perverted
by state TRAP laws, which have blurred the lines between ideology and
medicine. The majority opinion in NIFLA exacerbates this troubling trend. When
242. Under the bill as proposed, any person who administers an ultrasound upon a pregnant woman
without an order or referral shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The bill included an exception for
individuals who are licensed to practice medicine, as well as licensed advanced practice nurses and
licensed physician assistants. See Ja. State "d. ,f Med. EXa.’rsS Statement of Position, Self-Referred
Diagnostic Ultrasound Screening (Oct. 25, 2000), https://www.lsbme.la.gov/sites/default/files/doc
uments/Statements%20of%20Position/UltrasoundScreening.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H5A-HBSK] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018).
243. Uhles, supra note 236, at 270.
244. Alexander, supra note 237, at 9-10.
245. TCe all,Zed D,ff-label3 uses assu.e tCat a DCealtC Hare *raHtiti,ner3 Zill be *resHribing tCe
legallW .arAeted de'iHe Dt, a *atient3 f,r a disease ,r H,nditi,n DZitCin a legiti.ate CealtC Hare
practitioner-*atient relati,nsCi*.3 ?@ 1.S.!. & >8; U?Q@9T.
246. JAMES T.7’4EILLY ANDKATHARINEA. VAN TASSEL, 2 FOOD&DRUGADMIN. § 18:94 (4th
ed., 2018).
247. Id. § 18.1.
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physicians are required to share misinformation with their patients seeking
abortion, or when CPCs exploit the medical model, this does violence to the
sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.248 It erodes trust and sullies the
professional reputation of all physicians. Even where abortion providers follow
u* tCe .andat,rW disHl,sures ZitC disHlai.ers tCat DI ,nlW sCared tCat
information because I have to bW laZS n,t beHause I belie'e itS3 tCere is still
confusion. Does the physician speak for the government, or can she be trusted to
*r,teHt Cer *atients’ best interests$ /Cat d,es it .ean if tCe *CWsiHian is telling
the patient things that she herself does not believe? Is anything objective in
medicine, or is it all up for debate?
CPCs are exploiting the professional respect of physicians and the existing
framework of informed consent to shoehorn ideology through medicine.
Through TRAP laws and the deceptive practices of CPCs, the pro-life
community is eroding the distinction between a clinic and a pseudo-clinic, and
between politics and patient care. This could have sweeping negative impacts on
tCe *raHtiHe ,f .ediHineS and als, ,n Z,.en’s CealtC. /,.en ZC, visit CPCs
may delay being seen by actual doctors and might assume incorrectly that the
CPC staff are held to a professional standard of care. This could impose
significant health risks both on the pregnant woman and the fetus.
In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court has
recognized that states have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession.249 This should also be true in the context of abortion
providers. Recall that the Casey *luralitW stated tCat Dthe doctor-patient relation
here is entitled to the same solicitude it reHei'es in ,tCer H,nteXts.3250 This
message has sadly been lost on many state legislators, eager to pass TRAP laws
that pervert the ethical principles of patient autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice. Physicians should be allowed to have political voices.
So, too, should pro-life activists. But each should have their policy debates, and
win or lose them, in the political sphere. The sacred relationship between the
physician and patient should not be leveraged for ideological gains.
#t *resentS tCe laZ is l,*sided. TCe Pirst #.end.ent *r,teHts tCe !6!s’
deceptive practices not in spite of but because they are pseudo-clinics, motivated
not by commercial or professional interest but by ideology. Indeed, an auto-
mechanic or plumber, and certainly a licensed health care facility, is legally
prohibited from deceiving customers in the way that the CPCs do. And yet
248. DTCe relati,nsCi* betZeen a patient and physician is based on trust, which gives rise
to physicians’ etCiHal res*,nsibilitW t, *laHe patients’ Zelfare above the *CWsiHian’s own self-interest or
,bligati,ns t, ,tCersS t, use s,und .ediHal Budg.ents ,n *atients’ beCalfS and t, ad',Hate f,r tCeir
*atients’ Zelfare.3 See Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/patient-physician-relationships [https://perma.cc/2XDC-8ATB] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2018).
249. SeeWashington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
250. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
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precisely because the clinic is not a clinic at all, its deceptive practices are
afforded the greatest possible protection as ideological free speech. This is an
absurd outcome, given how underhanded CPCs are about revealing their
ideological underpinnings.
To correct this imbalance, it would have been wise for the Supreme Court
to adopt the perspective of the objective listener of the compelled disclosures
ZCen deter.ining C,Z t, HlassifW !6!s’ s*eeHC. TCis Z,uld Ca'e been a better
way to balance the free speeHC rigCts ,f ,rganiVati,ns against tCe *ubliH’s need
to understand who exactly is speaking to them. Political organizations such as
CPCs should not be allowed to hide behind their ideology to deceive
unsuspecting individuals. Unfortunately, at present this is not a practical
solution. It is not reasonable to expect injured women to wait until the Supreme
Court revisits or overrules its NIFLA precedent.
There are already tools at the disposal of our prosecutors and agency
regulators which can help to provide some protection for pregnant women.
Consumer protection statutes could restrict the deceptive advertising practices of
CPCs. State laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of medicine could be
enf,rHedS as IeZ ^,rA’s att,rneW general is atte.*ting t, do. FDA enforcement
aHti,ns H,uld HCi* aZaW at tCe !6!’s use ,f P_#-approved medical devices in
non-approved ways. But each of these existing tools requires the political will of
elected and appointed officials. And so far, there are very few of these leaders
who are willing to spend the political capital to protect pregnant women from
deceptive CPCs. This has left the injured pregnant women with very little
recourse.
Following basic tort remedies of compensatory damages, these injured
pregnant women should be compensated for their pain and suffering, any
resulting lost wages or income, and any other reasonable financial damages that
stem from the battery, such as increased medical expenses from delayed
diagnosis of pregnancy complications, or even wrongful deatC if tCe !6!’s
conduct results in the unwanted death of the fetus.251 Additionally, where the
CPCs deliberately defrauded these women to gain access to their bodies, these
women would also be good candidates for punitive damages, which would help
to fund tCe litigati,n and att,rneW’s fees.
We must fight to reclaim informed consent. It is not a meaningless tool to
shoehorn ideology through. It is not an amorphous concept, which allows a
pseudo-clinic to make a woman think she is being treated medically, when she
is actually being persuaded to submit to a religious ideology. By returning to the
roots of the informed consent doctrine, suing for the intentional tort of battery,
251. P,r tCe sa.e reas,ns disHussed ab,'e related t, DZr,ngful birtC3 Hlai.sS supra notes 196-198
and accompanying text, states are not likely to allow for damages from the resulting birth of a child, even
ZCere tCe !6!’s deHe*ti'e *raHtiHes led a Z,.an t, delaW reHei'ing an ab,rti,n until after it is *r,Cibited
by the state.
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victims of the misleading practice of CPCs can obtain personal redress. In the
absence of proper public enforcement, tort law emerges as our last and best
resort. And while tort law is scattershot and ex post, it can nonetheless provide
.eaningful and neHessarW regulati,n ,f !6!s’ deHe*ti'e beCa'i,r.
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ABSTRACT: Scholars and other commentators have identified failures in the
regulation of cosmeticsFwhich depends heavily on voluntary industry self-
regulationFand called for more stringent regulation of these products. Yet these
calls have largely neglected an important dimension of the problem: the current
laissez-faire approach to the regulation of cosmetics disproportionally places
women, and particularly women who are members of other excluded groups, at
risk. This Article examines federal cosmetics law and regulation through a
feminist lens. It argues that cosmetics law and regulation have lagged behind that
of the other major product categories regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 because
cosmetics are a gendered product and industry. In addition, conflicting views of
the meaning of cosmetics among self-identified feminists, and differences in
Z,.en’s relati,nsCi*s t, H,s.etiHs, mean that reform efforts must confront
opposition and tension both within and outside of feminism. Ultimately, this
Article questions the legitimacy of the current approach to cosmetics law and
regulation. It concludes with several recommendations about how to address
some of the failures of cosmetics law and regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The e)cessive use of lipstick has greatly increased the world’s troubles.
Lipstick is not healthful for women. It is not safe for men.1
The approximately fifty billion-dollar American cosmetics and beauty
product industry is a gendered industry,2 DHreated and .aintained bW Z,.en.33
/CetCer tCis industrW Dis a Car.fulS ,bBeHtifWing Hreati,n ,r a s,urHe ,f strengtC
and inde*endenHe f,r Z,.en3 Cas been desHribed as D,ne ,f tCe .,st
H,ntenti,us debates in #.eriHan fe.inis.s.34 Regardless of whether cosmetics
are viewed as oppressive, liberating, or something else, many women use or are
otherwise exposed to cosmetics.5 For example, 86 percent ,f Z,.en Duse s,.e
1. CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE RECORD 156 (1938) (reproducing 78 Cong. Rec. 8955-67 (May 16, 1934)) (statement of
Senator Matthew Mansfield Neely during debate on legislation to extend federal food and drug law to
cosmetics, which ultimately culminated in the passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) of 1938).
2. See ANYA COHEN, IBISWORLD INDUSTRY REPORT 32562: COSMETIC & BEAUTY PRODUCTS
MANUFACTURING IN THEUS 4 (Mar. 2018). The Dcosmetic and beauty product industry3 definition is not
entirely coterminous with the FDCA’s definition of Dcosmetics.3 Compare id. at 2, with FDCA § 201(i),
21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (2012); see also infra Section I.A (discussing the FDCA’s definition of cosmetics).
3. Amber R. Clifford, Feminism, in THE AMERICAN BEAUTY INDUSTRY ENCYCLOPEDIA 111 (Julie
Willett ed., 2010) (stating that Dthe key to the growth of the American beauty industry has been the
involvement of women as consumers, creators, and icons3). Of course, men also use cosmetics and men’s
personal care products are a growing industry. See RITA FREEDMAN, BEAUTYBOUND 225 (1986) (stating
that men Dare buying more cosmetics every year3); GWEN KAY, DYING TO BE BEAUTIFUL: THE FIGHT
FOR SAFE COSMETICS (2005); KATHY PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR: THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S BEAUTY
CULTURE (1998); Andria Cheng, The Surprising Trend in Beauty? Skincare Sales Growing the Fastest
Among Men’s Grooming Products, FORBES (June 15, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/andriacheng/2018/06/15/the-gift-your-dad-really-wants-this-fathers-day-anti-aging-cream/#71241e
5133ba [https://perma.cc/3DVZ-58XU]; MINTEL, MEN’S PERSONAL CARE U.S. (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter
MEN’S PERSONAL CARE].
4. Clifford, supra note 3, at 111; see, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 53, 231 (DCosmetic strategies
do help to normalize women, but they insidiously confirm female deviance even while counterbalancing
it.3); id. at 231 (DIf women don’t want to be regarded as decorative dolls, can they still delight in self-
display? Is the ultimate goal to be accepted for oneselfFuncoiffed, unadorned, and therefore, in the eyes
of many, unkempt? . . . When are cosmetic transformations a negative act of self-rejection, and when are
they a positive act of self-enhancement? . . . Many feminists have difficulty finding personal answers to
such questions, for they, too, experience the conflict between conviction and convention, between the
utopian ideal of natural beauty that includes all, and the actual ideal of cultured beauty that excludes so
many.3); NAOMIWOLF, THEBEAUTYMYTH: HOW IMAGES OFBEAUTYAREUSED AGAINSTWOMEN 113
(1992) (discussing the cosmetics industry and stating that D[w]asting women’s money is the calculable
damage; but the damage this fraud does women through its legacy of the dread of aging is incalculable3);
BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (1992).
5. This exposure may not be voluntary. For example, employers may have dress codes that require
female employees to wear makeup. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2006). Many women are exposed to cosmetics in their workplaces. For example, according to industry
estimates, 96% of the workforce in nail salons and other personal care services in the United States is
women. CENTERS FORDISEASECONTROL&PREVENTION, NAT’L INST. FOROCCUPATIONALSAFETYAND
HEALTH (NIOSH), NAILTECHNICIANS’HEALTHANDWORKPLACEEXPOSURECONTROL (internal citation
omitted), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/manicure/default.html [https://perma.cc/F7AH-H94U] [here-
inafter NIOSH, NAILTECHNICIANS’HEALTH]. There is also debate over whether or not cosmetics use can
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type of make-u*3 and Z,.en H,.*rise 8?.; percent of hairdressers, hairstylists,
and cosmetologistsFjobs that often involve exposure to cosmetics.6
TCe P,,d and _rug #d.inistrati,n UP_#T regulates DH,s.etiHs3 under tCe
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Since enacting the FDCA in
@8>9S !,ngress Cas signifiHantlW HCanged and strengtCened tCe #Ht’s *r,'isi,ns
for the other major product categories that were present in the original 1938 Act
(i.e., food, drugs, and medical devices). However, the cosmetics provisionsF
which span less than two pages of the approximately 500-page amended
FDCAFhave remained largely unchanged for the past eighty years.7
Accordingly, there is a substantial divide between the law and regulation for
cosmetics and that for the other major product categories.8 Cosmetics are the
least regulated ,f tCe .aB,r *r,duHt Hateg,ries ZitCin P_#’s BurisdiHti,n.9 The
_ireHt,r ,f P_#’s 7ffiHe ,f !,s.etiHs and !,l,rs Cas statedS f,r eXa.*leS tCat
P_# d,es n,t DAn,Z tCe nu.ber ,f .anufaHturers \,f tatt,, inAs Ua tW*e ,f
H,s.etiHT[S ZC, tCeW areS ZCere tCeW areS and ZCat tCeW .aAe.310 The Director
has also indicated that P_# is DBust seeing tCe ti* ,f tCe iHeberg3 in ter.s ,f tCe
reporting of adverse events related to cosmetics in the voluntary reporting
system.11
TCe H,s.etiHs industrW Cas argued tCat D\H[,s.etiHs are tCe safest *r,duHts
tCat P_# regulates.312 Yet this does not mean that cosmetics are safe, given the
ever be truly voluntary given societal pressures. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 48 (discussing
beauty routines and the Dstrong human need to conform to social norms3); PEISS, supra note 3, at 4.
6. MINTEL, COLORCOSMETICS-US-JULY 2017 [hereinafter COLORCOSMETICS]; BUREAUOFLABOR
STATISTICS, EMPLOYED PERSONS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR LATINO
ETHNICITY tbl.11 (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5PW-TP7R]
[hereinafter BLS, DETAILEDOCCUPATION] (DHairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists3).
7. See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2012); compare FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 361-364 (1938 supp. IV) with
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 361-364 (2012); see also 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 361-364 (West 2018).
8. See infra Section II.C.2.e. (discussing how cosmetics law and regulation lag behind that of other
product categories.)
9. Jordan Paradise & Ethan Fitzpatrick, Synthetic Biology: Does Re-Writing Nature Require Re-
Writing Regulation?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 70 (2012); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE
(GAO), GAO/HRD-90-58, COSMETICS REGULATION: INFORMATION ON VOLUNTARY ACTIONS AGREED
TO BY FDA AND THE INDUSTRY (Mar. 1990), https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/212263.pdf [https://perma.
cc/JH3V-CF3X] [hereinafter GAO/HRD-90-58]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), STATEMENT
OFGREGORY J. AHART, DIRECTOR, HUMANRESOURCESDIV., BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ONOVERSIGHT&
INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE ON THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION’S REGULATION OF COSMETICS (Feb. 3, 1978), https://www.gao.gov/assets/100/98639.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QEF8-XKSP]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), HRD-78-139, LACK OF
AUTHORITYHAMPERSATTEMPTS TO INCREASECOSMETIC SAFETY (Aug. 8, 1978), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/130/123795.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VD6-MV6Y] [hereinafter GAO, HRD-78-139].
10. FDA,Using Adverse Event Reports to Monitor Cosmetic Safety: A Conversation with Linda Katz
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/complianceenforcement/adverseeventreporting/ucm531
634.htm [https://perma.cc/U7AH-H8TA] [hereinafter FDA, Adverse Event Reports].
11. FDA, Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Testimony Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling, LLP, Before the
Health Subcomm. of Comm. on Energy & Commerce U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 27, 2012),
https://archives-energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearing
s/Health/20120327/HHRG-112-IF14-WState-HuttP-20120327.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU6J-STYJ]; Test-
imony of Halyna Breslawec, Ph.D., Chief Scientist & Exec. Vice President for Sci., Pers. Care Prod.
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large number of people that foodborne illnesses, medications, and tobacco
products kill and injure each year.13 Indeed, there is much uncertainty about the
safety of cosmetics, and some may not be safe.14 Yet the current approach to
cosmetics law and regulation, rather than helping to assess these claims, hinders
meaningful evaluation of the safety of the industry.
This Article examines federal cosmetics law and regulation from a feminist
perspective.15 SpecificallyS it asAs tCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3 ab,ut H,s.etiHs laZ
and regulati,n in ,rder t, DidentifW tCe gender i.*liHati,ns3 ,f tCis regulat,rW
sWste.S DZCiHC .igCt ,tCerZise a**ear t, be neutral ,r ,bBeHti'e.316 The
association between cosmetics and femininity is so strong that some readers may
)uesti,n ZCetCer tCere is e'en a need t, asA tCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3 ab,ut
cosmetics law and regulation. But as this Article argues, the relationship between
the under-regulation of cosmetics and their association with women is both
strong and complex. Cosmetics law and regulation have been deprioritized for
.anW reas,nsS inHluding as a result ,f differenHes in Z,.en’s usage ,f
cosmetics, the longstanding and close association of cosmetics with femininity
and women, and the debate among self-described feminists regarding cosmetics.
Explicitly considering how cosmetics law and regulation fail to account for the
needs and experiences of women and members of other excluded groups is
necessary if these omissions are to be remedied.
Council, Before the Health Subcomm. of Comm. on Energy & Commerce U.S. House of Representatives
(Mar. 27, 2012), https://archives-energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.
gov/files/Hearings/Health/20120327/HHRG-112-IF14-WState-BreslawecH-20120327.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/PDS4-Q7YD].
13. There are an estimated D106 000 deaths/year from nonerror, adverse effects of medications3 in
the United States. Barbara Starfield, Commentary, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA
483, 484 (July 26, 2000). In addition, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that
D[a]bout 48 million people (1 in 6 Americans) get sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die each year
from foodborne diseases.3 FDA, FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT (FSMA), INSPECTION &
COMPLIANCE, https://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm257978.htm [https://perma.cc/3E
FM-LMAW]. About D16 million Americans are living with a disease caused by smoking3 and Dcigarette
smoking is responsible for more than 480,000 deaths per year in the United States.3 Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention, Fast Facts: Diseases and Death, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/
fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm [https://perma.cc/A2AA-4JVC].
14. See also infra Section II.B (discussing potential risks and harms of cosmetics).
15. This Article focuses on gender and FDA’s regulation of cosmetics with respect to human health
and safety under the FDCA; it does not consider the role that other federal laws (e.g., the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, Occupational Safety & Health Act) and agencies (e.g.,
EPA, FTC, and OSHA) play in the regulation of cosmetics. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N (FTC),
https://www.ftc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/588Y-M9AN]; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), https://www.
epa.gov/ [https://perma.cc/32WU-2U3N]; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN. (OSHA), https://www.osha.gov/ [https://perma.cc/SLJ7-37NY]; Occupational Safety & Health
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-956, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2012)); Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2018 supp. V); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2018 supp. V). This Article also does not examine state
cosmetics laws and tort law. See, e.g., California Safe Cosmetics Act, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-
06/bill/sen/sb_0451-0500/sb_484_bill_20051007_chaptered.pdf [https://perma.cc/B75T-9C3X]; 148
AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 207 (originally published in 2015).
16. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990).
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I defines several key terms and
intr,duHes tCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3 as a fe.inist legal .etC,d. 6art II eXa.ines
cosmetics as a gendered product and industry, and highlights several ways that
product use and exposure may be shaped by the intersection of gender, race, and
class. It then discusses the safety of cosmetics and explains why women, and
particularly women who are members of other excluded groups, may be
disproportionately impacted by the failures of cosmetics law and regulation. Part
II then provides an overview of cosmetics law and regulation, with a focus on
how they have lagged behind that of the other major product categories in the
FDCA. Against this backdrop, Part III argues that cosmetics law and regulation
have been deprioritized as a result of their longstanding and close association
ZitC fe.ininitW and Z,.enS as Zell as Z,.en’s eXHlusi,n fr,. *,litiHal
participation and representation. It also argues that cosmetics law and regulation
have been deprioritized as a result of the debate among self-described feminists
,'er tCe .eaning ,f H,s.etiHsS as Zell as differenHes in Z,.en’s relati,nsCi*s
to and perspectives on cosmetics. Part IV considers the implications of this
analysis for reform. Ultimately, this Article uses a feminist lens to question the
legitimacy of the current approach to cosmetics law and regulation and strives to
make readers do the same.17
I. TERMINOLOGY&METHODOLOGY
Before turning to a discussion of the gendered and racialized impact of the
contemporary regulation of cosmetics in Part II, the current Part discusses
several important terms and provides a discussion of the method employed in
later seHti,ns. In *artiHularS tCis #rtiHle uses an eX*anded 'ersi,n ,f DtCe Z,.an
)uesti,nS3 ZCiHC analWVes Dgender . . . ZitCin tCe H,nteXts ,f.ulti*le identities3
t, asA C,Z H,s.etiHs laZ and regulati,n Dlea'e ,ut ,r disad'antage Z,.en and
.e.bers ,f ,tCer eXHluded gr,u*s.318
A. Defining “Cosmetics”
TCis #rtiHle f,Huses ,n DH,s.etiHs3 as defined under tCe P_!A. The FDCA
defines DH,s.etiHs3 t, .ean DartiHles intended t, be rubbedS *,uredS s*rinAledS
or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied to the human body or any
part thereof for cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the
17. See Allison M. Blackman,Manufactured Home Displacement and Its Disparate Impact on Low-
Income Females: A Violation of the Fair Housing Act in Boise, Idaho?, 4 THE CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J.
67, 68-69 (2011) (DThus, the underlying goal of this article is to challenge and provokeFto raise
awareness about involuntary manufactured home displacement, and ultimately to make readers question
the legitimacy of 2fair housing’ laws in their status quo operation.3).
18. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 831, 848.
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appearanHe.319 The definition includes components of such articles but excludes
soap, which FDA has defined narrowly.20 For example, cosmetics include hair
products (e.g., hair dyes, permanent waves, relaxers, cleansing shampoos, and
conditioners), makeup (e.g., eye products, lipstick, novelty makeup, permanent
makeup, and tattoo ink), nail products (e.g., fingernail polishes and artificial
nails), perfumes, deodorants, and skin moisturizers.21
Because the subject of this Article is cosmetics law and regulation, this
Article focuses on products that FDA regulates as cosmetics, not as cosmetics
and another product category (i.e., products with dual classification).22 It is
i.*,rtant t, n,teS C,Ze'erS tCat DH,s.etiHs3 .aW als, .eet tCe definiti,n ,f ,ne
,f tCe P_!#’s ,tCer *r,duHt Hateg,ries. P,r eXa.*leS a DH,s.etiH3 .aW als, be
a DdrugS323 ZCiHC inHludes artiHles intended f,r tCera*eutiH use and DartiHles . . .
intended t, affeHt tCe struHture ,r anW funHti,n ,f tCe b,dW ,f .an.324 The
intended use of a product is central to determining whether it is a cosmetic or a
drug or both.25 TCe HlassifiHati,n ,f a *r,duHt deter.ines tCe sH,*e ,f P_#’s
authority over it and the requirements that the manufacturer must meet. If a
product is a drug or a drug and a cosmetic, it is subject to the requirements for
19. FDCA § 201(i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (2012).
20. Id. The FDA has interpreted the term Dsoap3 to mean articles where D[t]he bulk of the nonvolatile
matter . . . consists of an alkali salt of fatty acid and the detergent properties . . . are due to the alkali-fatty
acid compounds3 and articles that are Dlabeled, sold, and represented only as soap.3 21 C.F.R. § 701.20
(2018).
21. FDA, FDA AUTHORITY OVER COSMETICS: HOW COSMETICS ARE NOT FDA-APPROVED, BUT
ARE FDA-REGULATED, https://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/GuidanceRegulation/LawsRegulations/ucm074
162.htm [https://perma.cc/G8NJ-9S5A] [hereinafter FDAAUTHORITYOVER COSMETICS].
22. Cosmetics may include ingredients that are regulated as Dcolor additives,3 however, these are
distinct regulatory categories with distinct regulatory requirements. See FDCA § 201(t), 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(t) (2012) (Dcolor additive3); FDCA § 301(i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (2012) (Dcosmetic3); FDCA § 721,
21 U.S.C. § 379e (2012) (Listing and Certification of Color Additives for Foods, Drugs, Devices, and
Cosmetics). Unlike Dcosmetics,3 Dcolor additives3 have to be listed (i.e., approved) for a particular use
before being so used. Id. Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of the current analysis, Dcolor
additives3 are not limited to use in cosmetics. Id. FDA may approve a color additive for use in or on food,
drugs, and devicesFproduct categories that unlike cosmetics do not have a long gendered-history. See
infra Section II.A.
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 359 (stating that the drugs and devices subchapter of FDCA Dshall not apply to
any cosmetic unless such cosmetic is also a drug or device3); see also FDA, IS IT A COSMETIC, A DRUG,
OR BOTH? (OR IS IT SOAP?), https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/guidanceregulation/lawsregulations/ucm
074201.htm [https://perma.cc/U3X4-2N3A].
24. FDCA § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012).
25. See FDCA § 201(g), (i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g), (i) (2012); see also Laura A. Heymann, The
Cosmetic/Drug Dilemma: FDA Regulation of Alpha-Hydroxy Acids, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 357, 358
(1997) (stating that the answer to the question of whether a product is a cosmetic or a drug under most
interpretations of the FDCA is Drooted not in the chemical composition or physiological effect of AHAs
but rather in how the manufacturer has positioned the product and the promises made as to its effects3).
But see PETER BARTONHUTT ET AL., FOOD ANDDRUG LAW: CASES ANDMATERIALS 118 (4th ed. 2014)
(DFDA has manifested an inclination to categorize articles containing pharmacologically active
ingredients as drugs even when their manufacturers make only cosmetic claims.3). The cosmetics industry
uses the term cosmeceutical to Drefer to cosmetic products that have medicinal or drug-like benefits,3 but
neither FDCA nor FDA recognize this term. FDA, COSMECEUTICAL, https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/
labeling/claims/ucm127064.htm [https://perma.cc/RHV7-X36X].
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drugs, which are much more stringent than those for cosmetics.26 For example,
P_# .ust a**r,'e a DneZ drug3 bef,re it Han be laZfullW s,ldS27 whereas no
approval is needed for a cosmetic.28
Because cosmetics law and regulation lag so far behind the law and
regulation of the other major product categories, there is a lot riding on a
*r,duHt’s HlassifiHati,n and it is a signifiHant s,urHe ,f tensi,n: indeedS ,ne
commentator wrote tCat tCis tensi,n DCas been tCe *ri.arW feature ,f tCe
e',luti,n ,f H,s.etiH laZ in tCe last fiftW Wears.329
Finally, because some of the literature and sources cited in this Article use
terms such as personal care products, beauty products, beauty supplies, and toilet
preparations, it is important to note that while these terms may include
DH,s.etiHsS3 tCeW are n,t H,ter.in,us ZitC tCe legal definiti,n ,f H,s.etiHs. For
example, these terms may include products that fall within another product
category under the FDCA (e.g., drugs, devices, or dietary supplements) or
outside of its reach entirely (e.g., consumer products).30
B. The “Woman #uestion” as a Feminist Legal Method
This Section begins bW defining fe.inis.. It tCen disHusses tCe DZ,.an
)uesti,n3 as a fe.inist legal .etC,dFincluding tCe .etC,d’s strengths and
limitationsFand how this Article employs the method to examine federal
cosmetics law and regulation.31
26. See infra Section II.C.2.e.
27. FDCA §§ 201, 505(a), 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 355(a) (2012); see also Jacqueline A. Greff, Regulation
of Cosmetics That Are Also Drugs, 51 FOOD&DRUG L.J. 243 (1996); Heymann, supra note 25, 364. The
new drug development and application process is time-consuming and expensive: it can take over a decade
and hundreds of millions of dollars. See Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices and the FDA: Part 1: An
Overview of Approval Processes for Drugs, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452302X1600036X [https://perma.cc/PCT8-X9WT
]; Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47
J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (May 2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167629616
000291 [https://perma.cc/VN6E-Z3J6] (estimating the research and development costs (including post-
approval research and development) for a new drug to be about $2.87 billion dollars); Vinay Prasad &
Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and
Revenues After Approval, JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1569 (2017) https://jamanetwork.com/journals/
jamainternalmedicine/article-abstract/2653012 [https://perma.cc/6PH3-5KLH] (estimating research and
development costs to be about $648 million).
28. See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2012).
29. Greff, supra note 27, at 243.
30. See FDA, Cosmetics Safety Q&A: Personal Care Products, https://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm136560.htm [https://perma.cc/JBU2-RUGQ]; FDA, Cosmetics &
Pregnancy, https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm388727.htm [https://perma.
cc/Y65D-KAQR] (last updated Mar. 6, 2018) (DNot all 2personal care products’ . . . are cosmetics.3).
31. See Bartlett, supra note 16.
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Defining Feminism
TCe ter. Dfe.inis.3 is Dtr,ubles,.e3: it is DH,nfusing and diffiHult3 and
e'en tCe n,ti,n ,f D2defining’ fe.inis. is H,ntr,'ersial.332 It has been defined
both narrowly and broadly, and is not static.33 Despite the many definitions of
feminism, feminism does have boundaries.34 It DtaAes gender as a Hentral
Hateg,rW ,f analWsis.335 One definition of fe.inis. is DtCe .,'e.ent f,r social,
*,litiHalS and eH,n,.iH e)ualitW ,f .en and Z,.en.336 Feminism according to
this definition consists of a movement with goals for changeS D\a[nd i.*liHit in
these goals is access to sufficient information to enable women to make
res*,nsible HC,iHes.337 Although having the benefits of being concise, this
definiti,n is n,t un*r,ble.atiHS as liAe ,tCer sC,rt definiti,ns it DreduHe\s] the
subtle complexity of a messy field of knowledge t, \a[ neat sl,gan\[.338
In her article, Feminist Critical Theories, Deborah L. Rhode identifies
several common features of the critical feminist theories that she examines.39
S*eHifiHallWS sCe states tCat U@T DtCeW seek to promote equality between women
and .en%3 U?T tCeW D.aAe gender a f,Hus ,f analWsis3 and Dai. . . . to
reconstitute legal practices that have excluded, devalued, or undermined
Z,.en’s H,nHerns%3 and U>T tCeW Das*ire t, desHribe tCe Z,rld in ZaWs tCat
H,rres*,nd t, Z,.en’s eX*erienHe and tCat identify the fundamental social
transformations necessary for full equality between the sexes.340 While the
approach of feminist theory differs from other critical approaches, like critical
legal studies and critical race scholarship, it also overlaps and often draws upon
these approaches.41 TCe general g,al ,f tCese tCe,riesS Dt, HCallenge eXisting
distributi,ns ,f *,ZerS3 is ,ne ZCiHC tCis #rtiHle sCares.42
32. CHRIS BEASLEY, WHAT IS FEMINISM? AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST THEORY ix, xi (1999).
33. Id. at xiv, xiii, 25-48.
34. Id. at xv.
35. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 617-18 (1990); see also
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in
the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1995) (discussing Dhow gender and sex came
to be conflated in the language of the law3 and arguing that Dit is important to distinguish between them3);
Megan Bell, Comment, Transsexuals and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (2004) (discussing
distinctions between gender and sex).
36. JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND
THE FUTURE 56 (2000).
37. Id.
38. See BEASLEY, supra note 32, at 26 (noting that despite the benefits of short definitions of
feminism, such definitions Dare of limited value if you want to grasp the character of the term, feminism,
more fully and appreciate its heterogenous forms3).
39. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, supra note 35.
40. Id. at 619.
41. Id. at 618G19.
42. Id.
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Asking the “Woman #uestion”
In Feminist Legal MethodsS KatCarine T. "artlett desHribes tCe DZ,.an
)uesti,n3 as a set ,f )uesti,ns Ddesigned t, identifW tCe gender i.*liHati,ns ,f
rules and *raHtiHes ZCiHC .igCt ,tCerZise a**ear t, be neutral ,r ,bBeHti'e.343
SCe *Crases tCese )uesti,ns as: D\N[a'e Z,.en been left ,ut ,f H,nsiderati,n$
If so, in what way; howmight that omission be corrected?What difference would
it .aAe t, d, s,$344 TCis in)uirW DCel*s t, de.,nstrate C,Z s,Hial struHtures
embody norms that implicitly render women different and thereby
sub,rdinate.345
TCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3 Cas been used t, DeXa.in\e[ C,Z tCe laZ fails t, taAe
into account the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than
of men . . . or how existing legal standards and concepts might disadvantage
Z,.en.346 There is a long history of feminist scholarship asking tCe DZ,.an
)uesti,n3 ab,ut di'erse areas ,f tCe laZ.47 For example, it has been asked in
some form about voting limitations, legal inequities associated with marriage,
and birth control.48 It Cas als, been asAed ab,ut tCe 4estate.ent UTCirdT’s
standard for medical product defect claims,49 pharmacist refusal clauses,50 health
care reform,51 and how the legal system has responded to HIV infection.52
This Article adds to the existing literature by asAing tCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3
about federal cosmetics law and regulation. Cosmetics are a highly gendered
*r,duHt and industrW. TCis #rtiHle uses tCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3 t, argue tCat bW
allowing cosmetics law and regulation to lag behind that of the other traditional
43. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 837.
44. Id.While different scholars have framed the questions somewhat differently, there is substantial
overlap in how they have done so. See, e.g., Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries
of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEYWOMEN’S L.J. 64, 72-76 (1985) (discussing seven questions, the
first four of which Dhelp . . . to identify how law and existence is gendered by patriarchy3 and the last
three of which Dinvolve the challenge of inventing, of imagining a world for which [there are] no givens3);
see also Lydia A. Clougherty, Feminist Legal Methods and the First Amendment Defense to Sexual
Harassment Liability, 75 NEB. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) (discussing the essential features of the Dwoman
question3 and providing examples of questions that have been asked).
45. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 843.
46. Id. at 837.
47. See id. at 838; see also Clougherty, supra note 44, at 3 n.7 (listing law review articles that apply
the Dwoman question3 to different areas of the law).
48. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 838.
49. Dolly M. Trompeter, Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c): Why
Comment E Is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (1999).
50. Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of
Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 501 (2006).
51. See John A. Robertson, Asking the “Woman Question” About Health Care Reform, 3 TEX. J.
WOMEN&L. 1 (1994).
52. Breanne Sergent, Comment, To Include or to Exclude? The Policy Question Plaguing Women’s
Role in Clinical Trials, 34 J. LEGALMED. 235 (2013); Mary Anne Bobinski,Women and HIV: A Gender-
Based Analysis of a Disease and Its Legal Regulation, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN&L. 7, 56 (1994). And although
not explicitly identified as such, it has been asked about FDA’s drug approval process and women’s
representation in clinical trials. Christina Cole, Comment & Note, Women and the FDA: Remedying the
Past and Preserving the Future, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 127 (2006).
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product categories that FDA regulates under the FDCA and by failing to
adequately regulate cosmetics, Congress and FDA have left womenFand their
needs and experiencesFout of consideration, thereby jeopardizing their health.
However, at the same ti.e tCat tCis #rtiHle asAs tCe DZ,.an )uesti,nS3 it als,
recognizes that this method is not without its limitations and has been the subject
of critique.53
PirstS using DZ,.en3 as a Hateg,rW is *r,ble.atiH.54 It is too general in that
it obscures the fact that women and their experiences are not monolithic and
undifferentiated, and thus risks essentialism.55 Focusing on women as a category
,f analWsisS ZitC,ut reH,gniVing tCat Z,.en’s eX*erienHes are sCa*ed bW ,tCer
factors such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class, which intersect and
interaHt ZitC gender and sCa*e Z,.en’s eX*erienHes, excludes women who are
burdened on more than one dimension.56 For example, Kimberlé Crenshaw has
arguedZitC res*eHt t, blaHA Z,.en tCat D\b[eHause tCe interseHti,nal experience
is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take
intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner
inZCiHC "laHA Z,.en are sub,rdinated.357Of particular relevance to the current
analysisS #ngela 6. Narris Cas argued tCat D\t[Ce relati,n ,f blaHA Z,.en t, tCe
ideal ,f ZCite beautW is n,t a .,re intense f,r. ,f ZCite Z,.en’s frustrati,n: It
is something other, a complex mingling of racial and gender hatred . . . .358 These
other factors do not simply magnify the effects of gender, but intersect and
interaHt ZitC gender t, .,ld Z,.en’s eX*erienHes. TCe result ,f essentialis.S
Narris Cas arguedS Dis n,t ,nlW tCat s,.e ',iHes are silenHed in ,rder t, *ri'ilege
others . . . but that the voices that are silenced turn out to be the same voices
silenced by the mainstream legal voice . . . among them, the voices of black
Z,.en.359 Indeed, one longstanding critique of mainstream feminism and
fe.inist legal tC,ugCt is tCat tCeW *ri'ilege alreadW DraHe- and class-privileged
53. See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 837-49. As Bartlett notes, some may question whether the Dwoman
question3 is really just Da mask for something else, such as legal substance, or politics.3 Id. at 843-44. Just
because the method shapes substance, however, does not mean that it is substance. Id. Indeed, this is not
a distinguishing feature of the Dwoman question3 as a legal method as Dall legal methods shape substance.3
Id. at 844-45.
54. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Introduction: Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our Beyond, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
55. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 16, at 872-73; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 615 (1990) (arguing Dthat gender essentialism is dangerous to
feminist legal theory because in the attempt to extract an essential female self and voice from the diversity
of women’s experience, the experiences of women perceived as 2different’ are ignored or treated as
variations on the (white) norm3).
56. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 1989 U. CHICAGO L. FORUM 139; see also Bartlett, supra note
16, at 847.
57. Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 140.
58. Harris, supra note 55, at 597-98.
59. Id. at 585.
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Z,.en.360 TCere is als, a risA tCat tCe use ,f DZ,.an3 as a Hateg,rW .aW
Dreinstate . . . tCe is,lati,n and stig.atiVati,n ,f Z,.en.361
In tCe H,nteXt ,f tCe Hurrent analWsisS tCe use ,f DZ,.en3 as a Hateg,rW is
problematic because factors other than gender likely impacted the development
of cosmetics law. For example, many of the prominent advocates of reform were
white middle- and upper-class women who brought their respective values to
their reform work.62 TCe use ,f DZ,.en3 is als, *roblematic because different
women use and are exposed to cosmetics in different and particular ways, and
the risks that this exposure poses are shaped by a variety of factors; therefore,
the inadequate regulation impacts them in different and particular ways.63 Race,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, socio-economic status, and other factors
i.*aHt Z,.en’s eX*erienHes ZitC and eX*,sure t, H,s.etiHs and C,Z tCe
limitations of current cosmetics law and regulation impact them.64 For example,
the risks to an African American woman who uses chemical relaxers and deep
conditioners;65 a Vietnamese immigrant woman who works in a nail salon;66 and
a white woman who uses dark hair dyes may differ.67 Yet all of these women
may be exposed to risks from cosmetics.
"eHause DfaHt,rs ,tCer tCan gender 'iHti.iVe Z,.enS3 it is neHessarW t, asA
about other excluded groups.68 "artlett suggests reHasting tCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3
60. Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 140; see, e.g., bell hooks, Black Women: Shaping Feminist Theory,
in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT 270 (Beverly Guy-
Sheftall ed., 1995); PATRICIAHILLCOLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OFEMPOWERMENT (2d ed. 2000); ANGELAY.DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE&CLASS (1981);
Harris, supra note 55; Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in
FEMINIST THEORY: A READER 289, 290 (Wendy K. Kolmar & Frances Bartkowski eds., 2013); see also
Sojourner Truth, Ain’t I a Woman?, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, MODERN HISTORY SOURCEBOOK (Dec.
1851), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/sojtruth-woman.asp [https://perma.cc/236G-RH9X].
61. See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 835.
62. KAY, supra note 3, at 15, 17, 31; see also id. at 31-33 (discussing Dmorality of visible makeup3);
PEISS, supra note 3, at 7, 41 (discussing Dmorality of visible makeup3 and racial attitudes towards
cosmetics).
63. See infra Section II.B.1 & 2; see, e.g., Ami R. Zota & Bhavna Shamasunder, Viewpoint, The
Environmental Injustice of Beauty: Framing Chemical Exposures from Beauty Products as a Health
Disparities Concern, AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 418, 418-20 (Oct. 2017) (discussing
D[p]reexisting vulnerabilities3 to and Dcumulative impacts3 of chemical exposures and the D[s]ocial and
economic dimensions of product use3); COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, AM.
COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, EXPOSURE TO TOXIC ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS (2013),
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Wom
en/ExposuretoToxic.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVZ5-Y355] [hereinafter EXPOSURE TO TOXIC AGENTS]
(discussing how a number of factors can impact exposure to toxic environmental chemicals and health
disparities).
64. See Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, supra note 35, at 622; Harris, supra note 55, at 587.
65. Adana AM Llanos et al., Hair Product Use and Breast Cancer Risk Among African American
and White Women, 38 CARCINOGENESIS 883 (Sept. 2017).
66. Cora Roelofs et al., Results from a Community-based Occupational Health Survey of
Vietnamese-American Nail Salon Workers, 10 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 353 (Aug. 2008),
https://www2a.cdc.gov/nioshtic-2/BuildQyr.asp?s1=20034386&View=e& [https://perma.cc/GH68-NB
9T]; NIOSH, NAIL TECHNICIANS’HEALTH, supra note 5.
67. Llanos et al., supra note 65.
68. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 847.
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as tCe D5uesti,n ,f tCe EXHludedS3 asAing C,Z DZ,.en and .e.bers ,f ,tCer
eXHluded gr,u*s3 Ca'e been left ,ut or disadvantaged.69 Thus, in considering the
DZ,.an )uesti,n3 in tCe H,nteXt ,f H,s.etiHs laZS tCis #rtiHle H,nsiders C,Z
DfaHt,rs ,tCer tCan gender 'iHti.iVe Z,.en3 and asAs ab,ut ,tCer eXHluded
gr,u*s sinHe DanalWsis ,f gender .ust ,HHur n,t a*art fr,. but within the
H,nteXts ,f .ulti*le identities.370 In addition, this Article tries to specify the
women to which it refers.71 Yet even the more specific categories which this
Article uses may be too general in that they risk other forms of essentialism.72
As Harris has remarked in critiquing gender essentialism by focusing on black
Z,.enS DCer ai. is n,t t, establisC a neZ essentialis. . . . based on the essential
eX*erienHe ,f blaHA Z,.en.373 Similarly, the aim of this Article is not to replace
gender essentialism with other forms of essentialism.
1sing DZ,.en3 as a Hateg,rW f,r analWsisS C,Ze'erS is als, t,, s*eHifiH.
Men also use and are exposed to cosmetics.74 The dangers and risks to human
health that cosmetics may pose cannot be controlled by only focusing on
women.75 The reforms that this Article proposes in the final Part are likely to
have broader benefits in terms of understanding and assessing the risks of
cosmetics.
#sAing ab,ut C,Z H,s.etiHs laZ and regulati,n i.*aHt DZ,.en3 Hreates
the illusion of a binary worldFwoman or man, female or male, feminine or
masculineFwhich fails to account for the complexities of sex and gender.76
69. Id. at 831, 847-48.
70. Id. at 847.
71. See id. at 848 (stating tCat DanW analWsis using tCe general Hateg,rW ,f Z,.an is itself
eXHlusi,narW3 and disHussing E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1988),ZCiHCS aHH,rding t, "artlettS Dsuggests tCat in s*eaAing ,f 2Z,.enS’ tCe s*eaAer sC,uld
na.e eX*liHitlW ZCiHC Z,.en sCe .eans3).
72. See Harris, supra note 55, at 585; Bartlett, supra note 16, at 848 (DAny category, no matter how
narrowly defined, makes assumptions about the remaining characteristics of the group that fail to take
account of members of the group who do not have those characteristics.3); see also Harris, supra note 55,
(DMy suggestion is only that we make our categories explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable. . . .3).
73. See Harris, supra note 55, at 585.
74. Envtl. Working Group (EWG), Exposures Add Up&Survey Results, https://www.ewg.org/skin
deep/2004/06/15/exposures-add-up-survey-results/#.W1IiAC_GwXo [https://perma.cc/VGC4-BZBX]
[hereinafter EWG, Exposures Add Up]; see alsoMeredith Melnick,Men’s Grooming Products: Are They
Really Any Different From Women’s?, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.huffington
post.com/2012/02/09/mens-grooming-products-different-womens_n_1264137.html [https://perma.cc/Q5
BL-R7ES].
75. SeeMinow, supra note 54, at 2.
76. See, e.g., Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental Rights
for the Intersexed, 12 CARDOZO J.L. &GENDER 31 (2005) (discussing the rights of intersexed people and
D[t]he gender binary model [which] posits that only two sexes exist and that every person must fit easily
into the category of male or female3 and arguing for a right to gender identity, which would recognize Da
variable spectrum of gender induced identities3); Katie Reineck, Note, Running from the Gender Police:
Reconceptualizing Gender to Ensure Protection for Non-Binary People, 24 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 265,
266 (2017) (noting that Dnon-binary peopleFwho do not identify within the accepted gender binary as
men or women. . . . may present in a way typically associated with women, by wearing makeup, keeping
their hair long, or wearing clothing sold in the women’s section; in a way typically associated with men,
by keeping their hair short, growing facial hair, or wearing clothing sold in the men’s section; or may
present androgynously by mixing elements of the two3).
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Although sex and gender have often been conflated in the law,77 many have
argued tCat tCese sC,uld be distinguisCedS as seX is n,t genderS but D.erelW ,ne
H,.*,nent3 ,f it.78 Especially relevant to the current analysis is the fact that
transgender and non-binary individuals use cosmetics and thus are impacted by
the state of cosmetics law and regulation.79
_es*ite tCe li.itati,ns ,f tCe DZ,.an )uesti,nS3 it is a useful fra.e ,f
analWsis and Dit still .aAes sense t, talA ab,ut 2Z,.en.’380 First, imperfect as
these categories are, analyzing cosmetics law and regulation using categoriesF
inHluding DZ,.en3Fhelps to illuminate the shortcomings of the current
regulatory approach.81 Second, the current analysis is constrained by the
limitations of the existing data, information, and scholarship that it examines.
ManW ,f tCese s,urHes use DZ,.en3 as a Hateg,rW and refleHt a binarW
understanding of gender. Nuanced gender information is often unavailable and
sources addressing cosmetics, their use, and the people that influenced early
reform efforts largely do so within a binary framework.82 There is a need for
explicit examination of how cosmetics law and regulation have impacted and
continue to impact transgender and gender non-conforming individuals. As the
cosmetics industry is beginning to explicitly recognize, many transgender and
gender non-conforming individuals use cosmetics.83
77. See Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, supra note 35, at 617-18; see also Case, supra note 35,
at 6; Bell, supra note 35, at 1716 (discussing distinctions between gender and sex).
78. See Adam R. Chang & Stephanie M. Wildman, Gender In/sight: Examining Culture and
Constructions of Gender, 18 GEO. J. GENDER&L. 43, 54 (2017) (noting that D[a]n increasing number of
educators and scholars presently explain gender as being a combination of sex, gender identity, and gender
expression3); see generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM & THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990).
79. See, e.g., Rachel Lubitz, Is “Gender-Neutral” Just A Beauty Buzzword&Or Something Greater?,
REFINERY29.COM (Aug. 22, 2018 2:00 PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/gender-neutral-makeup-
beauty-brands [https://perma.cc/LK2K-2GAA] (stating that people with different gender expression have
used makeup but that new brands are Dsignaling . . . that everyone, including cis women, cis men, and
transgender, gender non-conforming, non-binary, and gender-fluid individuals, can be their customers and
use their products3); Classes for Confidence, SEPHORA STANDS, https://www.sephorastands.com/
classes_for_confidence/ [https://perma.cc/HY3N-ELWP] (indicating that beauty retailer Sephora offers
beauty classes in its participating stores entitled DBold Beauty for the Transgender Community3).
80. Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About “Women”?, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 15, 16 (1991). This Article uses the term Dwomen3 largely to refer to people who others (e.g.,
legislators, regulators, medical professionals, and scholars) have regarded as women, similar to how
Christine A. Littleton Duse[s] the term 2women’ to refer to people who are regarded by those in
power . . . as women.3 Id. at 16.
81. Harris, supra note 55, at 582 (DTo think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions.3).
82. See, e.g., infra Section II.A (discussing cosmetics usage and pressures on women to use
cosmetics); infra Section III.A.1 & 2 (arguing that cosmetics law and regulation have been deprioritized
as a result of women’s exclusion from political participation and representation and because of their
longstanding and close association with femininity and women).
83. See, e.g., Ivana Rihter, How 4 Next-Gen Makeup Lines are Serving the Transgender Community,
VOGUE.COM (July 30, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://www.vogue.com/article/transgender-community-beauty-
tutorials-makeup-skin-brands-sephora-fluide [https://perma.cc/J857-EV76] (noting that Deven though it
may seem like makeup has long been at the center of the queer community, often considered a tool for
self-expression, identification, and reinvention, most transgender people 2don’t feel included in the beauty
world’3 and discussing Dgender nonbinary brands and charities that are supporting members of the
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TCis inf,r.ati,n defiHit relates t, an,tCer feature ,f tCe DZ,.an )uesti,n3
tCat sC,uld be aHAn,Zledged fr,. tCe ,utset. #s a legal .etC,d tCe DZ,.an
)uesti,n3 Dneither guarantees a *artiHular result n,r e'en tCe rigCt result.384
Accordingly, it Dd,es n,t re)uire deHisi,n in fa',r ,f a Z,.anS3 but ratCer seeAs
t, eX*,se Dinterests and H,nHerns tCat ,tCerZise .aW beS and Cist,riHallW Ca'e
beenS ,'erl,,Aed.385 Accordingly the reforms that this Article suggests in the
final Part are aimed at providing additional information in order to better assess
the risks that the current regulatory approach poses. This Article proceeds
mindful of the limitations of its chosen method.
II. THEGENDERED&RACIALIZED IMPACT OF THE CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH TO THE REGULATION OF COSMETICS
This Part begins by discussing the gendered nature of cosmetics in the
United States. Although men use cosmetics, cosmetics are strongly associated
with women and femininity, and, on average, women use more cosmetics.
Cosmetics use is also shaped by factors other than gender, including race,
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and age. This Part also discusses the risks to
Z,.en’s CealtC tCat H,s.etiHs .aW *,se and C,Z such risks may be shaped by
factors other than gender. It argues that because cosmetics are a highly gendered
product and industry, failures in cosmetics law and regulation may
disproportionately jeopardize the health of women, particularly women who are
members of other excluded groups. This Part then provides an overview of the
cosmetics provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
(FDCA), which largely remain unchanged. Finally, it examines current
cosmetics law and regulation and how they lag behind the law and regulation for
other major product categories regulated under the FDCA.
A. Gender, Race, Class & Cosmetics
Cosmetics are a highly gendered product and industry. On average, women
use more cosmetics than men.86 For example, one surveW f,und tCat D\t[Ce
LGBTQ+ community3); Vanessa Chesnut, Not Your Mama’s Makeup: New Cosmetics Target Consumers
Across Gender Spectrum, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2018 4:08 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-
out/not-your-mama-s-makeup-new-cosmetics-target-consumers-across-n873386 [https://perma.cc/6WX
A-9E33] (stating that Da growing number of transgender, gender-nonconforming and male identified
people . . . are seeking out gender-inclusive makeup products, and companiesFboth old and newFare
responding to their demand3).
84. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 849.
85. Id. at 846.
86. There is, however, a Dgrowing permissibility3 of cosmetics and hair dye for straight men. ROBIN
TOLMACHLAKOFF&RAQUELL. SCHERR, FACEVALUE: POLITICS OFBEAUTY 224 (1989); see also Jacob
Gallagher, More Men Are Wearing Makeup Than You Think&Here’s Why, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-men-are-wearing-makeup-than-you-thinkheres-why-1523626771
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a'erage Z,.an uses @? *r,duHts H,ntaining @;9 uni)ue ingredients e'erW daWS3
ZCereas tCe a'erage.an Duse\s[ ; *r,duHts dailW ZitC 9< uni)ue ingredients.387
Another poll found that 54 percent of male respondents indicated that they use
n, DsAin Hare and stWling *r,duHts UsuHC as .,isturiVersS Cair stWling *r,duHtsS
and makeup) . . . t, get readW in tCe .,rning ,n a tW*iHal daW3 ZCereas ,nlW @;
percent of female respondents indicated they use no products.88 A larger portion
of women than men indicated that they use three or more products (45 percent
vs. 11 percent).89 And as noted earlier, most women (86 percent) use makeupF
a type of cosmetic.90
Cosmetics use may not be voluntary for women. For example, employers
may have gendered employee dress codes that require femaleFbut not maleF
employees to wear makeup.91 And even when employers do not require women
to use cosmetics, women may face other pressures to do so.92 For example,
cosmetics use can impact how people perceive themselves and are perceived by
others and may have significant effects on both interpersonal relationships and
economic opportunities.93
Women also may be exposed to cosmetics through their employment.
Women are significantly more likely than men to hold certain jobs that often
involve exposure to cosmetics as beauty work is often done for women by
[https://perma.cc/TAN8-UNVX]; PEISS, supra note 3, at 265. The men’s grooming and personal care
products industry in the United States has grown in recent years. See, e.g., MEN’S PERSONALCARE, supra
note 3.
87. EWG, Exposures Add Up, supra note 74.
88. Survey, YOUGOV (Sept. 10G11, 2013), http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/
ypg8eyjbsv/tabs_skincare_0910112013.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR2N-ZRFA] (surveying subjects regard-
ing their morning and evening routines, as well as the cosmetics products used in the process).
89. Id. The number of products used varied by other factors including age, race, and education. Id.
90. COLOR COSMETICS, supra note 6; FDCA § 201(i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(i).
91. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co. was a case that involving a female bartender who was fired for refusing to wear makeup in
violation of her employer’s appearance standards. Id. Her case was not successful. Id. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the employer; it held that the employee
failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. Employer dress codes may have class implications.
92. Beauty serves as a Dproxy for status and ability.3 Nancy L. Etcoff et al., Cosmetics as a Feature
of the Extended Human Phenotype: Modulation of the Perception of Biologically Important Facial
Signals, 6 PLOS ONE e25656 (Oct. 2011), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.
pone.0025656#pone.0025656-Etcoff2 [https://perma.cc/6HK5-8YMS]. However, beauty is malleable.
Lauren Silverio,Makeup’s Effects on Self-Perception (Old Dominion Univ., STEM Educ. & Prof’l Stud.,
OTS Master’s Level Projects & Papers 49, 2010), https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1048&context=ots_masters_projects [https://perma.cc/4JPT-HKEJ]. For example, one study
found that study participants D[w]hen inferring trustworthiness, likeability, or competence from an image3
of a woman, were Dinfluenced significantly3 not only by inherited features Dbut by the effects
of . . . makeup.3 Etcoff, supra.
93. Kirsten Dellinger & Christine L. Williams, Makeup at Work: Negotiating Appearance Rules in
the Workplace, GENDER & SOC’Y 151, 153 (1997); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1037-38 (2009). Cosmetics may also be a source of pleasure. See, e.g., PEISS, supra
note 3, at 269.
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women.94 For example, in 2017, 92.6 percent of hairdressers, hairstylists, and
cosmetologists were women.95 In addition, 90.5 percent of the people employed
in beauty salons were women, as were 73.9 percent of those in nail salons and
other personal care services.96
Factors other than gender also impact cosmetics use and exposure.
Cosmetics usage and exposure differ among women of different racial and ethnic
groups.97 For example, African #.eriHans’ s*ending ,n *ers,nal Hare *r,duHts
as a portion of the total market, according to one estimate, exceeds their portion
,f tCe 1.S. *,*ulati,nS ZCiHC Dsuggest\s[ tCat tCeW buW and use .,re suHC
*r,duHts.398 Another study similarly found that African American women spend
80% more than the general market on cosmetics, and two times that of other
ethnic groups on hair products.99
Indeed, there also may be racial differences in the types of cosmetics women
use.100 For example, many African American girls have chemical relaxers
applied to their hair for the first ti.e during HCildC,,d and D#friHan
American . . . women are more likely [than white women] to use a greater
number and variety of hair products, and to have their hair chemically or
professionally treated.3101 In additi,nS D"laHA Z,.en are .,re liAelW . . . to use
vaginal douches as well as other fragranced feminine cleansing products such as
s*raWs and Zi*es.3102
94. PEISS, supra note 3; KAY, supra note 3. While the economic opportunities in the cosmetics
industry provides should not be minimized, it is important to recognize that these opportunities may be
accompanied by workplace exposure to the cosmetics and associated risks. See infra Section II.B.
95. BLS, DETAILEDOCCUPATION, supra note 6. Of those 76.7% were white, 16.3% Hispanic/Latina,
13.5% black, and 5.6% Asian. Id.
96. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYED PERSONS BYDETAILED INDUSTRY, SEX, RACE, AND
HISPANIC OR LATINO ETHNICITY tbl.18 https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm [https://perma.cc/D5XD-
TBBB] [hereinafter BLS, DETAILED INDUSTRY].
97. Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 63, at 418G20 (noting that D[w]orkers in the beauty industry,
who are predominately women of color and immigrant women, can . . . face occupational health hazards
from chemicals in professional cosmetic products3).
98. PAUL PESTANO ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, BIG MARKET FOR BLACK
COSMETICS, BUT LESS-HAZARDOUS CHOICES LIMITED (2016), http://www.firstresearch.com/Industry-
Research/Personal-Care-Products-Manufacturing.html [https://perma.cc/4HHC-TR2T].
99. See Stephanie D. Smith, Essence Panel Explores Beauty Purchasing, WWD (May 19, 2009),
https://wwd.com/beauty-industry-news/color-cosmetics/essence-panel-explores-beauty-purchasing-
2139829/ [https://perma.cc/7Z58-AQYG]; Rajiv Shah &Kelly E. Taylor, Note, Concealing Danger: How
the Regulation of Cosmetics in the United States Puts Consumers at Risk, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
203, 212 (2012); see also Tamarra James-Todd et al., Racial/Ethnic Differences in Hormonally-Active
Hair Product Use: A Plausible Risk Factor for Health Disparities, 14 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY
HEALTH 506 (2012) (finding that African American and African-Caribbean women from the New York
metropolitan area were more likely to be exposed to hormonally-active chemicals in hair products
compared to white women); Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 63.
100. Dark-skinned women of various races may disproportionately use skin lightening creams,
which have several potential adverse outcomes. See Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 63, at 419 (table);
see also Imani Perry, Buying White Beauty, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579, 590-91 (2006) (discussing
skin-bleaching creams and stating that D[t]he whitening of the world’s wealthy is a much safer affair than
that of its poorer, and blacker, populations3).
101. Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 63, at 419.
102. Id. at 420.
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There also may be significant racial differences in employment in certain
jobs that involve the use of cosmetics. For example, while 76.7 percent of
hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists are white and 5.6 percent are
Asian,103 only 44.8 percent ,f *e,*le e.*l,Wed in Dnail sal,ns and ,tCer *ers,nal
Hare ser'iHes3 are ZCite and =;.> percent are Asian.104
Furthermore, there may be class differences between beauty workers and
customers. For example, in The Managed Hand: Race, Gender, and the Body in
Beauty Service WorkSMiliann Kang DeX*l,re\s[ H,..,nalities and differenHes3
among Asian immigrant women in the nail salon industry in the United States.105
SCe disHusses C,Z nail sal,ns bring DZ,.en ZC, usuallW Z,uld n,t find
tCe.sel'es in tCe sa.e s,Hial HirHles3 int, Hl,se *CWsiHal H,ntaHt and C,Z tCese
interaHti,ns Dde.,nstrate C,Z Z,.en inCabit b,dies differently as well as how
Z,.en’s b,dies are differentiallW 'alued and e.*l,Wed.3106 Kang explores how
genderS raHeS and Hlass interaHt in nail sal,ns tCr,ugC DtCree different f,r.s ,f
body labor at Asian-,Zned nail sal,ns: 2*a.*ering b,dW lab,r’ in nail art salons
serving mostly white upper-[ ]and middle-Hlass Z,.en% 2eX*ressi'e b,dW lab,r’
in nail art salons serving mostly black working-and lower-middle-class women;
and 2r,utiniVed b,dW lab,r’ at disH,unt nail sal,ns ser'ing raHiallW and
s,Hi,eH,n,.iHallW .iXed Hust,.ers.3107
B. Cosmetics Safety
TCe H,s.etiHs industrW and P_# Ca'e stated tCat D\H[,s.etiHs are tCe safest
*r,duHts tCat P_# regulates.3108 But even if cosmetics are the safest products
that the agency regulates, cosmetics are not necessarily safe, as the harms caused
by other products that FDA regulates are well-documented.109
103. BLS, DETAILEDOCCUPATION, supra note 6.
104. BLS, DETAILED INDUSTRY, supra note 96.
105. MILIANN KANG, THE MANAGED HAND: RACE, GENDER, AND THE BODY IN BEAUTY SERVICE
WORK 11-12 (2010) (ebook). Kang’s work focuses on Korean women working in the nail salon industry
in New York City. Id. at 12.
106. Id. at 11-12.
107. Id. at 16.
108. See, e.g., Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th
Cong. (2012) (statement of Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling, LLP),
https://archives-energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearing
s/Health/20120327/HHRG-112-IF14-WState-HuttP-20120327.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU6J-STYJ]; Befo-
re the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. (2012), (Statement of
Halyna Breslawec, Chief Scientist & Exec. Vice President for Sci., Pers. Care Prod. Council), https://
archives-energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/Healt
h/20120327/HHRG-112-IF14-WState-BreslawecH-20120327.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDS4-Q7YD]; Peter
Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 461
(2008).
109. See FDCA § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (prohibiting certain acts with respect to Dany food,
drug, device, tobacco product, or cosmetic3); U.S. FOOD&DRUGADMINISTRATION, FOOD, https://www.
fda.gov/Food/default.htm [https://perma.cc/N3RM-TMCM] (food); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, DRUGS, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/default.htm [https://perma.cc/57BA-VK7R]
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While a comprehensive review of the literature on cosmetics safety is
beyond the scope of this Article,110 there is reason to be concerned about the
potential hazards that cosmetics may pose. Other legal scholars and
commentators have discussed the potential risks of a host of cosmetics products,
ingredients, and contaminates, including phthalates, permanent hair relaxers,111
spray tan solutions,112 tattoos and micropigmentation inks,113 henna (and henna
containing PPD and lead),114 nail salon products,115 nanoparticles,116 and
chemicals that have the potential to disrupt the human endocrine system.117 The
potential hazards that the literature discusses vary, and include severe scalp
burns, early puberty in girls, premature delivery, adverse effects on male
reproductive development, and cancer.118
Women may be disproportionately impacted due to differences in exposure.
As noted earlier, on average, women use more cosmetics than men and are
exposed to more chemicals than men through this use.119 Women may also be
eX*,sed t, H,s.etiHs tCr,ugC tCeir Z,rAS as DbeautW Z,rA3 is ,ften d,ne bW
women.120 Women also may be uniquely vulnerable to potential health harms
fr,. HCe.iHal eX*,sure. P,r eXa.*leS Z,.en’s b,dies .aW Dst,re HCe.iHals
Hu.ulati'elW .,re effeHti'elW tCen .en’s b,diesS *laHing Z,.en at greater
(drugs); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, TOBACCO PRODUCTS, https://www.fda.gov/
TobaccoProducts/default.htm [https://perma.cc/4DMF-3NUV] (tobacco products); supra note 13
(discussing harms of drugs, foodborne diseases, and cigarettes).
110. The focus of this Article is on physical risks, but cosmetics may pose economic harms as well.
See Bryan A. Liang & Kurt M. Hartman, It’s Only Skin Deep: FDA Regulation of Skin Care Cosmetics
Claims, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 249, 250 (1999) (DHowever, the FDA’s focus on physical safety,
and its attempted designation of skin care cosmetics as drugs, has ignored the significant responsibility of
the agency to protect the public against highly questionable efficacy claims by certain cosmetics
manufacturers.3); Amity Hartman, FDA’s Minimal Regulation of Cosmetics and the Daring Claims of
Cosmetic Companies That Cause Consumers Economic Harm, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 53, 54 (2008) (DThe
current regulatory scheme does not always give consumers adequate economic protection.3).
111. Shah & Taylor, supra note 99, at 210G14.
112. Jessica M. Dugdale, A Plea for Consumer Protection: The Potential Human Health Hazards of
the Spray Tanning Epidemic, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 347, 359-60 (2014).
113. Jessica C. Dixon, The Perils of Body Art: FDA Regulation of Tattoo and Micropigmentation
Pigments, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 682 (2006).
114. Carrie Griffin Basas,Henna Tattooing: Cultural Tradition Meets Regulation, 62 FOOD&DRUG
L.J. 779, 791 (2007).
115. Sarah A. Walsh, Beyond the Polish: An Examination of Hazardous Conditions in Nail Salons
and Potential Solutions for the Industry in New York City, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 243, 256-60 (2012).
116. Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1340-44 (2008); Donald
R. Johnson, Not in My Makeup: The Need for Enhanced Premarket Regulatory Authority over Cosmetics
in Light of Increased Usage of Engineered Nanoparticles, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 82, 94-
102 (2009); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Nanotechnology: The Challenge of Regulating Known Unknowns, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 704, 705-06, 708-09 (2006).
117. Valerie J. Watnick, The Missing Link: U.S. Regulation of Consumer Cosmetic Products to
Protect Human Health and the Environment, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 595, 607-11 (2014); Anastasia De
Paz, The Cosmetic Regime Needs A Makeover: Advocating to Empower the FDA Through the Safe
Cosmetics Act of 2011, 31 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 337, 340-42 (2012).
118. See, e.g., Shah & Taylor, supra note 99, at 211G18.
119. See supra Section II.A.
120. PEISS, supra note 3; KAY, supra note 3; supra note 69 and accompanying text; supra Section
II.A.
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risA.3121 Women of reproductive age and their offspring may be at particular risk
fr,. tCese eX*,suresS as D*reH,nHe*ti,n and *renatal eX*,sure t, t,XiH
environmental agents can have a profound and lasting effect on reproductive
CealtC aHr,ss tCe life H,urse.3122
Women who are members of other excluded groups may be at even greater
risk. These women may use or otherwise be exposed to more cosmetics,
including particular types of cosmetics, as cosmetics usage and work are not only
gendered, but also differ by race.123
The cosmetics that women who are members of other excluded groups are
exposed to also may be more hazardous. For example, Imani Perry suggests that
DtCe a'ailabilitW ,f teHCn,l,giHal res,urHes is CigCer f,r tC,se ZC, are alreadW
*ri'ileged3 and tCat tCis .aW reinf,rHe eXisting CierarHCies: D\i[f ,ne Han aff,rd
to . . . purchase the gentler products, the odds are that the person is already closer
t, tCe \beautW[ ideal.3124 7ne analWsis f,und tCat D\a[ s.aller sCare ,f Cair and
beauty products marketed to Black women scored low in potentially harmful
ingredients than produHts ai.ed at tCe general *ubliH.3125 Cosmetics have been
associated with health hazards in women of color.126 For example, one study
found an association between using hair dye more than twice a year, use of dark
hair dye shades, and salon application of hair dyes and the risk of estrogen-
positive breast cancer in African American women.127
Some women may have greater exposure to toxic environmental chemicals
due to a variety of factors. A report by the Committee on Health Care for
Underserved Women of the American College of Obstetricians and
OWneH,l,gists n,tes tCat DCar.ful en'ir,n.ental eX*,sure is ine)uitablW and
unequally distributed, which leaves some populations, including underserved
121. De Paz, supra note 117, at 341.
122. Id.; Shah & Taylor, supra note 99, at 209. One analysis found that women ages eighteen to
thirty-fourFwomen of reproductive ageFare more likely to be Dthe heaviest buyers of cosmetics.3
Millennial Women Key to Growth in Cosmetics Industry, TABS ANALYTICS BLOG (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.tabsanalytics.com/blog/millennial-women-key-to-growth-in-cosmetics-industry [https://per
ma.cc/Y2NX-S7WP]; see also AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMM. ON
GYNECOLOGIC PRAC., COMMITTEE OPINION, NUMBER 589, FEMALE AGE-RELATED FERTILITY DECLINE
(Mar. 2014 reaffirmed 2018), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Gynecologic-Practice/Female-Age-Related-Fertility-Decline
[https://perma.cc/M4HU-YF75] (discussing age and fertility).
123. See Perry, supra note 100, at 588; see also Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 63.
124. Perry, supra note 100, at 595.
125. PESTANO ET AL., supra note 98.
126. See, e.g., Lauren A. Wise et al., Hair Relaxer Use and Risk of Uterine Leiomyomata in African-
American Women, 175 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 432, 435 (2012) (finding Dincreased risks of uterine
leiomyomata in association with ever use of hair relaxers, duration of use, frequency of use, and total
number of burns experienced during use3); Jasmine A. McDonald et al., Hair Product Use, Age at
Menarche and Mammographic Breast Density in Multiethnic Urban Women, 17 ENVIRON. HEALTH 1, 8
(2018) (concluding that Dchildhood hair product use is associated with earlier age at menarche, an
established risk factor for breast cancer3).
127. Llanos et al., supra note 65, at 888. The study also found an association between certain hair
products and breast cancer in white women. Id. The study noted that there are differences in product use
among African American and white women. Id.
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women, more vulnerable to adverse reproductive health effects than other
*,*ulati,ns.3128 The exposure sources listed for some of the chemicals linked to
negative reproductive or developmental health effects in the report include
cosmetics and personal care products.129 D\"[eautW *r,duHt use .aW be ,ne ZaW
that structural discriminati,n beH,.es bi,l,giHallW e.beddedS3 as raHial
disHri.inati,n Han influenHe *r,duHt use and D\t[argeted raHialRetCniH .arAeting
Han influenHe *r,duHt use and related CealtC ine)uities.3130
Some workplaces may expose the women who work in them to high levels
of potentially toxic chemicals from cosmetics.131 For example, one study of
Vietna.ese Z,.en Z,rAing in nail sal,ns in !alif,rnia n,ted tCat D\n[ail
technicians handle solvents, glues, polishes, and other agents on a daily basis
exposing them to numerous chemicals, many of which are known or suspected
to cause cancer, allergies, and respiratory, neurologic, and reproductive
Car..3132 The study measured levels of total volatile organic compounds that
eXHeed tCe En'ir,n.ental 6r,teHti,n #genHW’s reH,..ended le'els and were
Din tCe range . . . at ZCiHC discomfort is expected and complaints of health
symptoms, including headaches and irritations of the eyes, nose, and throat, are
H,..,n.3133
Because of differences in usage, exposure, and biology, women may be
subject to greater risk from exposure to toxic chemicals in cosmetics than men
are. As a result, any regulatory failure to control these risks may
disproportionately impact women. Furthermore, because of differences in usage
and exposure, women who are members of other excluded groups may be at
particular risk. This Article now turns to the shortcomings of cosmetics law and
regulation.
C. Cosmetics Law & Regulation
Despite significant changes in the law with respect to the other major
product categories under FDA’s BurisdiHti,nS tCe P_!#’s H,s.etiHs *r,'isi,ns
have remained largely unchanged since the Act was passed in 1938. This Section
begins with an overview of the 1938 Act. It then discusses the current laws and
regulations with an emphasis on the changes since the FDCAwas enacted. It also
discusses the cosmetics industrW’s self-regulatory measures and how FDA
128. EXPOSURE TO TOXICAGENTS, supra note 63, at 1.
129. Id. at 3-4 tbl.2.
130. Zota & Shamasunder, supra note 63, at 419.
131. Women who receive services in these locations may also be exposed to potentially toxic
chemicals although likely for shorter time periods than workers. Cosmetics intended for professional use
only are less regulated than those intended for consumer use, which may also lead to differences in
exposure. See supra Section II.2.dGe.
132. Thu Quach et al., Characterizing Workplace Exposures in Vietnamese Women Working in
California Nail Salons, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S271, S271 (2011).
133. Id. at S274.
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regulates cosmetics in this environment. This Section ends by highlighting
several significant differences between how cosmetics and other products are
regulated. It argues that the divide between cosmetics law and regulation and the
law and regulation of the other major product categories defined in the FDCA
has grown since the 1938 Act was first enacted. These changes have deprioritized
the regulation of cosmetics, the product category most closely associated with
women. The limitations of cosmetics law and regulation hinder the ability to
meaningfully assess the safety of cosmetics.
The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938
The 1938 FDCA created the first federal law for the regulation of
cosmetics.134 As discussed in Section I.AS H,s.etiHs are DartiHles intended t, be
rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied
to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, beautifying, promoting
attraHti'enessS ,r altering tCe a**earanHeS3 inHluding artiHles intended t, be a
component of those articles, but not soap.135
The FDCA prohibited certain acts related to the misbranding and
adulteration of cosmetics as well as the causing of those acts provided that certain
interstate commerce connections were met.136 The FDCA provided that a
H,s.etiH is adulterated if it DH,ntains any poisonous or deleterious substance
which may render it injurious to users under the conditions of use prescribed in
the [its] labeling . . . ,r under suHC H,nditi,ns ,f use as are Hust,.arW ,r usualS3
but it excepted coal-tar hair dyes that comply with certain labeling
requirements.137 TCe P_!# als, *r,'ided tCat a H,s.etiH tCat DH,nsists inZC,le
or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substanHe3 ,r tCat DCas been
prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious
t, CealtCS3 is adulterated.138 # H,s.etiH’s H,ntainer H,uld als, render tCe
H,s.etiH adulterated if tCe DH,ntainer is H,.*,sedS in ZC,le ,r in *artS ,f anW
poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to
CealtC.3139 The FDCA also provided that a cosmetic other than a hair dye
containing a coal-tar color that had not been properly batch certified is
adulterated.140
134. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (June 25,
1938).
135. Id. § 201(i). The definition of cosmetics in the original Act has remained unchanged. Compare
id., with FDCA § 201(i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (2012).
136. FDCA § 301 (1938).
137. Id. § 601(a).
138. Id. § 601(b)-(c).
139. Id. § 601(d).
140. Id. § 601(e).
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The FDCA also provided that a cosmetic with labeling tCat Dis false ,r
.isleading in anW *artiHular3 is .isbranded.141 A packaged cosmetic is also
.isbranded if it d,es n,t bear a label ZitC DtCe na.e and *laHe ,f business ,f
tCe .anufaHturerS *aHAerS ,r distribut,rS3 and Dan aHHurate state.ent ,f tCe
quantitW3 ,f H,ntents.142 Other misbranding provisions addressed the
prominence of required information and misleading containers.143
Current Law & Regulation
a. The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938 as Amended
SinHe @8>9S tCe P_!#’s H,s.etiHs *r,'isi,ns have changed little. The
FDCA has grown from about 10 pages to nearly 500,144 yet the cosmetics
provisions remain less than two pages.145 As in the original act, the current
cosmetics provisions focus on prohibiting the certain acts related to the
adulteration and misbranding of cosmetics,146 and like the original act, they
except coal-tar hair dyes from the adulteration provision for cosmetics
containing any poisonous or deleterious substance.147
141. Id. § 602(a).
142. Id. § 602(b).
143. Id. § 601(c)-(d).
144. Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1938 supp. IV), with 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2012).
145. See generally FDCA, 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2012).
146. The FDCA provides that a cosmetic that Dcontains any poisonous or deleterious substance
which may render it injurious to users under the conditions of use prescribed in the [product’s]
labeling . . . or under such conditions of use as are customary or usual3 or that contains an Dunsafe3 color
additive as defined in FDCA § 721 (21 U.S.C. § 379e(a)) is adulterated, although it excepts coal-tar hair
dyes. FDCA §§ 301, 601, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 361 (2012). A cosmetic’s container can also render the
cosmetic adulterated if the Dcontainer is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious
substance which may render the contents injurious to health.3 Id. Finally, the FDCA also provides that a
cosmetic that Dconsists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance3 or that Dhas
been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated
with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health,3 is adulterated. Id. In addition, the
FDCA provides that a cosmetic the labeling of which Dis false or misleading in any particular3 is
misbranded. FDCA § 602(a), 21 U.S.C. § 362(a); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1.21 (2018) (failure to reveal
material facts); 21 C.F.R. pt. 701 (2018) (Cosmetic Labeling). A cosmetic in packaged form the label of
which does not contain Dthe name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor,3 Dan
accurate statement of the quantity3 of contents, or the required ingredient declarations is also misbranded.
FDCA § 602(b), 21 U.S.C. § 362(b); 15 U.S.C. § 1456 (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 701.3 (2018). Other
misbranding provisions address the prominence of required information, misleading containers, color
additives that don’t conform to packaging and labeling requirements, and violations of regulations issued
pursuant to the provisions of the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1980 regarding special packaging
standards for household substances to protect children from serious injury or illness and noncomplying
packages (21 U.S.C. §§ 1472-1473). FDCA § 601(c)-(f), 21 U.S.C. § 362(c)-(f) (2012). There are also
requirements for cosmetics under other laws. For example, under the Federal Trade Commission Act,
false, misleading, or deceptive advertising claims for cosmetics are prohibited. Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41-58; see also Jason Rea, “Actual Results May Vary”: Toward Fiercer National
Regulation of Digitally Manipulated Cosmetics Advertisements, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161,
163 (2012).
147. FDCA § 601(a), 21 U.S.C. § 361(a) (2012).
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The adulteration and misbranding provisions have been amended to reflect
the changes in how color additives are regulated: the adulteration provisions now
refer to unsafe color additives instead of uncertified coal-tar colors in the
provision providing that a cosmeticFother than a hair dyeFthat contains an
unsafe color additive is adulterated.148 The misbranding provisions also have
been amended to add a provision providing that a cosmetic that is a color additive
is misbranded if its packaging and labeling do not conform with the regulations
for that color additive.149 The misbranding provisions have also been amended
t, *r,'ide tCat a H,s.etiH is .isbranded D\i[f its *aHAaging ,r labeling is in
violation of an applicable regulation issued pursuant to [the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act (PPPA) (15 US.C. 1473-:>T[.3150 Also, intentionally added
plastic microbeads in wash-off cosmetics have been banned151 due to
environmental concerns about microbead pollution.152
b. FDA Regulations
Until 1972, FDA lacked a formal regulatory program for cosmetics, instead
taAing Dregulat,rW aHti,n ,n a case-by-Hase basis.3153 In the years since, FDA
has promulgated regulations specifically for cosmetics under the authority
granted to it by Congress under the FDCA, the PPPA, and the Fair Packaging &
Labeling Act.154 ManW ,f P_#’s H,s.etiHs regulati,ns set forth labeling
requirements.155 For example, cosmetics that are marketed to consumers are
required to have a list of ingredients,156 although there are exceptions for
fragrances and flavors, which may be listed as such.157
FDA has also restricted or prohibited the use of eleven ingredients or types
of ingredients in cosmetics due to safety concerns.158 It requires warnings on
148. FDCA § 601(e), 21 U.S.C. § 361(e) (2012).
149. FDCA § 602(e), 21 U.S.C § 362(e) (2012). Colors that Dare marketed and intended for use only
in or on hair dyes3 are excepted. Id.
150. FDCA § 602(f), 21 U.S.C § 362(f) (2012).
151. FDCA § 301(ddd), 21 U.S.C. § 331(ddd) (2017 supp. V).
152. See, e.g., Sarah Kettenmann, Nationwide Ban on Plastic Microbeads in Cosmetics, NAT.
RESOURCES&ENV’T, Summer 2016, at 58.
153. GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9, at iii.
154. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 700-740 (2018).
155. 21 C.F.R. § 701 (2018). There are also regulations related to the approval of color additives for
specific uses in cosmetics.
156. FDCA § 601, 21 U.S.C. § 361; 15 U.S.C. § 1456 (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 701.3; see also FDA
AUTHORITYOVERCOSMETICS, supra note 21 (noting tCat D\t[Cis re)uire.ent d,es n,t a**lW t, H,s.etiHs
distributed solely for professional use, institutional use (such as in schools or the workplace), or as free
sa.*les ,r C,tel a.enities3T. !,s.etiHs tCat d, n,t Ca'e tCe re)uired ingredient list are dee.ed
misbranded. See FDCA § 601, 21 U.S.C. § 361; 21 C.F.R. § 701.3 (2018).
157. FDCA § 602(a), 21 U.S.C. § 362(a); 21 C.F.R. § 701.3(a).
158. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 700 (2018); 21 C.F.R § 250.250 (2018) (Hexachlorophene, as a component of
drug and cosmetic products); see also Examining the Current State of Cosmetics: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, and H.R., 112 Cong. (2012) (statement of Michael
M. Landa, Director of Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, Food & Drug Administration), https://
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certain cosmeticsFfeminine deodorant sprays, foaming detergent bath products,
coal tar hair dyes posing a risk of cancer, and sun tanning preparationsFas well
as cosmetics in self-pressurized containers and cosmetics containing an
ingredient tCat Cas n,t been Dade)uatelW substantiated f,r safetW.3159 In addition,
FDA has promulgated regulations that require tamper-resistant packaging for
certain cosmetics that are accessible to the public while held for retail sale.160
c. FDA Staff & Resources
Cosmetics are the only major product category that does not have its own
Henter ZitCin P_#% insteadS H,s.etiHs are regulated bW P_#’s !enter f,r P,,d
Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN).161 /itCin tCe !PS#IS P_#’s 7ffiHe ,f
Cosmetics and Colors is responsible for both the oversight of cosmetics
regulation162 as well as the color additive certification program.163 In a 2008
report prepared by Peter Barton Hutt for the Science Review Subcommittee of
the FDA Science Board, he noted that FDA was unable to separate the funding
and personnel numbers for cosmetics from the numbers for CFSAN, a difficulty
that he indicated others had encountered as well.164 Nevertheless, Hutt
determined that between 1977 and 2007, funding and staff levels for cosmetics
regulation decreased to a total of fourteen staff at CFSANFwhich he described




after Landa Statement]. These ingredients are bithionol, mercury compounds, vinyl chloride, certain
halogenated salicylanilides, zirconium, chloroform, methylene chloride, chlorofluorocarbon propellants,
certain cattle materials, sunscreens, and hexachlorophene. 21 C.F.R. pt. 700; 21 C.F.R. § 250.250
(Hexachlorophene, as a component of drug and cosmetic products). In contrast, the European Union,
which has taken a more stringent approach cosmetics, has Dbanned the sale of cosmetics or personal care
products that contain any ingredients on a list of more than one-thousand chemicals known or suspected
of causing cancer, genetic mutations, or birth defects.3 Deborah E. Mason, Kiss and Make-Up: A Need
for Consolidation of FDA and Cosmetic Industry Regulation Programs, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 181, 192
(2008).
159. 21 C.F.R. pt. 740 (2018).
160. 21 C.F.R. § 700.25 (2018).
161. FDA, About FDA, CFSAN&What We Do, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Off
iceofFoods/CFSAN/WhatWeDo/default.htm [https://perma.cc/JJ67-FNLC] [hereinafter FDA, CFSAN];
Greff, supra note 27, at 248.
162. FDA STAFFMANUAL GUIDES, VOLUME I - ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS, SMG 1231.141,
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF FOODS AND VETERINARYMEDICINE, CENTER FOR FOOD
SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, OFFICE OF COSMETICS AND COLORS, DIVISION OF COLOR
CERTIFICATION AND TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.fda.Gov/Downloads/Aboutfda/Reports
manualsforms/Staffmanualguides/Ucm328610.Pdf [https://perma.cc/8QMY-WFQK].
163. Id.
164. Hutt, supra note 108, at 433.
165. Id. at 460-61. P_#’s ,*erating *lan f,r fisHal Wear ?Q@9S indiHates a t,tal ,f @@.: .illi,n d,llars
in budget authority funding for cosmetics activities (8.106 million for the center, 3.414 for the field, and
0.18 for the National Center for Toxicological Research). FDA, Food and Drug Administration,
Operating Plan for FY 2018, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Rep
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d. Industry Measures
FDA relies heavily on voluntary industry measures for cosmetics.166 FDA
has created a voluntary registration program for cosmetics establishments.167 It
also has created a voluntary filing program for cosmetics ingredient composition
statements.168 These voluntary programs exclude cosmetics that are for
professional use only and those that are not for sale.169 The cosmetics industry
su**,rted tCese ',luntarW *r,gra.s as a ZaW Dt, de.,nstrate tCe industrW’s
willingness to supply information to FDA and to discourage Congressional
legislati,n.3170
The cosmetics industry has undertaken other voluntary measures. For
example, the Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR) reviews the safety of cosmetics
ingredients. TCe 6ers,nal !are 6r,duHts !,unHil U6!6!TS DtCe leading nati,nal
trade association representing the global cosmetic and personal care products
industrWS3 created and funds the review.171 As of March 2017, CIR had done
safety assessments of 4,740 ingredientsFD4,611 [were] determined to be safe as
used or safe with qualifications, 12 [were] determined to be unsafe, and 117
[were] ingredients for which the information is insufficient to determine
orts/BudgetReports/UCM610299.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7KV-LWY3]; see also FDA, FY 2018
Operating Plan Narrative, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/
BudgetReports/UCM610298.pdf [https://perma.cc/67BT-VTHT].
166. For an analysis of how this compares with the regulation of other products, see Section II.C.2.e
below.
167. 21 C.F.R. §§ 710 & 720 (2018).
168. Id. §§ 710 & 720. FDA has also issued guidance regarding cosmetics. See, e.g., FDA, DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COSMETIC GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES (June 2013),
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/guidanceregulation/guidancedocuments/ucm353046.htm
[https://perma.cc/T5D5-CUR4] [hereinafter FDA, COSMETIC GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES];
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY OF NANOMATERIALS IN COSMETIC PRODUCTS (June 2014),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Cosmetics/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments/UCM300932.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5WM-2MVS]; FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, LEAD IN COSMETIC LIP PRODUCTS
AND EXTERNALLY APPLIED COSMETICS: RECOMMENDED MAXIMUM LEVEL DRAFT GUIDANCE (Dec.
2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Cosmetics/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments/UCM5172
68.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ2V-X4JH] [hereinafter FDA: LEAD IN COSMETIC LIP PRODUCTS].
169. FDA, Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program, https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/registration
program/default.htm [https://perma.cc/N9VK-256L].
170. Personal Care Prods. Council, About Us: A Centennial History of the Personal Care Products
Council, https://www.personalcarecouncil.org/about-us/history?page=2 [https://perma.cc/9QWK-TCY
W].
171. Id.; Personal Care Prods. Council, https://www.personalcarecouncil.org [https://perma.cc/
2K9G-RNWZ]; Personal Care Products Council, CTFA Changes Name to the Personal Care Products
Council, Launches Consumer Information Web Site on Product Safety (Nov. 29, 2007),
https://www.personalcarecouncil.org/newsroom/ctfa-changes-name-personal-care-products-council-laun
ches-consumer-information-web-site-product-safe [https://perma.cc/S5WC-U7NV]; Casey Mee Lee
Daum, Self-Regulation in the Cosmetic Industry: A Necessary Reality or a Cosmetic Illusion? (May 2006)
(unpublished paper written to satisfy third-year writing requirement, Harvard Law School),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8965615/Daum06.html?sequence=2 [https://perma.cc/PV8H
-VPCD].
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safetW.3172 TCe !I4 is li.ited in tCat Dit generallW f,Huses ,n tCe ingredients’
potential to cause short-term dermatological reactions . . . not their potential to
cause long-ter. CealtC *r,ble.s.3173 Also, because the CIR is a voluntary
industry measure, companies are not required to follow it.174 It often finds
insuffiHient data t, Dsubstantiate safetW3175 and a significant amount of
information is not available to FDA and the public due to trade secret and
fragrance exceptions to public review.176
e. How Cosmetics Law & Regulation Lag Behind that of Other
Product Categories
While the FDCA has been amended to give FDA greater authority over the
other major product categories under its jurisdiction and strengthen its regulation
of those product categories, as discussed above, the cosmetics provisions have
remained largely unchanged. Accordingly, cosmetics are the least regulated of
the major product Hateg,ries ZitCin tCe P,,d and _rug #d.inistrati,n’s UP_#T
jurisdiction.177 This Section highlights some of the ways cosmetics law and
regulation are less stringent than the law and regulation for other product
categories.
As discussed in Section II.B, even if cosmetics are the safest product
category, they are not necessarily safe. The shortcomings of current cosmetics
law and regulation are particularly problematic because they hinder the ability to
172. Ivan J. Boyer et al., The Cosmetic Ingredient Review Program&Expert Safety Assessments of
Cosmetic Ingredients in an Open Forum, 36 INT’L J. TOXICOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT 2) 5S, abstract (2017).
For a discussion of the number of cosmetics ingredients, see infra notes 186G195 and accompanying text.
The Research Institute for Fragrance Material, another self-regulatory program, reviews fragrance safety.
Caroline M. Reebs, Fragrant or Foul? Regulation of the Global Perfume Industry and the Implications
for American Sovereignty, 34 HASTINGS INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 223, 237 (2011) (discussing critiques of
the expert panel which reviews fragrance safety data). But see Thomas J. Donegan, Jr., Fifty Years of
Cosmetic Safety: A Government and Industry Partnership, 50 FOOD&DRUGL.J 151, 156 (1995) (arguing
that D[t]he CIR and RIFM programs combined are very effective in protecting public safety and in
anticipating problems before government action is necessary3).
173. Shah & Taylor, supra note 99, at 204; Envtl. Working Group (EWG), FDA Fails to Protect
Consumers (2005), https://www.ewg.org/skindeep/2005/10/05/fda-fails-to-protect-consumers/#.W2sDii
_GzGJ [https://perma.cc/XWK2-YL4L] [hereinafter EWG, FDA Fails to Protect]; see also ALEXANDER
SCRANTON, WOMEN’S VOICES FOR THE EARTH, COSMETIC INGREDIENT REVIEW: FAILING THE PUBLIC.
FAILINGMANUFACTURERS. AN INVESTIGATIVEBRIEF BYWOMEN’SVOICES FOR THEEARTH (Apr. 2018),
https://www.womensvoices.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/CIR_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T76
D-P6H5] (arguing that Dthe CIR has significantly underestimated or dismissed potential health and
environmental hazards of cosmetic ingredients3).
174. See Boyer et al., supra note 172, at 5S; Sarah E. Schaffer, Reading Our Lips: The History of
Lipstick Regulation in Western Seats of Power, 62 FOOD&DRUG L.J. 165, 200 (2007).
175. Hartman, supra note 110, at 64; EWG, FDA Fails to Protect, supra note 173.
176. Shah & Taylor, supra note 99, at 226.
177. Paradise & Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 70; see also GAO/HRD-90-58, supra note 9;
STATEMENT OFGREGORY J. AHART, supra note 9; GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9; see also supra note
161 and accompanying text (noting that cosmetics are the only major product category that does not have
its own center devoted to their regulation).
302 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 30:2
accurately assess the safety of cosmetics, which in turn hinders the development
of an appropriate regulatory system for cosmetics, leaving consumers at risk.
While drug, device, and tobacco product establishments and food facilities
must register with FDA,178 FDA has no mandatory registration requirement for
cosmetics.179 Instead, P_#’s registrati,n *r,gra. f,r H,nsu.er H,s.etiHs
products is voluntary.180 #s a resultS P_# .aW n,t DAn,Z tCe nu.ber ,f
.anufaHturersS ZC, tCeW areS ZCere tCeW areS and ZCat tCeW .aAe.3181 Since the
Voluntary Cosmetics Registration Program was established in 1972, there have
been 3,260 active cosmetics establishment registrations,182 but because
registration is voluntary and only covers products marketed to consumers, this
d,es n,t re*resent DtCe t,tal nu.ber ,f companies manufacturing or marketing
H,s.etiHs in tCis H,untrW.3183
Import and industry data suggest that the number of cosmetics
establishments eligible for registration may be much higher than the number who
have registered. Based on import records, FDA estimates that there are 29,000
foreign companies that manufacture cosmetics for or export cosmetics to the
United States,184 and IBISWorld estimates that there are 4,055 cosmetics and
beauty product manufacturers in the United States.185
Furthermore, unlike drug registrants, which are required to list with FDA
drugs for commercial distribution and provide the name of each ingredient,186
cosmetics manufacturers are not required to report the ingredients in their
cosmetics *r,duHts t, P_#. P_# Desti.ate\s[ tCat ,nly one-third of cosmetics
178. See FDCA § 510(g), 21 U.S.C. § 360; FDCA § 415, 21 U.S.C. § 350d; FDCA § 905, 21 U.S.C.
§ 387e; 21 C.F.R. pt. 807 (2018); 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, subch. H (2018); 21 C.F.R. pt. 207 (2018).
179. See FDA, Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program, supra note 169; Landa Statement, supra
note 158, at 4G5, 9; COHEN, supra note 2, at 35.
180. FDA, Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program, supra note 169; see also Landa Statement,
supra note 158, 4-5; COHEN, supra note 2, at 35.
181. FDA, Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10.
182. FDA, Registration Reports, https://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/RegistrationProgram/Registration
Reports/default.htm [https://perma.cc/CR62-8CXH]; see also Landa Statement, supra note 158 (stating
that in 2012 the Voluntary Cosmetics Registration Program Dha[d] almost 1,600 domestic and foreign
registered cosmetics establishments3).
183. FDA, Registration Reports, supra note 182; FDA, Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program,
supra note 169 (DAbout VCRP3).
184. Letter from Anna K. Abram, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Planning, Legislation &
Analysis, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to the Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr., Ranking Member, Committee
on Energy & Commerce, House of Representatives 2 (June 30, 2017), https://democrats-energycom
merce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/FDA%20Response%20to
%20Rep.%20Pallone%20on%20Cosmetic%20Imports.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK4Z-XKFR].
185. COHEN, supra note 2, at 4; see also supra Section I.A (discussing definition of cosmetics).
186. FDCA § 510, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2018 supp. V); Who must list drugs and what drugs must they
list?, 21 C.F.R. § 207.41 (2018); What listing information must a registrant submit for a drug it
manufactures?, 21 C.F.R. § 207.49 (2018); see also FDCA § 904(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 387d (2012); FDA,
Submit Ingredient Listing for Tobacco Products, https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Guidance
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Manufacturing/ucm602792.htm#9 [https://perma.cc/RK3G-FV62].
While food manufacturers generally do not need to notify or otherwise inform FDA of all of the
ingredients that they use in food, this has been the subject of significant critique. See, e.g., Martha Dragich,
GRAS-Fed Americans: Sick of Lax Regulation of Food Additives, 49 IND. L. REV. 305, 311 (2016).
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.anufaHturers ',luntarilW file ingredient state.ents f,r tCeir *r,duHts3 tCr,ugC
the Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program,187 which, as noted above, only
includes consumer cosmetics.188 And unlike drugs and foods, which are
generally required to have ingredient labeling regardless of whether the product
is intended for consumer or professional use,189 only cosmetics intended for retail
sale are required to have ingredient labeling under the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act (FLPA) and FD#’s regulati,ns.190 Cosmetics intended for
professional use only are not required to have ingredient labeling.191
Accordingly, both the identity and number of ingredients used in cosmetics is
unknown. And consumers and workers may be unaware that the cosmetic
intended for professional use only contains a potentially harmful ingredient.192
The number of ingredients used in cosmetics is likely higher than the number
of ingredients voluntarily reported by the cosmetics industry.193 The number of
ingredients that the industry has submitted to the Voluntary Cosmetic
Registration Program and the number of ingredients in the International
Cosmetic Ingredient Dictionary, however, may give some indication of the
number of ingredients used in cosmetics. The industry has submitted about
D;SQQQ ingredients used in 9@ *r,duHt Hateg,ries3 t, tCe V,luntarW !,s.etiH
Registration Program.194 The International Cosmetic Ingredient Dictionary and
Nandb,,A Dlists ,'er ?@SQQQ indi'idual ingredients tCat were once used, are
HurrentlW usedS ,r are .erelW a su**lier’s C,*e f,r future useS3 and ,ne re'ieZ
,f tCe !I4 *r,Hess esti.ates tCat ab,ut D>Q- .aW be eXHluded fr,. . . . re'ieZ3
and ab,ut D>?- are HurrentlW in use.3195 FDA estimated at one point that there
Zere D\a[b,ut @?S<QQ different H,s.etiH ingredients and a si.ilar nu.ber ,f
fragrance ingredients . . . being used bW tCe H,s.etiH industrW.3196
Concerns about cosmetics manufacturers failing to voluntarily register their
establishments and products and file ingredient statements are not new. In a 1978
report, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that
187. Landa Statement, supra note 158.
188. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
189. FDCA § 403(i), (q), 21 U.S.C. § 343(i), (q) (2012); FDCA § 502(e), 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (2012).
190. See FDCA, Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FLPA), Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451G1461 (1970)); 21 C.F.R. § 701.3 (2018).
191. See AMALIA K. CORBY-EDWARDS, ANALYST IN PUB. HEALTH & EPIDEMIOLOGY, CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE, R42594, FDA REGULATION OF COSMETICS AND PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS (July
9, 2012), http://asbcouncil.org/sites/default/files/library/docs/crs_report_fda_regulation_of_cosmetics_
and_personal_care_products.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SY8-XJBR].
192. See, e.g., Sharon E. Jacob et al., Commentary, p-Phenylenediamine in Black Henna Tattoos: A
Practice in Need of Policy in Children, ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS&ADOLESCENTMED. 790, 791 (2008).
193. See Boyer et al., supra note 172.
194. Id. at 7S.
195. Id. at 7S, 10S.
196. FDA, COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GUIDANCE MANUAL, PROGRAM 7329.001 ch. 29 (Sept. 30,
2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20090528173701/http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~acrobat/cp29001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PSL7-UDHU].
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Congress give FDA the authority to require cosmetics establishment and product
registration and the filing of ingredient statements.197
The infrequency of cosmetics establishment inspections is also cause for
concern. While the frequency of inspection for food, drug, device, and tobacco
product establishments is specified by law, there are no comparable requirements
for cosmetics establishments.198 For example, the FDCA provides that domestic
food facilities must be inspected, depending on their risk classification, once
every three or five years.199 The FDCA has also directed FDA to inspect drug
and device establishments according to a risk-based schedule established by
regulation.200
Given the lack of statutory mandate for cosmetics establishment inspection
and tCe P_#’s li.ited res,urHesS it is n,t sur*rising tCat H,s.etiHs
establishments are inspected infrequently. In 2016, FDA inspected a total of 136
cosmetics establishmentsF133 domestic and 3 foreign.201 The lack of required
establishment registration may also complicate inspection efforts, as FDA may
be unaware of some cosmetics establishments.202 The low inspection rate for
cosmetics establish.ents is n,t neZ. In @8:9S P_#’s !,s.etiHs _ireHt,r n,ted
tCat D\a[t P_#’s fisHal @8:8 le'elsS a H,s.etiH *lant Z,uld be ins*eHted ZitC,ut
s*eHial HirHu.stanHes e'erW ?Q t, ?< Wears.3203
PurtCer.,reS tCe sH,*e ,f P_#’s ins*eHti,n autC,ritW f,r H,s.etiHs is
limited compared to drugs, certain devices, tobacco products, and foods. For
example, if FDA has a reasonable belief that a food is adulterated and presents a
threat of serious adverse health consequences or death, it may access records
related to the food.204 FDA may also inspect records bearing on whether
Dprescription drugs, nonprescription drugs intended for human use, restricted
de'iHesS ,r t,baHH, *r,duHts3 are adulterated.205
197. See GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9, at 133.
198. See FDCA § 510(h), 21 U.S.C. § 360(h); FDCA § 421, 21 U.S.C. § 350j; FDCA § 905(g), 21
U.S.C. § 387e(g).
199. FDCA § 421, 21 U.S.C. § 350j.
200. FDCA § 510, 21 U.S.C. § 360(h).
201. FDA, OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRSFFIELD ACTIVITIES, FY 2018 FOODS (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM56633
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHC6-7U9A].
202. See GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9; see also GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9, at v (stating
that in the mid-1970s FDA Didentified about 1,000 additional manufacturers, which it had never inspected
because they had been unknown to the agency3).
203. 2 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSELL, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
§ 17:9 (2018) (citing Address by Eiermann, FDA Cosmetics Director, to Society of Cosmetics Chemists
(Sept. 27, 1978)).
204. FDCA § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374; FDCA § 414, 21 U.S.C. § 350c(a)(1); see also FDA, GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY, FDA RECORDS ACCESS AUTHORITY UNDER SECTIONS 414 AND 704 OF THE FEDERAL
FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (Apr. 2014), https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/ucm292
745.htm [https://perma.cc/NW4J-B94Y].
205. FDCA § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374.
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In H,ntrastS P_#’s ins*eHti,n autC,ritW f,r H,s.etiHs is generallW restriHted
to certain establishments and vehicles and does not extend to records.206
Accordingly, manufacturers DCa'e refused Food and Drug Administration
ins*eHt,rs aHHess t, .anufaHturing reH,rds.3207 This may prevent FDA from, for
eXa.*leS effeHti'elW enf,rHing its re)uire.ent DtCat labeling ,f H,s.etiHs tCat
Ca'e n,t been ade)uatelW tested f,r safetW inHluding a Zarning t, tCat effeHtS3 as
tCe laZ d,esn’t re)uire tCat .anufaHturers D.aAe tCeir test results available to
tCe agenHW.3208 TCis .aW als, li.it P_#’s abilitW t, in'estigate safetW issues
potentially associated with cosmetics.209
While FDA has promulgated quality systems regulations, known as Current
Good Manufacturing Practice regulations, for foods,210 drugs,211 and devices,212
it has only issued non-binding draft guidance and guidelines for cosmetics.213
TCis .aW Cinder P_#’s abilitW t, ade)uatelW regulate H,s.etiHs as O,,d
ManufaHturing 6raHtiHe regulati,nsZ,uld *r,'ide DHriteria t, deter.ineZCetCer
adequate methods, facilities, and controls are used in all phases of manufacturing
and distributi,n ,f H,s.etiHs.3214
The lack of mandatory reporting of adverse events to FDA is another area
where cosmetics lag behind. While dietary supplement, drug, and device
manufacturers must report certain adverse events215 and food manufacturers
must report reportable foods,216 there are no comparable mandatory requirements
for cosmetics.217 FDA relies on voluntary measures for cosmetics.218 Without
206. Id.
207. GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9, at iii.
208. Id.
209. FDA, FDA Information for Consumers About WEN by Chaz Dean Cleansing Conditioners,
https://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/productsingredients/products/ucm511631.htm [https://perma.cc/JW68-F
7RF] [hereinafter FDA, Information About WEN].
210. 21 C.F.R. pts. 110, 111 (2018).
211. 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211, 225, 226 (2018).
212. 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (2018).
213. FDA, COSMETICGOODMANUFACTURING PRACTICES, supra note 168; Landa Statement, supra
note 158; see also Greff, supra note 27, at 246. The FDCA requires FDA to promulgate regulations
regarding tobacco product manufacturing practice regulations. See FDCA § 906, 21 U.S.C. § 387f(e); see
also FDA, Tobacco Product Manufacturing Practice; Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,613 (Nov.
22, 2017).
214. GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9, at v.
215. FDCA § 201(ff), 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff); FDCA § 761, 21 U.S.C. § 379aa-1 (dietary supplements);
FDCA § 760, 21 U.S.C. § 379aa (nonprescription drugs); FDCA § 761(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 379aa-1(a)(1);
21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (drugs) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 803 (medical devices) (2018); see also FDA, Mandatory
Reporting Requirements: Manufacturers, Importers and Device User Facilities, https://www.fda.gov/
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postmarketrequirements/reportingadverseevents/default.ht
m [https://perma.cc/AHE5-2P39].
216. FDCA § 417, 21 U.S.C. § 350f.
217. See FDA, Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10.
218. Daum, supra note 171. CFSAN has an adverse event report system where consumers,
manufacturers, and health care professionals can voluntarily report adverse events associated with
regulated products including cosmetics. See FDA, Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10; Michael Kwa
et al., Research Letter, Adverse Events Reported to the US Food and Drug Administration for Cosmetics
and Personal Care Products, Research Letter, 177 JAMA INTERNALMED. 1202 (Aug. 2017).
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mandatory reporting for cosmetiHsS as tCe_ireHt,r ,f P_#’s7ffiHe ,f!,s.etiHs
and !,l,rs reHentlW stated in an inter'ieZS D,ften . . . [FDA is] just seeing the tip
,f tCe iHeberg in \tCe ad'erse e'ent re*,rting sWste.[.3219 For example, as of
November 15, 2016, FDA had received 1,386 H,nsu.er Dre*,rts ,f reaHti,ns
re*,rted t, be ass,Hiated ZitC3 Hertain H,s.etiHs cleansing conditioners:220
D/Cen . . . FDA inspected the manufacturing and distribution facilities for these
products, [it] learned that consumers had reported reactions in more than 21,000
complaints submitted to . . . the companies that market and manufacture the
products.3221 Under the current law, the companies are not required to report
these complaints.222 At one point, FDA had regulations for a voluntary program
for the filing of cosmetics product experiences by cosmetics manufacturers, but
these regulations were revoked.223
Finally, cosmetics do not require FDA approval prior to sale.224 In every
other major product category included in the 1938 FDCA, at least some products
now must be approved before they can be lawfully sold.225 Under the FDCA, the
policing of the adulteration and misbranding of Dcosmetics3 as a category takes
place after a violation occurs.226 And in a judicial action to enforce the Act, the
burden is on the government to prove that the product is adulterated or
misbranded,227 rather than on the manufacturer to show that it is safe.228
219. FDA, Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10.
220. FDA, Information About WEN, supra note 209.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See 21 C.F.R. § 730 (1997) (Voluntary Filing of Cosmetic Product Experiences); FDA, Food
and Cosmetic Labeling; Revocation of Certain Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,071, 43,073 (revoking 21
C.F.R. pt. 730); FDA, Adverse Event Reports, supra note 10. In the notice proposing to revoke the
Voluntary Cosmetic Reporting Program regulations, FDA noted that the program suffered from Dserious
limitations3: industry participation was Dvery limited and selective, the reports lack[ed] sufficient details
to be useful, and annual reports are sent in long after the occurrence of an adverse reaction.3 FDA, Food
and Cosmetic Labeling; Revocation of Certain Regulations; Opportunity for Comment, 61 Fed. Reg.
29,708, 29,710 (June 12, 1996) (proposed rule). FDA also noted its Dbudgetary constraints.3 Id.
224. See FDA, Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program, supra note 169.
225. See FDCA § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (food additives); FDCA § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (new drugs);
FDCA §§ 513, 515, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a), 360e (class III devices). As noted earlier, Dcolor additives3
have to be approved for a particular use before being so used. See supra note 22.
226. See FDCA §§ 301, 601, 602, 21 U.S.C §§ 331, 361, 362 (2012); see also GAO, HRD-78-139,
supra note 9 (stating that Da hazardous cosmetic can be marketed until the [FDA] obtains information to
prove that the product may be injurious to users3); Letter from Art O. Czabaniuk, Dist. Director, Detroit
Dist. Office, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ms. Kathie De Voe, President & Chief Executive Office,
Gilchrist & Soames, Inc., Warning Letter 2016-DET-09 (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/
EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2016/ucm491990.htm [https://perma.cc/4HQC-PRA5]; Letter from
Alonza E. Cruse, Director, Los Angeles Dist., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Patricia Alvarez, President,
Gemdo Cosmetics Inc., Warning Letter WL-16-15 (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/
EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2015/ucm443701.htm [https://perma.cc/LQY9-83TM].
227. FDCA §§ 301, 601, 602, 21 U.S.C §§ 331, 361, 362.
228. See, e.g., GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9.
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III. GENDER, FEMINISM&COSMETICS LAW&REGULATION
This Part argues that cosmetics law and regulation have been deprioritized
as a result of their longstanding and close association with femininity and
Z,.enS and Z,.en’s eXHlusi,n fr,. *,litiHal *artiHi*ati,n and re*resentati,n.
The 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act did not explicitly address cosmetics. While
the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act did, women were excluded from
full participation during the consideration of both Acts, and consideration of the
later Act was marred by the biases of some of the male participants. This Part
also argues that cosmetics law and regulation have been deprioritized as a result
of their longstanding and close association with women and femininity, which
have often been devalued. Finally, this Part argues that cosmetics law and
regulation have been deprioritized as a result of debate among self-described
fe.inists regarding tCe .eaning ,f H,s.etiHs and differenHes in Z,.en’s
relationships to and views of cosmetics more generally.
A. Cosmetics Law & Regulation Have Been Deprioritized as a Result of
Women’s *)clusion from Political Participation & Representation, as well
as their Longstanding & Close Association with Femininity & Women
The Pure Food & Drugs Act of 1906
The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 did not regulate cosmetics.229
Historian Gwen Kay describes the omission of cosmetics from the 1906 act as
an economic and political decision.230 /Cile earlier bills defined Ddrug3 t,
inHlude DH,s.etiHsS3231 in 1900, cosmetics were dropped from the legislation,
apparently in exchange for the support of the National Pure Food and Drug
Congress.232 At that time, the cosmetics industrW’s sH,*e Zas li.ited: tCe @988
.anufaHturing Hensus *ut tCe 'alue ,f D*erfu.erW and H,s.etiH3 industrW
229. See Federal Food & Drugs Act, 34 Stat. 768 (June 30, 1906) [hereinafter Pure Food and Drugs
Act].
230. KAY, supra note 3, at 30.
231. See, e.g., S. 4144, 55th Cong. (1898); H.R. 9154, 55th Cong. (1898).
232. Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., Pioneer Statute: The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 13 J. PUB. L.
189, 195 (1964); CHARLESO. JACKSON, FOODANDDRUGLEGISLATION IN THENEWDEAL 4 (1970); KAY,
supra note 3, at 15. The National Pure Food and Drug Congress was convened to support a food and drug
law and was to be comprised of delegates Dembrac[ing] as far as possible every interest involved in the
production, manufacturer, and sale of food, drugs and liquor products,3 as well as DScientists and Health
Departments,3 and Dthose who have charge of local laws in the various States and Territories.3 1898 J.
PROC. OF THENAT’L PURE FOOD&DRUG CONGRESS 4, https://ia801404.us.archive.org/21/items/journal
proceedi00unkngoog/journalproceedi00unkngoog.pdf. Proposed language from the 1898 proceedings of
the National Pure Food and Drug Congress included cosmetics within the definition of drug. Id. at 36.
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products at about seven million dollars, and in 1904 the value was about eleven
million dollars.233
GenderFas well as race, ethnicity, and classFlikely contributed to the
failure of Congress to include cosmetics in the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act.
Unlike food and drugsFwhich had problems that generated broad public outrage
and which were included in the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act234Fcosmetics,
while not without their hazards,235 DZere eXtre.elW easW t, ,'erl,,A.3236 The
industry was relatively small,237 and H,s.etiHs Zere D*urHCased and H,nsu.ed
by only half the population3: Z,.en.238 In addition, many women made their
own cosmetics at home.239 Even among women who used what today would be
H,nsidered H,s.etiHsS .anW .aW Ca'e s,ugCt t, Cide tCis use as D\a[.,ng ZCite
women . . . popular concern centered on the morality of visible .aAeu*S3 ZCiHC
Zas Dass,Hiated ZitC *r,stitutes and aHtresses.3240 IndeedS tCe D\Z[,.en
applying dangerous lead-based whitening lotions . . . [who] began to appear in
medical case records after the Civil War . . . [went] to great lengths to conceal
their c,s.etiHs use.3241
The use and advertising of cosmetics also reflected racial and ethnic
tensions, including white concerns about maintaining existing racial
hierarchies.242#t tCe ti.eS DtCe standard ,f beautW inCerentlW assu.ed a n,rtCern
Eur,*ean faHe.3243 Skin whitenersFwhich were marketed to both white and
black womenFDremained the most popular cosmetic throughout the nineteenth
HenturW.3244 !,s.etiHs Dreinf,rHed a n,Xi,us raHial aestCetiHS3 in ZCiHC
D\n[,ti,ns ,f #ngl,-American beauty . . . were continually asserted in relation
233. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BIENNIAL CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES
1921, at 745, 746 tbl.623 (1924) [https://perma.cc/2HBQ-NCVA] [hereinafter 1921 MANUFACTURES
CENSUS] (DPerfumery and cosmetics include perfumes, toilet waters, toilet preparations, cold cream, face
powders, etc.3) (ebook).
234. Pure Food and Drugs Act, supra note 229. See, e.g., KAY, supra note 3, 17-22; Jeffrey E.
Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 291, 299 (2001); Kara W. Swanson, Food and Drug Law as Intellectual Property Law:
Historical Reflections, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 331, 337.
235. See, e.g., PEISS, supra note 3, at 41-42.
236. KAY, supra note 3, at 30.
237. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
238. KAY, supra note 3, at 30.
239. Id. at 10G12.
240. Id. at 32G33; PEISS, supra note 3, at 7.
241. PEISS, supra note 3, at 41.
242. Id. at 40G43.
243. KAY, supra note 3, at 31.
244. PEISS, supra note 3, at 40.
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t, *e,*le ,f H,l,r3245 and D\s[Ain ZCiteners and Cair straigCteners Zere t,Aens
in a Ceated debate3 ab,ut beautW standards among black women.246
/Cile Z,.en’s ,rganiVati,ns *laWed an i.*,rtant r,le in tCe enaHt.ent ,f
the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act,247 cosmetics do not appear to have been a
Hentral f,Hus ,f .anW ,f tCese gr,u*s. TCis .aW Ca'e been beHause D\t[Ce
women who belonged to many of these groups, upper-class and white, would
.,st liAelW n,t Ca'e Z,rn U'isibleT H,s.etiHs at tCe beginning ,f tCe HenturW3248
beHause DZ,.en ZC, 'isiblW Z,re H,s.etiHs in tCe last tCird ,f tCe nineteentC
century were [considered] morally sus*eHt and liable t, HritiHis..3249 These
gr,u*s .aW Ca'e DunH,nsHi,uslW a**lied .iddle- and upper-class morals and
s,luti,ns t, tCe f,,d and drug *r,ble..3250 Indeed, one history of the push for
pure food and drug laws, which focuses on the role of women, makes scant
mention of cosmetics, noting only in passing that in 1898, a proposed definition
,f Ddrug3 inHluded H,s.etiHsS and tCat in @8Q< tCe Iati,nal !,nsu.ers’
Jeagues’ 6ure P,,d !,..ittee inHluded in tCeir g,als tCat DagenHies sC,uld
ensure cosmetics were safe and *r,*erlW labeled.3251But because cosmetics were
inHluded ZitCin tCe *r,*,sed definiti,n ,f drugs until @8QQS it’s difficult to
distinguish early general support for drug legislation from support for cosmetic
legislation.252
/,.en’s laHA ,f re*resentation in the legislative process during the
consideration and passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act may have also
contributed to the exclusion of cosmetics, as women did not have the right to
vote nationwide until approximately 14 years after the Act was signed into
law.253 When the Pure Food and Drugs Act passed in 1906, no woman had ever
served in the United States House of Representatives or Senate.254 It would be
245. Id. at 31, 34 (stating that D[f]or white Americans, sustaining a visual distinction between white
and black masked an uncomfortable truth, that Africans and Europeans were genealogically mixed3 and
D[i]n advice manuals and formula books, white fears of losing their superior racial identity underwrote
old anxieties about cosmetic artifice3).
246. See, e.g., id. at 7; NOLIWE M. ROOKS, HAIR RAISING: BEAUTY, CULTURE, AND AFRICAN
AMERICANWOMEN 37 (1996).
247. See, e.g., KAY, supra note 3; James Harvey Young, The Government and the Consumer:
Evolution of Food and Drugs Laws, The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 13 J. PUB. L. 197, 199
(1964).
248. KAY, supra note 3, at 15, 17.
249. Id. at 31.
250. Id. at 15, 17.
251. LORINE SWAINSTON GOODWIN, THE PURE FOOD, DRINK, AND DRUG CRUSADERS, 1879-1914,
at 114, 161 (1999).
252. See Anderson, supra note 232, at 195.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
254. JENNIFER E. MANNING & IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30261, WOMEN IN
CONGRESS, 1917-2018: SERVICE DATES AND COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS BY MEMBER, AND LISTS BY
STATE AND CONGRESS (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30261.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMN3-
KBQN]. The lack of diversity was not limited to gender. There were also no African American, Asian
American, Native American, or Hispanic American senators. Ethnic Diversity in the Senate, UNITED
STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/senators/EthnicDiversityintheSenate.htm [https://perma.cc/XZ
K9-AEN8]. The Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans in the House of Representatives were all non-
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over a decade until the first woman served in the House and even longer until a
woman served in the Senate.255 As one commentator noted, DtCe undeniable
realitW ,f Z,.en’s *,litiHal i.*,tenHe in @8Q; surelW H,nstituted a .aB,r faHt,r
in tCe eXHlusi,n ,f H,s.etiHs fr,. tCe @8Q; #Ht.3256
The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938
While a comprehensive examination of the history of the cosmetics
provisions of the 1938 FDCA is beyond the scope of this Article, portions of that
history provide examples of how gender shaped consideration of bills to
strengthen the law. Between the enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of
1906 and the passage of the 1938 FDCA, it became more socially acceptable for
women to use cosmetics, and the cosmetics industry grew substantially. At the
same time, a number of women were seriously injured by cosmetics that federal
law was powerless to address and there were growing concerns about the safety
of cosmetics. The history of cosmetics and the development of cosmetics law
during the period preceding the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act through the
enactment of the 1938 FDCA illustrates the gendered roots of cosmetics law.257
This history is particularly important because this law has changed little in the
intervening eighty years. The 1938 Act, with few modifications, remains the
basis of cosmetics law and regulation, and women still fall far short of equal
representation in the United States Senate and House of Representatives.258
a. Cosmetics Growth & Change, 1906-1938
In the years after the enactment of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act, the
cosmetics industry grew rapidly.259 "W @8?QS tCe t,ilet g,,ds industrW Zas D,ne
of the largest . . . in the United States, behind food, clothing, and
aut,.,biles.3260 In 1933, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the value of
voting delegates or resident commissioners from Hawaii and Puerto Rico. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES:
UNITED STATESHOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/Search/ [https://perma.cc/
HCD7-S4UA] (search by categories and by congress).
255. MANNING&BRUDNICK, supra note 254.
256. Daum, supra note 171.
257. The Author plans to more fully examine legislative history of the cosmetics provisions of the
FDCA and the role of women in future scholarship.
258. Darla Cameron & Kim Soffen, For Every Woman in Political Office in South Carolina, There
Are Six Men, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/politics/
women-running-for-office/?utm_term=.d24fb48a3a96 [https://perma.cc/3M8H-JS7J] (stating that 22 out
of 100 Senators and 84 out of 432 House members are women).
259. See 1921MANUFACTURESCENSUS, supra note 233, at 745, 746 tbl.623; see alsoGILBERTVAIL,
A HISTORY OFCOSMETICS INAMERICA 137 (1947) (listing statistics from the reports of the United States
Census Bureau). In 1929, the value of the industry was approximately $193 million. It then declined to
$153 million in 1931. VAIL, supra, at 137.
260. KAY, supra note 3, at 39.
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cosmetics industry production was about 97 million dollars.261 That same year
Senator Royal S. Copeland introduced a bill, S. 1944, to strengthen the 1906
Pure Food and Drugs Act,262 by, among other things, extending the Act to
prohibit the adulteration, misbranding, and false advertisement of cosmetics.
During a hearing on the bill in December of 1933, the Secretary of Agriculture
testified tCat D\t[Ce H,s.etiH industrW Ca\d[ beH,.e ,f first i.*,rtanHeS3 ZCereas
it Cad been Din its infanHW3 ZCen tCe @8Q; #HtZasZritten.263 By 1937Fthe year
before the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938Fthe
value of cosmetics industry production was about 132 million dollars.264
The tremendous growth of the industry was accompanied by a shift in the
acceptability of cosmetics use. Cosmetics use became more broadly acceptable
for women: for example, a 1915 article in McClure’s referred t, H,s.etiHs as
Daff,rding .uHC legitimate dailW H,.f,rt.3265 D\/[,.en fr,. aHr,ss tCe
country, from different social classes and racial-ethnic groups, enthusiastically
embraced cosmeticsFespecially makeupFin tCe earlW tZentietC HenturWS3
altC,ugC D\a[geS .arital statusS eH,n,.iH HlassS etCniH ,riginsS and residenHe
influenHed Z,.en’s relati,nsCi* t, tCe neZ .ass .arAet.3266
Cosmetics, particularly makeup, had a multitude of meanings.267 For
eXa.*leS Z,.en used H,s.etiHs Dt, *laW tCe ladW ,r tCe CussWS t, l,,A ,lder ,r
W,ungerS t, signifW H,..,n identities as 2#.eriHan’ and 2res*eHtableS’ ,r t,
in',Ae Hlass and etCniH distinHti,ns.3268 But despite these differences and
H,ntradiHti,nsS in tCe @8?Qs and @8>QsS D\.[aAeu* Zas a true eX*ressi,n ,f
fe.inine identitW3269 and bW tCe @8>QsS DCad beH,.e an aestCetiH eX*ressi,n
woven dee*lW int, Z,.en’s dailW life.3270
#t tCe sa.e ti.eS Z,rA*laHe a**earanHe re)uire.ents DbeHa.e inHreasinglW
regi.entedS3 b,tC re)uiring tCatZ,.enZear H,s.etiHs and regulatingZ,.en’s
cosmetics use.271 And the growth of the beauty industry opened up new
employment opportunities for women, e.g., as beauticians, product
demonstrators, and drugstore clerks.272 Entrepreneurs brought beauty culture and
261. VAIL, supra note 259, at 137.
262. See DUNN, supra note 1, at 37, 39, 42, 45-46 (S. 1944).
263. DUNN, supra note 1, at 1049 (Statement of the Honorable Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of
Agriculture).
264. See VAIL, supra note 259, at 137 (listing statistics from the reports of the United States Census
Bureau).
265. KAY, supra note 3, at 39.
266. PEISS, supra note 3, at 6, 168.
267. Id. at 6, 190.
268. Id. at 190.
269. Id. at 166. Conversely, D[c]osmetics were not readily reconciled with a heterosexual masculine
identity.3 Id.
270. Id. at 200.
271. See id. at 193.
272. Id. at 5.
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H,s.etiHs t, Hust,.ers and D.anW ,f tCe .,st suHHessful Zere i..igrantS
working-HlassS ,r blaHA Z,.en.3273
b. The Failures of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act &
Consideration of Reform
Concerns about the safety of cosmetics and the limitations of the 1906 Act
accompanied the growth of the industry.274 These concerns reflect the gendered
state of cosmetics. In the 1930s, there were numerous reports of cosmetics
seriously injuring women, which the Pure Food and Drugs Act could not
prevent.275
Several books highlighted the dangers of cosmetics and the lack of
protections for consumers: for example, in 1933, Arthur Kallet and F.J. Schlink,
ZC, f,unded !,nsu.ers 1ni,n and !,nsu.ers’ 4esearHC InH.S *ublisCed tCe
influential book 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs.276 The book devotes a chapter to
D\d[anger \i[n \H[,s.etiHsS3 ZCiHC begins ZitC a state.ent ab,ut tCe danger,us
D*atC f,ll,Zed bW Z,.en of all times and of all countries in search of the beauty
*r,.ised bW .agiH and .Wsteri,us *,ti,ns.3277 TCe b,,A n,ted tCat D\t[Ce
*urHCaser ,f H,s.etiHs Cas n, *r,teHti,n ZCate'er3 and disHussed Z,.en
injured by cosmetics and cosmetic procedures.278 In 1934, Mary Catherine
6Cilli*sS als, ,f !,nsu.ers’ 4esearHCS *ublisCed Skin Deep: The Truth about
Beauty Aids&Safe and Harmful in res*,nse t, Dnu.er,us Z,.en readers3 ZC,
requested advice on cosmetics brands.279 In Skin Deep, Phillips was even more
explicit than Kallet and Schlink about who cosmetics consumers were: she stated
tCat DtCe fe.inine H,nsu.er Cas littleS if anW *r,teHti,n against danger,us
*,is,ns in tCe f,r. ,f H,s.etiHs.3280 Phillips also stated that for some cosmetics
Dlittle researHC Cas been d,ne ,f a scientific, disinterested nature that can be used
273. Id. at 5, 64-70 (discussing the entrepreneurial successes of Elizabeth Arden, Annie Turnbo
Malone, Helena Rubinstein, Madam C.J. Walker); see also Perry, supra note 100, at 580.
274. These were not the first concerns about or injuries caused by cosmetics. A number of cosmetics
in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, contained mercury, lead, and arsenic. See, e.g., PEISS, supra
note 3, at 21.
275. See, e.g., RUTH DEFOREST LAMB, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF HORRORS: THE TRUTH ABOUT
FOOD ANDDRUGS viii (1936); Pure Food and Drugs Act, supra note 229.
276. ARTHURKALLET&F.J. SCHLINK, 100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS: DANGERS IN EVERYDAY FOODS,
DRUGS, AND COSMETICS (1933).
277. Id. at 78.
278. Id. at 78, 82G84, 89, 94.
279. MARY CATHERINE PHILLIPS, SKIN DEEP: THE TRUTH ABOUT BEAUTY AIDSFSAFE AND
HARMFUL xi (1934). The 1940 Census identified Mary Catherine Phillips as white. See USA, BUREAU OF
THECENSUS, SIXTEENTHCENSUS OF THEUNITED STATES, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives &
Records Admin., 1940, T627, 4,643 rolls, accessed via Ancestry.com [database on-line]) (listing Mary C.
Schlink); see also THE HISTORICAL MARKER DATABASE, MARY CATHERINE PHILLIPS, https://
www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=94693 [https://perma.cc/4ATL-JF75] (noting that Phillips married
Consumer’s Research founder Schlink).
280. Id. at 9.
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or relied on by consumers.3281 #nd in @8>;S 4utC deP,rest Ja.bS P_#’s first
Chief Education Officer, published American Chamber of Horrors, which
discussed the limits ,f tCe @8Q; #Ht and P_#’s laHA ,f autC,rity over
cosmetics.282 Like the authors of the other two books discussed above, she
provided examples of cosmetics that seriously injured women.283 The book was
based on an FDA-s*,ns,red eXCibit tCat Zas Ds, sC,HAing3 tCat a re*,rter
accompanying First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt to see the eXCibitS Ddubbed \it[ tCe
2#.eriHan !Ca.ber ,f N,rr,rs.’3284
These works also reflect the important role women played in bringing
attention to the problems of cosmetics and their regulation.285 In fact, Lamb
dedicated her book to the Dgallant gr,u* ,f Z,.en . . . holding the front-line
trenHCes in tCe H,nsu.ers’ Zar f,r *ure f,,dsS drugs and H,s.etiHs.3286 Women
and Z,.en’s ,rganiVati,ns *laWed a Hentral r,le in tCe *usC f,r tCe federal
regulation of cosmetics in the first part of the 20th century and the passage of the
1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. As Gwen Kay observes in her book,
Dying to Be Beautiful: The Fight for Safe CosmeticsS D\t[Ce leading *r,*,nents
for inclusion of cosmetics in a new law . . . Zere .,stlW Z,.en’s organizations
and H,nsu.er gr,u*s.3287
In @8>>S Senat,r !,*eland intr,duHed S.@8==S tCe D,riginal bill leading t,
tCe enaHt.ent ,f tCe \P_!#[.3288 P_#’s #nnual 4e*,rt tCat sa.e Wear n,ted
tCat federal laZZas DZC,llW ZitC,ut BurisdiHti,n ,'er H,s.etiHsS eXHe*t in tC,se
281. Id. at xi.
282. LAMB, supra note 275, at 15G39; FDA, Ruth deForest Lamb: FDA’s First Chief Educational
Officer, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/VirtualHistory/HistoryExhibits/ucm341860.htm [https:
//perma.cc/KEA3-PCBU] [hereinafter FDA, First Chief Educational Officer]. The 1930 Census identified
DRuth Forest Lamb3 as white. USA, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1930 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives & Records Admin. (1930) T626, 2,667 rolls,
accessed via Ancestry.com [database on-line]) [hereinafter FIFTEENTH CENSUS].
283. LAMB, supra note 275, at 15G39.
284. PEISS, supra note 3, at 197; LAMB, supra note 275, at 15G39; Vanessa Burrows et al., The
American Chamber of Horrors, FDA BLOG (June 29, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/
20180925190340/https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2018/06/the-american-chamber-of-horrors/
(accessing June 29, 2018 Internet Archive). The FDA website notes that Lamb Dplayed a key role in
explaining to the public, to Congressmen, and particularly to their wives, the importance of updating the
1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act.3 FDA, First Chief Educational Officer, supra note 282. First Lady
Roosevelt Dappealed to America’s women to campaign for stronger protections for consumers.3 FDA,
100 Years of Protecting and Promoting Women’s Health, https://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/
byaudience/forwomen/ucm118458.htm#1933:_Protecting_the_Health_of_Women [https://perma.cc/29F
N-HCDT] (D1933: Protecting the Health of Women3).
285. See LAMB, supra note 275; PHILLIPS, supra note 279; KALLET& SCHLINK, supra note 276.
286. LAMB, supra note 275, at Dedication.
287. KAY, supra note 3, at 3; see, e.g., Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearing Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941
and S. 5, Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 1 (1935)
[hereinafter 1935 Hearing] (stating that the Director of the Bureau of Foods, Drugs, and Hotels of the
Kentucky Health Department in her testimony stated that she did not have to tell the committee Dthat the
woman consumer is very definitely interested in cosmetics3).
288. See DUNN, supra note 1, at 24, 29-30.
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rare instanHes ZCen tCe labeling bears .ediHinal Hlai.s.3289 S. 1944 would have
extended the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 to prohibit the manufacture,
shipment, and sale of adulterated or misbranded cosmetics and the false
advertisement of cosmetics.290
In testi.,nW ,n tCe *r,*,sed legislati,nS P_#’s HCiefS /.O. !a.*bellS
referenHed DK,re.lu !rea.3 and DJasC JureS3291 two products that caused a
series of injuries to women and illustrated the limits of existing law.292 Koremlu
Zas a de*ilat,rW tCat used DtCalliu. aHetateS an ingredient H,..,nlW f,und in
rat *,is,nS t, destr,W and re.,'e Cair.3293 TCe H,s.etiHS ZCiHC DZas a**lied
mostly to women’s li*sS3 Haused Dl,ss ,f aXial ,r *ubiH Cair% baldness% te.*,rarW
or long-ter. *aralWsis% and ,*tiH ner'e da.age.3294 FDA cited Koremlu Cream
as an example of a product the federal government lacked authority over under
the 1906 Act, writing that the product was only removed from the market when
DtCe .anufaHturer Zas f,rHed int, banAru*tHW bW aHHu.ulati,n ,f da.age
suits.3295
DJasC JureS3 ZCiHC Zas used f,r dWing eWebr,Zs and eWelasCesS DH,ntained
paraphenylenediamine (PPD), an aniline dye that repeatedly achieved the rating
,f 2.,st danger,us’ in tCe list ,f Cair dWes.3296 It resulted in injuries ranging
fr,. Dte.*,rarW nauseaS disH,.f,rtS ,r 'isi,n *r,ble.s3 t, blindness and
289. Id. at 26 (reproducing portions of FDA’s 1933 Annual Report).
290. Id. at 30, 31, 33; S. 1944, 73rd Cong., § 2(c), 5, 6, 9.
291. DUNN, supra note 1, at 1122.
292. KAY, supra note 3, at 70. Koremlu is discussed in 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs, and both Koremlu
and Lash Lure are discussed in Skin Deep and American Chamber of Horrors. See KALLET & SCHLINK,
supra note 276; PHILLIPS, supra note 279; LAMB, supra note 275.
293. KAY, supra note 3, at 70. See, e.g., Hillick v. Edwards & Son, 143 Misc. 277 (N.Y. 1932)
(actions of three plaintiffs each alleging that she suffered injuries from the use of Koremlu Cream); Smith
v. Denholm & McKay Co., 192 N.E. 631 (Mass. 1934) (action by plaintiff alleging that she suffered
peripheral neuritis from thallium poisoning from Koremlu Cream); Greengard v. Odorono Co., 235 A.D.
806 (N.Y. 1932) (action by plaintiff alleging she developed severe skin poisoning from Odorono which
was advertised for use in Deliminating perspiration3). But see DUNN, supra note 1, at 1041 (statement of
American Medical Association representative) (noting Dcase of child swallowing Odorono,3 containing
Ddangerous lead acetate3)). In the United States, the use of thallium in rat poison has been banned Ddue to
its toxicity from accidental exposure.3 CDC NIOSH, Thallium: Systemic Agent, https://www.cdc.gov/
niosh/ershdb/emergencyresponsecard_29750026.html [https://perma.cc/R6VB-DY5H].
294. KAY, supra note 3, at 71.
295. DUNN, supra note 1, at 26 (reproducing portions of FDA’s 1933 Annual Report). In a 1934
Senate hearing, the FDA chief noted that Koremlu contained a rat poison Dfor which no antidote
has . . . been found3 and that it removes the hair not just from the site of application, but from the entirety
of the body. DUNN, supra note 1, at 1154.
296. KAY, supra note 3, at 71.
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death.297 Lash Lure was still on the market when the FDA chief first testified
about it.298
Koremlu and Lash Lure were not alone in injuring women. The legislative
Cist,rW ,f tCe P_!# indiHates tCat DeXtre.elW t,XiH substanHes3 suHC Das Hertain
coal-tar dWes and .etals liAe leadS arseniHS .erHurW and tCalliu.3 in Da nu.ber
of preparations . . . Haused seri,us i.*air.ent in tCe CealtC ,f users.3299
While the debate over the cosmetics provisions of legislation intended to
address shortcomings of the 1906 Act mentioned that men used cosmetics
Dt,,S3300 much of the focus was on women.301 Despite this, women’s direHt
participation in the legislative proceedings appears to have been relatively
limited and debate of the cosmetics provisions of bills reflected the
perspectivesFand biasesFof the male participants.
Senator Hattie W. Caraway, the sole woman Senator at the time, was present
for subcommittee hearings on the legislation.302 Women also testified on the
legislation before the subcommittee.303 ",tC Senat,r !araZaW’s .e.bersCi* ,n
the subcommittee and the testimony of women were of sufficient note that during
a _eHe.ber @8>> subH,..ittee CearingS DMrs. /illia. _iHA S*,rb,rg ,f 6,rt
!CesterS \IeZ ^,rA[3 re.arAed ,n tCe..304 SCe stated tCat sCe Zas DtCe first
woman . . . *er.itted t, a**ear3 at tCe Cearing and tCat Dall . . . .en3 Cad
testified before her that day and the day before.305 She also remarked that she
297. Id. at 72; see also Clyde E. Harner, Dermato-Opthalmitis Due to the Eyelash Dye Lash-Lure,
101 JAMA 1558-59 (1933) (reporting three cases of women injured by Lash Lure); Oliver P. Bourdon,
Severe Eye Symptoms Due to Dyeing the Eyelashes, 101 JAMA 1559 (1933) (reporting case of woman
injured by an eyelash dye, Larieuse); R. C. Jamieson, Eyelash Dye (Lash-Lure) Dermatitis with
Conjunctivitis, 110 JAMA 1560 (1933) (reporting case of woman injured by Lash-Lure); A. W. McCally
et al., Corneal Ulceration Following Use of Lash-Lure, 110 JAMA 1560 (1933) (reporting case of woman
injured by Lash-Lure); Sigmund S. Greenbaum,Dermatoconjunctivitis Due to Lash-Lure, An Eyelash and
Eyebrow Dye, 101 JAMA 363 (1933) (reporting case of woman injured by Lash-Lure); S. B. Forbes &
W. C. Blake, Fatality Resulting from the Use of Lash-Lure on the Eyebrow and Eyelashes, 103 JAMA
1441 (1934) (reporting fatality after using Lash-Lure). American Chamber of Horrors stated that there
were at least 17 cases of Lash Lure injuries reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association,
but there was no way to know how many women in total were so injured. LAMB, supra note 275, at 19.
298. DUNN, supra note 1, at 1154-55; see also LAMB, supra note 275, at 22.
299. DUNN, supra note 1, at 115-16; see also id. at 160; id. at 484; id. at 572 (quoting Congressman
Virgil Chapman as stating, DMany harmful and dangerous cosmetics have been sold to the public and used
by unsuspecting women so as to result in their permanent disfigurement and impairment of their health3);
id. at 256; Virgil Munday Chapman, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/C/CHAPMAN,-Virgil-Munday-(C000317)/ [https://perma.cc/J8J
P-PW33]; see also DUNN, supra note 1, at 256.
300. See DUNN, supra note 1, at 156.
301. See, e.g., 1935 Hearing, supra note 287, at 165 (quoting Congressman Virgil Chapman as
stating that Dthe committee realizes that women use cosmetics externally, internally, and eternally3).
302. DUNN, supra note 1, at 150; at 96, 269-70, 597, 969; MANNING&BRUDNICK, supra note 254,
96-97. She later served as a conferee for the Senate. DUNN, supra note 1, at 597, 969. The 1930 Census
identified Senator Caraway as white. FIFTEENTH CENSUS, supra note 282.
303. See, e.g., Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce on S. 1944, 73rd
Cong. (1933) [hereinafter 1933 Hearings]; 1935 Hearing, supra note 287.
304. 1933 Hearings, supra note 303, at 339. The 1930 Census identified Mrs. William Sporborg as
white. FIFTEENTH CENSUS, supra note 282 (listing Constance Sporborg).
305. Id. at 339, 340.
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Zas Dglad t, see a Z,.an ,n tC\e[ Senat,rial !,..ittee ZC,se deHisi,ns and
recommendations will effect so many women who are users of drugs, cosmetics,
and f,,ds.3306
The Senate debate reflected the male Senat,rs’ attitudes t,Zards Z,.en.
_uring Senate debateS .ale Senat,rs referred t, a Dbeautiful girl3 ZC, Dl,st Cer
eWes3 and Cer 'isi,n after use ,f an eWelasC dWe.307 TCe Dbeautiful girlS3 ZC,
remains nameless through the debates, appears to have been a social worker who
was injured before a dinner to honor her civic activity by an eyelash dye that
H,ntained Da *,is,n.3308 The woman was likely Hazel Fay Brown (Musser),
whose injuries from Lash-Lure are described in detail (with before and after
photographs) in American Chamber of Horrors.309
During the debate, the woman is largely reduced to the subject of the male
Senat,r’s 'ieZing.310 Senat,r !,*eland a**eared t, B,Ae ab,ut sub.itting DtCe
*C,t,gra*C ,f a beautiful W,ung Z,.an3 t, Senat,r Ma.es Na.ilt,n JeZisS
*r,.,ting ,bBeHti,ns ab,ut ,tCer Senat,rs eX*erienHing Den'W3 and DtCe
sus*ensi,n ,f *r,*er senat,rial aHti'itiesS3 as Zell as laugCter.311 Senator
!,*eland res*,nded bW stating tCat Ce Z,uld Dgi'e \tCe *C,t,gra*C[ t, tCe
Senate . . . so that there may be no feeling ,f disHri.inati,n.3312 Senator Lewis,
in an a**arent referenHe t, tCe *C,t,gra*CS D,bBeHt\ed[ t, tCe eXCibitsZCiHC Ca'e
Haused tr,uble.3313 And, Senator Matthew M. Neely expressed concern about
Senat,r !,*eland Dabs,rbing tCe entire attenti,n ,f tCe Senate in the
*C,t,gra*Cs ,f tCe beautiful girl.3314
Discussion of the cosmetics provisions of the proposed legislation was
punctuated by laughter: Senator Copeland after remarking on the manufacture,
sale, and use of cosmetics, prompted laughter when he joked about Senator
JeZis Ca'ing Dn, d,ubt . . . been a *r,f,und student in tCe fields in',l'ed.3315
There was als, laugCter after Senat,r IeelW stated tCat li*stiHA Dis n,t safe f,r
.enS3 and again after Senat,r !,*eland asAedZCetCer Senat,rIeelW Z,uld liAe
t, DtestifW ,n tCe subBeHt at anW great lengtC.3316
306. Id. at 344.
307. DUNN, supra note 1, at 156-57, 279.
308. Id. at 156, 279.
309. LAMB, supra note 275, at 15-18; KAY, supra note 3. The 1930 Census identified Hazel Fay
Musser as white. FIFTEENTH CENSUS, supra note 282.
310. FDA’s chief, W.G. Campbell appears to have shown a photograph of the injured woman during
a 1934 Senate hearing. See DUNN, supra note 1, at 1154-55.
311. Id. at 156; see also U.S. SENATE, SENATORS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-PRESENT,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/chronlist.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG2M-6KW
6] [hereinafter SENATORS OF THEUNITED STATES] (listing Senators chronologically).
312. Id.
313. DUNN, supra note 1, at 156.
314. Id.; SENATORS OF THEUNITED STATES, supra note 312, at 56.
315. DUNN, supra note 1, at 156.
316. Id.
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TCe debate als, refleHted tCe .ale Senat,rs’ Budg.ents ab,ut Z,.en’s use
,f H,s.etiHs: f,r eXa.*leS Senat,r IeelW re.arAed tCat Ce’d be D'erW .uHC
.,re entCusiastiH ab,ut tCe bill if it3 DH,ntain\ed[ an inCibition against the
eXHessi'e use ,f tCe ab,.inable li*stiHA.3317 And Senator Connally remarked
tCat D\i[t see.s . . . the more solemn [women] are, the less cosmetics they
use.3318 In contrast, Senator Copeland, who led the push for new legislation,
remarked that the woman who was blinded after using the eyelash dye was
D*re*aring CerselfS as sCe *r,*erlW sC,uld f,r an ,HHasi,n s, i.*,rtant t, Cer.3319
#nd tCat Ce Zas Dglad t, saW tCere3 tCat tCe bill did n,t *r,Cibit tCe use ,f
lipstick.320 Senator Copeland remarked tCat Ce 'ieZed Dit as tCe s,le.n dutW ,f
e'erW Z,.an t, be as beautiful as sCe Han be3 and tCat Ce did Dn,t bla.e anW
woman for using cosmetics if they tend in the direction of making her more
attraHti'e.3321 In explaining what he meant by solemn duty, he later statedS DI
mean, of course, it is my solemn duty to help them to be as beautiful as they can
be.3322
In the course of the legislative debate, Senator Copeland referenced the Dfair
Z,.an3 beH,.ing fairer as a result ,f H,s.etiH use.323 Given racialized notions
of beauty,324 this may have had racial undertones. Senator Copeland went on to
state tCat tCe Senate’s Dres*eHt f,r \tCe fair Z,.an[ is suHC tCat \tCeW[ desire tCat
ZCate'er sCe uses .aW be safe t, use.3325 Who the law was intended to protect
was at times described in limited terms. For example, Senator Copeland
re.arAedS DI Zant all Z,.enS in whom I have an interest, to be guarded and
*r,teHted against tCe use ,f tCings ZCiHC .aW be da.aging.3326 Copeland also
a**ealed t, Cis fell,Z.ale senat,rsS stating tCat D\e['erW Senat,r Ca'ing in.ind
the welfare of his wife, his children, his grandchildren, and his great-children if
there be such, is interested in having the measure enacted into law because of
what it will doFpromote their welfare, maintain their health, and extend their
li'es.3327
Devaluation of Cosmetics & Cosmetics Law & Regulation
Food is life-sustaining and everyone must eat. Drugs may treat serious
illness and can be lifesaving. In contrast to those traditional product categories
317. Id.
318. Id. at 278.
319. Id. at 156.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 278.
322. Id. at 279.
323. Id. at 694.
324. See KAY, supra note 3; PEISS, supra note 3.
325. DUNN, supra note 1, at 694.
326. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
327. Id. at 185 (emphasis added). But see id. at 155 (quoting Senator Copeland as stating that the
Dbill is intended to safeguard the men and women, the boys and girls, and the babies of this country3).
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in the FDCA, cosmetics are often viewed as frivolous or trivial.328 The
trivialization of cosmetics may be reinforced by the very meaning of the word
DH,s.etiHS3 as ,ne H,..,n definiti,n is Dsu*erfiHial.3329
While cosmetics have different meanings for different womenFand these
meanings are shaped by factors including race and socio-economic statusF
cosmetics are closely associated with femininity. In particular, cosmetics are
ass,Hiated ZitC a Ddee*lW-ingrained American cultural definition of femininity
den,ted as a *artiHular Aind ,f H,..erHialiVed fe.inine beautW.3330 Indeed,
cosmetics use has been shown to significantly impact impressions of
femininity.331
At the same time that cosmetics are closely associated with femininity, traits
and qualities associated with women or femininity have been devalued.332 For
eXa.*leS MarW #nne !. !ase Cas n,ted DtCe H,ntinuing de'aluati,nS in life and
in laZS ,f )ualities dee.ed fe.inine.3333 And as Deborah Zalesne has observed,
in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc.Fa case that unsuccessfully
challenged the firing of a female bartender for failing to comply with her
e.*l,Wer’s a**earanHe standardsS ZCiHC re)uired fe.ale e.*l,Wees t, Zear
makeupFDthe court failed . . . to consider the fact that the makeup, hair, and
dress requirements are deeply rooted in traditional notions of how men and
women should look and are based on stereotypes that deride feminine traits and
.arginaliVe indi'iduals ZC, *,ssess suHC traits.3334
328. See, e.g., POUCHER’S PERFUMES, COSMETICS AND SOAPS (Hilda Butler ed., 10th ed. 2000);
Dellinger & Williams, supra note 93, at 153; WOLF, supra note 4, at 9.
329. See Cosmetic, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Oxford University Press) (Aug. 14,
2018).
330. See Steve Craig, Feminism, Femininity, and the “Beauty”Dilemma: How Advertising Co-opted
the Women’s Movement, THE FEMINIST EZINE http://www.feministezine.com/feminist/fashion/The-
Beauty-Dilemma.html [https://perma.cc/QWA4-D4AQ]; see alsoKathy Peiss,Making Up, Making Over:
Cosmetics, Consumer Culture, and Women’s Identity, in THE SEX OF THINGS: GENDER&CONSUMPTION
INHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 311, 330 (Victoria de Grazia & Ellen Furlough eds., 1996) (stating that D[i]n
the period from 1900 to 1930, making up became one of the tangible ways women in their everyday lives
confirmed their identities as women3).
331. See, e.g., Richard Russell, A Sex Difference in Facial Contrast and Its Exaggeration by
Cosmetics, 28 PERCEPTION 1211, 1217 (2009) (suggesting that Dan important function of cosmetics may
be to increase the apparent femininity, and hence attractiveness, of the female face by increasing facial
contrast3); Jane E. Workman & Kim K.P. Johnson, The Role of Cosmetics in Impression Formation, 10
CLOTHING & TEXTILES RES. J. 63 (1991) (stating that D[r]esults support the use of cosmetics as a cue in
forming impressions of another’s . . . femininity3); Cathryn L. Cox & William H. Glock, Resume
Evaluations and Cosmetics Use: When More Is Not Better, 14 SEX ROLES 51, 51, 56 (1986) (noting that
D[c]osmetics use has been traditionally used by women to control their physical appearance3 and finding
Dthat cosmetics tend to enhance the perceived attractiveness and femininity of women3).
332. See, e.g., Case, supra, note 35; Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 72 (2001).
333. Case, supra note 332, at 3.
334. Deborah Zalesne, Lessons from Equal Opportunity Harasser Doctrine: Challenging Sex-
Specific Appearance and Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 535, 554 (2007); see also
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
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FDA is not immune to sociopolitical influences.335 Thus, the association
with women and femininity may have contributed to cosmetics law and
regulati,n being de*ri,ritiVed. 7tCers Ca'e argued tCat DP_# Cas been an
inade)uate *r,teHt,r ,f Z,.en’s CealtC3 and tCat DP_# inaHti,n \Cas[ directly
da.aged tCe CealtC ,f large nu.bers ,f Z,.en ,n .,re tCan ,ne ,HHasi,n.3336
P_#’s guidelinesFConsiderations for the Clinical Evaluation of DrugsFfor
.anW Wears DlargelW excluded women of childbearing potential from clinical
trialsS3 a *,siti,n tCat .anW 'ieZed as DrefleHt\ing[ gender stere,tW*ing .,re
tCan H,nHerns ab,ut g,,d sHienHe.3337
Gender gaps in clinical research may also impact the studyFand
regulationFof cosmetics safety.338 MediHine DgenerallW Cas *aid .,re attenti,n
to the risks and benefits of new drugs with a male model in mind, rather than a
fe.ale3339 and DAn,Zledge H,nHerning tCe effeHts ,f 'ari,us treat.ents ,n
Z,.en and tCeir uni)ue needs re.ains s*arse and underde'el,*ed.3340 Current
knowledge of the effects of cosmetics, a highly gendered produHtS ,n Z,.en’s
health, is similarly underdeveloped. For example, one epidemiologist at the
Nar'ard T.N.!Can SHC,,l ,f 6ubliH NealtC stated tCat D\f[,r deHadesZe’'e been
studWingZCat’s in tCe air tCat W,u breatCe and tCeZater W,u drinA. "ut W,uZaAe
up in the morning . . . and you may use a shampoo or a conditioner, and a
335. See Mara Sanders, Sex, Drugs, and Advisory Committees: An Analysis of Pharmaceutical
Industry Manipulation of FDA Vulnerability to Sociopolitical Influences on Matters of Women’s Health,
48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 150 (2017) (arguing that FDA Ddisplays a number of biases that
distort scientific analysis, from normative judgments about women’s sexuality to a patronizing sense that
women require heightened protection against the risks posed by otherwise effective drugs3).
336. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70
WASH. L. REV. 1, 51 (1995); see also Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Comm’r, Food & Drug
Admin., 724 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that Da more than seven year delay in issuing a
regulation impacting on women’s health is certainly an unreasonable delay3); Amanda L. Allen, A Plan
C for Plan B: A Feminist Legal Response to the Ways in Which Behind-the-Counter Emergency
Contraception Fails Women, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 401, 411 (2008) (arguing that D[a]t the very least, the
ways in which the FDA decision [regarding Plan B, an emergency contraceptive] privileged antiquated
views about women’s and girls’ sexuality along with the ideological agenda of a conservative presidential
administration over science, medicine, and women’s health offers support for the feminist critique of the
law as an inherently patriarchal institution3); Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, Medical Gender Bias and
Managed Care, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 781, 786 (2002) (Drais[ing] the haunting question whether
managed care has the built-in propensity to perpetuateFif not sanction and encourageFmedical gender
bias to the detriment of the health of women enrolled in managed care plans3); Rebecca
Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant
Debacle, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 973, 982 (1993) (discussing silicone gel breast implants,
diethylstilbestrol (DES), and the Dalkon Shield and arguing that Dfailed to act responsibly when dealing
with products affecting women’s health and safety3).
337. Karen H. Rothenberg,GenderMatters: Implications for Clinical Research andWomen’s Health
Care, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1239 (1996); see also Christina Cole, Women and the FDA: Remedying
the Past and Preserving the Future, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 127, 129 (2006).
338. See, e.g., Rothenberg, supra note 337, at 1208.
339. Ruth B. Merkatz, Women in Clinical Trials: An Introduction, 48 FOOD& DRUG L.J. 161, 162
(1993).
340. Rothenberg, supra note 337, at 1203.
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toothpaste, and cosmetics, and they all contain many different chemicals. And
Ze *rettW .uHC ne'er tC,ugCt ab,ut tCe..3341
B. Reform of Cosmetics Law & Regulation Must Confront Tensions Resulting
from the Debate Among Feminists Regarding the Meaning of Cosmetics &
Economic Opportunities in the Cosmetics Industry
The debate among self-described feminists regarding the meaning of
cosmetics and differences among women with respect to cosmetics may
complicate reform efforts. As discussed earlier, the use of, exposure to, and
meaning of cosmetics may differ as a result of the intersections between gender,
race, and class.342 In addition, the economic and entrepreneurial opportunities
that cosmetics may provide may create tensions that may further complicate
efforts to reform cosmetics law and regulation.
The Debate Among Self-Described Feminists
There is substantial debate among feminists over the meaning of cosmetics
and the cosmetics industry. This debate is part of a larger debate about beauty
and appearance.343 In her essay, Appearance as a Feminist Issue, Rhode
desHribes an DinHreasinglW frag.ented3 fe.inist .,'e.ent in ZCiHC Ddifferent
subHultures Ca'e differed sCar*lW ,n .atters ,f a**earanHe.3344
Some feminists are concerned about the costs of appearance norms,
inHluding finanHial H,stsS CealtC risAsS disHri.inati,nS DtCe de'aluati,n and
seXualiVati,n ,f Z,.enS3 and tCe exacerbation of economic, racial, and gender
inequalities.345 P,r eXa.*leS Ia,.i /,lf argues tCat i.ages ,f fe.ale beautW3
are used Das a *,litiHal Zea*,n against Z,.en’s ad'anHe.ent3 and tCat
cosmetics and the cosmetics industrW H,ntribute t, tCis DbeautW .WtCS3
pressuring women to adhere to unrealistic beauty standards and hence
constraining them.346 7tCer fe.inists Ca'e f,Hused ,n D\a[**earanHe \a[s an
341. Rebecca Kessler,More than Cosmetic Changes: Taking Stock of Personal Care Product Safety,
123 ENVIRO. HEALTH. PERSP. A120 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4421754/
[https://perma.cc/Z2PH-WJQT].
342. See supra Sections II.A & B. They may also differ based on other characteristics including
sexual orientation, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and age.
343. See Deborah L. Rhode, Appearance as a Feminist Issue, 69 SMU L. REV. 697, 697 (2016)
(stating that Das the feminist movement has grown increasingly fragmented, different subcultures have
differed sharply on matters of appearance3 and that D[w]hen it comes to appearance, what women want is
not always the same or always compatible3); see also SUSANBROWNMILLER, FEMININITY 157-61 (1984)
(discussing the feminism and the tensions over makeup).
344. Rhode, supra note 343, at 699; see also Craig, supra note 330.
345. Id. at 699-704.
346. NAOMIWOLF, THE BEAUTYMYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTYAREUSEDAGAINSTWOMEN 9-
10, 107, 115-18 (1992).
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opportunity for self-expression and self-deter.inati,nS3 albeitZitC li.its.347 For
example, Jennifer Baumgardner and #.W 4iHCards Ca'e argued tCat D\u[sing
.aAeu* isn’t a sign ,f ,ur sZaW t, tCe .arAet*laHe and tCe .ale gaVe% it Han be
sexy, campy, ironic, or simply decorating ourselves without the loaded
issues.3348
However, regardless of how one views cosmetics use, the current state of
cosmetics law and regulation is concerning because many women use or are
exposed to cosmetics. If cosmetics use generally is oppressive, then the current
state of cosmetics law and regulation reinforces this because it disproportionally
*uts Z,.en’s CealtC at risA. If H,s.etiHs use is liberatingS tCen tCe Hurrent state
of cosmetics law and regulation is troubling because cosmetics use is not
liberating if it comes with unknown and, thus, unaccepted risks.
Cosmetics, Entrepreneurship & Economic Opportunity
/,.en’s di'ergent interests .aW als, Cinder tCe de'el,*.ent ,f H,s.etiHs
law and regulation. As discussed in Section II.B, cosmetics use and exposure
may have negative health effects. But cosmetics are also big business,349 and it
is important to recognize the economic opportunities that the cosmetics industry
has provided and continues to provide women, including women who are
.e.bers ,f ,tCer eXHluded gr,u*s. /,.en’s eH,n,.iH interests and
considerations will likely impact any potential reforms.
There is a long history of the cosmetics industry providing economic
,**,rtunities f,r di'erse Z,.en. P,r eXa.*leS 6eiss Zrites tCat ZCile DbeautW
culture mainly offered women low-wage work, it became one of a handful of
occupations . . . t, sustain fe.ale entre*reneursCi* and ,ZnersCi*3 and
D\Z[,.en . . . became inventors, manufacturers, and distributors of beauty
*r,duHts.3350
The women entrepreneurs came from different classes (although many were
poor), were of different races, and were both immigrants and native-born.351 For
example, Annie Turnbo Malone and Sarah Breedlove (known as Madam C.J.
Walker) were two black women entrepreneurs who built thriving businesses
selling hair care products,352 an industrW tCat Cas Dl,ng been ,ne ,f tCe feZ sites
,f suHHess f,r blaHA Z,.en entre*reneurs.3353 Florence Nightingale Graham,
347. Rhode, supra note 343, at 705G07.
348. Jennifer Baumgardner & Amy Richards, Feminism and Femininity: Or How We Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Thong, in ALL ABOUT THE GIRL: CULTURE, POWER, AND IDENTITY 59, 60
(Anita Harris ed., 2004).
349. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
350. PEISS, supra note 3, 62-63.
351. Id. at 63G64, 96.
352. Id. at 67G70.
353. Monica C. Bell, The Braiding Cases, Cultural Deference, and the Inadequate Protection of
Black Women Consumers, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 125, 128, 133 (2007) (arguing that Dstate legislators
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who grew up in poverty in Canada, established Elizabeth Arden.354 And Helena
4ubinsteinS ZC, Ha.e fr,. Da.iddling MeZisC fa.ilW3 and.,'ed t, IeZ^,rA
from Europe after World War I started, began a cosmetics company bearing her
name.355 #ll f,ur ,f tCese Z,.en built Dbusiness e.*ires.3356 Although there is
some debate over whether Malone or Breedlove was the first black female
millionaire in the United States, both women were among the first.357
Beauty work, including that involving the use of cosmetics, is still often
done by women, and women comprise the majority of workers in many jobs that
involve such work.358 According to the chief scientist of the Personal Care
6r,duHts !,unHilS D\Z[omen and people of color account for nearly 74% of all
employment in the personal care products sector and 61.2% of management
*,siti,ns.3359 As a result, many women have an economic interest in cosmetics,
which may be impacted by changes in cosmetics law and regulation. For
example, in 2012, Deborah May testified at a Congressional hearing about the
economic contributions that the handcrafted soap and cosmetic industry
makes.360 SCe stated tCat tCe DindustrW is ,'er ?QQSQQQ s.all businesses Cand
producing small batHCes ,f s,a*s and H,s.etiHsS3 ,f ZCiHC 8<- Dare Z,.en-
,Zned3 and urged eXe.*ti,ns f,r s.all businesses fr,. if P_#Zere t, be gi'en
new authority over cosmetics.361 Accordingly, any reform efforts may confront
opposition from those with divergent interests.
should exempt braiders from cosmetology licensing requirements and authorize state administrators to
promulgate substantive regulations that are reasonably related to braiding and natural styling3); see also
Perry, supra note 100, at 581.
354. PEISS, supra note 3, 64-66.
355. Id. at 66-67
356. Id. at 70.
357. See, e.g.S #’Jelia "undlesS Madam C.J. Walker, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/biography/Madam-C-J-Walker [https://perma.cc/TJ38-3QY6]; Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., Madam Walker, the First Black American Woman to Be a Self-Made Millionaire, PBS.ORG,
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/100-amazing-facts/madam-
walker-the-first-black-american-woman-to-be-a-self-made-millionaire/ [https://perma.cc/9APK-ZEXV];
Detetria Irwin, [Unsung Sheroes] Beauty Pioneer Annie Turnbo Malone Opens Doors for Others,
EBONY.COM (Mar. 23, 2006), https://www.ebony.com/black-history/annie-turnbo-malone-ebonywhm/
[https://perma.cc/BT8Z-TZFL].
358. KAY, supra note 3; PEISS, supra note 3; see also BLS, DETAILED OCCUPATION, supra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing occupational data); BLS, DETAILED INDUSTRY, supra note 96 and
accompanying text (same).
359. Exploring Current Practices in Cosmetic Development and Safety Before the S. Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. 3, 3 (2016) (Statement of Beth Lange Jonas, Chief
Scientist, Personal Care Products Counsel), https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jonas3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VH7K-8K6P].
360. Hearing: Examining the Current State of Cosmetics Before the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, Subcomm. On Health, 112th Cong. 140, at 2 (2012) (Statement of Deborah May, President
and CEO, Wholesale Supplies Plus, Inc.), https://archives-energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.
energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/Health/20120327/HHRG-112-IF14-WState-MayD--2012032
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2SH-5CZN].
361. Id. at 4. She also stated that she supported several principles related to cosmetic regulation. Id.
at 4G5.
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IV. REFORMING COSMETICS LAW&REGULATION
Finally, this Article considers how asking the woman question and the
excluded group question could inform reform efforts.362 It is mindful of the fact
that the method that it employs does not lead to a particular end. It does, however,
reveal the gendered roots of cosmetics law and regulation, and highlight the need
to further investigate how cosmetics and the current state of cosmetics law and
regulation impact women, including members of excluded groups. It is not
enough to simply claim that cosmetics are the safest product category that FDA
regulates, as the current state of cosmetics law and regulation hinders the ability
to meaningfully assess the safety of cosmetics. This Article suggests several
changes to begin to reform cosmetics law and regulation to better account for
Z,.en’s eX*erienHes, safety, and needs.
A number of scholars and other commentators have proposed or supported
reforms to cosmetics law and regulations.363 In addition, the General Accounting
Office has studied and issued recommendations on cosmetics law and
regulation,364 and members of Congress have introduced bills to strengthen
cosmetics law.365 While many of these proposals and bills suggest fairly broad
cosmetics reforms, the reforms that this Article argues for are more limited in
scope.366 This is not to say that additional reforms are not neededFthey very
well may be. As an initial matter, however, this Article argues for reforms that
facilitate the collection of information to more accurately assess the safety of
cosmetics and the risks that they may pose to human health, including that of
diverse women. The reforms that this Article suggests would also begin to
narrow the gap between the regulation of cosmeticsFa highly gendered
productFand that of the other major product categories, which lack the same
gendered history and associations.
First, Congress and FDA should require that establishments involved in the
production and distribution of cosmetics intended for use in the United States
register with the FDA, just as food, drug, device, biologics, and tobacco product
362. See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 837.
363. See, e.g., De Paz, supra note 117; Mason, supra note 158; Julie Mueller, Pulling Our Hair Out
and Glossing over the Problem: A Call to Strengthen the FDA’s Power to Regulate Cosmetics Through
an Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 317 (2017); Shah &
Taylor, supra note 99; Brittany Stepp, You Don’t Know What’s in Your Shampoo, and Neither Does the
FDA: A Call for Change, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 277 (2017); Watnick, supra note 117; Johnson, supra note
116, at 120.
364. GAO, HRD-78-139, supra note 9; see also STATEMENT OF GREGORY J. AHART, supra note 9;
GAO/HRD-90-58, supra note 9.
365. See, e.g., Cosmetic Modernization Amendments of 2017, H.R. 575, 115th Cong. (2017); FDA
Cosmetic Safety and Modernization Act, S. 2003, 115th Cong. (2017); Personal Care Products Safety
Act, S. 1113, 115th Cong. (2017).
366. There is overlap, however, between the reforms that this Article argues are needed and those
proposed by others. See, e.g., Cosmetic Modernization Amendments of 2017, H.R. 575, 115th Cong.
(2017); FDA Cosmetic Safety and Modernization Act, S. 2003, 115th Cong. (2017); Watnick, supra note
117, at 637G49 (discussing federal legislative proposals); Mueller, supra note 363.
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establishments do.367 Registration requirements help to facilitate post-market
enforcement activities.368 Without mandatory registration, FDA may not even
know that a facility is producing cosmetics.
Second, Congress and FDA should require that cosmetics establishments
also be required to provide FDA with a listing of ingredients used in cosmetic
products intended for use in the United States. As noted above, filing ingredient
statements for each cosmetic product is currently voluntary.369 In response to a
comment requesting that FDA make the program mandatory, FDA stated that it
DCas n, statut,rW autC,ritW t, re)uire .andat,rW H,s.etiH *r,duHt re*,rting.3370
Together, establishment registration and product listing requirements would
provide FDA with informati,n ab,ut DtCe l,Hati,nsS business trade na.esS and
types of activity (manufacturing or packaging) of cosmetic product
establisC.entsS3 and Cel* faHilitate tCe distributi,n ,f regulat,rW inf,r.ati,n and
the conduct of inspections.371
Third, Congress and FDA should require that cosmetics manufacturers and
distributors report certain adverse events to the agency. As noted above, there is
n, re)uire.ent tCat suHC e'ents be re*,rtedS ZCiHC Ca.*ers P_#’s abilitW t,
monitor the safety of cosmetics. The required adverse event reporting should
include demographic information, including sex, race, and ethnicity, for the
person who experienced the event.
P,urtCS !,ngress sC,uld eXtend P_#’s autC,ritW ,'er H,s.etiHs t, all,Z tCe
agency to inspect records under certain circumstances.372 As noted above, under
tCe P_!#S P_#’s general ins*eHti,n autC,ritW ZitC res*eHt t, H,s.etiHs is
limited to certain establishments and vehicles.373
PiftCS !,ngress and P_# sC,uld H,lleHt and *ublisC data ,n P_#’s
regulatory activities and budget for cosmetics in an easily accessible format. As
noted above, such information is not currently readily available, and without this
367. FDCA §§ 415, 510, 901, 905; 21 C.F.R. §§ 207, 607, 807 (2018); FDA, BIOLOGICS
ESTABLISHMENT REGISTRATION, https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/EstablishmentRegistration/default.htm [https://perma.cc/RJ2N-V2U5] (2018);
FDA, REGISTRATION AND PRODUCT LISTING FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF DOMESTIC TOBACCO
PRODUCT ESTABLISHMENTS (Dec. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/RulesReg
ulationsGuidance/ucm189539.htm [https://perma.cc/8M9T-36YE].
368. See, e.g., Requirements for Foreign and Domestic Establishment Registration and Listing for
Human Drugs, Including Drugs That Are Regulated Under a Biologics License Application, and Animal
Drugs, 81 Fed. Reg. 60,170, 60170 (Aug. 31, 2016); see also Registration of Food Facilities Under the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894
(Oct. 10, 2003); Amendments to Registration of Food Facilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 45,912 (July 14, 2016).
369. See Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission for Office of Management and
Budget Review; Comment Request; Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,360 (Dec.
16, 2008).
370. 73 Fed. Reg. 76,361.
371. See Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 69 Fed. Reg. 9,339, 9,339 (Feb. 3,
2017).
372. See FDCA § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2012).
373. FDCA § 704(a), 21 U.S.C. § 374; see also FDCA §§ 801-802, 21 U.S.C. §§ 381-382; 21 C.F.R.
§ 1.101 (2018) (recordkeeping requirements for certain cosmetics exports).
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inf,r.ati,n it is diffiHult t, fullW assess tCe ade)uaHW ,f P_#’s H,s.etiHs
regulation.374
Finally, Congress and FDA should encourage more research into the
*,tential CaVards tCat H,s.etiHs .aW *,se t, Z,.en’s CealtCS inHluding t,
members of other excluded groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities.
The proposals in this Section are not intended to serve as a comprehensive
fix, but rather to serve as first steps designed to provide the information needed
to more fully assess the current state of cosmetics law and regulation and the
safety of cosmetics.
CONCLUSION
Examining cosmetics law and regulation through a feminist lens
demonstrates how the shortcomings of current regulatory approach
dis*r,*,rti,natelW Be,*ardiVe Z,.en’s CealtC. !,s.etiHs are Hl,selW ass,Hiated
with cultural constructs of femininity and womanhood, and are a highly gendered
product and industry. While women use more cosmetics than men and are the
majority of workers in the cosmetics industry,375 cosmetics law and regulation
Ca'e largelW negleHtedZ,.en’s di'erse eX*erienHes and needs. TCese ,.issi,ns
impact women differently and may vary as a result of many factors, including
race and socio-economic status.376 Recognizing the failure of current cosmetics
law and regulation for women is a precursor to remedying these injustices.377
The impact of these shortcomings, however, is not limited to women who use
cosmetics, either personally or at work. Men and children also use cosmetics,
and everyone, regardless of whether they use cosmetics or not, may be exposed
to cosmetics. Thus, cosmetics law and regulation should be strengthened in order
to more accurately assess the risks that cosmetics may pose to human health.
374. See supra Section II.C.2.c.
375. See supra Section II.A.
376. See Rothenberg, supra note 337, at 1207.
377. See David Stowman, Getting to Know Ourselves, BENCH&B.MINN. 5 (Feb. 2005).
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White Slavery and the Crisis of Will
in the Age of Contract
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ABSTRACT: Recognizing human freedom is never as simple as acts of legal
pronouncement might suggest. Liberal abstractions like freedom and equality;
legal formulations of personhood, free will, and contract; the constructed
divisions between public and private, self and other, home and market on which
the former are predicated—these are often inadequate to understanding, let alone
realizing, the shared aspirations they supposedly define. By the same token, the
dense and dynamic relations of power that characterize any liberal society
overwhelm and exceed our critical vocabulary. “Racism,” “sexism,” and
“capitalism” powerfully name structures of inequality, but they fail to capture
the full spectrum of social relations, practices, and exchanges that reproduce
inequality—deep structures of feeling, unspoken common sense, the stories we
tell ourselves about the world and our places in it. Focusing on an early
twentieth-century case involving an immigrant convicted of “white slavery,”
accused of “mesmerizing” his secretary, this Article explores the ways in which
the white slave panic and spiritualist practices reflect a set of anxieties about the
nature of agency and consent obscured by the universalizing and formalist
abstractions of contract law and theory. Through a close reading of competing
narratives surrounding the case, this Article seeks to investigate some of the ways
in which the rhetorical distortions of law affect the lives of its most vulnerable
subjects.
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INTRODUCTION
Late one evening in the summer of 1925, Dinshah Ghadiali was walking
back to his hotel room in Portland, Oregon when he had the distinct feeling that
he was being followed. He had just completed a demonstration of his invention
before a small audience. Ghadiali was the inventor of a popular healing system.
Any disease, he claimed, could be cured by simply casting colored lights on the
body. His invention, a therapeutic light box, had been a phenomenal success,
though it attracted voluble skeptics. That night, Ghadiali dragged his unsold
instruments back to his hotel room without the assistance he neededFhis young
secretary having disappeared the day before. At his hotel room, he was met by a
federal officer pointing a gun. Several other officers flooded the room. One
ordered him to strip. Ghadiali spent the night in Bail. It Zasn’t until tCe f,ll,Zing
morning that he learned he had been arrested for the crime of Dwhite slavery.31
The White Slave Traffic Act of 1910, better known as the Mann Act,
Hri.inaliVed interstate tra'elZitC ZCiteZ,.en f,r DanW i..,ral *ur*,se.32 The
1. DINSHAH P. GHADIALI, RAILROADING A CITIZEN 84-85 (1926).
2. /Cite Sla'e TraffiH #HtS >; Stat. 9?<. UMune ?<S @8@QT. TC,ugC tCe *Crase DZCite sla'erW3 .aW
sound odd, insensitive, or unsettling to contemporary readers, I use the phraseFusually to refer to forced
prostitution among white womenFbecause it was the phrase used to shape so many aspects of social life
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including apprehensions of race, gender, freedom and
coercion. Six years before it made its way into U.S. federal legislation, the phrase appeared in the title of
the International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slavery, a treaty signed by more than twenty
countries. The U.S. law itself was spurred by a massive investigation undertaken by a Congressional
Commission (though the Commission itself found little evidence of the phenomenon). KATHERINE
BENTON-COHEN, INVENTING THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM AND ITS LEGACY 151-158 (2018). However
exaggerated, concerns about white slavery played an extraordinary role in expanding the capacities of
what is now the Federal Bureau of Investigation. JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN
ACT AND THEMAKING OF THE FBI 1-8 (2014). The white slave panic found expression in print media and
popular film, including one of the first, and most successful, feature-lengtC fil.s. In ,tCer Z,rdsS DZCite
sla'erW3 Zas e'erWZCere.
5u,tati,n .arAs ar,und Z,rds liAe DZCite sla'erW3 ,r D.ulatt,3 'ari,uslW signal Cist,riHal
authenticity, epistemic doubt, rhetorical embarrassment, or shared skepticism. Quotation marks were once
used to add emphasis or signal authority; lately, writers use them more often to signal a break from
ordinary language, to disclaim or disavow certain language or ideas. SeeMarjorie Garber, “” %#uotation
Marks), CRITICAL INQUIRY 653, 662 (1999). In the remainder of this Article, rather than enclose white
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express purpose of the law was to protect white women from being forced into
prostitution. Its notoriously expansive wording, though, allowed police and
prosecutors to selectively punish menFespecially black and brown menF
involved in all manner of consensual behavior with white women. Ghadiali was
accused of having sex with his secretary, a twenty-three-year-old woman named
Geraldine McCann, on three occasions: once while vacationing with Ghadiali
and his family in Atlantic City, New Jersey; and twice, while traveling cross-
H,untrW t, *r,.,te Cis in'enti,ns. #t OCadiali’s trialS ZCen Cis att,rneWs asAed
MH!ann ZCW sCe H,ntinued t, Z,rA f,r OCadialiS ZCW sCe didn’t )uit ,r run
away after the first alleged incident, the young woman testified that she had been
mesmerized.3
Ghadiali immigrated to the United States from India in 1910. He became a
citizen in 1917, the same year that Congress barred further immigration from all
of Asia. He had been arrested several times during his career for violating laws
regulating the practice of medicine, but it was after he married a white woman,
in 1923, that he became the target of increasingly racialized persecution. In his
voluminous autobiographical writing, much of it devoted to documenting his
many encounters with police officers and prosecutors, Ghadiali boasts that he
was a mesmerist, as well as a theosophist, metaphysician, telepathist, and
Ds*ellbinding s*eaAer.34 He, like many others at the turn of the century, found in
spiritualist counterpublics a form of entertainment, a community of free thinkers,
opportunities to investigate capacities of the mind and interpersonal exchange.
And like many others excluded from the more respectable professionsFwomen,
immigrants, black AmericansFGhadiali found in spiritualist circuits a way to
earn a living.
Ghadiali first met McCann in 1924, when she and her aunt attended one of
his scientific demonstrations in Portland, Oregon. According to the prosecuting
attorney, Ghadiali lured the young woman away from the protective gaze of her
family by promising exciting work and a good salary. Ghadiali asked her to sign
ZCat tCe *r,seHut,rs referred t, as a DHuri,us H,ntraHtS3 bef,re in'iting Cer t,
live and work with his family at their Institute in New Jersey. As soon as Ms.
McCann arri'edS tCe *r,seHut,r arguedS OCadiali br,ugCt Cer Dunder Cis .ental
d,.inati,n.35 DNe abs,rbed Cer *ers,nalitW until Ce addiHted Cer Zill.3 6
During their cross-eXa.inati,n ,f CerS OCadiali’s att,rneWs re.inded
McCann that her employer had given her a bicycle; he taught her how to drive;
slavery in quotation marks, as if to distance myself and the reader from tCe Z,rds’meaning, I have chosen
to do without the typographical offsetFprecisely because the phrase, the spurious phenomena it
designates, and its haunting legacies cannot be so neatly contained. Nor should we assume that our
ordinary language is pure of the sorts of corruptions that quotation marks are used to isolate.
3. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 122-127.
4. DINSHAHP.GHADIALI, TRIUMPHOFSPECTRO-CHROME 231-2 (2d ed. 2002);Dinshah P. Ghadiali,
“Says !-Rays Are Not New,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 1896).
5. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 124.
6. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 123.
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the two had travelled by rail together all over the country. If she wanted to escape
Cer e.*l,Wer’s H,ntr,lS ZCW didn’t sCe flee ZCen sCe Cad tCe ,**,rtunitW$
MH!ann insisted tCat sCe Cad been Dunder s,.e tranHe3Fduring the entire
eleven months of her employment:
I had no will power of my own, and somehow or other, whenever I had
the desire to get away, I felt that something was drawing me back. I did
not have any will power to act and stand on my own feet. All my
personality was gone. I felt a weak feeling, as if I had no control over
my movements. Somebody else was controlling me.7
E'identlW *ersuaded bW MH!ann’s testi.,nWS tCe 7reg,n BurW H,nHluded
that Ghadiali Cad trans*,rted tCe W,ung Z,.an in interstate H,..erHe Df,r tCe
*ur*,se ,f *r,stituti,nS3 in 'i,lati,n ,f tCe /Cite Sla'e TraffiH #Ht. Ne Zas
sentenced to five years in prison.
Ghadiali appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented at his
trial H,uld n,t *,ssiblW su**,rt tCe BurW’s finding. MuHC ,f tCe testi.,nW ,ffered
by his accuser remained entirely uncorroborated. Ghadiali argued that the trial
had been so rushed that he himself had been given no opportunity to prepare an
adequate defense.8 So many miles from home, the only witnesses he was able to
bring forwardFhis wife and daughterFwere discredited as conspiring
procurers. Only after the trial was he able to collect some fifty affidavits
H,ntradiHting Cis aHHuser’s testi.,nWS ZCiHC Ce later reproduced in a self-
published book about his trial, Railroading a Citizen (1926).
TCe IintC !irHuit u*Celd tCe H,n'iHti,n. _eferring t, tCe BurW’s finding ,f
fact, Judge Neterer explained that the jury was better positioned to evaluate the
credibilitW ,f ZitnessesS Dt, ,bser'e tCeir de.ean,rS tCe reas,nableness ,f tCe
st,rWS3 and t, deter.ine DZCere tCe trutC in tCe Hase laW3% D\i[f tCere is anW
e'idenHe u*,n ZCiHC rati,nal .inds .igCt arri'e at a liAe H,nHlusi,nS3 Ce
H,nHludedS DtCis H,urt Hann,t re'erse tCe finding.39 There is nothing particularly
eXtra,rdinarW ab,ut tCis reHitati,n ,f tCe H,urt’s standard ,f re'ieZ. "ut it lea'es
unanswered the question: how could so many rational minds arrive at such a
H,nHlusi,nS DtCe defendant eXerHised an influence over the girl, which, in effect,
if n,t in faHtS a.,unted t, .es.eriH H,ntr,lS3 tCat OCadiali eXerHised
supernatural power?10 What about the contract between Ghadiali and his
seHretarW see.ed s, unusualS s, DHuri,us3 tCat Bur,rs H,nHluded tCat tCe H,ntract
memorialized not consent, but its opposite?
7. Ghadiali v. United States, 17 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1927).
8. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 119-20.
9. Ghadiali, 17 F.2d at 237.
10. Id.
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These, at least, are some of the questions that motivate my reading of
OCadiali’s Hase and *r,.*t a br,ader in)uirW int, tCe ZaWs legal disH,urse often
betrays how law is lived. Patricia Williams has observed that law operates within
a br,ader DsWste. ,f f,r.aliVed dist,rti,n ,f tC,ugCtS3 arguing tCat laZ
preserves its own sense of rationality and fairness by sustaining practices of
epistemic exclusion, historical amnesia, and affective denialFall of which tend
to obscure tCe laZ’s violent effects, suffered disproportionately by racialized
others, women, and the poor.11 Taking cues fromWilliams, this Article examines
the relationship between the abstracting habits of legal discourseFits
universalizing mythologies, its partializing constructions of human experience,
its repression of historical knowledgeFand the complex social worlds that law
sets in motion, worlds that become all the more difficult to apprehend with only
the conceptual resources found in legal discourse. Liberal abstractions like
freedom and equality, legal formulations of personhood, agency and consent,
and the conceptual divisions of public and private, self and other, the home and
the marketFthese are wholly inadequate to understanding how law is lived,
particularly by its most vulnerable subjects. By the same token, the dense and
dynamic relations of power that characterize any society, and have always
frustrated tCe 1nited States’ realiVati,n ,f its self-image, often exceed our
critical vocabulary. Words like Dracism,3 Dsexism,3 and Dcapitalism3 powerfully
name species of structural inequality but fail to capture the full spectrum of social
relations, habits, and exchange that reproduce and entrench inequality. They
in',Ae tCe D.,nu.ental s,Hial arHCiteHture3 ,f ine)ualitWS but d, n,t desHribe
the deep structures of feeling, the inarticulate common sense of embodied
knowledge accrued by moving through landscapes that shape our varying
notions of what is or is not true, what may or may not be possible, the stories that
we tell ourselves about our world and our place in it.12
This Article begins by exploring the role that theories of contract law have
played in creating a capitalist economy that remains thoroughly racialized and
genderedFthe abstracting and universalizing rhetoric of 2contractual freedom’
notwithstanding. In the aftermath of the Civil War and Emancipation, the idea of
contractual freedom had become charged with the promise of ushering in a new
era of freedom and equality. But during the same period, that promise was soon
betrayed by a style of legal formalism which, in the name of 2contractual
freedom,’ advanced the interests of expanding markets, often at the expense of
the working class, women, and racialized others. Writing of the formalism that
revised contract law principles at the turn of the century, Lawrence Friedman
11. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as Law’s
Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMIL. REV. 127, 151 (1987); PATRICIAWILLIAMS, THEALCHEMYOFRACE
ANDRIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 156, 160 (1992). See generally Patricia J. Williams, On Being
the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988).
12. AVERY GORDON, GHOSTLY MATTERS: HAUNTING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 4
(2008); RAYMONDWILLIAMS, THE LONG REVOLUTION 165 (1961).
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,bser'esS DH,ntraHt laZ is an abstractionFwhat is left in the law relating to
agreements when all the particularities of persons and subject matter are
re.,'edS3 rendering real *ers,ns and tCeir real grie'anHes eXtrinsiH t, legal
analysis.13 As he and other critics have argued, contractual form would come to
evacuate and replace the very agency and autonomy that the contract was
supposed to represent and protect. Slavery, decades after it was abolished, would
continue to shape legal and public conceptions of contract and consent,
perversely, in that almost any agreementFabsent obvious coercion, fraud, or
duressFwas recognized as willing consent.
If the recent memory of slavery and the failed promise of contract law raised
anxieties about the nature of free will, autonomy, and consent, these anxieties
seemed to find expression in popular spiritualist practices.14 In the early
twentieth century, spiritualist practices (séances, mesmerism, etc.) and contract
theory engaged a common set of questionsFabout the nature of human agency,
the fragility of mutual exchange, and the elusive forces that bind us to one
another. In his autobiographical writing, Ghadiali proudly confessed to being a
.es.eristS DZell An,ZnS3 interested in eX*eri.entingZitC *,Zers ,f *erHe*ti,n
and influenHe. "ut D.es.eris.3 enters the narrative of his trial more darkly as
a metaphor for the contract itselfFor its failureFappearing at times as a critique
of the employment contract, at times as a parody of the marriage contract, always
conjuring the specter of anti-will that haunts the modern contract.15
This Article then turns to track the figure of the white slave in its movement
across the landscape of nineteenth and twentieth century American history. The
term first appeared during the antebellum period to describe the horrors of
mistaken identity, racial instability, and the anxiety that the violence of slavery
could never be contained, demographically or morally. The white slave panic of
the early twentieth centuryFthe widespread but unfounded fear that white
women were forced into prostitution, often by black and brown menF
synthesized a set of anxieties about emerging forms of social violence and
coercion. Labor activists used the term to characterize the exploitation authorized
by the labor contract; feminists, to disenchant the unequal relationship
sanctioned by the marriage contract; and others, as the white slave panic itself
suggests, to decry the erosion of traditional distinctions of race and gender before
the leveling forces of the market economy.
In the second half of this ArticleS Ze return t, OCadiali’s narrati'e.
OCadiali’s HaseS unliAe .,st ZCite sla'erW HasesS did involve a kidnapping, but
in his account, it was not Ghadiali who kidnapped his secretary.
13. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY
20 (1965).
14. See Christopher Buccafusco, Spiritualism and Will(s) in the Age of Consent (2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1096367 [https://perma.cc/B8LT-2LXF].
15. SeeWilliams, On Being the Object of Property, supra note 11, at 5, 13-16.
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STATUS IN THEAGE OF CONTRACT
In the United States in the late nineteenth century, the idea of contract had
become charged with the promise of delivering the nation from its history of
slavery and ushering in a new era of freedom and equality. As Amy Dru Stanley
has observed, after the abolition of slavery in the 1nited StatesS DH,ntraHt Zas
ab,'e all a .eta*C,r ,f freed,.S3 re*resenting a release fr,. tCe ,ld b,nds ,f
dominion and dependence.16 In the second half of the nineteenth century, what
Brooks Thomas has called the DtCe age ,f H,ntraHtS317 the liberatory potential of
H,ntraHt Zas ass,Hiated ZitC NenrWMaine’s fa.,us deHlarati,n: DtCe.,'e.ent
of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.318 In traditional societies, the argument went, individual obligations
were determined by inherited status; in modern societies, they were more freely
assumed through negotiation and exchange. And where status-bound societies
*er*etuated f,r.al CierarHCWS H,nHei'ed as Dnatural3 and unHCangingS
contractual societies were continuously remade to reflect the collective desires
of free and equal individuals. A social order determined by free exchange among
equals would be dynamic rather than static, continuously improving. This
*r,.iseS TC,.as ZritesS DradiHallW H,nHei'edS3 is ,ne ,f an Di..anentS rather
tCan transHendental ,rdering ,f s,HietW.319
After the Civil War, promises of freedom and equality were announced more
boldly in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which abolished the status
of enslavement and extended to black Americans the rights of citizenship,
including due process and equal protection. But by the early twentieth century,
those same protections had been eroded by a Court that elevated contractual
freedom to a right of sacred inviolability and routinely struck down laws
intended to protect workers. In Lochner v. New York, for instance, the Court
struck down a labor law limiting the number of hours bakers were required to
stand ,n tCeir feetS finding tCe regulati,n an Dunreas,nable3 and DartifiHial3
interference with the individual aut,n,.WS ,r Dfreed,. ,f H,ntraHtS3 guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 At the same time, the
Court invested contract with extraordinary power, not only to express the shared
intentions of employer and employee, but to transform social unequals into
f,r.al e)uals. DTCe rigCt ,f a *ers,n t, sell Cis lab,rS3 tCe !,urt eX*lained in a
subse)uent HaseS Dis in its essenHeS tCe sa.e rigCt as tCe rigCt ,f tCe *urHCaser ,f
16. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE
MARKET IN THEAGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 2 (1998).
17. BROOK THOMAS, AMERICAN LITERARY REALISM AND THE FAILED PROMISE OF CONTRACT 1
(1997).
18. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TOMODERN IDEAS 141 (1861).
19. Id. at 3.
20. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
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labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the
*ers,n ,ffering t, sell it.321 In other words, by trick of formalism, employer and
employee were rendered equal through their exercise of an equivalent rightFthe
right to contract without legislative interference. Contemporary observers railed
at tCe !,urt f,r a**ealing t, an abstraHt and largelW Dillus,rW3 f,r. ,f e)ualitW
while shielding plainly unequal and increasingly exploitive relationships from
judicial scrutiny.22
The equalizing promise of contract notwithstanding, residues of status
would persist in the form of naturalized differenceFgender and race. The
Lochner Court routinely struck down state laws that interfered with the
DH,ntraHtual freed,.3 ,f lab,rers and tCeir e.*l,Wers. "ut ,ne re.arAable
exception to pattern involved a law limiting the number of hours women were
permitted to work.23 In Muller v. Oregon, the Court upheld the law, though it
interfered with contractual autonomy, finding that the state had a legitimate
interest in protecting the reproductive health of women:
TCat Z,.an’s *CWsiHal struHture and tCe *erf,r.anHe ,f .aternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is
obvious . . . . [B]y abundant testimony of the medical fraternity,
continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day
to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and, as healthy mothers
are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race.24
The Court distinguished its ruling in Lochner from its ruling in Muller in
terms of sex difference: DtCe differenHe betZeen tCe seXes \Bustifies] a different
rule.325
In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), similarly, it was racial difference that rendered
a J,uisiana laZ re)uiring Dse*arate but e)ual3 aHH,..,dati,ns H,nsistent ZitC
constitutional guarantees. The Court acknowledged that the Thirteenth
Amendment abolished both slavery and its correlate markers of legal status, but
not racial distinctionFDa distinction which is found in the color of the two races
and ZCiHC .ust alZaWs eXist.326 Likewise, the Court reasoned, the object of the
Fourteenth Amend.ent DZas und,ubtedlW t, enf,rHe tCe abs,lute e)ualitW ,f tCe
two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social [equality],
21. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908).
22. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
23. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
24. Id. at 421.
25. Id. at 419.
26. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1896).
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or a commingling of the two races.327 Racial distinctions, abstracted from
histories of subordination, expropriation, and enforced separation is reified
si.*lW as tCe a**earanHe ,f H,l,rS D*CWsiHal differenHeS3 and DraHial instinHt.328
The equalizing promise of contract, even as it failed the working classes, was
never intended to eliminate rank of race or gender.
The contractual ideal celebrated by the Lochner Court, in other ways,
seemed to have come loose from the practical and everyday administration of
contract law, as Morton Horwitz argues.29 When the Court struck down laws
aimed at improving the working conditions of laborers and equalizing the
employment relation, it did so by appealing to the notion that employment
contracts expressed the free will of the employer as well as employee. Contract
law drew its political legitimacy and claim to economic rationality from the
notion that contracts represented individual desires and the shared intentions of
consenting parties.30 According to the nineteenth-HenturW DZill tCe,rWS3 a
contract was enforceable because it represented the shared intentions of free
indi'iduals. # H,ntraHt re*resented a H,n'ergenHe ,f ZillS a D.eeting ,f tCe
.inds.3 #s l,ng as H,ntraHts Zere freelW entered int,S ZitC,ut e'idenHe ,f fraud
or coercion, enforcing judges were merely carrying out the intentions of
contracting parties.31
But judges and juries can never really determine whether a contractual
eXHCange is aHH,.*anied bW an aHtual D.eeting ,f tCe .inds.3 If a Hunning
buyer knows the real value of a piece of jewelry sold by a naïve seller, how can
a judge determine that the buyer and seller have reached an agreement not only
with respect to the price of the jewelry, but its value, or the nature of the thing
itself? The idealism of the will theoryFits sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies of
individual intent and the essential fragility of consentFwas ultimately strained
by its practical administration. The will theory demanded that judges and juries
search the minds of others to determine their true intentions. But this was an
impossible task. Consequently, the will theory was quickly unraveled by a
paradox: will, or intention, resides in the inner recesses of the individual, but is
known to others only through the world of social forms. As the will theory gave
way to contractual formalism, the power and privilege invested in the contractual
form came to displace and evacuate the very agency, will, and consent that it was
supposed to represent.
In his canonical essay, Consideration and Form, Lon Fuller argued that
judges should abandon the metaphysical search for a meeting of the minds and
instead a**lW Da si.*le and eXternal test3 t, deter.ine ZCetCer an agree.ent
27. Id. at 544.
28. Id. at 551.
29. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OFAMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 33-51 (1994).
30. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, in PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW 207
(Randy E. Barnett ed. 1995).
31. Id. at 35. See also Buccafusco, supra note 14, at 9.
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had been reached.32 Ne argued tCat Budges Zere .,re liAelW t, C,n,r D*ri'ate
aut,n,.W3 ,f H,ntraHting *arties by enforcing, without too much meddling, the
explicit terms of a carefully constructed agreement.33 Fuller enumerated the
administrative and pedagogical virtues of a formalist approach to contractual
enforcement: a well-formalized contract supplies the judge with evidence of the
eXHCange% besides.e.,rialiVing agree.entS tCe f,r.al H,ntraHt als, DHCannels3
,r enH,urages tCe *arties t, eXerHise *reHauti,n bef,re taAing DinH,nsiderate
aHti,n.334 As Fuller recognized, form, like language itself, stabilized
communication and exchangeFbut not without sacrificing authenticity,
spontaneity, and something of a human character.35 The trend towards formalism
required that disputes over the meaning of contractual terms be resolved not
through a judicial refereeing of discrepant views, but increasingly, with reference
t, an i.*ers,nal Dreas,nableness3 standard.36 !,ntraHtS in Puller’s aHH,untS
should play an important role, not merely in realizing the intentions of free and
equal people, but in disciplining rational market actors participating in a rapidly
expanding economy.
Thus, in the late nineteenth century, Horwitz demonstrates, contract law took
a turn aZaW fr,. an earnest in)uirW int, *arties’ DsubBeHti'e3 ,r real intenti,ns
and t,Zards an D,bBeHti'e3 inter*retati,n ,f *arties’ f,r.aliVed agree.ents. TCis
general shiftFfrom substance to form, from subjective to objectiveFwas part
,f a Dbr,ader tendenHW t, Hreate f,r.alS general tCe,ries tCat Z,uld *r,'ide
unif,r.itWS HertaintWS and *rediHtabilitW ,f legal arrange.ents3 to a growing
industrial economy.37 After the Civil War, formalism and objectivism tended to
standardize commercial transactions, facilitating the expansion and national
integration of labor and consumer markets. Notwithstanding its promises to
promote freedom and equality, the emerging regime of contract often sacrificed
an Dindi'idualiVed sense ,f BustiHe3 t, tCe s.,,tC funHti,ning ,f an inHreasinglW
ruthless economy.38 As judicial enforcement veered away from entertaining the
eccentric understanding of individual actors, it tended to recognize the real
intentions of individuals only insofar as they seemed to reproduce a set of
economic norms or conform to a set of market conventions. Though it was the
free will of individuals that supposedly animated the machine of industrial
capitalism, the machine itself had begun to operate independently of individual
will.
Legal realists at the time protested that these developments were not the
result of any natural progression or inevitable self-correction. Instead, they were
32. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941).
33. Id. at 806-10.
34. Id. at 800-01.
35. See, e.g., Nathan Isaacs, The Standardization of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917).
36. HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 42-45.
37. Id. at 36.
38. Id.
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an imposition of highly motivated proponents of a particular economic theory.
In his dissent from the decision in Lochner, for instance, Justice Oliver Wendell
N,l.esS Mr. H,.*lained tCat Cis H,lleagues Zere *usCing an DeH,n,.iH tCe,rW
that a large part ,f tCe H,untrW d,es n,t entertain.339 Likewise, a young Felix
Frankfurter complained of a mechanical jurisprudence, by which courts had
H,.e t, base tCeir deHisi,ns u*,n Da *ri,ri tCe,ries3 and DabstraHt assu.*ti,nsS3
inZild disregard f,r tCe DaHtualities ,f.,dern life.340 Roscoe Pound argued that
NenrW Maine’s fa.,us .aXi. Cad n, *laHe in tCe #ngl,-American tradition
ZCiHCS in Cis 'ieZS Zas D*r,gressing baHAZard.341 The notion that liberty of
contract promoted equality, he argued, was entirely illusory. D/CW tCenS3 Ce
asAedS Dd, H,urts *ersist in tCis fallaHW$ /CW d, s, .anW ,f tCe. f,rHe u*,n
legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of practical conditions of
inequality? . . . Why is the legal conception of the relation of employer and
empl,Wee s, at 'arianHe ZitC tCe H,..,n An,Zledge ,f .anAind$342
SPIRITUALISM AND THE CONVERGENCE OFWILL
The questions posed by legal realists were remarkably resonant with the
speculations of spiritualists during the same period. Pound and others observed
that a powerful set of economic abstractions had begun to transform not only the
material conditions of life and labor, but the conceptual means by which those
conditions were understood or apprehended. Spiritualism provided ordinary men
and women opportunities t, eX*l,re tCe DH,..,n An,Zledge3 t, ZCiHC 6,und
seemed to referFa common knowledge shared by the alienated and
dispossessed, one routinely obscured by economic theory and liberal invocations
of freedom and equality.
By the late nineteenth century, spiritualismFand associated experiments in
mesmerism, hypnotism, mediumship, and electro-biologyFhad become an
enormously popular pastime in Europe and the United States, perhaps because it
offered ordinary men and women alternative vocabularies and rituals with which
to make sense of their lives. Popular forms of spiritualismFfrom theatrical
displays of mesmerism or somnambulism before mass audiences to the séances
held in the intimacy of respectable homesFallowed men and women of every
rank to explore the limits of free will, their capacity for inter-personal influence
and exchange, and the experiences of both powerlessness and control.43
39. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
40. Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353,
364 (1916).
41. Pound, supra note 22 at 219.
42. Id. at 454.
43. See, e.g., RUSS CASTRONOVO, NECRO CITIZENSHIP: DEATH, EROTICISM, AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (2001); R. LAURENCE MOORE, IN SEARCH OF
WHITE CROWS: SPIRITUALISM, PARAPSYCHOLOGY, ANDAMERICANCULTURE (1977); ALEXOWEN, THE
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Spiritualism thus seemed to address the failed promise of contract law by
encouraging people to undertake their own investigations into the character of
agency, the various media through which we communicate our intentions, and
the forces that bind us to one another. As individuals found themselves adrift in
increasingly automated economies of exchange, spiritualism would offer its
enthusiasts more vital opportunities for exploring the contours of individual
agency and the possibilities of concerted action.
Spiritualism owed something of its appeal to the social upheavals which had
begun to transform American life beginning in the mid-nineteenth century: a
deadly war, increased social mobility, urbanization and industrialization, and the
arrival of new immigrants.44 It also addressed a growing crisis of faith among its
enthusiasts who, wearied of sectarian division and overweening stricture, found
in spiritualism a set of practices that were affirming of personal experience,
amateurism and experimentation, on the one hand, and defiant of existing forms
of authority, expertise, and hierarchy, on the other.45 OCadiali’s H,l,r tCerapyF
a compelling blend of spiritualism, popular science, and franchise
entrepreneurshipFwas embraced by more than ten thousand Americans during
the half century before it was finally suppressed.46 His practitioners consisted
mostly of working class men and (especially) womenFpeople denied entry to
the medical profession and alienated by the impersonality of the emerging
medical marketplace.47 Student-practitioners often treated themselves and their
family members and were encouraged to think of themselves as scientific
researchers, create communities, and collaborate in their investigations.
OCadiali’s ene.ies in tCe #.eriHan MediHal #ss,Hiati,n and federal P,,d and
Drug Administration pursued him for decades, recognizing him as a threat to the
medical establishment and its culture of expertise.48
The egalitarian and experimental ethos of spiritualist counter-publics
attracted a number of creative thinkers and activists, as respectable as William
Lloyd Garrison and George Bernard Shaw.49 For the same reason, it had become
aligned with the radical edge of social movements on both sides of the AtlanticF
movements to abolish slavery, reform marriage, and end imperialism, among
DARKENEDROOM:WOMEN, POWER, AND SPIRITUALISM INLATEVICTORIANENGLAND (2004); ALLISON
WINTER, MESMERIZED: POWERS OFMIND INVICTORIANBRITAIN (1998); Emily Ogden, Beyond Radical
Enchantment: Mesmerizing Laborers in the Americas, 42 CRITICAL INQUIRY 815 (2016).
44. R. Laurence Moore, Spiritualism and Science: Reflections on the First Decade of the Spirit
Rappings, 24 AM. Q. 474, 476 (1972).
45. See ANN BRAUDE, RADICAL SPIRITS: WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND SPIRITUALISM IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1989); Gauri Viswanathan, The Ordinary Business of Occultism, 27 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 1 (2000).
46. SeeMatthew Lavine, The Science of Automatic Precision: The Rise and Fall of Spectro-Chrome
Therapy, 44 HISTORICAL STUDIES IN THENATURAL SCIENCES 140, 157 (2014).
47. Id. at 149, 155.
48. Id. at 164-172.
49. Braude, supra note 45, at 17; Viswanathan, supra note 45, at 5.
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others.50 Of course, not all spiritualists were interested in social reform. Many
found in spiritualist demonstrations a form of entertainment; others, hoping
sincerely to communicate with the dead, sought consolation after the loss of a
l,'ed ,ne. "ut as 4uss !astr,n,', insistsS D\Z[ra**ed u* ZitC anW
H,..uniHati,n ZitC tCe dead L are )uesti,ns about the relation of the present
to the past, specifically ones involving a politics of memory that incorporates
and re*resses IeZ /,rld raHial enH,unters.351 Dead presidents were frequent
guests at séances, but so were vanished Indians and the ghosts of mulatto girls,
all returning to attest to historic crimes.52 In the American South, where law was
invested with the extraordinary power to turn people into things, it might not
have been difficult to imagine that things, in turnFtipping tables and
tambourinesFmight be animated by aggrieved spirits.53
P,r ,tCersS draZn t, ZCat tCeW H,nHei'ed ,f as tCe .,re D*Cil,s,*CiHal3 ,r
e'en DsHientifiH3 as*eHts ,f s*iritualis.S eX*eri.ents ZitC .es.eriH .ind
control were part of a much broader inquiry into the nature of individual agency
and inter-personal exchange. Anton Mesmer, the eighteenth-century physician
who originated mesmerism, claimed to have discovered an invisible force that
emanates from and surrounds the body of every living creature.54 This universal
substanceS ZCiHC Ce Halled Dani.al .agnetis.S3 H,nneHted li'ing Hreatures ZitC
other natural processes. Through it, individuals could pass thoughts and
sensations from one to another. Other spiritualists attributed similar effects to
D.agnetiH fluids3 ,r DeleHtr,-bi,l,gWS3 but tCeW generallW sCared an intuiti,n tCat
influence was a substantive rather than transcendental phenomenon. The
discovery that a universal medium was the source of interpersonal connectivity,
many spiritualists believed, had implications for understanding the ways in
which individuals were bound to one another. In the words of one American
spiritualist, for instance, humanity was bound together
by a thousand silken cords girded around by a magnetic belt of subtle
sensibilitiesFwhich communicate an injury done to or by the remotest
person to all other members of the living whole.55
50. Braude, supra note 45, at 117-141; Viswanathan, supra note 45, at 1-4.
51. Russ Castronovo, The Antislavery Unconscious: Mesmerism, "odun, and “*quality,” 53 MISS.
Q. 41, 43 (2000).
52. See Patrick A. Polk, “He Will Remember Me”: Anglo-American Spiritualists, Slavery, and the
Ghosts of Miscegenation, 47 SOUTHERN Q. 24 (2010); Bridget Bennet, Sacred Theaters: Shakers,
Spiritualists, Theatricality, and the Indian in the 1830s and 1840s, 49 DRAMA REV. 114 (2005).
53. Id.
54. Emily Ogden, CREDULITY: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF USMESMERISM (2018), 25-27; WINTER,
supra note 43, at 1-2.
55. See Sally Morita, Unseen (and Unappreciated) Matters: Understanding the Reformative Nature
of 19th-Century Spiritualism, 40 AM. STUD. 99, 113 (1999) (quoting Andrew Jackson Davis, The Great
Harmonia, Concerning the Physiological Vices and Virtues, and The Seven Phases of Marriage, 4 THE
REFORMER 409 (1857)).
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Thus, spiritualists entertained an understanding of reciprocal obligation that
radically differed from those held by proponents of contractual freedom. For
William Graham Sumner, nineteenth century social scientist and exponent of
HlassiHal liberalis.S Dfree .an in a free de.,HraHW Cas n, dutW ZCate'er t, .en
of the same rank and social standing except courtesy, respect, and good-Zill.356
He distinguished modern contractual societies from traditional status-bound
s,Hieties bW arguing tCatS in H,ntraHtual s,HietiesS DtCe free .an Hut ,ff all tCe
ties that might pull him down, [and] severed also all the ties by which might have
.ade ,tCers *ull Ci. u*.357 Su.ner’s i.age ,f freedom is independence from
,tCers. Su.ner’s Dfree .an3 is an Dis,lated .anS3 l,,sened fr,. tCe burdens
and benefits of mutual obligation.58 Only by entering into contractual
arrangements with others does the free man forfeit his original freedom to
assume any obligation towards others. Spiritualists, by contrast, by abandoning
fantasies of perfect independence and focusing instead on the Dsubstance3F
material conditions, historical embeddedness, inescapable interdependenceF
recognized freedom to reside not in self-sovereign isolation but in the shared
realm of experience. Unlike the contracting agent of classical liberalism, the
mesmerist and his subject are born already swimming in the substance and
circumstance of others.
Mes.eristsS in tCeir eff,rts t, aHti'ate tCe DHCe.istries3 tCat H,nneHt Cu.an
beings, experimented with the power of collective action. The twentieth-century
political philosopher Hannah Arendt locates the source of individual freedom not
in a .WtCiH state ,f nature but tCe D*Cen,.enal s*aHe Hreated bW .en.359 This
power is not the natural property of any individual but a collective achievement,
the fragile culmination of a plurality of actors achieving momentary consensus.
In The Human ConditionS #rendt ZritesS DtCe ,nlW indis*ensable .aterial faHt,r
in the generation of power is the living together of people . . . . Whenever people
gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and
n,t f,re'er.360 The generative power that Arendt ascribes to collective action in
*ubliHS ,rZCat sCe Halls tCe Ds*aHe ,f a**earanHeS3 is *erCa*s easier t, reH,gniVe
in the legacies of those who moved beyond their flirtation with spiritualism to
devote themselves to focused political reformFin ViHt,ria /,,dCull’s
Ha.*aign f,r.arital ref,r.S in#nnie "esant’s HCallenge t, "ritisC i.*erialis.S
in M,Candas OandCi’s satWagraCaS ,r .,'e.ents ,f trutC-forceFthan in the
practices of commercial spiritualists.61 But even in the average mesmeric
demonstration or table-turning exercise, ordinary men and women suspended
56. WILLIAMGRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSESOWE TO EACHOTHER 34 (1974).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 34.
59. HANNAHARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 155 (2d ed. 1965).
60. HANNAHARENDT, THEHUMAN CONDITION 199 (2d ed. 1998).
61. Braude, supra note 45, at 191-192; Viswanathan, supra note 45, at 3.
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disbelief, in trust of one another, to experiment with the potentialities of
collective power.
Part of what drew social reformers to spiritualism in the late nineteenth
century was the notion that a universal substance, however described, flowed
among human beings without regard to status, or distinctions of race, class, or
gender. But scholars suggest that the egalitarianism of popular spiritualism was
perhaps less radical than appearances might lead us to believe.62 Russ
Castronovo argues, for instance, that the imagined equality of the spirit world, in
which social differences are dissolved in a universal medium, too closely
resembles the well-worn fantasies of liberal universalism, within which equality
is i.aginable ,nlW a.,ng abstraHtS dise.b,diedS and aCist,riHal D*ers,ns.363
!astr,n,',’s *ersuasi'e Hriti)ue n,tZitCstandingS s*iritualist *raHtiHes see. t,
have engaged and troubled the impulses of liberal audiences, invoking the
essential sameness among people by presencing their material differences.64 The
thrill and scandal of the mesmeric demonstration was the spectacle of role
reversal: accented foreigners made puppets of well-born women; illiterate girls
held forth before juries of learned men.65 Writing of spiritualism in colonial
India, Gauri Viswanathan observes that in spiritualist counter-publics, colonizer
and colonized could participate in reimagining colonial relations in terms that
were non-hierarchical, though nonetheless racialized.66 OCadiali’s sHientifiH
demonstrations, similarly, offered participants opportunities to test social
boundaries and imagine alternative arrangements, as doctors and surgeons
sub.itted t, Cis autC,ritWS referring t, Ci. as D.asterS3 and ZCite Z,.en bared
their shoulders so that he could paint their skin with colored lights.67
Thus, spiritualism engaged another tension constitutive of the contractual
idealFthe tension between freedom and embodiment. Within the liberal
imaginary, the contract drew its authority from the perfect freedom individuals
supposedly enjoyed in the state of nature. But this imagined freedom is
essentially a disembodied freedom. Freedom confers legitimacy upon the
contractual bond, but freedom itself terminates in the contract. A factory girl, for
instance, expresses her freedom by consigning her body to work. In her case, the
abstract and immaterial self, the subject of contractual rights, makes itself known
only by binding the body.
Popular demonstrations of mesmerism and hypnotism seemed to mock this
predicament by spectacularizing forms of contractual mastery and possession. In
a typical demonstration, a powerful mesmerist would overcome the will of his
subject, replacing his intentions with hers, evidenced by his control over her
62. See Castronovo, supra note 51; Moore, supra note 44; Viswanathan, supra note 45.
63. See Castronovo, supra note 51, at 51.
64. Terry M. Parssinen, Mesmeric Performers, 21 VICTORIAN STUD. 87, 102 (1977).
65. WINTER, supra note 43, at 2; Moore, supra note 44 at 200.
66. Viswanathan, supra note 45, at 1-2.
67. Tele*C,ne inter'ieZ ZitC _arius _insCaCS _insCaC OCadiali’s s,n U7Ht. 10, 2010).
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body. Before mesmerism became a form of popular entertainment in American
cities, Emily Ogden has shown, it was proffered as a technique for controlling
laborers, conditioning their bodies to the rhythms and rigors of automated factory
work.68 Factory girls were assumed to be especially susceptible to mesmeric
techniques. Charles Poyen, the owner of a Caribbean sugar plantation credited
with introducing mesmerism to the United States, first recommended the
techniques to northern factory owners seeking to improve the efficiency of their
Z,rAers. 6,Wen Hlai.ed t, Ca'e An,Zn.anW DriHC and intelligent *lanters3 ZC,
made use of certain powers to control enslaved Africans.69 Mesmerism was
never adopted in the manner Poyen had suggested, but to turn-of-the-century
audiences, the spectacle of a woman being puppeted by a mesmerist may have
appeared as a kind of satire, throwing up for amusement a mode of subordination
already familiar to workers and wives. The sight of a person reduced to a body
without will also more darkly conjures the specter of anti-will that connects
slavery, rape, and modern contract law.
SPECTERS OFWHITE SLAVERY
In the early twentieth century, various anxieties about the loss of freedom
and control seemed to converge in the phantasmic figure of the white slave. Most
scholars agree tCatS gl,bal *aniH n,tZitCstandingS tCere Zas n, real DtraffiH3 in
white women.70 The Mann Act was passed for the purported purpose of
protecting white women from forced prostitution, but the broad wording of the
law allowed police and prosecutors to selectively punish men involved in all
manner of consensual behavior, especially black and immigrant men who
enjoyed premarital, extramarital, and cross-racial intimacy with white women.71
But here, rather than review the notorious record of racist enforcement, I want to
suggest that the figure of the white slave appears as the specter of anti-will that
would continue to haunt the institution of contract in the early twentieth century,
decades after the Emancipation Proclamation. In the return of this figure we can
68. Ogden, supra note 43, at 818-19.
69. Id. at 830. Not surprisingly, around the same time in the early nineteenth century, British
mesmerists claimed to have honed their discoveries in colonial India, where experimental subjects
succumbed easily to the influence of Western physicians. WINTER, supra note 43, at 187-93.
70. See e.g., Cheryl Nelson Butler, The Racial Roots of Human Trafficking, 62 UCLAL. REV. 1464,
1489 (2015); Brian Donovan & Tori Barnes-Brus, Narratives of Sexual Consent and Coercion: Forced
Prostitution Trials in Progressive Era New York City, 36 LAW & SOC. INQ. 600 (2011); Jennifer M.
Chacón, Misery and Mypoia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3016 (2016); JESSICA R. PLILEY, supra note 2, at 9-31 (2014).
71. S,,n after tCe laZ’s *assageS blaHA and br,Zn .en in seXual relati,nsCi*s ZitC ZCite Z,.en
were the primary targets of enforcement. Jack Johnson, the first black heavyweight boxing champion and
perceived threat to male white supremacy, was one of the first person to be prosecuted under the Act. See
Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive
Era, 8 YALE J. OF L. & FEMINISM 31, 33 (1996); TERESA RUNSTEDLER, JACK JOHNSON: BOXING IN THE
SHADOW OF THEGLOBAL COLOR LINE 132-163 (2018).
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trace the itineraries of racialized form and sexual discipline that elude or are
r,utinelW effaHed bW tCe language and idi,. ,f DH,ntraHtual freed,..3
Through much of the nineteenth century, as one scholar observes, the figure
,f tCe ZCite sla'e .,'ed aHr,ss tCe #.eriHan landsHa*e liAe Da restlessS
aggrieved ghost, a fugitive symbol, a reminder that slavery was not morally or
e'en *CWsiHallW H,ntainable.372 During the antebellum period, the figure of the
white slave circulated, primarily as hyperbole, to describe the degraded condition
of indentured immigrants or poor women fallen into prostitution. But it also
spoke of another set of anxieties: in these early narratives, whiteness appeared to
be an unreliable safeguard against the dehumanizing forces of the marketplace,
as the racial identity of the kidnapped person was itself transformed by the loss
of paperwork or by his or her entry into the stream of commerce. The
transformation was not merely figurative, as the confessions of a nineteenth-
century slave catcher would suggest. Slavery had unleashed a violence that could
breaA and li)uidate anW,ne: DMust HatHC a straW IrisC ,r Oer.an girl and sell Cer
. . . She turns into a nF at once . . . .373
White slavery figured powerfully in abolitionist rhetoric, often to elicit the
horrors of mistaken identity. The abolitionist Henry Beecher rose to celebrity in
1848 after staging a mock auction of two mulatto girls, daughters of an enslaved
mother and white master who had escaped a slave dealer in New Orleans. Before
a H,ngregati,n ,f IeZ ^,rAersS Ce asAedS D\s[Call this girlFalmost as white as
you areFbe s,ld f,r.,neW t, tCe first H,.er t, d, as Ce liAesZitC$374 TCe girls’
complexion presumably invited an identification which the darker appearance of
most other enslaved children presumably foreclosed. Underscoring "eeHCer’s
appeal was a sentimentality that played upon a sense of both patriarchal and
racial duty, to protect daughters not only from the sexual whims of white masters
but from contamination by black men. Writing about the trials of fugitive slaves,
Ariela Gross has shown that fugitive women often succeeded in claiming that
they had been mistakenly captured and remanded to slaveryFthe cost of
erroneously enslaving a white woman was evidently unbearable to juries of white
men.75
If the sight of an enslaved white woman confronted spectators with the
unbearable thought of miscegenation, then the changing pallor of the enslaved
surely confronted white Americans with the repressed knowledge that slavery
was itself perpetuated through sexual violenceFthat the Southern plantation was
also a harem. Moreover, the appearance of the pale slave undermined the
supposed certainty and stability of racial identity in general, after more than a
72. STEPHEN TALTRY, MULATTOAMERICA: AT THECROSSROADS OFBLACK ANDWHITECULTURE,
A SOCIALHISTORY 9 (2003).
73. Stephen Taltry, Spooked: The White Slave Narratives, 85 TRANSITION 48, 58 (2000).
74. Id. at 51.
75. ARIELAGROSS, WHAT BLOODWON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL INAMERICA 58-63
(2008).
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hundred years of illicit intimacy, voluntary and coerced, had blurred the color
line, often rendering black and white virtually indistinguishable.
During the antebellum period, Southerners defended the institution of black
bondage by arguing that, as an economic arrangement, it was preferable to the
white slavery practiced in the industrial North.76 Labor advocates in the North,
in turn, adopted the phrase to challenge triumphalist narratives of emancipation
and the market conditions under which Dfree labor3 was exchanged.77 By
comparing the conditions of industrial wage labor to slavery, labor advocates
insisted that working conditions were not merely coercive and exploitive, but
racially degrading. For instance, one labor advocate argued that vagrancy laws,
which were used to force unemployed men into penal servitude, had reduced to
Dwhite sla'erW an ar.W ,f .en ZC, d, n,t bel,ng t, a ser'ile raHe.378 Thus,
labor advocates recognized the double-edged danger introduced by the ideology
of 2free labor.’79 2Free labor’ was contrasted with enslaved labor. But the
abstraction of 2free labor,’ with its partializing recognition of human beings as
commodified labor, was itself a vestige of slavery, one that, after emancipation,
facilitated the absorption of black, immigrant, and women workers into an
expanding industrial economy. 2Free labor’ lacked individuality and was
infinitely interchangeable. But because it was so indifferent to status, the market
for 2free labor’ augured a loss of status for white men.
Feminists also appealed to the rhetoric of white slavery. Feminists
advocating for marriage reform often argued that the marriage contract reduced
Z,.en t, a f,r. ,f b,ndage. EliVabetC !adW Stant,n arguedS DIf tCe H,ntraHt be
e)ualS ZCenHe H,.e tCe ter.s 2.arital *,ZerS’ 2.arital rigCtsS’ 2,bedienHe and
restraintS’ 2d,.ini,n and H,ntr,l’$ . . . #HH,rding t, .an’s ideaS as set f,rtC in
Cis Hreeds and H,desS .arriage is a H,nditi,n ,f sla'erW.380 Radical feminists like
Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Emma Goldman sought to disenchant the
institution of marriage by describing it as a form of sexual commerce. As Gilman
Zr,teS DSCe gets Cer li'ing bW getting a Cusband. Ne gets Cis Zife bW getting a
living. It is to her individual economic advantage to secure a mate. It is to his
individual sex-advantage to secure economic gain. The sex-functions have to
beH,.e eH,n,.iH funHti,ns.381 Goldman similarly described marriage as
76. STANLEY, supra note 16, at 86.
77. P,r instanHeS in an essaW *ublisCed in @99;S ,ne suHC ad',Hate Zr,teS DTCeW saW sla'erW is
abolished in the United States now, but I say no. True, the colored people are free, but how many
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Z,rA in a .ill ,r faHt,rW f,urteen and fifteen C,urs a daW$3 Id.
78. Id. at 121. StanleW suggests tCat DraHe s,.eti.es figured int, tCe i.agerWS3 but DtCe d,.inant
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D*ri.arilW an eH,n,.iH arrange.entS an insuranHe *aHt.382 A prostitute differs
fr,. a Zife ,nlW in tCat a *r,stitute Dsells Cer b,dW out of wedlock.383 While
radical feminists argued that marriage was no different from any other form of
commercial exchange, bourgeois reformers sought to rectify marriage by
heightening the division between the home and the market. In the words of one
6r,gressi'e Era ref,r.erS D\T[Ce CigCest f,r. ,f Cu.an relationship is the
association of one man with one woman on a basis of loyalty and love within the
circle of a family that they have created, developing intimate and individual life
in H,ntrast ZitC a larger Z,rld \and[ unsub.erged bW it.384
While metaphors of white slavery failed to advance the causes of labor
activists and feminists, as Amy Dru Stanley has shown, the term 2white slavery’
eventually became synonymous with the prostitution of white women. Stanley
writes,
\/[itC sla'erW’s d,Znfall *r,stituti,n Hame to appear as a singularly
wrong sale of selfFa f,r. ,f b,ndage as *eHuliar as tCe 7ld S,utC’s
had been, one that validated wage labor and marriage as falling within
the bounds of contract freedom despite the dispossession of self entailed
in these relations. Not labor but sex represented the human essence
whose sale as market commodity transformed its owners from free
persons to slaves.85
The limits of contractual freedom were marked not by labor exploitation or
the formal subordination of women. Instead, the absolute limit of contractual
freedom was represented by prostitutionFspecifically, paid sex with white
women.
The white slave panic of the early twentieth century also had a global
dimension. Before it reached the United States, it had already seized much of
Western Europe, reflecting anxieties about unregulated intimacies and exchange
in the colonies. By the early twentieth century, prostitution had become a regular
feature of colonial outposts across the globe.86 When the United States, through
its acquisition of Spanish territories in 1898, joined the community of modern
e.*iresS its .ilitarW establisCed Dt,leranHe V,nes3 in !ubaS 6uert, 4iH,S and tCe
Philippines, where prostitution was regulated.87 In the United States, as in parts
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 89.
85. STANLEY, supra note 16, at 263.
86. Paul A. Kramer, The Darkness that Enters the Home: The Politics of Prostitution During the
Philippine-American War, in HAUNTED BY EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES OF INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN
HISTORY 366, 369 (Ann Laura Stoler ed. 2006).
87. Laura Briggs, Familiar Territory: Prostitution, Empires, and the Question of U.S. Imperialism
in Puerto Rico, 1849-1916, in FAMILIES OF A NEW WORLD: GENDER, POLITICS, AND STATE
DEVELOPMENT IN AGLOBAL CONTEXT 40, 42-43, 51 (Lynne Haney & Lisa Pollard eds. 2003).
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of Europe, these regulatory projects quickly gave rise to abolition movements,
led by coalitions of feminists and anti-imperialists.88 The principal motivation
for reform was not concern for the colonized women who were engaged in
prostitution, but imperial stability, threats of racial contamination, and the
growing realization that a number of white women were apparently drawn to the
sex trade in colonial outposts. Paul A. Kramer writes that U.S. officials were
inHreasinglW alar.ed bW tCe DH,s.,*,litan Carl,trW3 gatCering at ports in the
American Philippines at the start of the twentieth century. The largest number of
foreign prostitutes in the Philippines were from Japan, but they were joined by
women from the United States, Spain, Italy, Russia, and Australia.89
Writing about the British imperial context, Philippa Levine suggests that
ZCite Z,.en’s *artiHi*ati,n in tCe H,l,nial seX trade *resented ,ffiHials ZitC a
particular embarrassment.90 Colonial officials believed prostitution among
Asians to be determined by a patriarchal despotism, endemic to the East, and the
essential slavish character of Asian women.91 A British official in Singapore, for
instanHeS suggested tCat D!Cinese and *r,bablW MalaW Z,.en . . . are regarded
by men as inferior beings and . . . d, n,t eXerHise anW inde*endenHe ,f Zill.392
The essential willlessness of Asian women provided justification for the
regulation of prostitution and colonial domination more broadly. But white
women who left home to become prostitutes in the colonies could not have been
understood in the same terms, as so essentially slavish. White women involved
in colonial prostitution, Levine suggests, were instead seen as either criminal
entrepreneurs or victims of coercion.93
In the United States, too, the white slavery panic synthesized a broad set of
anxieties generated by varieties of cross-racial intimacy made possible by
colonial settlement and new migration. Critics have long recognized the
twentieth-century narrative of sexual coercion to reprise colonial-era captivity
narratives.94 Curiously, the notoriously expansive wording of the White Slave
TraffiH #HtS banning interstate tra'el ZitC Z,.en f,r DanW i..,ral *ur*,seS3
appeared decades earlier in the Page Act of 1875, a federal law restricting
i..igrati,n fr,. D!CinaS Ma*anS ,r anW 7riental H,untrWS3 t, indi'iduals
88. Jessica R. Pliley, The FBI’s White Slave Division: The Creation of a National Regulatory Regime
to Police Prostitutes in the United States, 1910-18, in GLOBAL ANTI-VICE ACTIVISM, 1890-1950, 221,
224 (Jessica R. Pliley et al. eds. 2016).
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tra'eling ,f tCeir Dfree and ',luntarW H,nsent.395 The express purpose of the law
Zas t, *re'ent Din',luntarW .igrati,n3 ,f tZ, Hateg,ries ,f *e,*le: H,ntraHt
laborers (generally men) and prostitutes, or anyone entering the country for
DleZd ,r i..,ral *ur*,se3 UgenerallW Z,.enT.
The ban on contract labor did little to stop the flow of male laborers; the ban
on prostitution, however, was so vigorously enforced that it prevented most
wives from joining their husbands.96 As scholars have shown, through the late
nineteenth century, many Asian women migrating to the Pacific Northwest were
prostitutes, finding work among the predominantly male 2bachelor’ communities
at the frontier.97But they were not forced into prostitution, as lawmakers implied.
Rather, immigration restrictions, which produced a gender imbalance within
Asian communities, together with anti-miscegenation laws, which discouraged
Asian men from sharing intimacy with white women, effectively created the
flourishing market for Asian prostitution.98 Thus, while the Page Act, through its
uneven enforcement, played a role in promoting prostitution in the Pacific
Northwest, rhetorically, it transformed a practice of consensual commercial
exchange into a species of coercion.
Enforcement of the ban on Asian prostitutes also confronted legislators and
immigration officials with the sort of category crisis into which radical feminists
had thrown the institution of marriage. How would immigration officials
distinguisC betZeen a Dreal3 Zife and a *r,stitute *assing f,r ,ne$ In @8Q:S under
pressure from nativist groups, Congress convened a committee to investigate,
a.,ng ,tCer tCingsS DTCe I.*,rtati,n and Narb,ring ,f /,.en f,r I..,ral
6ur*,ses.399 The Dillingham Commission, as it was called, generated a report
describing the various difficulties immigration officials encountered while
administering the prostitution ban. One problem was that a woman might enter
the country as a prostitute then marry her pimp or *r,Hurer. DTCe deteHti,n ,f
tCese frauds is eXtre.elW diffiHultS3 aHH,rding t, tCe re*,rt% butS in faHtS tCe
problem of passing into marriage discloses the fluidity between prostitution and
marriage, and the reality that marriage itself houses all manner of coercive and
95. Page Act, 18 Stat. 477 (1875).
96. The number of Chinese men entering the United States during the period of Page Act
enforcement exceeded that of any over seven-year period before the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act
in 1882. EITHNE LUIBHÉID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER 31-54 (2002).
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illiberal conduct.100 Another problem identified by the report: Chinese women
often entered the country Da**earing as Zi'es ,r daugCters ,f tCe !Cinese .en .
. . are then sold to keepers of h,uses.3101 Given the difficulty of enforcing
immigration laws restricting entry of prostitutes, the Dillingham Commission
recommended continued surveillance of Chinese women after entry. The
commission report includes not only cases of immigration officials finding that
Z,.en tra'eling as DZi'es3 and DnieHes3 Zere reallW *r,stitutesS but als, Hases
of immigration officials embarrassed to have mistaken virtuous women and
wives for prostitutes.
The difficulties associated with detection were not limited to problems of
passing or mistaken identity, but of distinguishing between a respectable
.arriage and Dsla'isC3 seXual arrange.ents. TCe.arital Hust,.s ,f!Cinese and
Japanese immigrants in particular seemed to confront United States officials with
this particular challenge. The Dillingham Commission regarded the marital
customs of Asian immigrantsFinter-marriage generally, arranged marriages,
and es*eHiallW tCe traffiH in Ma*anese D*iHture brides3Fwith suspicion, as these
seemed to blur the line between intimacy and commerce, romantic love and
convenience. If these boundary disturbances struck at an ambivalence already at
tCe Ceart ,f tCe.,dern instituti,n ,f.arriageS tCe ban ,n D,riental3 prostitution
would allow Americans to resolve that ambivalence by distinguishing their own
sexual progressivism from the slavishness of others, and projecting the origins
of the disturbance far beyond their own borders.
UNVEILINGNARRATIVES
In December of 1925, Dinshah Ghadiali stood by his attorneys as the jurors
filed into the Oregon courtroom, the judge took his seat, and the clerk began
reading the verdict. The jury had found Ghadiali guilty as charged. He was
sentenced to prison for a term of five years. Several local newspapers, having
followed his trial with bemused horror, reported the verdict on their front page,
in tall headlines. From The Portland News:
Col. Dinshah convicted on all 6 counts. Zoroastrian Religion, used as a
Hl,aA against Cis 'iHti.sS re',lts Bur,rsL. Nis faHe i..utable as tCe
Sphynx, Colonel Dinshah Ghadiali, Parsee, head of the Spectro-Chrome
Institute at Malaga, N.J., heard a federal juryWednesday pronounce him
guilty of all six counts of an indictment charging Mann Act violations.
This means imprisonment in a federal penitentiary, but Colonel
Ghadiali’s gaVeS ri'eted ,n tCe HlerA ZC, read Cis fateS did n,t Za'er.102
100. S. Doc. No. 61-196, at 10.
101. Id. at 19.
102. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 202.
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The Oregon Journal contrasted the highly-charged performance of the other
H,urtr,,. aHt,rs ZitC tCe a**arent i.*assi'itW ,f tCe defendant: D#s tCe HlerAS
in sl,Z t,nesS read tCe Z,rld 2guiltW’ after eaHC H,untS n,t a .usHle in tCe
weazened little dark-skinned face of the defendant moved . . . . He showed no
sign ,f e.,ti,n.3103 The Portland Telegram ,bser'ed tCat DtCe st,iHal !,l,nel
OCadiali reHei'ed tCe bl,Z ZitC,ut batting an eWe.3104
The reporters, perhaps like the others who filled the balustrades, searched
OCadiali’s a**earanHe f,r signs ,f guilt ,r inn,HenHeS sCa.e ,r indignati,n at
having been accused of committing the most infamous crime. Not only did
Ghadiali fail to produce any intelligible or sympathetic response, but in the eyes
,f Cis ,bser'ersS Cis Di.*assi'itW3 see.ed t, read as a Aind ,f ins,lenHe and
intransigenHe.OCadiali’s a**arent ,*aHitW re'ealed t, Cis ,bser'ers n,t tCe li.its
of their own hermeneutic, but a form of racial concealmentFDZoroastrian
religi,n used as a Hl,aAS3 DfaHe as i..utable as tCe S*CWnX.3
For reasons never made entirely clear to Ghadiali, the Oregon federal court
in which he was tried provided no court reporter and no stenographer. Ghadiali
usually represented himself in court, but this time he relied on the representation
of two court-appointed attorneys. At the beginning of the trial, they
recommended to Ghadiali that he remove his topi, his religious head-covering,
t, a',id D*reBudiHe.3105 Ghadiali refleHtedS DI H,uld Ca'e d,ne e'erWtCing t,
*lease tCe. and tCe Budge and tCe BurW t, a',id tCis s*eHter ,f 2*reBudiHe’ but
C,Z H,uld I HCange .W faHe$ TCat Zas tCe biggest 2*reBudiHe.’3106 OCadiali’s
attorneys, apparently well-meaning individuals, agreed and recommended that
perhaps Ghadiali should avoid facing the judge and jury altogether, lest anyone
.istaAe Cis gaVe f,r .,re D.es.eriVing.3107 For much of the trial, Ghadiali
would keep his head down anyway, taking meticulous notes of arguments and
testimonies *resented bef,re tCe BurW.OCadiali’s att,rneWsZ,rried tCat e'en n,te
taking would attract prejudice, but Ghadiali insisted on maintaining a record of
DtCe terrible insults and *erBuries3 Curled against Ci..108
TCe result ,f OCadiali’s ,bstinaHW is Cis two-volume Railroading a Citizen,
an aggressive counter-narration of the events leading up to his conviction for
white slavery. If the features of his life had been distorted and deranged to
conform to the lurid imagination of jurists, yellow journalists, and the promoters
of the white slave panic, then in his counter-narrative, Ghadiali would
strenuously try to set things right. He meticulously cross-references versions of
events, interrupts transcriptions of testimony to declare perjuries, and appeals to
103. Id.
104. Id.
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his readers to arrive at a better judgment. Railroading, in this sense, reads as the
defense Ghadiali was never able to present to the Oregon jury: an extra-judicial
appeal.
In legislative reports, journalistic exposés, popular literature, and film, the
white slave panic took the form of a standard narrative in which white women,
leaving the protective gaze of their families to find employment in large urban
centers, found themselves suddenly abducted by menFoften immigrant men,
assumed to be the agents of international sex-trafficking syndicates.109 Tropes of
veiling and unveiling had been made conventional in legal cases as well as
popular film in the 1910s.110 In the film, Traffic in Souls (1913), for instance,
what appears to be a winning suitor is unveiled to be a kidnapper; what appears
to be a Swedish benevolent society turns out to be a brothel; and what appears to
be a progressive anti-vice campaigner turns out to be the leader of a vast network
of pimps and prostitutes.111 TCe *r,seHut,rs in OCadiali’s Hase made great use of
this plot device, insinuating that Ghadiali was not merely an inventor but a
criminal seducer, tCat tCis C,.e in IeZ MerseW ZasS in faHtS a DCare..3 Nis Zife
and daughter, the only witnesses he was able to produce at his hurried trial, were
discredited as co-conspiring prostitutes and pimps.112
In his counter-narrative, Ghadiali also exploited the trope of unveiling made
s, H,n'enti,nal in ZCite sla'e narrati'es. P,r instanHeS earlW in OCadiali’s
counter-narrative, a few suspicious characters begin to show up at his lectures.
He suspects some of them to be Klansmen. Another eventually reveals himself
to be the author of an unflattering story about Ghadiali, published in the
Dearborn Independent, known to reflect anti-Semitic and xenophobic leanings
of its owner, Henry Ford.113 S,,n after tCatS OCadiali’s C,.e is 'isited bW a
woman claiming to sell hosiery, while inquiring about the women in his
household and inspecting his bookshelves. She is later revealed to be an Agent
of the Department of Justice.114 Ghadiali would use the trope of unveiling to
dramatic effect, but also to undermine the authority of standard social and legal
109. See, e.g., TRAFFIC IN SOULS (Universal Film Manufacturing Co. 1913).
110. For instance, the DillinghamCommission Report reported a number of cases in which supposed
prostitutes were able to slip past immigration authorities by disguising themselves as respectable people.
In its re*,rtS tCe !,..issi,n n,ted: DIt is ,ften eXtremely difficult to prove the illegal entrance of either
Z,.en ,r *r,Hurers. TCe ins*eHt,r Cas t, Budge .ainlW bW tCeir a**earanHe and tCe st,ries tCeW tell.3
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scripts and to assert his own.115 In moments, it reads as a pedagogical text,
teaching white Americans to become better interpreters of their worlds,
recognize racist hermeneutics, bear witness and responsibility. By explaining to
his readers that he avoided the gaze of courtroom observers, Ghadiali confirms
that what the reporters recognized to be a form of emotional withholding was
precisely that. But his apparent impassivity was not a reflection of inner
indifferenHeS as tCe re*,rters suggestedS but tCeir ,Zn D*reBudiHe.3 /Cat tCe
newspapermen saw in OCadiali’s de.ean,r Zas tCeir ,Zn *r,BeHti,n.
RACE, GENDER, AND CONTRACTUAL FORM
In the opening sections of Railroading a Citizen, Ghadiali offers a sketch of
his early life, devoting considerable energy to describing his two marriagesFthe
first to an Indian woman named Manek, the second to an American woman
named Irene Grace. Both of these marriages, Ghadiali is at great pains to
characterize as consensual.
Pr,. tCe beginningS OCadiali ZritesS Ce Zas D#.eriHan at Ceart.3116 As a
W,ung .anS Ce Zas eager t, esHa*e tCe *ar,HCialis. ,f Cis *arents’ C,.e t,
DestablisC a se*arate d,.iHile ZCere I H,uld be free t, Z,rA as I *leased.3117 By
taking on odd jobs, he was able to rent an apartment and quietly pursue the
DsHientifiH researHC3 ,f ZCiHC Cis fatCerS a Cu.ble ZatHC re*air.anS
disa**r,'ed. /Cen OCadiali’s landl,rd ,ffered Ci. a daugCter for marriage,
Ghadiali DdeHlined it ZitC tCanAs.3118 He ZritesS DI Cad n,t seen tCe girlS but I
Zas inf,r.ed sCe Zas beautiful.3119 Ghadiali does not explicitly disapprove of
arranged marriagesFwhich opponents to Indian immigration and independence
described as evidence of slavishnessFbut suggests that he was simply too
busy.120He spent the next several years traveling to the United States and Europe
with the British Merchant Marine.121 But amazingly, nearly a decade later, he
ended up marrying the very same woman his landlord had first offered. This time
the young woman, Manek, had been introduced to Ghadiali by his friend.
I saw her . . . There was the girl and she was the one I had declined in
1895 without seeing her. I fell in love with her. She was certainly a
beautiful personality. On November 22, I married her, without any
115. See Robert Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 196, 200 (1987).
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dowry. For my nation, it was a novelty, but I was born at heart an
American. I just married her.122
In this tale of startling coincidence, Ghadiali recasts what might have
otherwise appeared to be a traditionally arranged marriageFa trade in women,
brokered among menFas something more romantic, modern, and essentially
D#.eriHan.3 Ne uses tCe language ,f H,ntraHt t, e.*CasiVeS besides tCeir sCared
commitment to vegetarianism and temperance, social equality and mutuality of
exchange: DI ga'e ManeA tCe t,tal abstinenHe *ledge against .eat-eating and
alcohol; she shared my views of non-slaughter and mercy. She became my
H,nstant *al and Ze *lanned a gl,ri,us life aCead.3123
OCadiali’s ,*ening deHlarati,ns ,f inde*endenHe and H,.*ani,nate
.arriage H,nBure ZCat "r,,A TC,.as desHribes as tCe DradiHal *r,.ise3 ,f
contractual freedomFthe abandonment of old hierarchies in pursuit of
associational freedom. But OCadiali’s aHH,unt ,f Cis ,Zn .arriage is far .,re
equivocal in that, although Ghadiali fashions himself a romantic hero moved
only by his own desire, his desire happens to coincide rather neatly with the
original brokered arrangement. Ghadiali seems to have avoided an arranged
marriage, only to enter into something like a twice-arranged marriageFarranged
the second time by some transcendent power. Ghadiali writes that, while visiting
Madras in @98=S an Dastr,l,ger Cad sAetHCed tCe Aind ,f Zife I Z,uld Ca'e.3124
The sketch happened to reveal the face of Manek. As if by an alignment of the
stars, an old Indian tradition is made to converge with a modern American
mystification of marriage. Less the agent of his own romance, the hero is a
servant of fate; less freely-HC,sen tCan *re,rdainedS OCadiali’s first .arriage
gestures not at the open-ended proliferation of romantic freedom, but more
modestly at his own willingness to yield to naturalized order.
In 1910, Ghadiali came to the United States with his wife and their two
children. He eventually established a home and a business in rural New Jersey.
In 1917, he became a naturalized citizen. But that same year, for reasons left
somewhat opaque in OCadiali’s aHH,untS ManeA left tCe 1nited States t, return
to India, alone.125 Five years later, after Ghadiali had divorced his first wife, he
married a 19-year-,ld Z,.an ,f DOer.aniH deHent3 na.ed Irene OraHe.126
This second marriage would generate its own representational dilemma. By
marrying Irene Grace, Ghadiali entered the fold of white middle-class
respectability, gaining membership in the extended American family. But his
marriage also raised the dreaded specter of miscegenation. In Railroading,
122. Id. at 16.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 27.
126. Id. at 38.
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Ghadiali does not rhapsodize about the beauty or fateful meeting of his second
wife. In his brief and muted descriptions of Irene Grace, he is careful to distance
her from the image of the flapper, the 2new womanS’ white women who flouted
social convention, consorted freely with 2colored men,’ and generally threatened
social order. (Ghadiali would associate that sort of recklessness with his
secretary, Geraldine McCann.127) As he wrote of his first meeting with Irene, it
Zas Cer Dsi.*liHitW in dressS n,n-following of the foolish fashions . . . so dear to
the average flapper [that] were so to my liking that I began to consider her
)ualifiHati,ns as a Zife.3 #s ZitC Cis first .arriageS OCadiali Zas insistent tCat
the marriage was based on equality, mutuality, and companionship:
That civil marriage of March 14, 1923, was unique in its simplicity.
TCere Zas n, Here.,nial farHeS n, fussS n, false 2,beW’ ,r 2best,Z’
promise, no useless expense, no foolish paraphernalia. Not a gift was
exchanged, not even the usual old ring, which I look upon as a sign of
subordination of the bride. We were joined not only in the material, but
in true companionship, eternal friendship and cordial affection,
engendered by mutual respect and admiration for one another.128
Notwithstanding Ghadiali’s insistenHe u*,n tCe H,nsensual nature ,f Cis
marriage, he and his wife must have been met with suspicion. As Lon Fuller
understood, consent is critical to the legitimacy of contract, but consent is
essentially elusive.129 Inner will, intention, can be made known only by
eX*ressi,n ,r eXternaliVati,n. "ut in OCadiali’s eX*erienHeS e'en ,rdinarW
attempts to make himself known, to clarify his intentions, were clouded by his
external appearance. As Ariela Dubler has shown, the institution of marriage has
l,ng been Celd t, sanHtifW tCe .,st une)ual ,f bargains and t, DHure3 tCe .,st
sordid of arrangements.130 "ut in OCadiali’s case, marriage did not lend his
ordinary arrangement the sheen of respectability. Instead, it only confirmed the
,'erZCel.ing *,Zer ,f Cis D.ale',lent influenHe.3131
For Ghadiali, marriage lent no safety of form.132 He avoided the exchange
,f rings t, a',id anW Dsign ,f sub,rdinati,n ,f tCe brideS3 but felt compelled to
formalize his marriageFnot just with a civil filing, but, a few months after their
marriage, with a pair of notarized affidavits.133 His wife signed an affidavit
attesting that she had both married Ghadiali and converted to his religion,
127. Id. at 69-71, 78.
128. Id. at 39.
129. See Fuller, supra note 32.
130. See Dubler, supra note 99, at 756-7.
131. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 123.
132. For relevant discussion about the relationship between identity and legal form see Jessica A.
Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 747 (2015).
133. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 48.
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Zoroastrianism, D,f.W ,Zn freeZill and aHH,rd.3134Ghadiali signed an affidavit
attesting that he was ],r,astrian and DZCite.3135
Ghadiali makes no mention of the affidavits at his trial, perhaps because the
*r,seHuti,n Cad argued tCat OCadiali’s eXtra'agant use ,f legal f,r.s dis*laWedS
rather than mutuality of intent, excess of control. But he submitted the affidavits
into evidence at his denaturalization trial to prove that he was 2white’ and thus
eligible f,r HitiVensCi*. #s Ce argued tCenS D.W Zife is a/Cite Z,.an% if I Zere
a NinduS sCe Z,uld ne'er Ca'e .arried .e.3136 Referring the judge to the
affida'itS OCadiali arguedS DZCat .ust Ca'e been in ,ur .ind Zas affir.ed at
tCat ti.e bef,re a 6Ciladel*Cia I,tarW 6ubliH.3137
The affidavit and accompanying testimony evidence not just racial identity,
as Ghadiali argued, but the understanding that, no matter how exhaustively
Ghadiali and his wife documented the mutuality of their intentions, their
relationship was shadowed by doubt: how could a white Christian woman have
chosen to marry an Indian immigrant without having succumbed to some
malevolent influence?
Though the prosecution focused on the suspicious character of the
employment contract into which Ghadiali and McCann enteredFtCe DHuri,us
H,ntraHt3Fneither the prosecution nor the defense submitted the actual contract
into evidence. Instead, in his self-published account, Ghadiali explained that he
simply wanted to reach an understanding with his new secretary.
Before hiring McCann, Ghadiali had fired two previous secretaries. The
firstS Ce fired in @8?>S ZCile t,uring tCe Zest H,ast. #s OCadiali ZritesS DZe
gathered from her inadvertent remarks the real motive of her signing with usF
she was aiming for HollywoodFsCe Z,uld Ca'e left us flat in !alif,rnia03138
UTCe Dus3 referred t, CereS inHludes OCadiali’s neZ ZifeS Irene OraHeS Cis
teenaged daughter, Kashmira, and his driver, Harry Saunders.139) Ghadiali,
having made promises to tCe seHretarW’s .,tCerS Cad tCe un*leasant dutW ,f
sending her back home. He paid for her train ticket.140
A few days later, in Seattle, Ghadiali placed an advertisement for a new
secretary.141 To his surprise several young women responded. But none of these
agreed t, f,ll,Z Cis fa.ilW’s striHt regi.enFno cigarettes, meat, alcohol,
C,sierWS ,r *erfu.e. E'entuallWS Ce Cired a W,ung Z,.anS Da**r,aHCing >QS Cad
134. DINSHAH P. GHADIALI, DINSHAHNATURALIZATIONCASECLEARINGCONTESTEDCITIZENSHIP
35 (1944).
135. Id.
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ser'ed in tCe ZarS Zas an eX*ert sten,gra*Cer.3142 But she, too, proved to be a
disappointment. As Ghadiali wrote,
We told her [on the morning of our departure] that she should leave all
paints, powders, rouges, and similar artificialities at home prior to
joining us, as she would be with my daughter and we would not have
anything like that on our premises. It was all according to the agreement
and there could be no misunderstanding. She comprehended thoroughly
all the service requirements.143
But the next evening, Kashmira complained that the secretary had smuggled
int, tCe C,tel r,,. tCeW sCared Dall f,rbidden ,d,r,us *ara*Cernalia.3144
Ghadiali, with regret, fired her, too.
After his lecture in Portland, Geraldine McCann and her aunt, Mary Hayes,
approached Ghadiali. Mrs. Hayes introduced herself as a Theosophist,
s*iritualistS and Ddee* student ,f tCe ,ccult . . . dissatisfied with the worldly life
sCe Zas leading.3145 Her niece, McCann, ambitious and eager to travel, asked if
she might join Ghadiali and his family as a traveling secretary. Mrs. Hayes
granted her niece permission.146 It was then that Ghadiali’s ZifeS Irene OraHeS
drafted tCe DHuri,us H,ntraHt3 tCat MH!ann signed. #s OCadiali Zr,teS
We explained the reasons for each clause. Why the supervision over the
mail? Because of my bad experience with the less trustworthy people
and my fights with the Medical Trust. Why the cap? Because of the
effects of higher power electrical oscillations, chemical vapors, sunlight
and the like on the head; we lived in a laboratory atmosphere. Why the
vegetarian diet? Because of the practicing what I preach: mercy,
healthfulness and consistency of principle. Why no gifts or presents?
Because of our absolute graftlessness to maintain strict integrity. There
was nothing kept back.147
In one sense, there was nothing unusual about the contract. Then, as now,
courts routinely enforce contractual terms that limit the communication of
e.*l,Wees f,r tCe *ur*,se ,f *r,teHting an e.*l,Wer’s trade seHrets and
reputational interests. Ghadiali may have been unusually paranoid about scrutiny
from the medical establishment, but he was probably not unlike most other
inventors and patent physicians at the time who thrived within the medical
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service might not have been entirely misplaced: the United States postal service
*laWed a HritiHal r,le in e'entuallW re.,'ing OCadiali’s in'enti,ns fr,. tCe
stream of interstate commerce.148
TCe H,ntraHt Zas *erCa*s DHuri,usS3 though, in that it was not limited to
terms of employment but rather seemed to embrace more personal sartorial and
dietary restraints. The contract was less concerned with the exchange of value
for labor than it was in compelling recognition, if not respect, for his way of life.
In OCadiali’s aHH,untS Ce Cad in'ited MH!ann t, beH,.e n,t Bust Cis e.*l,Wee
but a member of his household, his family. But having failed to compel her
predecessors to respect his household customs, he demanded as much by having
her sign a contract. Above all else, it seems, he wanted her to cover her headF
probably for religious reasons as well as hygienicFand to observe
vegetarianism.149
_uring tCe trialS MH!ann .aintained tCat sCe Cad been in a DtranHe3 during
the eleven months of her employment, drained of will.150 Her characterization of
work resonates with that of labor advocates, who argued that modern industrial
labor often reduced individuals to somnambulists and automatonsFbodies
without will. But the suspended animation that McCann describes also reflected
the legal status of women in marriage. The traditional marriage contract was
different from the employment contract in that, by entering into a marriage,
freely contracting parties were returned to status-like positionsFhusband and
Zife. #HH,rding t, "laHAst,ne’s fa.,us aHH,unt ,f tCe d,Htrine ,f.arital unitWS
DbW .arriageS tCe Cusband and Zife are ,neL tCe 'erW being ,r legal eXistenHe
,f tCeZ,.an is sus*ended during tCe.arriage.3151 The doctrine of marital unity
rendered ra*e an i.*,ssibilitWS as a Z,.an ZC, agrees t, .arrW DCatC gi'en u*
herself in this kind unto her husbandS ZCiHC sCe Hann,t retraHt.3152 Laws
expanding the right of married women to control property gradually undermined
tCe d,Htrine ,f D.arital unitWS3 but e'en until tCe.id-twentieth century, in many
parts of the United States, by agreeing to marry, a woman seemed to agree to
148. OCadiali’s was not the only color therapy device on the market in early twentieth century, but
his seemed to have been singled out for investigation. Christopher Turner writes of the great lengths to
which FDA went to pursue Ghadiali in 1938:
FDA agents tracked down newspaper advertisements placed by people selling secondhand
Spectro-Chromes, in order to try and identify dissatisfied customers. Agents posed as patients;
doctors conducted independent trials. The post office provided the addresses of every Spectro-
Chrome consignee, whom FDA agents visited and interviewed (their names, collected in the
McCarthy era, read something like a blacklist: Walter Chandler, Anna Cabaj, Dorothy
Westphol, Stella Hitkowosk.) Finally, in October 1946, Ghadiali appeared in court charged
with introducing a misbranded article into interstate commerce, a violation of the criminal
code.
Christopher Turner, The Kingpin of Fakers, 18 CABINETMAG. (2005), http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/
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everything elseFto have sex with her husband as he desired, bear his children,
and otherwise do as he willed.
/Cat tCe *r,seHuti,n referred t, as tCe DHuri,us H,ntraHt3 tCus returns us t,
the tension between autonomy and embodiment that nags at the claim of
contractual freedom. In OCadiali’s HaseS tCe )uesti,n tCat see.ed t, ,'ersCad,Z
tCe Huri,us H,ntraHt Zas tCis: did a Z,.an’s H,nsent .ean tCe sa.e tCing in
marriage as it did in the marketplace?
RECAPTURINGWHITEWOMEN
Proponents of the Mann Act claimed to be concerned about protecting
innocent white women from the corrupting influences of the marketplace and the
predations of traffickers. Ghadiali himself was suspicious of the myth of pure
white womanhood, observing that American women seemed eagerly complicit
in transf,r.ing tCe.sel'es int, seXual H,..,dities. In OCadiali’s narrati'eS tCe
primary threats to feminine virtue were not black or brown men, but
intemperance, consumerism, powders and perfumes, which he regarded as
unwelcome intrusions of the market into the home, and commercialization of the
body.153 Ghadiali also resisted the bourgeoisFand racializedFdistinction
betZeen DZ,.en3 and Dladies.3 !,.*laining ,f Cis diffiHultW finding a g,,d
secretary, Ghadiali wrote:
One after another, various types and temperaments came to work for the
Spectro-Chrome Institute and our household. It was difficult to retain
any longer because of our vegetarian diet, hard business life and
al,,fness fr,. s,Hial tangle.entsL. 7ur nigCt Z,rA eXtended into the
next morning, and it was very difficult to find coworkers. The girls
eX*eHted us t, treat tCe. liAe 2ladies.’ /e bluntlW t,ld tCe. tCere Zere
n, 2ladies’ in #.eriHaS ,nlW Z,rAers and Z,.en.154
An improvement over previous secretaries, McCann seemed to
aHH,..,date Cerself t, OCadiali’s ter.s ,f e.*l,W.ent. #sOCadiali Zr,teS Cis
W,ung seHretarW DZent t, Z,rA in earnest and greZ in H,nfidenHe.3155 McCann
herself seemed eager to shed the restraints of sentimentalized female incapacity.
McCann arrived at Ghadiali’s institute Zearing D,rdinarW fe.ale Hl,tCesS3 but
asAed if sCe H,uld Zear tCe .,re .annisC unif,r. Z,rn bW OCadiali’s Zife and
daughter.156
153. GHADIALI, supra note 1, at 45.
154. Id., at 38.
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At her own request, they bought for her knickerbockers until proper
serge suits might be tailored. Miss McCann liked the smart, comfortable
and business-like serge suits of coat and breeches worn all the year
round by my wife and daughter and persuaded them to have her
similarly outfitted.157
In OCadiali’s account, McCann seemed to enjoy her new independence and
discovering her capacity for work. And Ghadiali, in turn, seemed to identify with
McCann as a fellow traveler, eager to leave behind the conscriptions of origin.
McCann did often travel with Ghadiali and his family because she wanted to.158
MH!ann beganZriting f,rOCadiali’s neZsletter.159As a number of students
explained, in testimonials collected by Ghadiali, McCann spoke before
OCadiali’s classes, at times, offering surprisingly eloquent testimonials.160 After
the birth of tCe OCadiali’s new son, Geraldine assumed new responsibility and
DbeHa.e attaHCed \t, tCe babW[ liAe a .,tCer.3 Ghadiali describes his institute,
like his home, as a collaborative venture, absorbing and uplifting others on the
move, including his own wife and daughter, his black driver and his wife,
entrepreneurial young women.161 But OCadiali’s terrifiHallW irregular enterprise,
even as it seemed to epitomize the radical promise of contractual freedom, drew
constant scrutiny.
His home was visited by an officer inquiring into the well-being of the
women in his home.162 Then came a series of letters, one after another, imploring
MH!ann t, H,.e C,.e. Pr,. Cer#unt NaWes: DsinHe W,ur mother is very ill and
W,u are aHtuallW needed at C,.e ZitC tCe HCildren \MH!ann’s nieHes and
ne*CeZs[S I a. n,Z asAing W,u ,n b,tC W,ur .,tCer’s beCalf and mine to come
at ,nHe.3163 McCann replied,
I certainly will not be held back in career for the whims of my relatives.
I send mother a check of $30.00 every month. I can do nothing more for
her than I am doing. In my position I am happy, contented, well taken
care of and respected by the public and I do not intend to leave my
duties.164
#t Cis trialS tCe g,'ern.ent argued tCat MH!ann’s refusals t, return C,.e
e'idenHed n,tCing ,f Cer ,Zn intenti,nS ,nlW OCadiali’s ,'erZCel.ing
influence.
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McCann received a more agitated letter from her Aunt, expressing worry of
an 1nHle MiHAeW’s D*lan ,f *utting your mother into a home or back into an
asWlu. againL I,Z I tCinA it’s a Hri.e f,r W,u + MiHAeW t, d, tCat t, W,ur
darling mother. I hate to ask you to give up your career, if there is one there for
W,uS but W,ur.,tCer is first.3165 TCenSMH!ann’s brother sent a letter reminding
McCann that the cost of becoming a career girl was loss of domestic privilege.
_,n’t f,rget tCe Aiddies are gr,Zing ,lder and tCe l,nger W,u are aZaW
the easier it is to forget and no one wants that to happen after what you
did f,r tCe. ZCen tCeW Zere W,ungL regarding W,ur gi'ing u* W,ur
position, of course it is perfectly natural that you should not want to do
s,S but in.W esti.ati,n a daugCter’s first H,nsiderati,n is Cer.,tCer.166
According to Ghadiali, McCann remained entirelW un.,'ed bW Cer fa.ilW’s
entreaties.167
Then Ghadiali himself received an alarming letter from a former student and
Dwell-wisher3 in7reg,nS re*,rting tCat MH!ann’s relati'es Cad begun s*reading
malicious rumors about Ghadiali in Portland.168 The letter read:
She started in by saying that you were running a Harem, and that you
had schemed for her niece to go away with you under the pretext of
aHting as W,ur *ri'ate seHretarWL TCat W,u lied ZCen W,u said tCe tZ,
ladies you had here with you were your wife and daugCterL asserted
tCat sCe Cad *r,,f tCeW Zere W,ur *ris,ners and *art ,f W,ur Nare.L
Claimed to have reason that you were an impostor and a man of the
lowest type of the underworldFsnaring innocent girls into your
2Nare.’ and C,lding tCe. *ris,ners ,n a 30 acre farm at Malaga out of
Cearing and reaHC ,f e'erW ,neL. TCat W,u res,rted t, bringing tCe.
under your power by hypnotic means and satisfying your devilish
desires in a most horrid unnatural way.169
Incredibly, none of this seemed to alarm Ghadiali who ignored the letters
and retreated into the quiet of his laboratory. So close, he was, to completing his
latest inventionFthe It-is-o-meterFa medical instrument designed to locate in
any sufferer precisely what the disorder is, where it is, and how to H,rreHt it. DIf
I H,uld d, itS3 OCadiali refleHtedS DI Z,uld be taAing tCe l,ngest stride ,f anW in
tCe Nealing #rts.3170 He seemed to have missed the clear signs of coming
165. Id. at 87.
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disaster, having fallen under the spell of a machine that promised to render
visible every hidden source of misery.
A fewmonths later, in the summer of 1925, Ghadiali began planning another
tourFthis time, to promote his new invention. McCann offered to accompany
Ghadiali as his travelling secretary. She even outfitted herself in her new naval
uniform. Ghadiali gave a polite nod of approval, but, as he explained in his own
writing, he was extremely reluctant to bring her along. McCann persistedFhe
Cad *r,.isedS sCe Cad been s, dutifulS it Zasn’t fair t, *unisC Cer f,r tCe aHti,ns
of her relatives, and yet Z,uldn’t it be a great ,**,rtunitW t, 'isit tCe.Fand
Ghadiali, against his better judgment, relented.171
McCann proved to be a more vexing travel companion than Ghadiali had
anticipated. She sang loudly in the parlor car and drew strangers into suggestive
ga.es ,f DI s*W.3 OCadiali begged MH!ann t, beCa'e Cerself and ,tCerZise Ae*t
his eyes trained on his beloved instruments.172
If it Zas a HCallenge f,r s,.e,ne ,f OCadiali’s H,.*leXi,n t, tra'el bW train
in the era of Plessy, Ghadiali does not expressly say. But he took a few telling
precautions. At his trial, Ghadiali submitted into evidence letters he sent to train
companies, explaining his situationFthat he was traveling not with family, but
with a secretary, and that he hesitated to engage a private drawing room, but was
arranging to do nonetheless s, beHause it Zas i.*,ssible t, tra'el ZitC DdeliHate
eleHtriHal a**arati3 ,tCerZise.173 For the convenience of his co-traveler, he asked
tCat tCe train H,.*anies Dsu**lW tCe neHessarW Hurtains t, insure her privacy and
at the same time give me the convenience of leaving the door wide open day and
nigCt.3174Ne addedS DIf W,uZill d, anWtCing t, s.,,tC .W ab,'e stated situati,n
so that I may not have any probable complication or legal trouble, I shall feel it
a *ers,nal fa',r.3175
Finally, after the two had arrived in Portland, Ghadiali sensed that something
was a.iss. D"eing trained t, a life ,f CigClW H,nHentrati'e .editati,n and
accustomed to mental absorption in research work, I am prone to feel human
etCeriH ,sHillati,ns liAe a tuned radi,.3176 Indeed, by the next morning, Ghadiali
discovered that McCann had vanished.
Ghadiali made his usual progress through the long day. He concluded his
lecture late in the evening and dragged his instruments back to his hotel.177 As
he wrote, he had the unmistakable impression that he was being followed. As
Ghadiali unlocked the door to his room, a man lunged behind. Ghadiali raced for
171. Id. at 71, 74.
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his revolver.178 (Having been threatened before, Ghadiali always slept with a
loaded revolver.) Ghadiali claimed he had no intention of shooting, but was
prepared to defend himself against the unpardonable intrusion. When Ghadiali
raised Cis gunS tCe ,tCer.an did tCe sa.eS sC,utingS DPederal 7ffiHer. 6ut d,Zn
W,ur gun.3179 TCen tCe r,,. filled ZitC ar.ed .en. DI’'e been f,ll,Zing W,u
f,r tCree WearsS3 ,ne ,f tCe. said. #n,tCer ,rdered Ci. t, stri*. Ohadiali
protested but removed his clothes, as told. One of the officers laughed, another
ste**ed ,n OCadiali’s t,esS and an,tCer *r,dded Cis genitals ZitC tCe barrel ,f
his gun. Ghadiali writes,
My blood tingled in my ears. Such an obscene monstrosity would have
been resented any other time, but I was in their clutches, I was
undefended, I was among strangers, I had no physical means to secure
helpFthere I was standing naked before five huskies all armed with
guns and apparently meaning no good to me.180
Ghadiali spent the night in jail. McCann had been dragged home by her
family.181
#t tCe trialS tCe g,'ern.ent ad,*ted MarW NaWes’ lurid i.age ,f OCadiali
and his householdFcharacterizing Ghadiali as a seducer, his wife and daughter
as procurers, his home as a harem.182 In OCadiali’s H,unter-narrative, the letters
fr,.MarW NaWes and MH!ann’s br,tCer suggest tCe real .,ti'ati,n underlWing
tCe HCarge ,fZCite sla'erW.#sOCadialiZrites ,f tCe br,tCer’s letterS D#Ca0 Nere
was an industrious sister working her way in life; there was a less industrious
br,tCer trWing t, tra.*le ,n Cis sister’s HareerS beHause Ce Zanted Cer t, drudge
as a C,useAee*er.3183 #*art fr,. *ettW ri'alrWS ZCat tCe MH!ann fa.ilW’s letters
reveal is sudden regret about losing the value of Geraldine’s d,.estiH lab,r and
fa.ilW *rer,gati'e. In OCadiali’s narrati'eS tCe HCarge ,f ZCite sla'erW Zas tCe
device families used to remand ambitious women to household drudgery.
POSTSCRIPT: INCREDULITY
We can never really know what happened between Dinshah Ghadiali and
Oeraldine MH!ann. In retelling tCe st,rW ,f OCadiali’s arrest and H,n'iHti,nS I
have relied, in great measure, on his own reporting.
In his Lives of Infamous Men, Michel Foucault observes that the historical
archives are full of obscure figures, unimportant men and women who, but for
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 100-1.
181. Id. at 99.
182. Id. at 127.
183. Id.
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one fateful encounter with the law, would have followed the billions of others
who leave the world without a trace of their existence.184 The irony, for Foucault,
is that these odd individuals enter the archive only to announce their infamy; in
the worst cases, these lives enter the historical record just as they are
eXtinguisCed bW *,Zer. Na'ing H,.e aHr,ss s, .anW Dsingular li'esS3 reduHed
t, Dstrange *,e.sS3 P,uHault eX*lainsS Ce felt H,.*elled t, .aAe a studW ,f
them.185
I considered the texts in their dryness, trying to determine their reason
f,r beingL seeAing t, understand ZCW it Cad suddenlW been s,
i.*,rtant in a s,HietW liAe ,urs t, 2stifle’ Uas ,ne stifles a HrWS s.,tCers
a fire, or strangles an animal) a scandalous monk or a peculiar and
inconsequential usurer?186
Why, we might wonder, in twentieth-century America, was it so important
to contain someone like Ghadiali? The appearance of infamous men in the
historical archives, Foucault suggests, tells us less about the individuals
themselves than the societies that struck them down.
4arelW d, indi'iduals ZitC OCadiali’s life eX*erienHe enter tCe Cist,riHal
record; even more rarely do they enter legal scholarship. When they do, their
stories are generally told by others, often enemies or adversaries, often to justify
their suppression. Rarely are the stories of such individuals told by themselves,
in their own voices. When they are, we should listen. Not because those who
have been historically silenced or subordinated Ca'e s*eHial aHHess t, 2ZCat
really happened’, or 2the truth’, but because they have the potential to disrupt the
regimes of silencing, subordination, and truth-making that reinforce one another.
When we listen to the voices of the historically silenced and subordinated, we
begin to reshape public meaning, our shared institutions, and the narratives that
hold us in place.187
TC,se are s,.e ,f tCe reas,ns tCat I Ca'e HC,sen t, taAe seri,uslW OCadiali’s
counter-narrative of the events leading to his conviction. For separate reasons, I
Ca'e been inHlined t, belie'e OCadiali’s aHH,unt ,'er tCe *r,seHut,r’s. Scholars
agree that the overwhelming purpose of the Mann Act, as I suggested above, was
to restrict the sexual freedom and social movement of white women in an era of
unprecedented change.188 Black and brown men were routinely figured as the
primary threat to the status quo, which in turn, had become conflated with
184. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Lives of Infamous Men, in POWER (James D. Faubion ed., Robert Hurley
trans. 2000).
185. Id. at 158.
186. Id.
187. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of
Teaching, 32.3-4 DIACRITICS 17, 24 (2002).
188. See supra notes 70-1 and accompanying text.
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preserving the purity of white womanhood.189 TCe *r,seHuti,n’s Hase against
Ghadiali follows that familiar script.
M,re,'erS OCadiali’s life st,rWS which he wrote and rewrote compulsively,
is one of continuously outrunning false scripts and racist misrepresentation.
Before he was arrested for violating the Mann Act, Ghadiali was accused of
violating laws governing the practice of medicineFlaws intended to police the
boundaries of an emerging profession that would remain segregated, and
condone segregation, until the civil rights era.190 OCadiali’s Zas n,t tCe ,nlW
color therapy device sold in the United States in the first half of the twentieth
century, but his seemed to become the target of obsessive scrutiny among
defenders of the medical establishment.191 Their attempts to discredit Ghadiali
often assumed a racist tone.192 After he was released from prison, the federal
g,'ern.ent s,ugCt t, HanHelOCadiali’s HitiVensCi*S asserting tCat CeZas raHiallW
ineligible.193
And still, I remain uncertain. Victims of racial violence are also capable of
H,..itting aHts ,f gendered 'i,lenHe. TCe *r,seHuti,n’s tCe,rWFthat Ghadiali
mesmerized women, that he forced them into prostitutionFseems both
incredible and disingenuous. But the particular events that anchor both the
*r,seHuti,n’s narrati'e and OCadiali’s H,unter-narrative may be entirely
consistent with a pattern of sexual abuse. The isolation from family, the
imposition of rules, the surveillance of lettersFall of it might be consistent with
what survivors of sexual abuse and their advocates describe as grooming,
gaslighting, Stockholm syndrome, and trauma. Both the prosecution and
Ghadiali reference encounters between Geraldine and others which raise more
questions than they answer.194 M,re,'erS in OCadiali’s tZ,-volume narrative,
189. Id.
190. Harriet A. Washington et al., Segregation, Civil Rights, and Health Disparities: The Legacy of
African American Physicians and Organized Medicine, 1910-1968, 101 J.NAT’LMED. ASS’N 513 (2009).
191. See Lavine, supra note 46; Turner, supra note 148.
192. The 1924 article published in the Dearborn Independent ridiculed the shortcomings of
OCadiali’s tCera*eutiH de'iHe but als, raised unflattering )uesti,ns ab,ut OCadiali’s H,..erHial
.,ti'ati,nsS referring t, Ci. as a DSe.etiH Zanderer3 ZC, Cas DH,.e ,ut ,f tCe 7rient t, Ceal tCe ills ,f
.,rtal .an.3 M,rgan, supra note 113. Matthew Lavine, who has written about the rise and fall of
OCadiali’s s*eHtr,HCr,.e tCera*WS desHribes a tele'ised inter'ieZ ZitC 7li'er Pield ,f the AMA:
The program opened with a sketch in which Gus [a cartoonish naïve hypochondriac susceptible
t, .ediHal fraud[ is Z,rAed ,'er bW a turbaned and gleefullW unsHru*ul,us )uaHA na.ed 2I. M.
SiAC.’ #fterZardsS \tCe inter'ieZer[ *r,.*ted Pield t, elab,rate ,n tCe 2sZa.i stuff’ Bust
*,rtraWed. /itC,ut using _insCaC \OCadiali’s[ na.eS Pield \s*,Ae[ ab,ut 2tCe ,ld fell,Z ZC,
came over from India . . . .
Lavine, supra note 46, at 172.
193. See Sherally Munshi, “You Will See My Family Became So American”: Race, Citi'enship and
the Visual Archive, in LAW AND THE VISUAL: REPRESENTATIONS, TECHNOLOGIES, AND CRITIQUE 161
(Desmond Manderson ed. 2018).
194. More specifically, the prosecution references a vaginal exam performed by Ghadiali. Ghadiali,
who fashioned himself a physician, suggested that McCann had been afflicted by some sort of ailment for
which she appealed to Ghadiali for help. Ghadiali insinuated that McCann may have been sexually active
and that she may have been involved in a sexual relationship with his black driver, Harry Saunders.
Though Ghadiali himself was often cast in an unforgiving haze of racial suspicion, he was not above
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McCann is never really allowed to speak for herself. Ghadiali argues that
MH!ann’s testimony is not really her own, that the prosecution uses herFbut
perhaps Ghadiali does, too.
Uncertainty weighs more heavily as I draft this postscript, a few days after
the Senate concluded a pair of confirmation hearings by advancing a man who
was credibly accused of sexually assaulting at least one woman to a seat on the
Supreme Court. Christine Blasey Ford first contacted her representatives and the
Washington Post earlier this summer, soon after she learned that the person who
had assaulted her decades before was now being considered for a vacancy on the
Supreme Court.195 D"rett Ka'anaugC *CWsiHallW and seXuallW assaulted .e
during CigC sHC,,l in tCe earlW @89QsS3 sCe Zr,te in a letter addressed t, a
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee.196 Her story was corroborated by
session notes kept by her therapist and conversations recalled by her husband.197
She passed a polygraph test.198 Though she wished to remain anonymous, once
reporters learned of her identity, Ford felt she had no choice but to make her
accusations public.199
Immediately overwhelmed by both public support and death threats, a
reluctant Ford agreed to testify before Congress, but asked that the Senate
MudiHiarW !,..ittee ,rder an P"I in'estigati,n firstS t, Densure tCat tCe HruHial
facts and witnesses in this matter are assessed in a non-partisan manner, and that
the Committee is fully informed before conducting any hearing or making any
decisions.3200 Refusing to order a thorough FBI investigation, to subpoena other
witnesses, or even to slow down the pace of events, the Senate Judiciary
exploiting anti-black racism to direct suspicion away from himself and towards others. GHADIALI, supra
note 1, at 123, 135-37.
195. Jessica Contera, et. al., Kavanaugh accuser Christine Blasey Ford moved 3,000 miles to
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!,..ittee effeHti'elW ,rHCestrated tCe 'erW DCe saidS sCe said3 tCeW den,unHed
as pointless.201
In late September, Ford offered her account of the incident.202 In the summer
of 1982, when she was fifteen years old, she attended a house party in suburban
Maryland. She left the company of her friends to go to the bathroom upstairs.
Upstairs, she was pushed into a bedroom by two boys, obviously drunk.
Kavanaugh, as she recalled, pushed her onto a bed, pinning her there with the
ZeigCt ,f Cis b,dWS grinding and gr,*ing% ZCile Ka'anaugC’s friendS MarA
Judge, watched and laughed. Struggling to breathe as he covered her mouth, Ford
worried that Kavanaugh might inadvertently kill her. When Judge jumped onto
the bed, toppling the other two, she managed to leave the room and then the
party. Ford delivered her testimony with earnest cooperation, restrained emotion,
disarming candorFcareful to acknowledge what she could and could not recall
thirty years later. When asked how she could be so certain that it was Kavanaugh
and not someone else who attacked her, Ford, a professor of psychology,
explained that certain details might be seared in ,ne’s .e.,rW e'en as ,tCers
faded away. When asked what she remembered most clearly about that night,
P,rd reHalled tCe *leasure tCe b,Ws t,,A in Cer Cu.iliati,n. DIndelible in tCe
hippocampus is the laughter . . . the uproarious laughter between the two . . . I
Zas . . . underneatC ,ne ,f tCe.S ZCile tCe tZ, laugCed.3 203
Ka'anaugC’s testi.,nWS ZCiHC f,ll,Zed later in tCe aftern,,nS H,nsisted ,f
howling accusations, implausible denials, willful dissembling, and petty insults
aimed at Senators who dared )uesti,n Ci.. NardlW addressing P,rd’s Hlai.sS Ce
implied that they were the conjury of some political conspiracy.204 He boasted
of his academic achievements, as though elite schooling and good grades should
insulate individuals against accusations of wrongdoing.205 Where her testimony
was meticulous, his was petulant. Where she was compliant, he was rageful.
While it is obvious that both Kavanaugh and Blasey Ford suffered terribly
through the public ordeal, she suffered death threats, loss of privacy, and the pain
of publicly reliving a humiliating memory with heroic composure. In contrast,
he suffered death threats, loss of reputation, and calls to accountability with tears
of self-pity. A number of times over the course of his testimony, Kavanaugh,
who certainlW An,Zs tCe differenHeS HCaraHteriVed ,tCers’ laHA ,f reH,lleHti,n as
201. Burgess Everett & Elana Schor, Trump Says He’s OK with the FBI Interviewing Kavanaugh,
POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/01/mitchell-ford-kavanaugh-accusati
on-854433 [https://perma.cc/6JPA-5US3]
202. Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript/?utm_term=.9121f6bb076c [https://per
ma.cc/7FRZ-FTY2] (full transcript of Nomination of Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court, Day 5, Focusing on Allegations of Sexual Assault: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
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refutations.206 The explanations that Kavanaugh offered under oath for the
language he had written in his own high school pageFDral*CS3 Db,,fedS3
Dde'il’s triangleS3 D4enate alu.nus3Fwere so incredible that they prompted
several former classmates to come forward, expressing fresh doubt about
Ka'anaugC’s fitness as a Budge.207
Here, too, we can never really know what happened. It is impossible to
determine with any certainty what did or did not happen in a suburban home in
Maryland some thirty-six years ago. But it is also clear that the confirmation
hearings were never really about determining what did or did not happen. By
agreeing t, *artiHi*ate in tCe H,..ittee’s *r,HeedingsS P,rd b,und herself to the
H,..ittee’s unWielding autC,ritW t, H,ntr,l .eaningS t, deter.ine ZCat did ,r
did not happen.208 Before the Ford-Kavanaugh hearing, Senator Mitch
MH!,nnell *r,.ised a r,,. full ,f su**,rtersS DZe’re g,ing t, *l,Z rigCt
tCr,ugC.3209 Before hearing CerS Senat,r JindseW OraCa. ann,unHed tCat P,rd’s
testi.,nW Z,uld n,t HCange Cis ',te: DI’. n,t g,ing t, ruin Mudge Ka'anaugC’s
life ,'er tCis.3 Ne Zent ,n t, saWS inHrediblWS tCat P,rd sC,uld n,netCeless DCa'e
her say, she will be treated respectfully.3210 One reporter in the room during the
hearing observed that Republican committee members, with one exception,
avoided looking Ford in the eyes as she spoke.211
To so many of us who watched, the fair hearing that Ford had been promised
quickly became a public demonstration of willed ignorance. Twenty-eight years
ago, during the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings, a committee, composed
of all white men, attacked the woman who accused the nominee of sexual
206. Mike McIntire et al., At Times, Kavanaugh’s Defense Misleads or "eers Off Point, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-fact-check.html
[https://perma.cc/X2NU-49RP].
207. Kate Kelly & David Enrich, Kavanaugh’s Yearbook Page is ‘Horrible, Hurtful’ to a Woman It
Named, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/business/brett-kavanaugh-
yearbook-renate.html [https://perma.cc/7LVR-BYHD]; Clark Mindock, More Yale Classmates Come
Forward Claiming Brett Kavanaugh Has Been Lying, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/kavanaugh-yale-classmates-chad-ludington-kerry-be
rcham-beer-drunk-liz-swisher-a8565261.html [https://perma.cc/4PQ7-D5V8].
208. I am indebted to Kathryn Pogin for these words and insights.
209. Eliza Collins, McConnell: We’re (oing to ‘Plow Right Through’ and (et Kavanaugh
Confirmed Despite Assault Allegation, USA TODAY (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2018/09/21/mitch-mcconnell-were-going-plow-right-through-ford-allegation/138090
5002/[https://perma.cc/9KWK-DMMZ].
210. Ann Telnaes, (raham’s Mind Has Been Made Up, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/23/grahams-mind-has-been-made-up/?utm
_term=.453b9aaca385 [https://perma.cc/U8FU-J6D9]; Chris Cillizza, Lindsey (raham’s Depressing and
Disappointing Admission About Thursday’s Brett Kavanaugh Hearing, CNN (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/25/politics/donald-trump-lindsey-graham-brett-kavanaugh/index.html?no
-st=1546398805 [https://perma.cc/ZCK7-SEK9].
211. Dahlia Lithwick et al., The Waves: Gender, Relationships, Feminism: The Rage at Brett Edition,
SLATE (Oct. 4, 2018), http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/doublex_gabfest/2018/10/the_hosts_
of_the_waves_discuss_male_entitlement_female_rage_and_what_comes.html [https://perma.cc/AD4S-
4NP8] (last visited Jan. 1, 2019) (Dahlia Lithwick commentary starting at 40:00).
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harassment, relentlessly challenging her credibility.212 Careful to avoid the same
mistakes this time around, many Republicans on the committeeFstill composed
largely of white menFacknowledged that Ford seemed credible. While Hill was
disHredited as a liarS P,rd Zas disH,unted as D*leasing3 but *erCa*s H,nfused.213
Ka'anaugC’s su**,rters see.ed t, H,n'erge u*,n tCe sa.e unliAelW tCe,rW:
something terrible happened to poor Ford, but Kavanaugh had nothing to do with
it. Of course, the mistaken identity theory is the one theory that would allow
Senators to reconcile her apparent credibility with his aggressive denials. There
is at least one other possibility: he did it, but he could not remember, either
because he was too drunkFas many former classmates publicly assumedFor
because what she experienced as terror was, for him, another unremarkable night
of fun.
President Donald Trump, who was voted into office after he was caught
boasting of sexual assault in a recorded conversation, was among the few who
dared to suggest that Ford might be making a false accusation.214 D#nd you know
ZCW$3 he explained at a press conference. D"eHause I’'e Cad a l,t ,f false
HCarges.ade against.e.3215 More than a dozen women have accused Trump of
sexual impropriety; Trump has dismissed them as opportunists taking advantage
of famous and powerful men.216 Ne later addedS DMW ZC,le lifeS I’'e CeardS
2W,u’re inn,Hent until *r,'en guiltWS’ but n,Z W,u’re guilty until proven
inn,Hent. It’s a 'erW sHarW ti.e f,r W,ung .en in #.eriHan ZCen W,u Han be
guiltW ,f s,.etCing tCat W,u .aW n,t be guiltW ,f.3217 Of course, as some were
quick to point out, there is indeed a long history of false accusation in this
country. "ut it’s n,t fa.,us ZCite.en ZC, Ca'e been *artiHularlW 'ulnerable t,
false accusations, presumptions of guilt, and lack of due process, but black and
brown men.218 Tru.* Cas sC,Zn far .,re H,nHern f,r tCe Ddue *r,Hess3 rigCts
212. See T,ni M,rris,nS DIntr,duHti,n: PridaW ,n tCe 6,t,.aHS3 in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
REALITY i-xxx (1992).
213. Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Credibility: Doubting the Testimony and
Dismissing the Experience of Domestic Violence Survivors and Other Women, 167 U. PENN L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3133066 [https://perma.cc/MNF5-
BA4S]; Sen. Hatch Calls Ford ‘Attractive,’ ‘Pleasing’, PBS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/politics/sen-hatch-calls-ford-attractive-pleasing [https://perma.cc/E5WB-3AWL].
214. President Donald Trump: 2I’ve Had a Lot of False Charges Made Against Me, USA TODAY
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/videos/news/politics/2018/09/26/president-donald-trump-
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218. Petula Dvorak, Black Men&Not White Guys&Face False Allegations and a Presumption of
Guilt, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/black-men--not-white-guys--
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of a judge who stands only to lose a seat on the Supreme Court than, for instance,
the Central Park Five, black and brown men wrongly convicted and imprisoned
for raping a white woman when they were teenagers.219 In 2016, Trump
announced his campaign for the presidency by calling (all but Ds,.e3T MeXiHan
immigrants rapists and murders.220 As President, he has shamelessly exploited
the same racist fantasies, defining of white slave panic, to promote anti-black
and anti-immigrant policies.
We can never really know what happened in either case, but Kavanaugh was
given the benefit of a far more searching standard than GhadialiFand perhaps
.,st Hri.inal defendants. "ef,re and after tCe CearingsS Ka'anaugC’s
supporters, like Trump, insisted that the judge was entitled to a presumption of
innocence.221 Judicial confirmation hearings are job interviews, not criminal
trials, as many pointed out.222 Nis su**,rters H,.*lained ab,ut a laHA ,f Ddue
*r,HessS3 but ',ting against a Supreme Court nominee is not the same as
convicting him of a crime.223 A negative vote would have sent Kavanaugh not to
prison, but back to the D.C. Circuit.
The Kavanaugh controversy was often framed in terms of evidence, matters
of fact, what can or cannot be proven. But the real division exposed by the
controversy has less to do with what actually happened than with who decidesF
who is authorized to participate in shaping public meaning and the norms of
social exchange; who is accountable to whom and for what; who gets to decide
what we collectively recognize as consent, as violence, as right or wrong. This
became clear soon after Kavanaugh began to testify. Republicans on the
committee Cad Cired a Dfe.ale assistantS3 a federal *r,seHut,rS t, )uesti,n P,rdS
but quickly dispensed with her and her questioning.224 Instead, they took turns
bellowing at their Democratic counterparts, accusing them of turning the
hearings into a political circus.225 T, Ka'anaugCS tCeW assuredS W,u d,n’t Ca'e
to answer to this. What the rest of us were made to witness that afternoon was a
219. In 1989, Trump spent $85,000 placing full-page advertisements calling for their execution.
Astonishingly, in 2016, long after the Central Five had been exonerated by DNA evidence, Trump
maintained that the men were guilty. Sarah Burns, Why Trump Doubled Down on the Central Park Five,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/opinion/why-trump-doubled-down-
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Who is Rachel Mitchell?, SALON (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/09/26/republicans-hire-
a-female-assistant-to-grill-brett-kavanaughs-accuser-who-is-rachel-mitchell/ [https://perma.cc/8RMJ-LE
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closing of ranks. If, in the past decades, historically subordinated communitiesF
black people, immigrants, sexual minorities, womenFhad been asserting their
collective power to reshape public meaning and shared institutions, then a
handful of white men would stop it. Not by appealing to good faith, reason, or
credulity, but by wielding power.
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INTRODUCTION
An 84-year-old transgender1 man named George2 had advanced dementia
and was placed in a nursing home. Assuming he lived in a hostile environment
for transgender elders, he hid his gender identity3 from other residents and
isolated himself. But George could not hide from the staff who bathed and
dressed him in clothes that did not match who he was and had been for years.
TCe staff and residents Halled Ci. DsCe3 andS ratCer tCan res*,nd as s,.e,ne
else, he became unresponsive. When he had lived in his community, he had been
a vibrant and charming man who engaged others with a sharp wit and keen
observations about life and people. After a few weeks in the nursing home,
however, he became unrecognizable to those who knew himFlistless,
completely withdrawn, sleeping through the day and no longer taking care of his
basic hygiene or dressing himself. He stopped eating because he refused to go to
the dining hall, not wishing to eat and socialize with others. The medical staff
1. DTransgender is a broad term that can be used to describe people whose gender identity is different
from the gender they were thought to be when they were born.3 Understanding Transgender People: The
Basics, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (July 9, 2016), https://transequality.org/issues/res
ources/understanding-transgender-people-the-basics [https://perma.cc/Q4FW-XUW9]. See also WORLD
PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 97 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF
CARE] (defining transgender as Da diverse group of individuals who cross or transcend culturally defined
categories of gender. The gender identity of transgender people differs to varying degrees from the sex
they were assigned at birth.3). Although the focus of this article is on transgender individuals, other
individuals whose gender identity is non-conforming (people whose gender expression differs from
conventional expectations of masculinity and femininity) and those who are gender fluid (a person who
at any time may identify as male, female, other, or a combination of identities) should also be afforded
the protections and advocacy described, and supported in their gender identity when faced with incapacity.
2. George’s story is based generally on a client the Author represented as an attorney in private
practice.
3. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 1, at 96 (defining gender identity as Da person’s intrinsic sense
of being male (a boy or a man), female (a girl or woman), or an alternative gender.3).
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diagn,sed Ci. ZitC Dfailure t, tCri'e.34 That was fitting because, without being
recognized for who he was, he could not be himself in that setting and so he
could not thrive.
However, a court had declared him to be legally incapacitated5 and unable
to make decisions about where he lived. So, even had he been capable of
arranging to move out of that nursing home, he did not have the legal authority
to do so. Fortunately, the court had appointed him a suitable guardianF
transgender-aware and -affirming. With the advocacy of a culturally responsive
attorney, the guardian identified a transgender-affirming caretaker with a private
residence and moved George there. After only a few weeks of true caretaking,
he became himself again and thrivedFeating, bathing, dressing with care in his
own style, and making those around him laugh and become inescapably fond of
him. It is profound that even when his memory and other cognitive capacities
were severely impaired, his identity remained key to his survival. And when he
was no longer invisible, he no longer needed to hide. Instead, he was
acknowledged and known for who he was, and so he responded. It proved, in his
HaseS t, be tCe differenHe betZeen life and deatC. #fter Cis .,'e DC,.eS3
surrounded by people who knew and saw him, he remained engaged and himself
through his final days. George was fortunate, but how many others in similar
situations are failing to thrive or will be without advocacy and reform?6
Oe,rge’s st,rW de.,nstrates ZCat studies Ca'e already found: that feeling
H,.*elled t, H,nHeal ,ne’s gender identitW is signifiHantlW H,nneHted t,
depression for transgender people.7 M,re,'erS D\a[ real H,nHern ,f .anW
transgender people is that they will be misgendered in the event that they become
reliant on others for care, especially if those carers have not been accepting of
tCeir gender identitW ,r are uninf,r.ed ab,ut suHC .atters.38 A sample of
poignant statements by elder transgender individuals illustrates their fears as they
4. TCeIati,nal Institute ,f#ging desHribes failure t, tCri'e as a DsWndr,.e ,fZeigCt l,ssS deHreased
appetite and poor nutrition, and inactivity, often accompanied by dehydration, depressive symptoms,
i.*aired i..une funHti,n . . . .3 KatCrWn #garZalS Failure to Thrive in Elderly Adults: Evaluation, UP
TO DATE (May 2, 2016), https://www.uptodate.com/contents/failure-to-thrive-in-elderly-adults-evalua
tion [https://perma.cc/8HHN-MR46].
5. Statutory definitions of Dincapacity3 vary, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-102 (5) (2016)
(D2Incapacitated person’ means an individual other than a minor, who is unable to effectively receive or
evaluate information or both or make or communicate decisions to such an extent that the individual lacks
the ability to satisfy essential requirements for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate
and reasonably available technological assistance.3).
6. SeeNancy J. Knauer, LGBT Issues and Adult Guardianship: A Comparative Perspective, TEMPLE
UNIV. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 2013-02, 14 (2013) (citing Jane Gross, Aging and Gay, and Facing
Prejudice in Twilight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/us/09aged.html
[https://perma.cc/SVG8-FTSX]).
7. Karen L. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., Physical and Mental Health of Transgender Older Adults: An
At-Risk and Underserved Population, 54 GERONTOLOGIST 488, 494 (2014).
8. ALZHEIMER’S AUSTL., DEMENTIA, TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE: DO SERVICE
PROVIDERS REALLY KNOW WHAT THEIR NEEDS ARE? 4 (2014) [hereinafter ALZHEIMER’S AUSTL.],
https://www.dementia.org.au/sites/default/files/130739_LGBTI%20Discussion%20Paper.2-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5B7-JTU2].
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contemplate a potential future when they are unable to make their own decisions
or care for themselves and must rely on others, and may require institutional care.
A 61-year-old transgender woman spoke of her anxiety about long-term care
*laHe.ent: D.W biggest fear rigCt now, [is] not having the freedom to control my
dignitW.39 7tCers Ca'e said tCat tCeW Z,rrW ab,ut: D*e,*le . . . atte.*t\ing[ t,
f,rHe.e int, being tCeZr,ng gender310% D\C[a'ing Haregi'ers sCa'e.W faHe and
put me in a dress because I have not had lower surgerW311% D\C[a'ing genitals tCat
d,n’t fit .W eXternal a**earanHe and being abusedS .istreated ,r negleHted as a
result312% DI Ca'e realistiH H,nHerns tCat IZill n,t be treated as I Z,uld liAe ZCen
I a. de*endent ,n ,tCers313% D\t[Ce daW I need a Haregi'erS I will implement my
end ,f life suiHide *lan.314
A majority of LGBT people in mid-life anticipate receiving care that does
not respect their gender identity.15 This concern is alarmingly realistic because
the incidence of discrimination, ignorance, and bias towards transgender persons
by those who serve the elderly is well documented.16 Further, a study of the
physical and mental health of transgender elders reports that they are more likely
to experience poorer health outcomes, including mental and/or physical
disabilities, than the non-transgender LGB elder population.17 Strikingly, the
United States Transgender Survey (USTS), a national study of transgender and
gender nonconforming persons, found that 39 percent of respondents reported a
disability, compared to 15 percent of the U.S. population.18 Given those
statistics, some transgender persons will likely require others to care for them at
some point. One such disability that affects the general elderly population in
disproportionate numbers is dementia. In its later stages, dementia leads to
9. Allison Auldridge et al., Improving the Lives of Transgender Adults: Recommendations for Policy
and Practice 25 (National Center for Transgender Equality 2012), https://transequality.org/sites/default/
files/docs/resources/TransAgingPolicyReportFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD3K-JDT8].
10. ALZHEIMER’S AUSTL., supra note 8, at 6.
11. Tarynn M. Witten & A. Evan Eyler, Transgender and Aging: Beings and Becomings, in GAY,
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL& TRANSGENDERAGING, CHALLENGES IN RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 187,
212 (Tarynn M. Witten & A. Evan Eyler eds., 2012).
12. Id. at 212.
13. ALZHEIMER’SAUSTL., supra note 8, at 6.
14. Id. at 8.
15. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., THE HEALTH OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR BETTERUNDERSTANDING 274 (2011).
16. Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Elder Law: Toward Equity in Aging, 32 HARV. J.L. &GENDER 301, 303
(2009).
17. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 496. See also, KAREN I. FREDRIKSEN-GOLDSEN ET
AL., INST. FOR MULTIGENERATIONAL HEALTH, THE AGING AND HEALTH REPORT: DISPARITIES AND
RESILIENCE AMONG LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER OLDER ADULTS, 22-23 (2011),
https://www.lgbtagingcenter.org/resources/pdfs/LGBT%20Aging%20and%20Health%20Report_final.p
df [https://perma.cc/3JAT-GSBA].
18. SANDY E. JAMES ET AL, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015
U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 57 (2016) https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-
Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZV9-EK4D].
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profound incapacity that requires caretaking and, often, decision-making by
others who act as surrogates.
If a transgender elder with dementia-related incapacity requires a surrogate
decision-maker, that surrogate might not be knowledgeable about the
indi'idual’s uni)ue H,nHernsS needsS and 'ulnerabilities related t, tCeir gender
identity. In addition, the surrogate might not be comfortable with or supportive
,f tCe indi'idual’s gender identitW and its eXternal eX*ressi,n. The attendant bias
H,uld result in deHisi,ns tCat are Car.ful t, tCe elder’s Zell-being. Such a
scenario would realize the fears expressed by transgender elders contemplating
incapacity and caretaking by others.
Accordingly, it is vital that a transgender elder who is incapacitated select
or be appointed a decision-maker who will treat them with dignity and intervene
when others do not; one who will affirm and assist them in maintaining their
identity, commit to educating themselves and others about transgender elders’
unique needs; and one who will make decisions as the transgender individual
would have when they had capacity. Equally vital is a decision-maker who will
advocate zealously on their behalf for transgender-affirming care with medical
and other service providers. Such an outcome requires both preventative and
proactive legal measures and reforms.
Professor Nancy J. Knauer has identified distinct issues impacting LGBT
people who require guardians.19 This Article addresses transgender individuals’
unique concerns and explores in depth the societal and legal challenges
transgender elders confront when faced with incapacity and guardianship.
Transgender elders must protect their self-determination, identity, and welfare
by predetermining a surrogate decision-maker prior to incapacity. One who will,
for example, make health care decisions that safely maintain their gender
identities by addressing their particular health care needs. Alternatively, if a
transgender elder becomes incapacitated and has not previously chosen a
surrogate decision-makerFand, upon incapacity, cannot express a preference for
who would serve in that roleFa court should appoint a suitable decision-maker
to ensure the well-being of the elder. That is, one who is culturally
knowledgeable and respectful, an advocate, and who would make transgender-
affir.ing CealtC Hare and ,tCer deHisi,ns ,n tCe elder’s beCalf.
Part I of this article describes the current generation of transgender elders
through demographic data, health status, and health care concerns. Part II
identifies preventative legal measures that should be taken while a transgender
person has capacity. It notes the challenges in identifying an appropriate
surrogate decision-maker, and the need for protective language to be added to a
transgender indi'idual’s CealtC Hare *,Zer ,f att,rneW and ad'anHe direHti'e t,
honor their gender identities. Last, it presents the range of state standards of
19. Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Issues and Adult Guardianship, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
ADULTGUARDIANSHIP, 299-311 (1st ed. Carolina Academic Press 2015).
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decision-making for health care agents appointed by individualsFfrom
protective of the indi'idual’s self-determination to insufficiently protective.
Part III provides an overview of a typical guardianship proceeding for adults
alleged to be incapacitated. It discusses the need to identify the gender identity
of persons for whom a guardian is to be appointed. Next, it proposes measures
courts can take to identify and appoint transgender-affirming guardians, and
recommends that the courts monitor the decisions made by the guardians on the
transgender elder’s beCalf. TCis 6art H,nHludes bW identifying certain
circumstances that require zealous advocacy by guardians, to protect the
transgender individuals they serve.
I. A DEMOGRAPHIC PICTURE OF TRANSGENDER ELDERS, THEIR
HEALTH, ANDHEALTH CARE
The lack of empirical research regarding the current transgender elder
population impedes an accurate description of this group.20 Similarly, it is
challenging to reliably estimate the number of transgender elders in the United
States because, among other factors, national population surveys omit questions
about gender identity.21 And transgender individuals who are members of more
than one marginalized groupFsuch as transgender people of colorF
underreport.22 However, the most recent estimate is that transgender adults
20. GARY J. GATES, THEWILLIAMS INST., HOWMANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER? 2-3 (2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-
People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BRQ-DLNU]. See alsoKnauer, supra note 16, at 9 (DThe
absence of empirical evidence is particularly acute in the case of transgender elders.3). See generally
MARK E. WILLIAMS, & PAT A. FREEMAN, TRANSGENDER HEALTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR AGING AND
CAREGIVING 104 (2008) (DScholarly research regarding aging and the transgender community remains
very limited. Much of what has been written about transgender aging issues is again based on extrapolation
from research examining heterosexual and LGB elders.3); Nancy A. Orel, Investigating the Needs and
Concerns of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Older Adults: The Use of Qualitative and
Quantitative Methodology, 61 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 60 (2014) (DOne of the most challenging tasks in
conducting any research with LGBT older adults is actually being able to locate this population in order
to recruit their participation for specific research projects.3).
21. ANDREW R. FLORES, JODY L. HERMAN, GARY J. GATES, & TAYLOR N. T. BROWN, THE
WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 2 (2016),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-
in-the-United-States.pdf [https://perma.cc/T68L-8UMX].
22. JAIME M. GRANT, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, OUTING AGE 2010: PUBLIC POLICY
ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER ELDERS 138 (2010), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/566c7f0c2399a3bdabb57553/t/566cb65a25981d5723b7ed00/1449965146
749/2010-NGLTF-Outing-Age-Report-Public-Policy-Issues-Affecting-LGBT-Elders.pdf [https://perma.
cc/L65M-Z9Y9] (D[G]iven the fact that there is currently little to no research that samples transgender
people in the general population, and the reality that highly vulnerable LGBT peopleFincluding a
percentage of gender-nonconforming/trans people, people of color, immigrants, non-English speakers,
undocumented and low-income peopleFare unlikely to identify as LGBT on even an anonymous
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represent 0.6 percent of the United States’ *,*ulati,nS ,r a**r,Xi.atelW @.=
million persons.23 Moreover, although older adults are less likely than younger
adults to identify as transgender, 0.5 percent (or 217,050 of adults) aged 65 and
older identify as transgender.24 The number of older transgender adults is
expected to increaseFparalleling the growth of the American elder population
in general.25 By 2030 one in five Americans will be 65 years of age or older, and
those 85 or older will constitute a much greater percentage of the elder
population by 2040.26
TCis nati,n’s aging trend is signifiHantS in *artS beHause a**r,Xi.atelW ,ne
in ten *e,*le age ;< and ,lder Cas #lVCei.er’s de.entia.27 That number
increases to thirty-two percent of persons who are 85 or older.28 The risk for
Alzheimer’s and other dementias rises significantly at age 65 and older.
Accordingly, as the American population ages, the number of those with
#lVCei.er’s Zill .irr,r tCis gr,ZtC. #.,ng tC,se ZitC #lVCei.er’s Uand ,tCer
types of dementias) will be elders who are transgender and have particular needs
and vulnerabilities when they become incapacitated.
Compared to the general U.S. population, more American transgender adults
are persons of color, primarily Hispanic or Latino and African-American.29
Notably, rates of Alzheimer’s and ,tCer de.entias a.,ng Nis*aniH and #friHan-
American elders are significantly higher than those of their non-Hispanic white
peers.30 Regarding general well-being, for transgender elders of color DtCe
combination of anti-transgender bias and persistent, structural racism [is]
especially devastating. People of color in general fare worse than white
participants across the board, with African-American transgender respondents
faring Z,rse tCan all ,tCers ...331
questionnaire, we believe that the [estimated LGBT population figures] significantly undercount the
community.3).
23. FLORES ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 489.
26. LORRAINEA.WEST ET AL., 65+ IN THEUNITED STATES: 2010, at 5 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014).
27. ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2018 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACT AND FIGURES 17 (2018),
https://www.alz.org/media/HomeOffice/Facts%20and%20Figures/facts-and-figures.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WV9T-Z3FU] [hereinafter ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE] (DAlzheimer’s disease is a degenerative brain
disease and the most common cause of dementia. Dementia is also caused by other diseases and
conditions. It is characterized by a decline in memory, language, problem-solving and other cognitive
skills that affects a person’s ability to perform everyday activities.3).
28. Id. at 17.
29. ANDREW R. FLORES, TAYLOR N. T. BROWN, & JODY L. HERMAN, THE WILLIAMS INST. RACE
AND ETHNICITY OF ADULTS WHO IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2016),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Race-and-Ethnicity-of-Transgender-Identified-
Adults-in-the-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JEY-JPKC].
30. ALZHEIMER’SDISEASE, supra note 27, at 21 (DMost studies indicate that African-Americans are
about twice as likely to have Alzheimer’s and other dementias as older whites. Some studies indicate
Hispanics are about one and one-half times as likely to have Alzheimer’s and other dementias as older
whites.3).
31. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., WASHINGTON NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY AND
NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
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A. Health and Access to Health Care
D\T[ransgender individuals are among the most stigmatized and medically
underserved groups, facing barriers at every phase of accessing care, from
getting int, tCe d,Ht,r’s ,ffiHe t, *aWing f,r Hare.332 Like the rest of the elder
population, transgender elders use health care services more often than the
younger population. But their access to and the sufficiency of those services is
significantly compromised because of discrimination.33 In general, transgender
individuals face an elevated risk of disability and have poorer health outcomes.34
Compared to 5 percent of the general U.S. population, 30 percent of respondents
to a National Transgender Discrimination Survey (NTDS)35 reported significant
difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions due to a physical,
mental or emotional condition.36
For transgender persons of color, racial discrimination is an additional
barrier to health care access, and, as a group, they have even poorer health
outcomes.37 Transgender persons with disabilities are particularly vulnerable,
having higher rates of suicide attempts than the non-disabled transgender
population.38 Notably, at 48 percent, the prevalence of depression is also
significantly greater for transgender older adults39 compared to the
approximately 1 percent rate of depression among the general older population.40
Depression is associated with cognitive decline and is a significant risk factor for
dementia.41 In one study, depression almost doubled the risk of dementia and
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011), https://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
Injustice%20at%20Every%20Turn.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRE5-FXY3]. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 18,
at 6.
32. Sarah E. Gage, The Transgender Eligibility Gap: How the ACA Fails to Cover Medically
Necessary Treatment for Transgender Individuals and How HHS Can Fix It, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499,
500 (2015).
33. INST. OFMED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 15, at 273. See also, GRANT ET AL., supra note
31, at 72 (DAccess to health care is a fundamental human right that is regularly denied to transgender and
gender nonconforming people.3). See also, JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 93.
34. See, e.g., Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 494. See also JAMES ET AL., supra note 18,
at 57 (D39% of respondents indicated that they had one or more disability . . . compared to 15% of the
general population3); see also SERVICES&ADVOCACY FOR LGBT ELDERS (SAGE), SIX THINGS EVERY
LGBT OLDER ADULT SHOULD KNOW ABOUT CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE AND HYPERTENSION (2014),
https://www.lgbtagingcenter.org/resources/pdfs/6thingscardiovascular.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HAW-53
W6] (DLGBT older adults and people of color are especially vulnerable to cardiovascular disease and
hypertension, due to poorer health outcomes.3).
35. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31.
36. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 57.
37. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 72.
38. ANN P. HAAS ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG TRANSGENDER AND
GENDER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS 10 (2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/593L-W6ZV].
39. FREDRIKSEN-GOLDSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26.
40. David C. Steffens et al., Prevalence of Depression Among Older Americans: The Aging,
Demographics and Memory Study, 21 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 879, 879 (2009).
41. Jane S. Saczynski et al., Depressive Symptoms and Risk of Dementia: The Framingham Heart
Study, 75 NEUROLOGY 35, 36-39 (2010).
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#lVCei.er’s.42 Given the higher rates of disability, depression, and poor health
among transgender elders, it is reasonable to assume a corresponding higher rate
of cognitive impairment, including dementiaFa disease that is chronic and
progressive and eventually results in incapacity and death.43
Furthermore, addressing stigma and victimization against transgender
persons is vital to decrease the health risks faced by that population.44 Significant
threats to the health of transgender elders include fear of accessing health
services and concealment of gender identity.45 Troublingly, the NTDS revealed
that up to 24 percent of transgender respondents reported having been denied
medical care due to their transgender or gender non-conforming status.46 Further,
up to 28 percent had postponed medical care due to discrimination, and 33
percent delayed or did not seek preventive health care.47 The refusal to provide
medical care is especially concerning because the rate of suicide attempts by
those denied treatment was an alarming 60 percent.48 Again, transgender people
of color experience more obstacles to health care access than their transgender
peers.49 DTCe \d,uble[ Be,*ardW ,f raHis. . . . \and[ trans*C,bia Cas been sC,Zn
t, Hreate.,re signifiHant barriers t, Hare f,r JO"T *e,*le ,f H,l,rS350 including
a higher percentage who are denied medical treatment.51
A study on the health of transgender elders found evidence of anti-
transgender bias in medical settings: one quarter or more of participants had
encountered discrimination by a physician.52 Such discrimination results in
transgender individuals hiding their gender identity from providersFwhich is a
double threat to their health and welfare. First, fear-based identity concealment
by transgender elders is linked to increased depression and stress.53 Second, they
42. Id.
43. The Author found no research specifically on numbers of transgender elders with dementia or
that included cognitive impairment among the disabilities cited. Research needs to be done to learn the
extent of incapacity among transgender elders and the population-specific risk factors.
44. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 488-90.
45. Id. at 7-8, 31.
46. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 6, 73 (24 percent of transgender women and 20 percent of
transgender men reported having been refused medical care.). See also id. at 73 (DDenial of health care
and multiple barriers to care are commonplace in the lives of transgender and gender non-conforming
people. Respondents in our study seeking health care were denied equal treatment in doctor’s offices and
hospitals (24%), emergency rooms (13%), mental health clinics (11%), by EMTs (5%) and in drug
treatment programs.3)
47. Id. at 76.
48. HAAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 2.
49. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 10 (DOne-third of those who saw a health care provider in the
past year reported having at least one negative experience related to being transgender, such as being
refused treatment, verbally harassed . . . having to teach the provider about transgender people in order to
get appropriate care, with higher rates for people of color and people with disabilities.3)
50. GRANT, supra note 22, at 72.
51. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 73. See also, JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 97 (noting that
American Indian respondents (50 percent) reported the highest level of negative experiences, and rates
among Middle Eastern (40 percent) and multiracial (38 percent) respondents were also higher).
52. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 489.
53. Id.at 7.
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are more likely to avoid seeking medical care at allFwhich includes not
receiving necessary (for many) gender transition-related medical care.54
Moreover, transgender elders face bias on multiple fronts if they belong to other
marginalized groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities.55 Further, if they are
gay, lesbian, or bisexual, their sexual orientation compounds the potential for
bias by health care providers and institutions.56 Disturbingly, when medical
providers learn that a patient is transgender, the incidence of discrimination and
abuse against them increases.57 This underscores the critical need for advocacy
by surrogates in health care settings.
This population also faces the additional burden that medical providers
generally are ignorant about transgender-specific health care needs. Fifty percent
of NTDS and twenty-four percent of USTS respondents reported having had to
teach their medical providers about transgender appropriate care.58 For example,
medical providers may not realize that male-to-female transgender persons still
need to be screened for prostate cancer and for breast cancer, and female-to-male
transgender persons need pap smears to screen for cervical cancer. For
transgender elders seeking health care, the necessity of educating their medical
providers first raises issues of trust and competency regarding those providers.
Second, it requires that they be medically knowledgeable consumers and assert
their needs in a system that is often intimidating for the general population (the
doctor knows best). It is troubling and unfair that they must meet this additional
educational and advocacy threshold to get their health care needs met. Third, it
is unrealistic for many who are already daunted by the potential for bias if they
disclose their gender identity. These burdens compound the anxiety the
transgender individual may feel about their health status generally, and any
specific health conditions or concerns.
54. Id. at 10-11; see also, JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 98 (D[N]early one-quarter (23%) of
respondents reported that they avoided seeking health care they needed in the past year due to fear of
being mistreated as a transgender person.3); see also, Mark E. Williams & Pat A. Freeman, Transgender
Health: Implications for Health and Caregiving, 18 J. GAY & LESBIAN SOC. SERV. 93, 98 (2008)
(D[H]ormone therapy has the potential for many drug interactions . . . .3).
55. Sexual orientation is separate from gender identity and describes a person’s sexual and romantic
attraction to other people. Transgender individuals may be heterosexual, lesbian, gay, bisexual, asexual
or other.
56. D[M]any LGBT persons are also members of other groups that face substantial discrimination.
These groups have had to navigate multiple instances of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, language,
degree ,f *CWsiHal abilitWS ge,gra*CiH l,Hati,nS etH.3 7rel, supra note 20, at 15, 61. See also Guidelines
for Psychological Practice With Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 838 (2015); Williams & Freeman, supra note 54S at 89 UDTransgender *e,*le ,f H,l,r
may be the most at risk for inadequate health care and health insurance coverage due to compounding
sources of stigmatization and discri.inati,n related t, raHis.S trans*C,bia and *,'ertW.3T.
57. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 75.
58. Id. at 76; JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 96.
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B. Transgender-Specific Health Care
Typically, transgender persons lack access to care that is trans-affirmative.59
As the authors of the NTDS noted:
Access to health care is a fundamental human right that is regularly
denied to transgender and gender non-conforming people . . . .
Participants in our study reported barriers to care whether seeking
preventive medicine, routine and emergency care, or transgender-
related services. These realities, combined with widespread provider
ignorance about the health needs of transgender and gender non-
conforming people, deter them from seeking and receiving quality
health care.60
Transitioning refers to the period when a person begins to live and present
themselves according to their gender identity, rather than the gender they were
assigned at birth.61 It ,ften inHludes HCanging ,ne’s a**earanHeS dressS na.eS and
pronouns.62 A majority of transgender people who transition seek transition-
related treatment, primarily counseling and hormone therapy.63 Most individuals
who transition gender do so when they are young or middle-age adults.64
Transitioning may also include other forms of physical modification or surgery.65
A review of the literature on transition-related hormone therapy reveals that 80
*erHent ,f tC,se ZC, reHei'e Dtrans-affirmative care experienced an improved
quality of life, decreased gender dysphoria,66 and Da reduHti,n in negati'e
*sWHC,l,giHal sW.*t,.s.367 That finding shows the importance of trans-
affirmative care to the well-being of transgender individuals.
59. See Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 497;Guidelines for Psychological Practice, supra
note 56, at 835; see also id. at 839 (DAlthough the landscape is beginning to change with the recent revision
of Medicare policy and changes to state laws, many TGNC people are still likely to have little to no access
to TGNC-related health care as a result of the exclusions in their insurance.3).
60. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 72.
61. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 40.
62. Id.
63. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 78 (noting that 84 percent of transgender respondents receive
transition-related counseling, especially to qualify for transition-related medical care, and that 76 percent
of transgender respondents accessed hormone therapy); see also id. at 180 (noting that hormone therapy
is D[t]he administration of hormones to facilitate the development of secondary sex characteristics as part
of a medical transition process. Those medically transitioning from female to male may take testosterone
while those transitioning from male to female may take estrogen and androgen blockers.3).
64. TARYNN M. WITTEN & EVAN A. EYLER, GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER AGING,
CHALLENGES IN RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 2 (2012).
65. Id. at 9> UD\#[ltC,ugC tCe .aB,ritW re*,rted Zanting t, 2s,.edaW’ be able t, Ca'e surgerW. TCe
high costs of gender-related surgeries and their exclusion from most health insurance plans render these
life changing (in some cases, life-saving) and medically necessary procedures inaccessible to most
transgender *e,*le.3T.
66. AM. PSYCHIATRICASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUAL OFMENTALDISORDERS 451
(5th ed. 2013).
67. Guidelines for Psychological Practice, supra note 56, at 846.
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Transgender-specific, affirming medical care is necessary health care68 Df,r
a vulnerable population that is uniquely dependent on medical treatments to
realiVe tCeir identities and t, li'e CealtCWS autCentiH li'es.369 For example,
transgender elders who have received cross-gender hormones for long periods
may be at increased risk of complications associated with other common health
care problems of the elderly, such as cardiac or pulmonary conditions and drug
interactions.70 Abruptly stopping hormones results in Da CigC liAeliC,,d ,f
negati'e ,utH,.es suHC as . . . de*ressed .,,dS dWs*C,riaS andR,r suiHidalitW.371
In addition, cross-gender hormone therapy may increase the risk of some chronic
diseases, such as diabetes.72 Also, given the elevated prevalence of depression,
disability, and suicide attempts by those who are disabled, it is essential to
monitor the mental health status of elderly transgender individuals who are at
risk and, if indicated, engage them in mental health treatment. Further,
transgender persons need a mix of traditionally gender-specific disease
prevention screenings.73
C. Bias in Institutional Care
7lder adults ZC, are inHa*aHitatedS suHC as bW ad'anHed #lVCei.er’s
dementia, may require institutionalization at later stages of the disease when
round the clock supervision and medical care become necessary. Similar to their
experience with health care systems, transgender elders face bias and
mistreatment in institutional settings.
Shelly, a trans woman has recently moved into a residential care facility.
She has been on gender affirming hormones for decades. Since moving
into residential care she has not received her hormones. Staff have
noticed that Shelly has become depressed and withdrawn and she has
begun saying that she wants to end her life.74
A survey of LGBT elders placed in long-term care revealed that only 22
percent of respondents felt they could be open about their LGBT identities with
facility staff, 89 percent predicted that staff would discriminate based on their
68. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 85. See generally STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 1.
69. Kellan Baker & Andrew Cray, Why Gender-Identity Nondiscrimination in Insurance Makes
Sense, CTR. FORAM. PROGRESS 6 (2013), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
BakerNondiscriminationInsurance-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWG4-RJNR].
70. WILLIAMS&FREEMAN, supra note 54, at 98-99.
71. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 1, at 68.
72. GRANT, supra note 22, at 79.
73. Baker & Cray, supra note 69, at 5.
74. ALZHEIMER’SAUSTL., supra note 8, at 3.
2018] Safeguarding Vulnerable Transgender Elders 383
sexual orientations and/or gender identities, and 43 percent reported instances of
mistreatment.75
Because of the incongruence between genital anatomy and the gender
expression76 of many transgender older adults,77 when personal care such as
bathing is required, concealing their nonconforming gender identity is not an
option.78 Others may be outed due to the visible effects of surgery, such as scars.
And institutional staff are largely uninformed about the particular needs of
transgender residents.79 This may include not maintaining their gender
expression, such as hairstyle, or dressing them in gender identity-incongruent
clothing.80 Because the risk of discrimination by medical providers increases
ZitC tCe re'elati,n ,f a *atient’s transgender status, that threat likely similarly
exists among care providers in institutional settings.
II. ADVANCE PLANNING: PROTECTIVE LEGALMEASURES TO BE
TAKEN PRIOR TO INCAPACITY
Due to the potential for anti-transgender bias and ignorance by caregivers, it
is crucial for a transgender elderFwhile still retaining capacityFto select a
transgender-affirming surrogate decision-maker who would make decisions
u*,n tCat indi'idual’s inHa*aHitW. TC,se deHisi,ns Z,uld C,n,r tCe indi'idual’s
preferences and advocate for their welfare and transgender health care and other
needs. This Part describes the difficulty in identifying suitable surrogate decision
makers for a transgender person, and, accordingly, the preventative legal
measures that transgender persons should take or be assisted with completing
while having capacity. I provide a context for the importance of those
preventative measures by noting the unreliable range of state standards of
decision-making for health care agents appointed by individuals.
A. Issues in Identifying a Suitable Surrogate Decision-Maker
Transgender and LGB elders face particular challenges in finding culturally
competent care and caregivers.81 Consequently, they can find it difficult to
identify a decision-maker who will make transgender-affirming decisions in
75. JUSTICE INAGING, LGBTOLDERADULTS IN LONG-TERMCARE FACILITIES: STORIES FROM THE
FIELD 6, 8 (2011), http://www.justiceinaging.org.customers.tigertech.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
Stories-from-the-Field.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLU2-HLTN].
76. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 180 (DHow a person presents or expresses his or her gender
identity to others, often through manner, clothing, hairstyles, voice or body characteristics.3).
77. Inst. of Med., Later Adulthood, in THE HEALTH OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR BETTERUNDERSTANDING 275 (2011).
78. JUSTICE INAGING, supra note 75, at 15.
79. GRANT, supra note 22, at 97.
80. ALZHEIMER’SAUSTL., supra note 8, at 4.
81. GRANT, supra note 22, at 86.
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their stead. Most elders who need caregivers, including decision-makers, look to
their spouses and children to serve in those roles.82 However, LGBT elders are
single and live alone at twice the rate of non-LGBT elders.83 D\T[Cese realities
place older LGBT people at high risk of finding themselves without care when
tCeW need it.384 Further, the national transgender surveys found that relationships
were ended for 27 to 45 percent of transgender adults who came out to their
spouses or partners.85 The rate of relationship severance was considerably higher
for male-to-female transgender individuals, than for female-to-male.86 And,
significantly for purposes of this Article, those age 65 and older experienced
rejection due to being transgender at two times the rate of younger transgender
respondents.87
Additionally, as noted, a minority of transgender adults are parents. Further,
21 percent of USTS respondents and 30 percent of NTDS respondents reported
having been rejected by one or more of their children when they came out as
transgender.88 The number rejected rose for those who lived as their preferred
gender continuously and for those who had undergone medical treatment to aid
their transition.89 Twenty-one percent of USTS respondents who were parents
reported having been rejected by one or more of their children after coming out
to them.90 Compared to female-to-male transgender parents, male-to-female
transgender parents reported being rejected by their children significantly more
often.91
Yet, transgender elders are more likely than LGB adults to have children,92
and the National Transgender Discrimination Survey found that 70 percent of
respondents with children continued to have relationships with them after
coming out as transgender.93 Thus, in theory, this could mean that transgender
adults who are parentsFa minorityFwould potentially have a family member
willing to serve as a guardian or power of attorney. However, this would only
suffice if the child intended to be a transgender-affirming surrogate for their
*arentS and if tCe HCild Z,uld be tCe transgender *arent’s preference to serve in
82. Services & Advocacy for LGBT Elders (SAGE), Social Isolation (2018),
https://www.sageusa.org/your-rights-resources/social-isolation/ [https://perma.cc/YJW8-XAGD].
83. Id.
84. GRANT, supra note 22, at 87.
85. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 95.
86. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 95; see also, JAMES ET AL., supra note 19, at 67.
87. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 67.
88. Id. at 69; see also, GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 99.
89. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 99 (noting that 37 percent of those who lived as their preferred
gender all of the time reported being rejected, and 35 to 37 percent of those who had received medical
interventions to transition).
90. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 65.
91. Id. at 69; GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 99.
92. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 493.
93. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 88.
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that role. Nonetheless, it does lend some hope to an otherwise seemingly bleak
set of circumstances.
Further, identifying a suitable and willing surrogate decision-maker among
other family members may not be an option because 57 percent of NTDS
respondents and 44 percent of USTS respondents experienced family rejection
when they came out as transgender.94 D\T[ransgender indi'idualsS e'en .,re s,
than LGB individuals, face rejection from family and community members, who
therefore may n,t be a'ailable ,r a**r,*riate as Haregi'ers.395A report on LGBT
aging and health found that LGBT elders were much less likely to receive care
from a family member than their non-LGBT peers, with only 3 percent receiving
care from an adult child and only eight percent from another relative.96
Moreover, identifying an appropriate surrogate may be more difficult for
transgender persons of color, who tend to be more socially isolated.97 Consistent
with that finding, transgender persons of color, especially American Indian,
report higher rates of family rejection.98
Alternatively, for some transgender elders, an appropriate surrogate
decision-maker might be identified from among their social network, if no family
member was identified or preferred.99 But some studies have found that
transgender adults have limited social support, even lower than LGB adults who
do not identify as transgender.100 In contrast, another study found that they have
larger social networks in comparison.101 In an adaptive response to rejection by
biological family, close, family-like peer relationships are a common
phenomenon among LGBT adults. These relationships are referred to as
D\H[C,sen fa.iliesFsingle-generation cohorts of intimate friends and loved
onesF[and] have long provided LGBT people a foundation for surviving intense
societal neglect, stigmatization and abuse, thus supporting health and self-
aHtualiVati,n aHr,ss tCe lifes*an.3102 For example, one study found that 42
percent of LGBT caregivers care for friends, neighbors, or others who are not
members of their biological families.103 Another reported that 46 percent of
LGBT elders are caregivers to members of their biological families or families
94. Id. at 7; JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 70.
95. Inst. of Med., supra note 77 at 267.
96. FREDRIKSEN-GOLDSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 45-47.
97. GRANT, supra note 22, at 92 (DExtrapolating from studies on poverty in the general population,
it is likely that the risk of social isolation may be particularly high for . . . LGBT elders of color . . . .3).
98. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 94. See also, JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, at 76.
99. FREDRIKSEN-GOLDSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 48 (D[A]mong LGBT older adults, friends play
a much greater role in caregiving.3).
100. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 494.
101. Elena A. Erosheva et al., Social Networks of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Older
Adults, 38 RESEARCH ONAGING 98, 114-15 (2016).
102. GRANT, supra note 22, at 31.
103. Id. at 87. Although the study reported that research on caregiving by transgender elders is
lacking. Id. at 89.
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of choice.104 Therefore, a chosen family member may be identified to serve as a
transgender-affirming surrogate decision-maker.105
B. Appointing an Agent for Decision-Making: Powers of Attorney
and a Guardian Preference
A majority of transgender people reportedly do not complete advance health
care directives and other estate planning, and do not have a power of attorney for
health care decisions.106 In a national report on LGBT aging, only 37 percent of
transgender elders had completed a durable power of attorney for health careF
a much lower rate than their LGB peers.107 Transgender elders should protect
their welfare and health by appointing a surrogate health care decision-maker
and nominating a preferred guardian prior to incapacity.108 Those actions would
prevent the imposition of a biased surrogate who could make potentially harmful
decisions, or fail to .aAe s,und ,nes. # transgender ad',Hate’s guide f,r
advance planning goes further, by recommending specific language to be
inHluded in a transgender indi'idual’s CealtC Hare *,Zer ,f att,rneW.109 The
suggested language grants the agent the authority to instruct health care providers
t, C,n,r tCe transgender adult’s gender identitW and eX*ressi,n:
The Agent has the authority . . . to direct any healthcare provider,
medical staff, or other person to address me by my name and gender
pronouns of choice, and to preserve to the fullest extent possible an
appearance consistent with my gender identity.110
In addition, advance health care directives, which instruct medical providers
,n tCe *rinHi*al’s .ediHal treat.ent *referenHesS Han be Zritten t, inHlude
language instructing that medical care shall include, for example, continued
cross-gender hormone therapy (as long as it is not medically contraindicated due
104. MARJORIEH.CANTOR, MARKBRENNAN, &R.ANDREWSHIPPY, NATIONALGAYANDLESBIAN
TASK FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE, CAREGIVING AMONG OLDER LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDERNEWYORKERS 2 (2004) (on file with author).
105. See Knauer, supra note 6, at 20. Knauer argues that guardian preference provisions in adult
guardianship laws Dshould include non-marital partners regardless of gender and provide a mechanism
for the recognition of chosen family.3
106. Karen Fredriksen-Goldsen, Informal Caregiving in the LGBT Communities, in GAY, LESBIAN,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDERAGING: CHALLENGES IN RESEARCH, PRACTICE AND POLICY (2011).
107. FREDRIKSEN-GOLDSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 39 (The majority of LGBT respondents who
had not completed a durable power of attorney for health care reported that Dthey do know someone that
they would be comfortable with acting in this role.3)
108. Durable powers of attorney for health care remain valid when the principal (the person who
appointed the agent) becomes incapacitated. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-2(B) (West 1995).
109. Corey Prachniak, Creating End-of-Life Documents for Trans Individuals: An Advocate’s Guide,
NAT’L RES. CTR. ON LGBTAGING&WHITMAN-WALKERHEALTH (2014), https://www.lgbtagingcenter.
org/resources/pdfs/End-of-Life%20PlanningArticle.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXZ3-4MYQ].
110. Id. at 2.
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t, CealtC H,nditi,ns ,r statusT. #dditi,nallWS tCe transgender ad',Hate’s guide
suggests the following language:
During any period of treatment, if I am unable to personally maintain
my [preferred gender] appearance, I direct [my physician and all
medical personnel] to do so to the extent reasonably possible,
irrespective of whether I have obtained a court-ordered name change,
changed my gender [marker] on any identification document, or
undergone any transition-related medical treatment.111
Durable powers of attorney for health care should also be used to nominate
the person a transgender elder would choose to serve as their guardian112 should
the elder become legally incapacitatedFi.e., determined by a court to be unable
to manage her or his personal and financial affairs.113 However, completing
durable powers of attorney for health care and property obviates the need, in
many cases, for a guardianship because a surrogate can act for the principal
without court appointment.114 Powers of attorney are also considered less
restrictive alternatives to guardianship, because voluntarily granting another
decision-.aAing autC,ritW d,es n,t e)uate t, a H,urt’s in',luntarW re.,'al ,f a
*ers,n’s self-determination and fundamental civil liberties. Further, powers of
attorney restrict the authority of the surrogate to powers specifically granted in
the document.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Many advance directive forms include a provision designating who the principal wants to have
appointed as their guardian if circumstances require one. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-4, 5 (West
2015). See also Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Introduction, 2012 UTAHL. REV. 1157, 1191 (D[A] guardian
means a Dperson or entity appointed by a court with the authority to make some or all personal decisions
on behalf of an individual the court determines lacks capacity to make such decisions.3).
113. Statutory definitions of incapacity vary by state, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-
102(5) (West 2016) (D2Incapacitated person’ means an individual other than a minor, who is unable to
effectively receive or evaluate information or both or make or communicate decisions to such an extent
that the individual lacks the ability to satisfy essential requirements for physical health, safety, or self-
care, even with appropriate and reasonably available technological assistance.3); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 12,
§ 3901(a)(2) (West 2014) (D[I]n the case where a guardian of the person is sought, such person is in danger
of substantially endangering person’s own health, or of becoming subject to abuse by other persons or of
becoming the victim of designing persons3).
114. But the scope of authority of powers of attorney do not include decisions regarding custody,
placement or residenceFauthority that may be needed if the incapacitated elder has to be moved, and is
unable to make or communicate an informed, safe and responsible choice of where to reside, including an
institutional setting.
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C. Statutory Standards of Health Care Decision-Making for Agents
DNealtC Hare agents . . . aHt as an eXtensi,n ,f tCat indi'idual’s ',iHe.3115
This ethical surrogate decision-.aAing standard ensures tCat an indi'idual’s
wishes, self-determination, and autonomy are preserved and protected. State
laZs tCat are *r,teHti'e ,f an indi'idual’s ZisCes and aut,n,.W re)uire a health
care agent to make decisions for the individual, called the principal, based on the
decision the principal would have made had she retained capacity; or, for
ad'anHe CealtC Hare direHti'esS based ,n tCe *rinHi*al’s Zritten instruHti,ns.116
For exampleS DAn agent shall make a health-care decision in accordance with the
*rinHi*al’s indi'idual instruHti,nsS if anWS and ,tCer ZisCes t, tCe eXtent An,Zn
to the agent.31177nlW ZCen tCe *rinHi*al’sZisCes are n,t An,Zn sC,uld an agent
make decisions according t, tCe agent’s subBeHti'e assess.ent ,f tCe *rinHi*al’s
best interests. And ethics require that the agent base a best interests evaluation
,n tCe 'alues ,f tCe *rinHi*al tCeW ser'eS n,t ,n tCe agent’s 'alues. PinallWS tCe
agent should be required to follow tCe *rinHi*al’s 'alues in deter.ining tCeir best
interestsS ratCer tCan.erelW DH,nsider3 tCe. as all,Zed bW states tCat re)uire tCe
agent t, ,nlW H,nte.*late tCe *rinHi*al’s 'alues.118
I,rtC _aA,ta’s statut,rW ,*ti,nal CealtC Hare direHti'e f,r. is ideal for a
transgender person to educate their agent about their concerns regarding health
care, and to state their transgender-affirming preferences regarding health care
decisions made for them by their agent.119 In the section of the form in which the
principal gives the agent instructions for health care, there is a section titled,
DTCese are .W beliefs and 'alues ab,ut \CealtC Hare[.3120 It begins with this
state.ent: DIZant W,u t, An,Z tCese tCings ab,ut.e t, help you make decisions
ab,ut .W CealtC HareS3 tCen inHludes s*aHe t, Zrite DMW g,als f,r .W CealtC
Hare3 and DMW fears ab,ut .W CealtC Hare.3121
Conversely, an advance directive statute that is not protective of a
transgender *ers,n’sZisCes regarding.aintaining their gender expression (such
as through continued cross-gender C,r.,ne tCera*WT *r,'ides: D\I[f tCe
115. A.B.A. COMM’N ON L. &AGING, HEATHCARE-DECISION-MAKINGAUTHORITY: WHAT IS THE
DECISION-MAKING STANDARD? 1 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
law_aging/What_is_the_Decision_Making_Standard.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/772G-A4JG].
116. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-61(f) (West 1991) (D[T]he health care representative shall
seek to make the health care decision the patient would have made had he possessed decision making
capacity under the circumstances . . . .3); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-2(E) (West 2016).
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-2(E) (West 2016).
118. See, e.g., id. (DOtherwise, the agent shall make the decision in accordance with the agent’s
determination of the principal’s best interest. In determining the principal’s best interest, the agent shall
consider the principal’s personal values to the extent known to the agent.3) (emphasis added). See also
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4684 (West 2000). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-61(f) (West 1991) (not requiring
the consideration of the principal’s values in a best interests decision-making determination).
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-17 (West 2017).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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*rinHi*al’s ZisCes are unAn,ZnS \tCe agent sCall .aAe CealtC Hare deHisi,ns[ in
accordance with the agent’s . . . assess.ent ,f tCe *rinHi*al’s best interests and
in accordance with accepted medical practice.3122 If an agent is uncomfortable
with and biased against transgender identity and expression, then their subjective
Dassess.ent3 ,f tCe *rinHi*al’s best interests .aW n,t be transgender-affirming
healtC Hare. P,r transgender *ers,ns ZC, d, n,t H,nf,r. t, s,HietW’s n,r.sS a
socially subjective standard of best interests is rife with the risk that what is best
f,r tCat *ers,n is t, H,nf,r..#ndS .,st H,nHerningS DaHHe*ted.ediHal *raHtiHe3
and providers are often biased against trans-affirmative treatment.
Statutory language that also risks exposing a transgender elder who is
incapacitated to negligence by not maintaining their gender identity includes a
Miss,uri statute tCat reads: D#n att,rneW in faHt who elects to act under a power
of attorney is under a duty to act in the interest ,f tCe *rinHi*al.3123 That language
does not require the agent to follow the wishes and values of the transgender
*rinHi*al regarding tCe *rinHi*al’s CealtC Hare. 4atCerS tCe agent’s subBeHti'e
assess.ent ,f tCe Dinterest3 ,f tCe *rinHi*al ,r tCe.ediHal *r,'ider’s assess.ent
of that interest could easily result in a failure to obtain or provide transgender
affirmative medical care.
The above nonprotective statutory language illustrates the importance of a
transgender adult carefully choosing a trans-affirmative health care agent to
represent them. Further, written instructions to an agent to make transgender-
affirming health care decisions are the best way to protect a transgender *ers,n’s
CealtC Hare needs. /e *laHe eXHessi'e and danger,us relianHe ,n an agent’s
ability and willingness to advocate for a transgender elder in a health care system
often biased against transgender persons by not requiring an agent to make
decisions based ,n tCe *rinHi*al’s ZisCes. #ls, danger,us is re)uiring tCe agent
t, .erelW H,nsider tCat *ers,n’s 'aluesS ZCile.aAing subBeHti'e deHisi,ns based
on a best interests assessment. Similarly, if the agent is required to merely
H,nsider tCat *ers,n’s values while making subjective decisions based on a best
interests assessment, then there is no actual protection of or deference to the
transgender indi'idual’s *referenHesS and tCe agent is free t, substitute tCeir
values when making decisions.
III. PROTECTIVE LEGALMEASURESUPON INCAPACITY
This Part first provides a brief overview of a typical adult incapacity
guardianship proceeding. Second, I describe the complexity and necessity of
identifying a suitable guardian for a transgender elder who is incapacitated, and
who did not nominate a guardian prior to incapacity. I propose measures courts
122. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:6 (West 2015) (emphasis added).
123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 404.714(1) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
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can take to identify and appoint a transgender-affirming guardian. Third, I
recommend ways courts can monitor the decisions made by the guardian on the
transgender elder’s beCalf t, *r,teHt tCe elder’s Zell-being. Finally, I identify
contexts that require zealous advocacy by guardians to protect the transgender
individuals they serve.
A. Brief Overview of an Adult Guardianship Proceeding
A guardianship involves a court re.,'ing an inHa*aHitated *ers,n’s
fundamental civil rights to make their own decisions, such as medical treatment,
and to manage their personal and, in some instances, their financial affairs. The
indi'idual’s rigCts are transferred t, a tCird *artWS Halled a guardian. Because an
indi'idual’s essential aut,n,.W is in',l'edS H,nsiderable due *r,Hess *r,teHti,n
is most often required throughout the proceeding. The due process required
'aries fr,. state t, state based ,n eaHC state’s adult guardiansCi* laZs, which
are often found in the probate code. The protections typically include a clear and
convincing standard of proof, a hearing, notice to the allegedly incapacitated
person of the proceeding and the hearing, the right to a jury trial, representation
of the individual by counsel, the right to attend all hearings, to examine
ZitnessesS *resent e'idenHeS and t, a**eal tCe H,urt’s adBudiHati,n ,f inHa*aHitW.
The procedure begins with the filing of a petition or similar pleading,
typically by the person seeking to be appointed as guardian, requesting the
appointment and stating the nature and degree of the incapacity necessitating a
guardianship.124 An evaluation of capacity by a qualified professional is often
required to be submitted to the court to inform it of the allegedly incapacitated
*ers,n’s funHti,ningS abilitiesS and i.*air.ents.125 TCe state’s laZs.aW *r,'ide
for the appointment of a court investigator, usually called a court visitor, whose
duties might include interviewing the proposed guardian and the allegedly
incapacitated individual, reporting to the court on the allegedly incapacitated
*ers,n’s needsS and .aAing a reH,..endati,n regarding tCe suitabilitW ,f tCe
proposed guardian.126 At the hearing, the court considers the evidence to
determine whether the individual is incapacitated, and, in a majority of states,
the individual is represented by counsel.127 If the court finds that the individual
is incapacitated to some or to a full extent, it will appoint a guardian. The court
124. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303(A) (2018). See generally A.B.A. COMM’N ONLAWAND
AGING, CAPACITY DEFINITION & INITIATION OF GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/chartcapacityandinitiation.auth
checkdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7TR-NV4X].
125. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303(D) (2018).
126. Id. at (E). See generally, A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, REPRESENTATION AND
INVESTIGATION INGUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/law_aging/chartrepresentationandinvestigation.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/725X
-KHKK].
127. See generally id.
2018] Safeguarding Vulnerable Transgender Elders 391
.aW li.it tCe guardian’s autC,ritWS if it deter.ines tCat tCe indi'idual is Ha*able
of exercising some rights, guided by the principle that the guardianship should
be the least restrictive measure available and to ensure the individual as much
autonomy as is safely possible.128
B. Identifying an Allegedly Incapacitated Person as Transgender
If a transgender individual in a guardianship proceeding has lived openly as
transgender, that person can be identified to the court as transgender at the start
of the process through the initial court pleading which contains identifying
information.129 Alternatively, the disclosure may occur during the process by the
transgender indi'idual’s ',luntarW disHl,sureS gender eX*ressi,nS or through
investigation by their counsel or a court investigator.
TCe H,urt and tCe H,unsel’s abilitW t, learn ,f tCe indi'idual’s gender
identitW .aW be H,.*liHated ,n se'eral fr,nts. PirstS tCis generati,n’s
transgender elders grew up during a time that, due to social stigma and the risk
of hostility and a lack of acceptance, they were likely to hide their identities.130
Second, many elders do not identify or label themselves as transgender even after
they transition.131 But they still have the same needs as those who do identify as
transgender for trans-affir.ati'e treat.ent and .ediHal Hare. TCirdS Din tCe Hase
of dementia, people progressively lose their most recent memories. For a
transgender person this could mean only remembering living in another gender,
including not remembering having had gender affirmation procedures or
surgerW.3132 Fourth, courts and attorneys are not likely to ask about or investigate
an allegedlW inHa*aHitated elder’s gender identitW beHause tCeW assu.e tCat
people conform to societal norms regarding gender identity. And the courts and
att,rneWs .aW be biased against n,nH,nf,r.ing gender identities. DM,st
transgender people have previously experienced misunderstanding or hostility
fr,. . . . tCe legal sWste..3133 The NTDS confirmed this disconcerting trend:
D@?- \,f res*,ndents Zere[ denied e)ual treat.ent ,r Carassed ,r disres*eHted
bW Budges ,r H,urt ,ffiHials.3134 Eight percent were denied equal treatment by
128. See generally A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, CONDUCT AND FINDINGS OF
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin
istrative/law_aging/chartconduct.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZRT-7QHB]. See also generally
A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND PROPERTY (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/chartlimitedguardianshipofthep
resonandproperty.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TX2-WJ8J].
129. Such as through information gathered and presented in the petition for the appointment of a
guardian, the initial pleading that begins the guardianship proceeding.
130. Nancy Knauer, “(en Silent”: Advocating for L(BT *lders, 19 ELDER L.J. 289, 291 (2012).
131. WITTEN&EYLER, supra note 64, at 200.
132. Id.
133. See Catherine Sakimura & Daniel Redman, A Great Unmet Need: Legal Aid Services for Low-
Income Transgender Clients, 26 MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J. 29, 31 (2012).
134. GRANT ET AL., supra note 31, at 5.
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legal services clinics and six percent were harassed or disrespected.135 DIn tCe
area of judges, courts, and legal services clinics, [male-to-female transgender
respondents] reported consistently higher rates of mistreatment than [female-to-
.ale transgender[ res*,ndents.3136 Considering the link between a transgender
indi'idual’s Zelfare and stigma free environments,137 it is critical that courts are
a safe, unbiased environment for a person to reveal themselves, or to be known,
as transgender. Fear-based H,nHeal.ent affeHts transgender *ers,ns’ e.,ti,nal
and mental healthFalready likely compromised by incapacity.
Therefore, as Knauer notes, it is essential to educate adult guardianship
courts about nonconforming gender identities.138 Those courts could then serve
a crucial protective role by requiring that the counsel and court visitor inquire
int, a *ers,n faHing guardiansCi*’s gender identitW. If H,unsel ,r tCe H,urt 'isit,r
learns tCat tCe *ers,n is transgenderS tCe H,urt.ust tCen ensure tCat tCe *ers,n’s
best interests are served by appointing a suitable guardian.
C. Appointing a Transgender-Affirming Guardian
As is true with health care agents and care providers, a transgender-affirming
guardian is essential to the health and well-being of transgender elders who are
inHa*aHitated. D\Transgender[ *e,*le ZC, reHei'e s,Hial su**,rt about their
gender identity and gender expression have improved [psychological and health]
,utH,.es and )ualitW ,f life.3139 #s illustrated tCr,ugC Oe,rge’s st,rW at tCe
beginning of this Article, such support is potentially lifesaving.140
If a transgender elder who becomes incapacitated has not expressed in
writing a preference regarding who would serve as their guardian, then a court is
left to identify and appoint one. State laws typically prioritize family members
to serve as guardians, but many also grant tCe H,urt disHreti,n t, aHt in a *ers,n’s
best interests in selecting a guardian.141 Because acceptance rather than
stigmatization of transgender individuals is crucial to their health and emotional
135. Id.
136. Id. at 133.
137. Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., supra note 7, at 497 (D[B]oth discrimination from health care
providers and internalized stigma can exacerbate chronic stress . . . . Stigma reduction strategies for health
care professionals and improved education about gender identity and aging are essential to reduce stigma
and discrimination in health care setting for transgender older adults . . . . [C]reating environments
whereby transgender older adults do not possess stigmatized identities and do not feel the need to conceal
their gender identity is critically important.3).
138. Knauer, supra note 19, at 312.
139. Guidelines for Psychological Practice, supra note 56, at 846.
140. See also Knauer, supra note 6, at 14 (DAs Dr. Melinda Lantz, chief of geriatric psychiatry at
Beth Israel Medical Center in New York explains, closeted older LGBT people face 2a faster pathway to
depression, failure to thrive and even premature death.’3).
141. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-311(B)-(C) (West 2018).
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welfare,142 courts must take steps to ensure that they appoint transgender-
affirming guardians.
One way to accomplish this is for statutes to require representation by
counsel for allegedly incapacitated adultsFespecially those, like transgender
adults, who are among the most marginalized and vulnerable populations
because of their nonconformance to societal norms. A majority of states, thirty-
eight, mandate by statute that an allegedly incapacitated adult is entitled to
counsel in guardianship proceedings.143 That counsel serves in one of two
different lawyer roles. One role is as a standard zealous advocateFthe role
laZWers tW*iHallW assu.eZCen re*resenting tCeir Hlient’s *,siti,n and defending
their rights.144 The other role is as a guardian ad litem,145 whose duties may
include *resenting tCeir Hlient’s *,siti,n ,n guardianship and preferences to the
court,146 re*,rting t, tCe H,urt ,n tCe Hlient’s best interestsS147 advocating for
tCeir Hlient’s best interests,148 and informing the client about their rights and
explaining the proceeding.149
Some statutes allow the allegedly incapacitated adult to have both a zealous
advocate and a court appointed guardian ad litem.150 Because transgender elders
face potential stigmatization and bias from the courts and have a potentially
higher risk of an allegation, if not a finding, of incapacity, a zealous advocate is
necessary. Moreover, I suggest that before a court appoints a guardian ad litem,
if an alleged incapacitated individual is known to be transgender, or is revealed
as such during the proceeding, the court needs to inquire into the proposed
H,unsel’s attitude t,Zards transgender *ers,nsS t, ensure tCat att,rneW is n,t
biased towards those individuals. And that the attorney must educate themselves
about how to effectively engage with and represent their transgender clientFa
requirement for competent representation.151
142. See, e.g., Guidelines for Psychological Practice, supra note 56, at 835 (DRespecting and
supporting TGNC people in authentically articulating their gender identity and gender expression, as well
as their lived experience, can improve TGNC people’s health, well-being, and quality of life.3). See also
Knauer, supra note 6, at 14.
143. A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW ANDAGING, supra note 115.
144. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. 13.26.246 (West 2018); D.C. CODE ANN. 21-2033(b) (West
2018).
145. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-1-201(A)(22) (West 2012) (defining a guardian ad litem as Da
person appointed by the district court to represent and protect the interests of a minor or an incapacitated
person in connection with litigation or any other court proceeding.3).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35A-1107 (West 2003).
147. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-10(a) (West 2018); TENN. CODE ANN. 34-1-107(d)(1)
(West 2018) (DThe guardian ad litem owes a duty to the court to impartially investigate the facts and make
a report and recommendations to the court. The guardian ad litem serves as an agent of the court, and is
not an advocate for the respondent or any other party.3).
148. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2619(b) (West 2013).
149. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-10(a) (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.5305(1) (West 2018); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-7(c) (West 2017).
150. A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW ANDAGING, supra note 115.
151. Cynthia M. Ward & Nelson P. Miller, The Role of Law Schools in Shaping Culturally
Competent Lawyers, 89 MICH. B. J. @;S @; U?Q@QT UD/itC an inHreasinglW di'erse *,tential Hlient baseS
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In guardianship proceedings, a court visitor, investigator, or court
representative are other potential sources for informing an allegedly
incapacitated person about the proceeding. The court visitor is also a conduit to
the court for that person to express their preferences, including who they wish to
serve as their guardian. However, only 14 states require the appointment of a
court visitor or similar appointee.152 It is critical that states require a thorough
in'estigati,n ,f tCe allegedlW inHa*aHitated indi'idual’s identitW and
corresponding needs either by a court visitor or a guardian ad litem. An inquiry
that includes interviewing friends and family and reviewing medical records may
be the only way to identify the gender identity of an alleged incapacitated
individual.
S,.e states’ adult guardiansCi* laZs inHlude a state.ent ,f tCe statute’s
purpose. For example, some assert that the purpose is Dt, *r,.,te and t, *r,teHt
the well-being ,f tCe *ers,n3 f,r ZC,. guardiansCi* a**lies.153 It is antithetical
to that purpose to appoint an anti-transgender biased guardian for a transgender
person. To accomplish the statute’s *ur*,seS a H,urt .ust in)uire int, ZCetCer
tCe *r,*,sed guardian Z,uld *r,.,te and *r,teHt tCe transgender elder’s gender
identity, and, thus, well-being. However, such an inquiry is not required by
enough states. By contrast, a state may require merely that the guardian agrees
to serve154 ,r is DeligibleS3155 hardly a standard that ensures a transgender
*ers,n’s Zell-being and best interests.
Some statutes, at least according to their language if not in practice, require
or appear to require the court to vet tCe guardian’s Zillingness and intent t,
*r,teHt and *r,.,te tCe inHa*aHitated *ers,n’s Zell-being. Those statutes state
tCat tCe guardian sC,uld be DsuitableS3156 D)ualifiedS3157 ,r Da**r,*riate3158 to
serve in that role. An anti-transgender biased and non-affirming guardian would
be inherently unsuitable, unqualified, and inappropriate to serve a transgender
person.
#ls,S an in'estigati,n int, a guardian’s suitabilitW sC,uld n,t be left t, tCe
H,urt’s disHreti,n tCr,ugC language .erelW suggesting tCat tCe H,urt may
lawyers cannot ignore cultural competency. Lawyers must provide competent legal services. Competent
service depends on understanding the clients whom laZWers ser'e.3T. See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 4. @.@ U@89>T Ure)uiring tCe *r,'isi,n ,f DH,.*etent3 legal ser'iHes t, HlientsT.
152. A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW ANDAGING, supra note 115.
153. See, e.g., MONT. CODEANN. §72-5-306 (West 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §464-A:1 (2018).
See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-301.1 (West 1989) (stating when guardianship is to be used).
154. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:10 (2009).
155. See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1101.101(a)(2)(B) (West 2015). However, Texas statute
requires the court to consider the best interests of the person for whom guardianship is necessary, which
should result in an inquiry into the suitability of the proposed guardian. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §
1101.101(a)(1)(B) (West 2015).
156. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-304(C)(5) (West 2009). See alsoWASH. REV. CODEANN. §
11.88.020(1), (1)(f) (West 2011).
157. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-310(H)(3) (West 2014).
158. See, e.g., TENN. CODEANN. § 34-1-107(d)(2)(D) (West 2013) (requiring the guardian ad litem
to determine whether the proposed guardian is Dappropriate3 to be appointed.).
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consider it. Instead, there must be a procedural provision requiring that inquiry.
E'idenHe ,f a guardian’s suitabilitW sC,uld be a re)uired finding bW tCe H,urt at
the hearing on the appointment of the guardian. A finding establishes that
evidence must be presented and assessed, and a critical burden of proof met.
Typically, the evidentiary standard in guardianship proceedings is clear and
convincing.159 That standard already pertains to required findings by the court
that a person is indeed incapacitated, and that a guardianship is necessary. Under
IeZ MeXiH,’s adult guardiansCi* statuteS f,r eXa.*leS tCe H,urt is re)uired t,
find that the proposed guardian is both qualified and suitable.160 Because no less
than the physical, emotional, and mental health of a transgender individual is at
stake, the court should be required by law, through a finding, to appoint a
transgender-affirming guardian.
If their role is investigative, a guardian ad litem or a court visitor may be in
the best position to inquire into and make a recommendation to the court
regarding a *r,*,sed guardian’s suitabilitW. S,.e states d, re)uire suHC an
investigation and recommendation by one or both of those court appointees.161
However, most states do not provide for such appointees. Therefore, the burden
falls ,n tCe H,urt ,r tCe allegedlW inHa*aHitated *ers,n’s H,unsel t, H,nduHt a
sufficient inquiry. Guardianship law reform efforts should press legislatures to
ad,*t a re)uired finding regarding a *r,*,sed guardian’s suitabilitWS if n,t
alreadW .andated bW tCe state’s laZs. #rAansas’ guardiansCi* statute is an
eXa.*le ,f eX*resslW re)uiring *r,,f ,f a guardian’s suitabilitWS stating tCat
bef,re a H,urt a**,ints a guardian it D.ust be satisfied tCatS3 a.,ng ,tCer tCingsS
DtCe *ers,n t, be a**,inted guardian is )ualified and suitable t, aHt as suHC.3162
E'idenHe ,f suitabilitW sC,uld inHlude tCe *r,*,sed guardian’s Zillingness
and intent to (1) learn about transgender identity, needs, vulnerabilities,
including the harmful effects of stigma and increased risk of suicide attempts;
(2) make gender identity-affirming decisions on behalf of the person under
guardianship, such as obtaining transgender-specific health and mental health
Hare% U>T su**,rt and enable tCe .aintenanHe ,f tCe *ers,n’s gender expression,
such as by providing gender-congruent clothing and enabling access to gender-
affirming grooming services; and (4) educate and advocate for transgender-
affir.ing Hare bW .ediHal and instituti,nal *r,'iders. TCe H,urt’s in)uirW int,
whether the proposed guardian is suitable to serve must include whether the
guardian intends to advocate for their well-being, including the ongoing
maintenance of their gender identity and expression.
159. A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW ANDAGING, supra note 115.
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-304(C)(5) (West 2009).
161. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. §§ 15-5-315(1)-(2); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2619.03(4); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303(E); N.D. CENT. CODEANN. § 30.1-28-03(6)(i)(2).
162. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-210(3) (West 2018). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. 1§ 45-5-304(C)(5)
(West 2009) (findings required by the court to appoint a guardian include that Dthe proposed guardian is
both qualified and suitable.3).
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If a court finds that the guardian does not intend to defend the person under
guardiansCi*’s gender identitW and .eet tCeir H,rres*,nding needsS tCen tCe
appointment should be denied and an alternative guardian must be identified and
appointed.163 Regardless, but especially if no suitable alternative guardian is
available, through its order appointing the guardian 164 the court should include
language requiring the guardian to educate themselves about transgender
identity, needs, and vulnerabilities.165 The court should also order the guardian
to make transgender-affirming decisions, such as transgender-specific health
care decisions. The guardian can refer to the World Professional Association for
Transgender Health standards of care,166 and identify transgender-safe and -
affirming health care providers (such as through a local transgender advocacy
gr,u*’s referral listsT. If an instituti,nal *laHe.ent is neHessarWS tCe guardian
must determine that any proposed institution is transgender safe and affirming
before placement. Alternatively, the guardian must advocate for staff and
providers to be trained in culturally responsive transgender care.
D. Ongoing Monitoring of the Guardianship by the Court
Guardianship procedure reform efforts emphasize the need for courts to
continually monitor the welfare of the person under guardianship and the actions
,f tCe guardian. DTCe H,urt sC,uld .,nit,r tCe Zell-being of the person . . . on
an ongoing basis, including, but not limited to: . . . ensuring the well-being of the
person . . . improving the performance of the guardian, and enforcing the terms
,f tCe guardiansCi* ,rder.3167 A majority of state laws require a guardian to
complete and file an annual report with the court, which maintains supervisory
jurisdiction over adult guardianship cases.168 The reports typically require the
guardian to describe the health status and welfare of the person under
163. Most state statutes have a provision prioritizing those who can be appointed as a guardian,
including those closely related by blood or marriage. However, such statutes typically allow the court the
discretion to appoint someone with a lesser priority based on various factors, including the allegedly
incapacitated person’s best interests. See e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-309(b) (West 2010); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 72-5-312(3) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2627(c) (West 2015). Nancy Knauer has
described well the LGBT-specific concerns regarding statutory provisions prioritizing who is eligible to
be appointed as guardian. Knauer, supra note 19, at 300; 308-309.
164. Hurme & Wood, supra note 112, at 1200 (D[T]he court should issue orders that . . . maximize
the person’s right to self-determination and autonomy.3 However, courts should go further, and issue
orders that maximize the person’s right to have their identity and dignity defended.).
165. Id. (D[T]he court . . . should ensure that guardians, court and court staff, evaluators, and others
involved in the guardianship process receive sufficient ongoing, multifaceted education to achieve the
highest quality of guardianship possible.3).
166. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 1.
167. Hurme & Wood, supra note 112, at 1200.
168. A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, MONITORING FOLLOWING GUARDIANSHIP
PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/
chartmonitoring.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9RC-HUR7]. See also CAL. PROB. CODE §§
1850(a)(1)-(2) (West 2011) (going further by requiring a direct court review six months after a guardian’s
appointment and annually thereafter.).
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guardianship and major decisions, such as medical and placement, made on their
behalf. The reports are intended to allow the court to monitor the welfare of the
person under guardianship.
Statutes sC,uld g, furtCer t, *r,teHt an inHa*aHitated indi'idual’s self-
determination and known preferences by requiring that the reports to the court
include occurrences when the guardian has, for example, accessed transgender-
specific health care on the inHa*aHitated *ers,n’s beCalf. 6,ssible additi,ns .aW
include a sworn statement that the guardian made decisions, when possible,
aHH,rding t, tCe *ers,n’s An,Zn *referenHes and in a gender-identity-affirming
manner. The guardian could also be required to alert the court if the guardian
encounters barriers, such as the denial of services, to transgender-specific,
affirming health care or respectful institutional care. The court could then, for
example, appoint a guardian ad litem to advocate for the person under
guardianship.
Notably, Florida recently passed legislation that includes a provision
suspending the decision-making authority of an agent appointed by an adult prior
to incapacity through a power of attorney if it is proved during the guardianship
pr,Heeding tCat D\t[Ce agent’s deHisi,ns are n,t in aHH,rd ZitC tCe alleged
inHa*aHitated *ers,n’s An,Zn desires.3169 Similar statutory provisions should be
enaHted t, *r,'ide f,r tCe sus*ensi,n ,f an a**,inted guardian’s autC,ritW u*,n
a finding that the guardian has not made transgender-affirming decisions in
aHH,rdZitC tCe *ers,n under guardiansCi*’s An,Zn *referenHes. TCe H,urt H,uld
then either remove the guardian and transfer the guardianship to another person
or hold the guardian accountable to make decisions that conform to the
transgender *ers,n’s *referenHesS suHC as tCr,ugC a detailed H,urt ,rder ,r bW
setting ,ng,ing status Cearings t, .,nit,r tCe guardian’s conduct.
E. Advocacy by the Guardian
As discussed above, anti-transgender bias by medical and institutional
providers requires that the guardian be a zealous advocate for the transgender
person who is incapacitatedFand so is presumably unable to advocate
ade)uatelW f,r tCe.sel'es. TCe guardian sC,uld be aZare tCat DJO"T ,lder
adults who came of age before the gay liberation movement of the 1970s have
lived largely in the context of extremely hostile social, medical and mental health
systems, making self-advocacy within aging services agencies or institutional
settings overwhelmingly difficult for .anW ,f tCese elders.3170 However, the
guardian .ust als, res*eHt and *r,teHt a transgender *ers,n’s ZisC f,r *ri'aHWS
169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3203 (West 2015).
170. GRANT, supra note 22, at 16.
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if eX*ressed ,r An,ZnS and n,t D,ut3 tCe. regarding tCeir gender identitW unless
it is necessary for their health and welfare.
Under the standards of practice required of guardians by the National
OuardiansCi* #ss,Hiati,nS guardians .ust DidentifW and ad',Hate f,r tCe
*ers,n’s g,alsS needsS and *referenHes.3171 Transgender incapacitated adults
have ongoing health care needs. For example as noted, discontinuing hormone
treatment can be harmful to the health of those who have taken hormones long
term.172 M,re,'erS D\H[,llab,rati,n aHr,ss disHi*lines Han be HruHial ZCen
working with [transgender and gender nonconforming] people because of the
potential interplay of biological, psychological, and social factors in diagnosis
and treat.ent.3173 Accordingly, a guardian should advocate for and coordinate
trans-affirmative care across disciplines to best meet the person under
guardiansCi*’s needs.
Because a majority of transgender people have to teach their medical
providers about transgender-specific care, the guardian must first educate
themselves in order to educate the providers about those needs. Next, because
transgender individuals are at risk of being refused care and many have
experienced discrimination by care providers, guardians must advocate for
access to treatment, and for respectful and nondiscriminatory care by providers.
That means, for example, attending all medical appointments and regularly
monitoring the care by institutional providers, such as by participating in
treat.ent tea. .eetings and re'ieZing tCe instituti,n’s reH,rds ,n tCe resident.
Further, to address the fears of transgender adults when contemplating
institutionalization, state laws dictating the duties of a court-appointed guardian
should include a provision like the progressive and protective measure recently
*assed in Pl,rida ZCiHC re)uires a guardian t, D\a[d',Hate ,n beCalf ,f tCe Zard
in institutional and other residential settings ....3174 That advocacy should include
that institutional staff be trained regarding knowledge and understanding of
transgender persons and caring for them effectively.175 Guardians must exhibit
heightened scrutiny and protectiveness when serving transgender persons of
171. NAT’L GUARDIANSHIP ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 7 (4th ed. 2013), https://www.guard
ianship.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/NGA-Standards-with-Summit-Revisions-2017.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/9GE6-YW8M].
172. INST. OFMED., supra note 77, at 265.
173. Guidelines for Psychological Practice, supra note 56, at 850 (internal citations omitted).
174. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.361(13)(i) (West 2015). Other states should follow Florida’s lead by
recognizing that guardians have a duty to advocate on behalf of their protected persons (including those
who are transgender) in institutional settings. Until more states enact similar advocacy measures,
transgender persons in those settings are at risk of harm due to bias.
175. Transgender advocacy groups and resource centers, such as the Transgender Resource Center
of New Mexico, offer free transgender cultural competency or literacy trainings to organizations and
groups and the Transgender Training Institute. Additionally, online trainings are available from various
national transgender advocacy organizations such as webinars by the Transgender Health, NAT’L LGBT
HEALTH CTR. (2018), https://www.lgbthealtheducation.org/topic/transgender-health/ [https://perma.cc/
XSM2-J776].
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color because they are most at risk of discrimination and mistreatment by
institutional care providers.
CONCLUSION
Transgender elders who are incapacitated are particularly vulnerable to harm
if a non-transgender-affirming guardian is appointed to make decisions for them.
Before the courts become involved, transgender individuals can take steps,
described in this Article, to protect themselves from an unsuitable surrogate. If a
court becomes involved, it can help to ensure that a transgender person is served
by a surrogate who will protect their health, welfare, and identity. Courts can,
therefore, address the realistic and profoundly disturbing concern of many aging
transgender individuals who fear becoming dependent and being denied dignity,
respect and, for some, losing the will to live.
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INTRODUCTION
In October of 2017, the HarveyWeinstein scandal precipitated a nationwide
awakening about sexual harassment and assault. At least 122 prominent men
were accused of sexual misconduct in the wake of the Weinstein allegations1—
often by large numbers of women.2 After actress Alyssa Milano posted a tweet
† Yale Law School, J.D., expected 2020; Cornell University, B.A., 2017. I would like to thank William
Eskridge for inspiring me to write about feminist theory in civil procedure. Many thanks also to Isabelle
Hanna, Celina Scott-Buëchler, and Jennifer Mosquera for reading early drafts of this Comment, and to
the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism editing team.
1. Those accused of sexual misconduct after Weinstein have ranged from prominent actors such as
Ben Affleck to former U.S. President George H.W. Bush. See Samantha Cooney,Here Are All the Public
Figures Who’ve Been Accused of Sexual Misconduct After Harvey Weinstein, TIME (Nov. 9, 2017),
http://time.com/5015204/harvey-weinstein-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/8V2V-GFRS]. For the original
report of the Weinstein allegations, see Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey,Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual
Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/
harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/MN8R-SEHM].
2. Bill Cosby was accused of sexual harassment and assault by sixty women. Carly Mallenbaum et
al., A Complete List of the 60 Bill Cosby Accusers and their Reactions to His Prison Sentence, USA
TODAY (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/04/27/bill-cosby-full-list-
accusers/555144002/ [https://perma.cc/J5AW-GT3B]. Harvey Weinstein was accused of sexual
harassment and assault by eighty-seven women. Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein
Scandal: A Complete List of the 87 Accusers, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-accusers/804663001/ [https://perma.cc/M6
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encouraging women who had been sexually harassed or assaulted to tweet
#MeToo,3 this movement acquired a name.4
The #MeToo movement has sparked widespread story-sharing on social
media, and (to some degree) has resulted in the firing or forced resignations of
powerful men in the entertainment industry and in politics.5 #MeToo has even
implicated the judiciary, as evidenced by the sexual harassment scandal that
preceded the resignation of former Ninth Circuit judge Alex Kozinski.6 The
#MeToo movement almost certainly increased the weight given to the sexual
assault allegations that arose during Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation.7
56-FQCR]. Larry Nassar is reported to have victimized at least 332 women. Rex Santus, Larry Nassar’s
332 Victims Are Getting $425 Million from Michigan State, VICE (May 16, 2018), https://news.vice.com/
en_us/article/9k8yap/larry-nassars-332-victims-are-getting-dollar425-million-from-michigan-state
[https://perma.cc/HS6N-JPB4]. Though most of these allegations have involved male sexual violence
against women, it is important to acknowledge that not all the survivors who have spoken out since the
rise of #MeToo are women. Kevin Spacey has been accused of sexual assault and other types of sexual
misconduct by fifteen men. Maria Puente, Kevin Spacey Scandal: A Complete List of the 15 Accusers,
USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/2017/11/07/kevin-spacey-scandal-
complete-list-13-accusers/835739001/ [https://perma.cc/RRU8-CFCZ].
3. While Milano sparked the use of #MeToo for this movement, the phrase was actually coined by
activist Tarana Burke in 2006. Morgan Greene, #MeToo’s Tarana Burke Tells Local Activists Movement
‘By Us and for Us’ Must Include Women of Color, CHI. TRI. (Oct. 11, 2018), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-tarana-burke-me-too-20181010-story.html [https://perma.cc/9A
FR-T4G5].
4. Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.
theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/ [https://perma.cc/E824
-FQ6J].
5. NBC host Matt Lauer was fired after allegations of “inappropriate sexual behavior in the
workplace.” David Usborne, The Peacock Patriarchy, ESQUIRE (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.esquire.com/
news-politics/a22627827/matt-lauer-nbc-me-too/ [https://perma.cc/Y9TK-9FLX]. Fox News let host Bill
O’Reilly go under similar circumstances. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly is Forced Out
at Fox News, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/business/media/bill-
oreilly-fox-news-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/JCW6-8RZF]. Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and Rep.
Blake Farenthold (R-TX) resigned after sexual harassment allegations against them surfaced. See Elana
Schor & Seung Min Kim, Franken Resigns, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
story/2017/12/07/franken-resigns-285957 [https://perma.cc/2UV4-BZ3Z]; Joe Tacopino, Congressman
Resigns After Using Taxpayer Funds to Settle Sex Harassment Suit, N.Y. POST (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://nypost.com/2018/04/06/congressman-resigns-after-using-taxpayer-funds-to-settle-sex-harassmen
t-suit/ [https://perma.cc/4M37-L62H].
6. Dan Berman & Laura Jarrett, Judge Alex Kozinski, Accused of Sexual Misconduct, Resigns, CNN
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/18/politics/alex-kozinski-resigns/index.html [https://per
ma.cc/T2MU-AAGZ]; Dahlia Lithwick,He Made us All Victims and Accomplices, SLATE (June 7, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/judge-alex-kozinski-made-us-all-victims-and-accomplices.
html [https://perma.cc/8QCS-XYTM].
7. The people who mobilized and spoke out against Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation largely
adopted the #MeToo framing, and news coverage of the confirmation battle reflected this. See, e.g.,
Emanuella Grinberg, What’s Next for #MeToo After Kavanaugh’s Confirmation, CNN (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/13/us/kavanaugh-whats-next-metoo/index.html [https://perma.cc/E5V5-
NCM4]; Celina Scott-Buechler, It’s Not Surprising that Beneath his Toxic Politics, Brett Kavanaugh is a
Toxic Man, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/celinascott
buechler/our-own-brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford [https://perma.cc/6TYB-XQ82]; Kate Zernike
& Emily Steel, Kavanaugh Battle Shows the Power, and the Limits, of #MeToo Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/us/politics/kavanaugh-blasey-metoo-supreme-
court.html [https://perma.cc/Q6EX-KUU7].
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However, only a few of the most prominent #MeToo cases—involving Larry
Nassar,8 Bill Cosby,9 and Harvey Weinstein10—have resulted in legal action.
These recent examples demonstrate the importance (and powerful impact)
of scores of women acting in numbers. They can also help contextualize a recent,
unsuccessful women-led movement—the class action brought by 1.5 million
female Wal-Mart11 employees that was denied certification in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes.12 Unsurprisingly, much of the literature on Dukes has focused on
evaluating the decision from a jurisprudential standpoint.13However,Dukes also
illustrates the normative implications of the American legal focus on
individualized (rather than collective) adjudication.
As Frances Olsen points out, classical liberal thought has tended to structure
thinking into seemingly opposing dichotomies, many of which are gendered:
“rational/irrational,” “objective/subjective,” and “principled/personalized” are
only a few.14One dichotomy that is particularly prominent in discussions of civil
procedure is the “individual/group” distinction: discussions of due process often
focus on individualizing trials in order to provide persons an opportunity to be
heard.15 In keeping with this traditional understanding, Justice Scalia’s majority
8. See Scott Cacciola & Victor Mather, Larry Nassar Sentencing: “I Just Signed Your Death
Warrant,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/sports/larry-nassar-
sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/JLG2-A4DX]; Matt Mencarini & Justin A. Hinkley, Michigan State
and 332 of Larry Nassar’s Victims Reach “Historic” $500 Million Settlement, LANSING STATE J. (May
16, 2018), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/05/16/larry-nassar-michigan-state
-settlement-lawsuit/614502002/ [https://perma.cc/4JUL-Z37R].
9. Eric Levenson & Aaron Cooper, Bill Cosby Sentenced to 3 to 10 Years in Prison for Sexual
Assault, CNN (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/25/us/bill-cosby-sentence-assault/index.
html [https://perma.cc/GYC3-JBUM].
10. Maria Puente,Harvey Weinstein Heads to Court on Sex-Crime Charges as Video Surfaces of him
Touching an Accuser, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2018/
09/12/weinstein-heads-court-video-surfaces-showing-him-touching-accuser/1285157002/ [https://perma.
cc/XN3G-WPRR]; Samantha Schmidt, Enabling Harvey Weinstein’s Sex Life was ‘Condition of
Employment,’ New York Attorney General Says in Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/02/12/new-york-attorney-general-sues-harvey-
weinstein-and-his-company-for-egregious-civil-rights-violations/ [https://perma.cc/D9BV-5GRW].
11. As of Feb. 1, 2018, Wal-Mart’s legal name has been changed to Walmart. Walmart Changes its
Legal Name to Reflect How Customers Want to Shop, WALMART (Dec. 6, 2017), https://news.walmart.
com/2017/12/05/walmart-changes-its-legal-name-to-reflect-how-customers-want-to-shop [https://perma.
cc/EXR5-6JFJ]. However, since Dukes uses Walmart’s former legal name, this Comment refers to
Walmart as “Wal-Mart” for the sake of clarity.
12. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Sherry E. Clegg, Employment Discrimination Class Actions: Why Plaintiffs Must Cover
all their Bases after the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) in
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1087, 1120 (2012); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 395, 477 (2011);
Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 174
(2012); Michael J. Zimmer,Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection out of Protected Cases, 16 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 409, 462 (2012).
14. Frances Olsen, Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective, in SOURCEBOOK
ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 342, 342 (Hilaire Barnett ed., 1997).
15. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976).
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opinion in Dukes described class actions as “‘an exception to the usual rule that
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”16
The “usual rule” of individualized adjudication, however, makes it much
more difficult for the American legal system to adequately evaluate claims of
widespread discrimination. When such claims arise from the behavior of
numerous bad actors operating within an institutional context, the adjudicative
focus on individuality tends to obscure how oppressive institutional dynamics
have made the discrimination possible. These dynamics often only become
evident when individual experiences are considered in the aggregate, in two key
ways. First, as the #MeToo movement shows, aggregation of claims results in
believability: one woman accusing a powerful man of sexual misconduct can be
easily dismissed, but hundreds of accusers are more difficult to ignore. Second,
aggregating claims can often demonstrate the institutional dimension of
discrimination, proving that discriminatory behavior is not due to a single bad
actor, but rather has been enabled by institutional structures that must be changed
to prevent the behavior from recurring.
A case brought by one individual against another, then, simply cannot carry
the “unique and powerful” symbolic importance of a class action.17 As the
feminist cry that “the personal is political”18 demonstrates, experiences that
appear singular are often manifestations of widespread systemic oppression. As
Patricia Hill Collins wrote, “[w]hile my individual experiences with
institutionalized racism [as a black woman] will be unique, the types of
opportunities and constraints that I encounter on a daily basis will resemble those
confronting African Americans as a group.”19 As a legal mechanism that
facilitates the aggregation of claims, class actions have incredible potential for
imbuing individual, personal harms with group, political meaning.
Some of the benefits of class actions have long been recognized: they
increase access to the courts, making actions more efficient and cheaper.20
Moreover, there is currently no other practicable way for very large groups to
resolve issues in a single litigation.21 But, as the above discussion illustrates,
16. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 348.
17. As Suzette Malveaux put it in her discussion of Dukes: “There is strength in numbers, especially
when that number is 1.5 million.” Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 35 (2011).
18. On the origins and significance of this phrase, see KERRY T. BURCH, DEMOCRATIC
TRANSFORMATIONS: EIGHTCONFLICTS IN THE NEGOTIATION OFAMERICAN IDENTITY ch. 8 (2012).
19. Patricia Hill Collins, Comment on Hekman’s ‘Truth and Method’: Feminist Standpoint Theory
Revisited’: Where’s the Power?, 22 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE& SOC’Y 375, 375 (1997).
20. Malveaux, supra note 17, at 35. See generally David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts:
Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) (discussing the benefits of class
actions).
21. The federal rules gives federal courts the ability to break up one case into multiple actions “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). A judge faced with
a large group of plaintiffs who were not united as a class would likely exercise this power. Moreover,
even smaller numbers of plaintiffs might struggle to bring collective actions under Rule 20(a)(1), which
allows Permissive Joinder of Parties. Id. 20(a)(1). While there is technically no limit on how many
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class actions are also uniquely able to increase certain plaintiffs’ believability,
and the ability to uncover and provide redress for the institutional dimensions of
discrimination in a single action. By heightening the “commonality” requirement
for class action certification, then, Dukes has not merely decreased access to the
courts in certain cases. It has also made it exponentially more difficult for the
legal system to evaluate and redress claims brought by groups that are negatively
impacted by institutional discrimination.
Part I of this Comment explains howDukes raised the bar that plaintiffs must
meet in order to have “commonality” for the purposes of class certification. Part
II illustrates the stakes of this discussion by describing a class action that would
be barred under Dukes’ heightened commonality standard, and arguing that
alternative legal avenues fail to similarly increase the plaintiffs’ believability and
ability to show the institutional dimensions of bad behavior as much as a class
action. This Part focuses on an ongoing harm committed against a particularly
vulnerable group of women: the federal government’s consistent under-
investigation of sexual assaults against Native American women who live on
reservations. Part III discusses the limited legal avenues for collective
adjudication of gender discrimination claims post-Dukes.
I. BACKGROUND:WAL-MART V. DUKES
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) establishes several prerequisites for
class action certification, one of which is that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.”22 Prior to Dukes, lower courts disagreed over the
application of the commonality requirement in cases where employees claimed
that their employers’ policy of allowing managers to base decisions (such as
hiring or promotion) on their subjective evaluations of employees facilitated or
caused discrimination by allowing managers to abuse their authority.23 The
Supreme Court had last addressed the commonality requirement in General
plaintiffs may join an action under Rule 20(a)(1), in order to join an action as plaintiffs, persons must
demonstrate that they are asserting a right to relief “with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Id.Moreover, even if this standard is met, Rule 20(b)
gives the court the power to order separate trials “to protect a party against embarrassment, delay, expense,
or other prejudice.” Id. 20(b). Most states’ rules parallel the federal rules. Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is
Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002
UTAH L. REV. 249, 261 & n.52.
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). The other requirements are numerosity, typicality, and adequacy. See
id. (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members
only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.”).
23. Daniel S. Klein, Note, Bridging the Falcon Gap: Do Claims of Subjective Decisionmaking in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions Satisfy the Rule 23(a) Commonality and Typicality
Requirements?, 25 REV. LITIG. 131, 133 (2006). But see Clegg, supra note 13, at 1089 (“Prior to [Dukes]
the commonality requirement . . . was not widely debated”).
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Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon.24 In a famous footnote, the Falcon
Court suggested that commonality could be satisfied by “[s]ignificant proof that
an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination . . . [that]
manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion,
such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.”25
Without additional guidance on this notoriously ambiguous footnote,26 the
lower courts split: some courts found that this type of subjective decisionmaking
policy supported a finding of commonality, while others concluded that the
inherently individual application of subjective decisionmaking meant putative
class members could not meet the commonality requirement for allegations of
discriminatory employment practices.27
Wal-Mart v. Dukes entered this contested landscape as the largest
employment class action lawsuit in American history.28 Female employees29
claimed that Wal-Mart’s policy of subjective decisionmaking by individual store
managers denied women equal pay and promotions in violation of Title VII.30
Because Wal-Mart was aware that its policy disadvantaged female employees,
the plaintiffs argued that its refusal to limit managers’ authority constituted
disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Plaintiffs
24. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
25. Id. at 159 n.15.
26. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 23, at 138 (referring to Falcon’s footnote fifteen as “oracular”).
27. Id. at 133-34.
28. Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases
Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 433 (2012).
29. This Comment focuses primarily on the gendered nature of the discrimination against the female
employees in Wal-Mart. However, it is important to acknowledge that this discrimination was facilitated
by the fact that female Wal-Mart employees were disadvantaged along other axes of oppression. For
instance, named plaintiff Betty Dukes, a black woman, was described by her niece upon her death as “a
voice fighting for equal rights and against racial and gender discrimination in the workplace.” Michael
Corkery, Betty Dukes, Greeter Whose Walmart Lawsuit Went to Supreme Court, Dies at 67, N.Y. TIMES
(July 18, 2017) (emphasis added), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/business/betty-dukes-dead-
walmart-worker-led-landmark-class-action-sex-bias-case.html [https://perma.cc/RDX6-YMBX]. Named
plaintiff Cleo Page, also a black woman, described her struggle to remain afloat financially after being
unfairly passed over for promotions in favor of male applicants: without savings, she lost her house and
the foster children for whom she had been caring. Ritu Bhatnagar, Dukes v. Wal-Mart as a Catalyst for
Social Activism, 19 BERKELEYWOMEN’SL.J. 246, 246-47 (2004). Dukes’ and Page’s experiences are not
unique: Wal-Mart workers are overwhelmingly low-income—50 percent of Wal-Mart’s workforce is
composed of part-time workers, who receive lower pay and fewer benefits than full-time workers. Nandita
Bose, Half of Walmart’s Workforce are Part-Time Workers: Labor Group, REUTERS (May 25, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-workers/half-of-walmarts-workforce-are-part-time-workers-
labor-group-idUSKCN1IQ295 [https://perma.cc/RU92-XXLB]. Wal-Mart employees are among the
largest groups on food stamp subsidies. Id.According toWal-Mart, 43 percent of its domestic “associates”
are people of color and 55 percent are women. (Wal-Mart does not break down racial statistics by gender).
WALMART, Road to Inclusion: 2017 Culture, Diversity, and Inclusion Report 10, https://cdn.corporate.
walmart.com/11/0d/f9289df649049a38c14bdeaf2b99/2017-cdi-report-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3D6-7
EZZ].
30. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 343. The Court in Dukes also held that claims where monetary relief is not
incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), id. at 360, but
that portion of the holding is not relevant to this discussion. For more on this aspect of the opinion, see
Malveaux, supra note 17, at 45-52.
31. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 345 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
2018] The Feminist Case Against Individualized Adjudication 407
further claimed that “a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’” was part of what
allowed bias against women to infect managers’ decisionmaking, “thereby
making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory
practice.”32
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, theDukes Court held that the plaintiffs failed
to provide “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operated under a general policy of
discrimination.”33 Plaintiffs had provided the testimony of a sociological expert
that conducted a social framework analysis of Wal-Mart’s culture, but the Court
found the testimony insufficiently robust, and potentially inadmissible.34 The
Court was similarly unconvinced by statistics showing gender disparities in pay
and promotions, as well as 120 affidavits by female Wal-Mart employees
reporting discrimination.35
The Court further reasoned that Wal-Mart’s choice to allow managers’
subjective decisionmaking over employment matters was “just the opposite of a
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a
class action,” since it was “a policy against having uniform employment
practices.”36 Under a subjective decisionmaking system, the Court wrote,
“demonstrating the invalidity of one manager’s use of discretion w[ould] do
nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s,” since each individual
manager was entirely free to make decisions based on (1) sex-neutral
performance-based criteria, (2) general aptitude tests or educational
achievements that produce disparate impact, or (3) intentional discrimination
against women.37 In short, the Court held that “[m]erely showing that Wal-
Mart’s policy of discretion ha[d] produced an overall sex-based disparity” was
insufficient to meet Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.38
In explaining its reasoning, the Court noted that the commonality
requirement is met when
claims . . . depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it
is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.39
32. Id.
33. Id. at 353.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 358. As Malveaux points out, “by analyzing each type of evidence in isolation to determine
whether it provided ‘significant proof’ of a general discriminatory policy, the Court diminished the overall
import of plaintiffs’ evidence.” Malveaux, supra note 17, at 39 (emphasis added). For a critique of the
majority’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ evidence, see id. at 39-43.
36. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 355.
37. Id. at 356.
38. Id. at 357.
39. Id. at 350.
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In other words, class certification depends not on “the raising of common
‘questions,’” but on “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”40 This holding has been
roundly criticized for incorporating the Rule 23(b)(2) “predominance
requirement” into the 23(a)(2) commonality analysis.41
Some commentators have nevertheless interpreted Dukes narrowly as
holding that “a system of delegated decision-making that produces large
statistical disparities cannot furnish the requisite commonality to support a class
action, even where the corporate culture is infected by gender stereotypes.”42
However, the principle that commonality exists only when the outcome of a class
action turns on claims having the same answers (i.e., is “capable of a classwide
resolution”)43 has implications that reach far beyond subjective decisionmaking
class actions.
As Roger Reinsch and Sonia Goltz have noted, Dukes’s heightened
commonality requirement is most likely to negatively impact cases that involve
second-generation discrimination.44 Unlike first-generation discrimination,
which “involves easily recognizable, blatant discrimination,” such as “the
exclusionary sign on the door,”45 second-generation discrimination “cannot be
reduced to a single, universal, or simple theory of discrimination.”46 Second-
generation discrimination is “subtler and involves patterns of interaction that
exclude certain groups over time. . . [It is] structural, situational, and hard to
identify.”47 The company policy the plaintiffs challenged in Dukes is a
“classic”48 example of second-generation discrimination.
It is highly unlikely that Dukes will make cases involving first-generation
discrimination more difficult. Imagine, for instance, a company that sends out a
memo telling all supervisors that women could not be promoted to managerial
positions because they are too emotional. Adjudicating these employees’ claim
of discrimination would clearly involve a common contention the truth or falsity
of which would resolve an issue that is central to each of the claims in one
stroke.49
40. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
41. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 13, at 1105; Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO.
L. J. 759, 794-800 (2012). The dissent also makes this point. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 376.
42. Tippett, supra note 28, at 434.
43 Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 350.
44. Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There From Here: Implications of theWalmart
v. Dukes Decision for Addressing Second-Generation Discrimination, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 264
(2014).
45. Id. at 281 (quoting Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 473 (2011)).
46. Id. at 281.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 at 350.
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Second-generation discrimination is more subtle and likely to manifest in a
variety of different ways, making it unlikely that such claims will meet Dukes’s
stringent commonality standard. And yet, as the next Part argues, it is claims of
second-generation discrimination that benefit most from aggregation. Alone, a
claim of second-generation discrimination can be easily dismissed as caused by
other factors, such as singular bad actors or the existence of larger societal factors
disadvantaging a particular group. However, when numerous claims of second-
generation discrimination are placed together, it becomes clear that the problem
is not only driven by a few bad actors, but also enabled by institutional structures.
II. THE IMPOSSIBLECLASS ACTION
Consider the problem of sexual violence against Native American women
on reservations. According to the Department of Justice, 35 percent of American
Indian and Alaska Native women have experienced sexual violence with
penetration.50 Native women are thus 1.7 times more likely than non-Hispanic
White women to be victims of sexual violence.51 The complicated legal
relationship between the U.S. government and Native tribes means that the task
of prosecuting sexual assaults on reservations typically falls on the federal
government,52 and there is some evidence suggesting that the federal government
systematically under-enforces sexual assault laws on Native American
reservations. Federal prosecutors decline to prosecute 26 percent of cases filed
in federal court, but decline to prosecute sexual assaults against Native women
on tribal reservations 65 percent of the time.53 This is likely because federal
agents are reluctant to take on such cases.54 As former U.S. Attorney Margaret
Chiara observes, Assistant U.S. Attorneys “want to do big drug cases, white-
collar crimes, and conspiracy,” while federal judges “look at these Indian
Country cases and say, ‘What is this doing here? I could have stayed in state
court if I wanted this stuff.’”55
Imagine that Native women who have been victims of rape wish to sue the
federal government for consistently failing to adequately investigate sexual
assault on the reservation in which they live. Such a lawsuit would not be entirely
unprecedented—in Cole v. Oravec, the families of two Native murder victims
sued an FBI investigator for consistently under-investigating murder cases
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., VIOLENCEAGAINSTAMERICAN INDIANANDALASKANATIVEWOMENAND
MEN, 14 TBL. 2.1 (2016).
51. Id.
52. Jasmine Owens, ‘Historic’ in a Bad Way: How the Tribal Law and Order Act Continues the
American Tradition of Providing Inadequate Protection to American Indian and Alaska Native Rape
Victims, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 504-508 (2012).
53. Id. at 512
54. Id. at 511.
55. Id. (quoting Bill Moyers Journal, PBS television broadcast (Nov. 14, 2008) (transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/11142008/transcript4.html [https://perma.cc/T5NE-9MP4]).
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involving Native American victims.56 Because a class action is more efficient
and less expensive than individual lawsuits, the impacted women seek 23(b)(2)
certification.57
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes, it is difficult to see how such
a class could ever be certified. Dukes construes the 23(a)(2) requirement that
there be “questions of law or fact common to the class” extremely narrowly.
Since the women would likely be alleging discriminatory under-investigation by
several officials (much as the women in Dukes alleged employment
discrimination by different supervisors), the class would likely fail the
commonality requirement. In a case such as this, as in Dukes, each official could
argue that their behavior was motivated by permissible (rather than
discriminatory) reasons. Thus, as the Court held in Dukes, a class-wide
proceeding could not generate a “common answer.” 58
Certainly, one of the impacted Native women could file a lawsuit asserting
the same claims against an individual investigator, as occurred in Oravec.
However, the focus of the trial would center on the decisionmaking of the
specific federal investigator that investigated the woman’s claim. Such a case
likely would not bring to light any evidence that the federal government as an
institution consistently fails to adequately investigate and prosecute sexual
assault on Native American reservations.
Sexual assaults against Native women in the U.S. have been committed with
impunity for centuries, and there is great historical significance in “the ongoing
rape [of Native women] and [the] colonization of their tribes.”59 One lawsuit
against a single federal prosecutor for failing to pursue a Native woman’s rape
case can be dismissed as an isolated instance of discrimination, or as justified by
the facts of that woman’s assault. In contrast, a class action lawsuit brought by
Native women against the federal government would not only make the problem
of systematic under-enforcement of their sexual assaults impossible to ignore,
but also situate this problem within the broader history of American exploitation
of and violence towards Native tribes.
By privileging individual over group adjudication, Dukes’ heightened
commonality requirement has stripped class actions of much of this symbolic
potential, and reduced their ability to hold institutions (rather than merely
individuals) accountable for discriminatory conduct. Thus, Dukes greatly
56. 465 Fed. Appx. 687 (9th Cir. 2012). The suit was a Bivens action seeking damages for equal
protection violations under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. at 688. For a detailed description
of the case, see Adrian Jawort, Parents in Crow Reservation Death Still Seeking Justice, LASTBESTNEWS
(Jan. 19, 2017), http://lastbestnews.com/2017/01/parents-in-crow-reservation-death-still-seeking-justice/
[https://perma.cc/GY2P-YYB9].
57. Their attorney decides the predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) is best avoided—if the
class action is won, monetary damages can be sought on a case-by-case basis.
58. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
59. Owens, supra note 52, at 503.
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abridged one mechanism through which marginalized groups could assert their
rights, limiting the degree to which collective storytelling can challenge the
“normal,” “objective,” “individualistic” focus of adjudication.
III. MOVING FORWARD: OPTIONS FORCOLLECTIVEADJUDICATION POST-
DUKES
Commentators are split on the real-world impact of Dukes. On the one hand,
Title VII “pattern or practice claims” like that brought in Dukes can still be
brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is exempt
from class action certification requirements.60 Moreover, class actions the size
ofDukes are extremely rare.61On the other hand, the plaintiffs’ theory of liability
inDukes is fairly common, raising concerns that judges may useDukes to require
“a stronger causal connection between an employer’s discretionary
decisionmaking policy and a disparity or adverse employment action,” making
it more difficult for employees relying on this theory to act collectively.62
While Dukes would seem to make it quite difficult to seek redress based on
the discretionary actions of multiple individuals within an organization,63 not all
hope is lost. For one, some courts have read the case fairly narrowly.
Approximately 2,000 plaintiffs alleging gender discrimination in pay and
promotions at Goldman Sachs were recently awarded partial class certification.64
District Judge Analisa Torres distinguished Dukes because that case lacked a
“common . . . evaluation procedure” used to discriminate against the plaintiffs,65
whereas the Goldman Sachs plaintiffs were all subject to common “360 review,”
“quartiling,” and “cross-ruffing” evaluation processes.66
Moreover, multiple plaintiffs remain able to hold institutions accountable,
though to a lesser degree. In the #MeToo context, three women have filed a class
action suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Harvey
60. See e.g., Tippett, supra note 28, at 443 (explaining that Title VII “pattern or practice claims” like
that brought in Dukes can still be brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is
exempt from class action certification requirements). But see Malveaux, supra note 17, at 37 (noting that
“government agencies—burdened by budgetary and political constraints—often cannot fill the gap left by
the lack of private enforcement”).
61. Malveaux, supra note 17, at 44.
62. Id. at 44-45.
63. See supra Parts I & II.
64. Chen-Oster et al. v. Goldman Sachs & Co. et al., No. 10 Civ. 6950 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018),
available at http://goldmangendercase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Dkt_578-OPINION-AND-ORD
ER.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWG2-5WP9]; see also Jonathan Stempel,U.S. Judge Certifies Goldman Sachs
Gender Bias Class Action, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldman-sachs-
bias-lawsuit/u-s-judge-certifies-goldman-sachs-gender-bias-class-action-idUSKBN1H61SN [https://per
ma.cc/WEN8-VKNE].
65. Chen-Oster, No. 10 Civ. 6950 at 26.
66. Id. at 27.
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Weinstein and the company he owned, Miramax.67 Because the complaint
primarily brings claims against the company for knowingly enabling a single bad
actor, it poses a question that determines the claims of all class members: namely,
what did Miramax executives know about Weinstein’s actions, and when did
they acquire this knowledge? Thus, this class action likely does meet the Dukes
standard.
All in all, then, avenues for change remain open for those seeking to
challenge institutional discrimination. Even in the wake ofDukes, there are non-
legal mechanisms through which institutions can be held accountable for
discriminatory conduct. Google recently ended its practice of forced arbitration
for claims of sexual harassment or assault after 20,000 employees walked out in
protest.68 However, Dukes’s prioritization of individualized adjudication has
come at a cost. Those who seek to bring claims of second-generation
discrimination against institutions have lost some of the key benefits of a class
action—increases in efficiency, access to the courts, believability, and the ability
to prove institutional dimension of discrimination.
67. Harvey Weinstein Faces New Rape Accusation in Class Action Lawsuit, GUARDIAN (June 1,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/jun/01/harvey-weinstein-accusation-lawsuit-latest [https:
//perma.cc/S6QQ-EP9T].
68. Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy After
Employee Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/technology/google
-arbitration-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/K3L8-TYU9].
